Unbounded Loyalty

Frontier Crossings in Liao China

NAOMI STANDEN

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Naomi Standen

University of Hawai'i Press
Honolulu

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Printed in

12 11 10 09 08 07 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Standen, Naomi, 1965–
Unbounded loyalty : frontier crossings in Liao China / Naomi Standen.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8248-2983-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN-10 0-8248-2983-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. China—History—Liao dynasty, 947–1125. 2. China—Boundaries—History. 3. Ethnicity—China—History—To 1500. I. Title. II. Title: Frontier crossings in Liao China.
DS751.74.S73 2007
911'.5109021—dc22
2006022251

University of Hawai‘i Press books are printed on
acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence
and durability of the Council on Library Resources

Designed by University of Hawai‘i Press production staff
Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group

For Sam and Zoë,
This is what Mum does at work

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Preface

This book is an attempt to portray a world made alien partly by distance, but mostly by history. It is primarily about choices: choices of allegiance, choices of identity, choices of interpretation, the choices people make to negotiate turbulent times. It attempts to define the parameters within which a particular set of people made particular choices, and to investigate what influences those choices, in turn, had on the evolution of the parameters within which the next choices would be made. And it traces changing interpretations of these choices in the sources, primarily as a method for extracting hints about tenth-century circumstances from materials mostly written centuries after the events.

Presented here are the results of research that started out very differently. My original doctoral topic of frontier crossers developed into a thesis about the creation of what I would now call a border, which then necessitated a rethinking of several important assumptions before it could take the present form. In the course of (seemingly endless) rewriting, my new assumptions, unavoidably, had to be woven back into every part of the book. Accordingly, the finished work starts at the end of my own process, and as such is not an explanation of how I got there, but an invitation to make the journey again wearing a different set of spectacles, speaking a different language, and attuned for a different set of observations.

A journey was also what sparked my fascination with frontiers. In the early 1980s, cycling through an Eastern Europe still under the shadow of the Cold War, I observed at close quarters the multitudinous and paradoxical workings of frontiers and borders. I noticed that the Berlin Wall was to keep the East Germans *in,* and that the fiercest barriers were at the Austria-Hungary border, crossed freely in both directions every day. On country roads, borders were marked by simple checkpoints with not a fence in sight, and dramatic changes in the landscape were better signs of entering a new country, as when the small fields and hay stooks of Czechoslovakia gave way to Hungarian fields so big the roads ran through and not around them. Meanwhile, in

Poland, the bright, new copper roofs of the churches declared the population's allegiance to Catholicism above all. That trip introduced me to the practical concerns of *living* the frontier: how is it defined, deployed, subverted, or ignored by the local inhabitants? What role, if any, do central governments play in this relationship? Why is frontier crossing, in its various forms, such an arena for struggle between governments and locals?

In the field of Chinese history questions like these are now allowing us to make some inroads into fresh understandings of frontier issues. In the too many years since I started this research, the concept of sinicization has gone from bugbear to nonissue, from the knife in the table represented by Pamela Crossley's 1990 essay "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," to Sudipta Sen's announcement of the death of the assimilationist model in the *Journal of Asian Studies* in 2002. In that time ethnicity has become the chief route out of the discourse of sinicization, but now ethnicity itself is in question as a framework—at least for the premodern period—and here I try to offer alternative categories of analysis, better suited to a world where ethnicity was not conceivable as a way of organizing the world.

There are, of course, too many debts to mention, so only a few can feature here. Jinty Nelson taught me how fascinating chronicles are, and how to read them. Anne Duggan did her best to make my prose bearable. Herbert Franke was deeply encouraging about Classical Chinese. Like many others, I benefited from the patient and persistent support of Denis Twitchett. His generous encouragement will be greatly missed. Pamela Crossley has been by turns inspiration, supporter, essential critic, and conscience. My colleagues at the University of Wisconsin at Superior and at Newcastle have provided warm and supportive working environments, complete with interested students.

The original research for this book was completed with the assistance of a predoctoral fellowship from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange in Taiwan. Subsequent jobs, fellowships, and conference invitations have mostly been taken as opportunities to explore other angles and related topics rather than working on this manuscript, from which delaying tactics I can only hope it has benefited, however belatedly. Thanks here go to Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, and especially to Nicola Di Cosmo for his forbearance at a crucial moment. I hope the final appearance of this volume will be some recompense. On a different note, a subvention from the Universities' China Committee in London has kept down the cost of the book.

Nicola Di Cosmo and Pamela Crossley read the manuscript for the Press (Pamela for the second time). I have tried to take full account of their helpful

comments, although I have not here been able to take all their stimulating suggestions as far as they need to go. Yuri Pines and Andrew Chittick discussed loyalty at important junctures and forced me to sharpen up my ideas. Kevin Greene, Graeme Milne, Bob Moore, and Sam Turner read what is now the Introduction and Chapter 1 in a more formless state. Alison Hardie was a second eye on the translations, Tim Kirk suggested the title, Peter Lorge offered a useful criticism at the eleventh hour. Mike has pored over every draft, and will doubtless be glad that now he'll be getting something different to read. Pat Crosby at the University of Hawai'i Press has been all an editor should be and more, for which I offer her more than ordinary thanks. It has also been a pleasure to work with Margaret Black. All of these people have helped me to improve what follows, but of course none of them is in any way responsible for the faults.

My family have to put up with a lot, and writing this book hasn't helped. I might have finished it earlier if they hadn't expected me to have weekends off and be home for dinner, but without that insistence—not to mention their love, patience, and chaos—I doubt I would have finished it at all.

Newcastle upon Tyne
March 2006

Introduction

The reality of China as it exists today is impossible to ignore. But that should not lead us to imagine that China—or its borders—were a historical inevitability. When An Lushan rebelled against the Tang dynasty in 755, the Chinese empire fell apart.[1] We know that eventually—over two centuries later—another Chinese empire came into being. Hindsight feeds neatly into the modern narrative of nationalism, and together they impel us to seek the origins of what is generally called the *re*unification of some implicitly indestructible entity called "China."[2] But in fact, during those two hundred years following An Lushan's rebellion—and perhaps for another half-century after that—nobody knew that a Chinese empire would ever again be the dominant power in East Asia. This book is an exploration of the latter part of that period, a moment when "China" as we know it was not inevitable, when East Asia might conceivably have remained, like Europe, a congeries of competing states.[3]

Instead, what happened in East Asia was the emergence of a borderline out of a borderland. In the century between the death throes of the Tang (618–907) and the treaty of Shanyuan in 1005, a sharply defined border developed between the two states of Liao (907–1125) and (Northern) Song (960–1126).[4] The end of this process saw imperial order beginning to be established in a form that was to remain familiar in its fundamentals for much of the late imperial period, but the process began in the radically different world of the late Tang and Five Dynasties (907–960), when multiple power centers within the same territory interacted on an entirely different basis. An account of this change provides a case study of some of the ways in which borders and boundaries functioned before the invention of the nation-state and the development of the narrative of nationalism. I attempt here to describe a world in which the categories available to order experience and think about choices were fundamentally unlike those familiar to modern readers. In doing this, it is important to treat the borderland not merely as part of some larger whole, but as an object of study in its own right.[5]

One way into these issues is provided by over two hundred cases (listed in the Appendix) of people who began their lives under regimes based south of the notional line of the Great Wall, but who subsequently became subjects of the Liao regime based to the north. Many of these people were officials or soldiers who transferred their service from southern to northern masters. As the tenth century began, central authority had broken down, to be replaced with a plethora of leaders, lords, and rulers of various kinds, a situation that had been sporadic since An Lushan's rebellion (755–763), and endemic since Huang Chao's (875–884). Even those claiming royal or imperial status were in no position to demarcate borderlines or negotiate arrangements for frontier institutions (like markets), nor to dictate their will to frontier leaders who frequently controlled their own armies and sources of income. In these circumstances the ability of leaders and rulers to exercise authority depended chiefly on their capacity to attract followers (whether by coercion or persuasion) and win their fidelity, giving such servitors an influence over wider events unknown in times of internal stability.[6]

Servitors thus had genuine options. From their point of view, there was no guarantee that one's lord of the morning would last the night, and officials and soldiers frequently had to choose whether to remain loyal to their current master or switch their allegiance to a new one. During the first half of the tenth century it was these on-the-spot decisions of individuals that were the chief or only factors governing the location and functioning of borders and boundaries. But by the first years of the eleventh century a pair of emperors—Liao and Song, Kitan and Chinese, longstanding military antagonists—wielded enough authority within their own realms to be able to demarcate a borderline between them in full confidence that their officials would adhere to what had been determined at court. Such changes in the nature of this frontier are revealed in the lives of those below the status of emperor who started by making borders and ended by observing them. The varied relationships between people and frontiers, as seen in the choices people made regarding their allegiances, are the chief matter of this book.

These choices have been valued differently at different times. Thanks to the famous tirade against those who changed allegiance in the Five Dynasties, written by Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) and developed further by Sima Guang (1019–1086), this period has been generally regarded as one of renegades, turncoats, and even traitors.[7] This view rests upon the application to tenth-century people and circumstances of moral standards formulated in the eleventh century as ethical strictures began to harden, revised in the late imperial period, and again in modern times. These later standards assume that political borderlines are clear-cut, that these correlate unprob-

lematically with boundaries of identity and allegiance, and accordingly that frontier crossing is deviant.[8] When these anachronistic criteria are thrust back on the past, the frontier crossers of the tenth century are denied choice, and must be either condemned or excused. Even the most positive interpretations of their behavior are presented in terms of mitigating circumstances, which, by offering apologies for frontier crossing, implicitly confirm its dubious morality.[9] This framework leaves no scope for treating the choices and actions of frontier crossers as normal behavior, that may invite explanation but requires no justification.

Problems with approaches to the Tang-Song transition

Some issues raised by the use of post-tenth-century understandings of political units, identities, and allegiance are discussed in Chapter 1, but the assumptions underlying the standard portrayal of tenth-century frontier crossers begin with an oddly inconsistent view of the wider context of the Tang-Song transition and neglect the role and significance of the Liao in tenth-century history.

The tenth century

The tenth century forms a crucial portion of the Tang-Song transition, sometimes regarded as the most significant turning point in the history of imperial China.[10] The Tang-Song transition is generally held to begin with An Lushan's rebellion in the mid-eighth century. Over the next two or three hundred years, the culturally inclusive, territorially expansive, northwest-orientated, aristocratic Tang empire, that dominated East Asia even in decline, was transformed. By the middle of the eleventh century there was instead a culturally normative, territorially concentrated, southerly orientated, socially mobile Song state that was forced to accept an interstate system in which no single power held primacy.[11] However, the way the wider period has been conceptualized does not permit satisfactory explanations of either the tenth century or of frontier crossing. The greatest concern has been to explain how we get *to* the Song rather than how we get *from* the Tang. That is, scholars have chiefly sought the Tang (or earlier) origins of phenomena that characterize the Song, and have paid much less attention to considering what happened, under later regimes, to phenomena characteristic of the Tang. Hence the Liao have been considered as the enemy and equal of the Song in the later tenth century, but their political dominance during the century as a whole, and their concomitant role in shaping the post-Tang world, has been marginalized.

TABLE 1. Rulers of Liao, Five Dynasties, and Song, with the Ten Kingdoms

Liao		Date	Southern regimes		Ten Kingdoms	
PERSONAL NAME	TEMPLE NAME		PERSONAL NAME	TEMPLE NAME	REGIME	DATE
			TANG			
		888		Zhaozong		
		904		Aidi	Wu	902–937
			LATER LIANG			
Abaoji	Taizu	907	Zhu Wen	Taizu	Former Shu	907–925
		913	Zhu Yougui	none	Wuyue	907–978
		913	Zhu Youzhen	Modi	Min	909–945
					Southern Han	917–971
			LATER TANG			
		923	Li Cunxu	Zhuangzong	Nanping/Jingnan	924–963
Deguang	Taizong	926	Li Siyuan	Mingzong	Chu	927–951
		933	Li Conghou	Mindi		
		934	Li Congke	Modi		
			LATER JIN			
		936	Shi Jingtang	Gaozu	Later Shu	934–965
		942	Shi Chonggui	Chudi	Southern Tang	937–975
			LATER HAN			
Wuyu	Shizong	947	Liu Zhiyuan	Gaozu		
		948	Liu Chengyou	Yindi		
			LATER ZHOU			
Yelü Jing	Muzong	951	Guo Wei	Taizu	Northern Han	951–979
		954	Guo Rong	Shizong		
		959	Guo Zongxun	Gongdi		
			NORTHERN SONG			
		960	Zhao Kuangyin	Taizu		
Yelü Xian	Jingzong	969				
		976	Zhao Kuangyi	Taizong		
Yelü Longxu	Shengzong	982				
		997	Zhao Dechang	Zhenzong		
		1022	Zhao Zhen	Renzong		
Yelü Zongzhen	Xingzong	1031				

In the crucial period of the tenth century, the Tang empire fragmented into a sequence of five short-lived dynasties north of the River Huai (see Table 1) and ten chronologically overlapping kingdoms to the south and west. These kingdoms concern us little but for Northern Han (951–979) in Shanxi (then called Hedong).[12] It should be no surprise, then, that the dominant power in Northeast Asia for most of this period was none of these, but rather the Liao dynasty, founded in 907 by Kitan pastoralists and based in the region known to modern times as Manchuria. During the 950s the last rulers of the Five Dynasties began the conquest of the Ten Kingdoms that was completed by the first two Song emperors, Zhao Kuangyin (Taizu, 960–976) and Zhao Kuangyi (Taizong, 976–997). These conquests included limited warfare with the Liao, but from the 980s Liao and Song clashed in earnest, fighting each other to a standstill over two decades before concluding the treaty at Shanyuan in 1005 that prevented further war between them for over a century.

Despite the centrality of the tenth century in the Tang-Song transition, it is rarely treated in any detail. Scholars of the Transition have given most attention to social and economic issues, even though the sources are grudging with systematic information on these topics, and tend to enforce a focus on the Tang up to the mid-ninth century and the Song starting from the early eleventh century, with little detailed analysis of the tenth century itself.[13] Although there are more materials for intellectual history, this topic often labors under similar chronological constraints, however unwillingly.[14] Having said that, the recent revivals of interest in the imperial clan and in military history do sometimes address the early Song and even the Later Zhou.[15]

Those who do focus on the tenth century itself rarely treat it as a whole. It is generally split at some point mid-century—947, 950, and 960 are common choices—and, at least until the Song unification, between the regions north and south of the River Huai. Although war and politics dominate the written record for this century, modern historians have spent little time on such matters.[16] Meanwhile, the southward shift of the Song court and lettered elites from the early twelfth century (Southern Song, 1127–1276) has meant better survival for material from south of the Huai, with the result that the north has been generally less studied in comparison to the steady flow of research on the south, and Fujian in particular.[17] The materials that do survive for the tenth century in the north have been used largely for studies of governmental institutions.[18]

This fragmented study of the tenth century has provided valuable analyses of developments north and south up to mid-century, but starting from

mid-century chiefly for the south. The thread of continuity for the entire tenth century and beyond is the Liao, which is generally treated quite separately, if at all.

The Liao

The brief survey above indicates the extent to which the mid-imperial transition has been considered almost entirely from the Song, or more broadly, Chinese, point of view. Despite the Liao's dominance of the region politically and later religiously, they have rarely been studied in their own right, or taken seriously until they confront the Song near the end of the tenth century.[19] Before then they are generally referred to as the Kitan, an ethnic designation that carries unspoken, but subtly powerful, connotations.[20] The secondary literature's use of "Kitan" for most of the tenth century positions them as a people rather than a political regime, implying that they are stateless and so denying them the political status they actually had. Among the Song themselves, after the conclusion of the treaty of Shanyuan in 1005, there were those who sought to retain "Kitan" as the formal designation of their counterpart in place of the new term "Northern Court" precisely because the latter conveyed an uncomfortable sense of equality.[21] Speaking of the "Kitan" brackets them with tribal groups like the Xi, Tuyuhun, Shiwei, Dilie, and a host of others, none of which formed recognizable states, or at best with the Turkish and Uighur empires, whose lack of an acknowledged dynastic name places them outside, and in implied and necessary opposition to, the Chinese cultural sphere.[22]

The Liao, of course, is generally regarded as the first of the "conquest dynasties," being followed (and conquered) by the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234), who were in turn conquered by the Mongols who established the Yuan dynasty (1260–1368). All three confronted the Song dynasties and have tended to be studied largely in association with the Song as a whole, as enemies, rivals, and partners in cultural exchange. Grouping the three together assumes that they shared certain similarities. Thus where the Liao are discussed at all, it is frequently in tandem with the Jin or (less often) the Yuan, so that, for instance, even the best of the several recent histories dealing with Inner Asia have routinely linked the Liao with the Jin as conquerors of China.[23] Bracketed with Jin and Yuan, the role of the Liao as non-Chinese, "barbarian" conquerors has been to play the foil to the Song.[24]

Although it is recognized that the three conquest dynasties exhibited marked differences from each other, there is a great need for some actual research into such issues.[25] Even at the crudest level we may note that whereas the Jin overlapped entirely with one or another incarnation of the Song, the

Liao started fifty years before the Song. But in the compilation of dynastic chronologies the Liao are rarely placed anywhere but *after* the Song, which they predate, so that they can be located with the "other conquerors." This goes unremarked upon because Europhone research on the Liao has tended away from the early period in favor of a focus on Liao relations with its Song antagonist, chiefly from the treaty of Shanyuan onwards.[26] Chinese historical research on the Liao is becoming more varied, but remains tiny in volume.[27]

As a consequence, the first century of Liao rule—and accordingly its relations with the Five Dynasties—rather disappears from consideration.[28] Even when there was a flurry of Chinese work in the 1980s on early Liao relations with the Five Dynasties, the conceptual framework of the conquest dynasties made it easy to interpret these interactions as simply prefiguring Song-Liao (or Song-Jin or Song-Mongol/Yuan) relations between the Chinese regime and its alien enemy intent on conquest.[29] There has been, then, a circularity to the way the Liao have been studied that has reinforced their status and presumed inclinations as a conquest dynasty.

Classifying the Liao as a conquest dynasty carries the unexamined presumption that the regime aimed to conquer China, but acquiring lands within the line of the Great Wall does not appear to have been a deliberate strategy and did not impel military action. The Sixteen Prefectures (or Yan-Yun region) promised in 936 (with registers handed over in 938) are the ostensible conquest, but were in fact a payment from a challenger of court authority in return for indispensable Liao help in overthrowing the sitting Five Dynasties emperor. The sources disagree as to whether the Liao occupied Yan and Yun opportunistically during the campaign and so created a fait accompli, or whether they were the prize offered in advance to win Liao intervention. Either way, the region had not been seriously sought by the Liao before and it was not fought over, save for one encirclement lasting a maximum of four days.[30] The Liao did conquer the Later Jin in 947 after three seasons of determined fighting, but this episode was famously brief, lasting less than five months.

This lack of conquest in a conquest dynasty is usually explained by the argument that the Liao really wanted to conquer but were unsuccessful. However, this relies on two assumptions; first, that all of the many recorded Kitan raids on the Five Dynasties and Song were automatically part of a wider strategy of territorial encroachment, and second, that Chinese rallied against the 947 conquest and drove out the alien occupiers. In fact, there were many reasons for raids, they could head north from the Five Dynasties and Song as well as south from Liao, and they were not all directed by a court. Raids were often part of normal border interaction and were not necessarily a manifestation of

court-on-court warfare. Meanwhile, the evidence for the Liao-Jin war and 947 occupation suggests that the Liao ruler Deguang (Taizong, 926–947) never intended to stay in the south. He began to withdraw his troops *before* the locals began acting against the garrison leaders, apparently in response to requests from his own generals.[31] Recent reinterpretations of the second half of the century (to 1005) similarly argue that the Liao were disinclined to conquer the Later Zhou or Song, fighting only in defense of prosperous lands that by then had been theirs for decades.[32]

The Liao, then, are quite unlike the Jin or the Yuan on this central issue of expansion south of the line of the Wall, though parallels do remain, of course. To take just two important examples, the Liao did rule a sizeable population drawn from Tang and Five Dynasties administrative districts, whether inhabitants of the Sixteen Prefectures, people seized in Abaoji's massive raids before 907, or refugees from the chaos of the late Tang and early Five Dynasties. And they did establish models of dual administration for the management of their economically mixed empire that were borrowed by subsequent dynasties that *did* take up permanent occupation south of the line of the Wall. Yet the context was completely different for the Liao than it was for the Jin and the Mongols, and that was of the greatest significance.

The Liao emerged, crucially, from the wreckage of the Tang dynasty, and their first ruler, Abaoji (Taizu, 907–926), "ascended the imperial throne" in 907 at the same time that others were making similar claims within the line of the Great Wall.[33] Scholars have been properly suspicious of this coincidental timing, but it can be seen as a natural consequence of the collapse of a great dynasty that claimed authority over lands and peoples extending far to the north and west of its heartlands, in which outposts a residual influence continued to be felt, for instance, in matters of protocol and conciliar styles of rule. If we see the Liao as one—indeed, the most politically successful—of the many successor states to the Tang, it makes perfect sense for it to begin as the Tang ends.[34] The Liao were as much a product of the late Tang as were the Five Dynasties, and it is this that makes them different in kind from the later conquest dynasties.

For the first half-century of its existence, the Liao regime was not in competition with any other major state. It held supremacy among at least the eastern Inner Asian peoples, while the regimes to its south sought accommodation or peaceful relations, or even acknowledged Liao overlordship, until the beginnings of expansion under Guo Rong (Shizong, 954–959) of the Later Zhou. The Liao was established out of near political vacuum and faced little opposition to achieving a position of unequivocal power. The early rulers could expand their authority and develop new and modified systems of

internal control without distraction from serious external challenge. They could coexist with their neighbors because their neighbors were not a threat. Their preeminent position in the borderlands—which also included the Five Dynasties regimes—meant that the Liao necessarily played a significant role in shaping the tenth-century transformation and determining the character of the post-Tang world.

By contrast, the Jin and the Mongols both began as pretenders muscling in on reasonably stable relationships between pairs of states abiding in a balance of power, whether Liao and Song after 1005, or Jin and Song after 1142 (or, including the Tangut state of Xia, between them and Song after 1044). Both Jin and Mongols arose in opposition to well-established, strong states operating within a well-tried interstate system. While coexistence was not impossible, it could only be achieved by determining, militarily, a suitable demarcation of authority measured out territorially. To gain their place in the sun, the Jin and the Mongols had to fight for recognition as the political equals of their neighbors. But, unlike the tenth-century Liao, they could no longer shape the system in which they operated at a fundamental level; modifications were possible, but the basic pattern had already been set for them, and the Liao had been major contributors to creating that pattern.

So neither the Liao nor the tenth century fit readily within the historical narratives in which they are normally placed. In particular, a wedge is driven between the Five Dynasties and Liao by assuming their opposition in anticipation of the outcomes of the eleventh century and beyond. The Five Dynasties are cast as "Chinese" (even though three of the five were led by Shatuo Turkish families) resisting the inevitable predations of the "barbarian" Kitan.[35] But if we set aside our expectations, we may see patterns that do not easily fall into the conquest-dynasties rubric, but which suggest, rather, that it might be fruitful to consider both the Liao and Five Dynasties together, seeing north China, in Pamela Crossley's phrase, "as part of an Inner Asian continuum."[36] To do this we also have to study the period of the tenth century as an entity in its own right—not simply as a sad and degenerate coda to the Tang or a chaotic preliminary to the Song—but analytically distinct. We have to be able to trace changes without confusion from categories developed for later times that may be ill-fitting impositions. We cannot hope to understand transitional eras adequately if we presuppose the answers.

In order to understand the choices of tenth-century frontier people, we first need to reconsider the concepts of borders, ethnicity, and loyalty that frame modern interpretations of frontier crossing. Accordingly, Chapter 1 sets out a revised vocabulary for discussing the choices and actions of frontier crossers, separating territory from allegiances, and rejecting ethnicity as

the mainspring for choice in favor of loyalty. The final piece of the tool kit is a methodology of historiographical comparison that turns problematical sources to advantage.

Loyalty is central to the analysis offered here, but we know remarkably little about what it may have meant in the tenth century. Chapter 2 therefore examines the development of ideas of loyalty, or *zhong,* from their origins to their radical redefinition by the historians of the eleventh century. By the early tenth century many different interpretations of *zhong* were available to condition choices made in turbulent times, but a century later the development of a new political formation—two equal and opposing states rather than one hegemonic empire—had begun to narrow the options dramatically. Chapter 3 will then consider the practice of loyalty by tracing the relationship between allegiance and borderlines from around 900 until the conclusion of the treaty of Shanyuan in 1005. From this it will become apparent that we are dealing with a number of different borders and boundaries, which do not necessarily coincide.

The task then is to try to show how different borders and boundaries interweave and interact over time, and how these relationships affect, and are shaped by, the choices of individual human beings. And at all times we have to keep in mind the influence of the recorders upon our picture of the tenth-century world. In the five case studies comprising Chapters 4 to 6 the issues can be seen in human terms, at the level of individual choices.

Four of our five subjects served together at the Liao court. Han Yanhui (882–959) was the earliest arrival in Liao, and was joined in 936 by Zhang Li (d. 947) and Zhao Yanshou (d. 948/9). All three would have met Li Huan (d. 962) on the journey back to the North after the Liao conquest of 947. Li Huan and Han Yanhui then served in the same court until Han Yanhui's retirement. These four were not all the same age. Zhang Li seems to be about a decade younger than Han Yanhui, and Zhao Yanshou was probably a decade younger again. Li Huan may have been about the same age as Zhao Yanshou, but it is difficult to be sure. Finally, Wang Jizhong (d. 1022) comes from an entirely different generation, for he must have been no younger than his late twenties by the time of his capture in 1003.

Joining the Liao regime in its founding period in the first years of the tenth century, Han Yanhui made important contributions to establishing the institutions of a Chinese-style state and seemed entirely unconcerned about issues of cultural identity. In Chapter 4 his choices are compared with Zhang Li's, who also moved between nascent states, but in the South. Han Yanhui's concern to find secure employment follows one interpretation of *zhong,* while Zhang Li's filial piety appears to follow quite another.

Both changed their master more than once, and their behavior was considered normal at the time.

Zhang Li's tale subsequently intertwines with that of Zhao Yanshou in Chapter 5, after both crossed to Liao in the 930s. Zhang once tried to escape from Liao back to the South, while Zhao led Liao armies against the Later Jin (936–947). Their stories give a particularly detailed picture of the pressures and attractions of Liao service for those with more or less political power. The changing political situation, to which they contributed, put their loyalties in question and so made their choices more problematical than those of Han Yanhui and the young Zhang Li.

In Chapter 6 we see how loyalty was redefined as two major states developed in opposition to each other. Li Huan was taken north following the Liao conquest of the Later Jin in 947. Unlike his earlier counterparts, Li acted against the Liao, seemingly because he retained an attachment to his home in the South, but perhaps out of opportunism. His actions may suggest a change that we see completed in the case of the Song general Wang Jizhong. Captured by the Liao, he negotiated the treaty of Shanyuan on their behalf, but was unable to fulfill his deepest wish to return to Song. Whereas a century earlier rulers competed for the loyalties of every individual official, now an emperor could sacrifice the loyalty of an individual to the more important goal of maintaining a working peace treaty. We see that Li Huan exercised choices that Wang Jizhong was apparently unwilling to contemplate.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the stages by which the meanings of *zhong* changed through the tenth century and in the historiography of the period and discusses some of the implications for our understanding of territoriality, identity, and morality, and the relationships between them, before the eleventh century. These, in turn, may allow us to reflect further on our frameworks for analysis, and in particular on the impact of the narrative of nationalism, not just on how we explain periods of (arguably) nascent modernity (such as the Qing dynasty), but also on our interpretations of undisputedly premodern times. For these times much work remains to be done to elucidate the categories that were meaningful to contemporaries, in comparison with those that are important to ourselves. It is in that comparison that we may grow in understanding.

This book offers an alternative reading of the tenth century by consciously starting out from a different, and explicit, set of assumptions. We are well aware that our imagining of our world and how it works in the first years of the twenty-first century may not have been shared by our predecessors on the planet. In establishing the assumptions used here before applying them to empirical evidence, I have tried to identify the set of possibilities existing

for the people under examination. Accordingly, I offer a new route through the data at our disposal. My interpretation of these events, choices, and processes may help to suggest possibilities for seeing Chinese imperial history before the Song in different ways. Those who disagree with either assumptions or conclusions may at least be moved to consider what starting points might be preferable.

PART I

Borders, Boundaries, and Frontier Crossers

Concepts and Background

CHAPTER 1

You Can't Get There from Here

Rethinking Categories

> Historical consciousness in modern society has been overwhelmingly framed by the nation-state.
>
> —Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing history from the nation*

> . . . rulers, generals, clerics, and statesmen probably did not frame the pressing issues of their day in such a fashion.
>
> —Ruth Dunnell, *The Great State of White and High*

There are surely many issues whose definition according to later terms hinders our understanding of the tenth century, but those relevant to this study may be placed under three headings. First, *borders:* here research questions have tended to focus on why the Song were unable to be the expansive empire that the Tang had been. Were the Song—and by extension the Five Dynasties —weak or strong in relation to their neighbors? More immediately, how could the Song—and the Five Dynasties—keep out the conquerors from the north, starting with the Liao? Second, *ethnicity:* scholars have noted a strong strand of ethnocentrism and irredentism in the post-Shanyuan Song dynasty, concerns that are read back into the tenth century chiefly as assumptions that these tendencies had direct antecedents in that period. The question then becomes: to what extent did ethnic consciousness develop during the Five Dynasties?[1] Third, *loyalty:* why were so many Five Dynasties people willing to change sides so often when the latter parts of both Northern and Southern Song are famous for their loyalists? Were Five Dynasties people morally bankrupt, ethnic turncoats, or seeking to civilize the barbarians? To what extent were their actions responsible for permitting the development of alien challenges to the Song?

Each of these issues is defined by post-Shanyuan standards that continue to resonate in the modern period or, perhaps we would do better to say, by modern standards whose roots have been sought in the Song. As Arif Dirlik

has noted, "the most important question guiding the rewriting of the past are [*sic*] identity needs of the present."[2] Hoyt Tillman sets out these standards for the twelfth century and the modern period alike as "consciousness of Chinese 'we feeling,' loyalty to the Chinese dynastic state, and practical proposals to empower the state to expel alien invaders."[3] As Tillman notes, these categories of ethnicity, loyalty, and borders, respectively, derive from the concept of nationalism, a notion that can be a major obstacle to understanding periods of transition and fluidity like the tenth century, and which is increasingly critiqued.[4]

The categories of nationalism

The basic theory of nationalism, as it has developed from its nineteenth-century origins, generally sees *border*s as defining a particular territory for a self-governing state that is the equal of other similar states, inhabited by at least a core population that is *ethnically coherent* whether by descent or construction, whose cultural nexus is dominant within the state, and which is prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of a *loyalty* to the state that ranks at or near the top of individuals' hierarchies of loyalties. Seeking to establish the extent to which the theory of nationalism can help us to understand Song China, modern scholars have accordingly identified tendencies such as Chen Liang's explicitly territorial view of the Song state, an ethnocentric assumption that China is forever encroached upon by barbarians, and the division of officials into patriots or capitulationists.[5]

Most analyses, however, are not so explicit about their use of nationalist categories. They are nevertheless underpinned by a dominant narrative of division and unification that presupposes the continuous existence of an essentialized, national "China" that not only has ideological and cultural dimensions, but also a piece of land eternally proper to it ("China Proper," indeed). This narrative embraces the whole of "Chinese" history, and is revealed in the terminology commonly used. Qin Shihuang is described as the "first unifier of China," implying that unification is "China's" natural condition and that the pre-imperial states were just waiting for him to come along. The Han expansion is praised, and the third to sixth centuries declared a period of "disunion," implying a deviation from expectations. The Sui and Tang are praised for *re*unifying the territories held by the Han, with lamentation for the fragmentation after An Lushan's rebellion. The Song accomplish another *re*unification only to see "China" "divided" once more. The Mongols ironically *re*unify "China" yet again, and it remains "intact" until the Republican period. The combined import of this narrative, with its indicative terminology

and associated interpretations, is to posit a world in which "China," as an entity existing in time, space, mind, and behavior, is opposed to "not-China" across a range of concepts and practices.[6]

Accordingly, modern scholars have tended to see the tenth century as one where "China" was first divided against itself, while moral standards, exemplified by loyalty, were catastrophically in abeyance, paving the way for alien encroachment.[7] In English, the moral element is more often simply implied (unconsciously or otherwise) by another ubiquitous terminology of "turncoats," "traitors," and disloyalty. Once the Song *re*unification brought a formal end to internal strife (rebellions notwithstanding), "China" was soon forced to defend its borders against a revived external threat identified as foreign. A large Chinese literature maintains that throughout this century those Chinese people who entered Liao service mostly did so only under compulsion, and that once in place they maintained (and extended) Chinese cultural practices.[8]

Restricted by the form of the questions, the explanations associated with such characterizations of the tenth century are not at all satisfactory. If the Liao were always out to conquer, why did they not do so when they had the chance? The Liao withdrawal after the conquest of 947 can be attributed to the heroic response of the Chinese to foreign invasion, but why did the Liao not conquer in 936 when there was nothing to stop them?[9] And how does the primacy of the external threat square not only with the continual conflict *within* the Five Dynasties regimes but also with the willingness of those resisting court authority to seek assistance from the Liao? If moral standards were so much in abeyance, why do the sources record so many individuals who are exemplary in every respect but for their side-changing? And if Chinese had to be forced to serve the Liao, why did so many choose to go there, serve so assiduously, and eventually give their children Kitan names?

Answers to these problems do not fall within the range of interpretations permitted by a framework based on nationalist categories. Specifically, the modern theory of nationalism, and empirical studies of particular cases, establish borders and ethnicity as the parameters that determine where loyalty lies. In the classical nationalist ideal, borders and ethnicity coincide, although in reality there are frequent tussles between them. A territorially defined state dominated by a particular ethnic group may lay claim to the loyalty of all the various minority ethnic groups lying within its boundaries. Conversely, such minorities, or their leaders, whether contained within one state or divided between more than one, may equally pronounce their own nationhood, bidding for the primary loyalty of individuals, and on that basis seeking a political form of their own. But whether in theory or practice, loyalty is seen as a corollary of

the relationship between borders and ethnicity. The placing of loyalty with either a state or an ethnic group (or, ideally, both at the same time) constitutes a choice of identity, whether political, ethnic, or a combination of the two.

But what if loyalty is held to be not a corollary of something else, but is itself a determining category? What if the placing of allegiances was conducted in circumstances where some conception or set of conceptions of loyalty was itself taken as a framing category and mainspring for action, without reference to either a state or its borders and without consideration of ethnic groupings? I believe that this is a more fruitful way of viewing the tenth century (and possibly earlier periods too), but such an interpretation requires the abandonment of the usual nationalist categories.

Accordingly, I shall explain below how we should rethink the three categories of borders, ethnicity, and loyalty in order to improve our understanding of the tenth-century borderlands. Returning again to the questions asked of what we might call the "high Song" period, and which have been read back into the tenth century, I contend first that the framing of the issue of borders assumes the primacy of territorial thinking and does not invite consideration of other ways of organizing political space. In the tenth century the emphasis was on bonds of allegiance and authority rather than territorial divisions. Second, arguments employing ethnicity assume that this concept was as relevant then as it is now, so that it should have determined people's behavior. I suggest we may learn more by not using it. And third, questions about loyalty assume a late-imperial conception of *zhong* (loyalty), implying a moral requirement for undying loyalty to a single dynasty under the paradigm of loyalism, betrayal, and justification. This will prove inapplicable for the tenth century. The foregoing suggests the importance of historiographical reassessment in developing a fresh analysis, a reassessment that must be applied to the primary materials as much as to secondary scholarship. Accordingly, I conclude the chapter by outlining the problems and opportunities offered by a unique set of sources.

Some definitions

So far I have talked of frontiers and crossings without specifying exactly what is meant, but now it will be helpful to define both concepts more precisely. Borders, frontiers, and boundaries are more and more the objects of study, but what each word signifies remains fluid and needs to be specified by each writer. The words can be used interchangeably, but for my purposes here it will be convenient to employ them to distinguish between linear, zonal, and conceptual dividers.

Border or *borderline* will be held to imply the conventional modern understanding of a linear divider that can be drawn on a map. Borders are primarily the demarcations—more or less accurate and open to dispute—agreed in peace treaties. They are also the edges of administrative districts or the divisions between them, marking the theoretical extent of a particular authority but not necessarily the reality. Where administrative districts controlled by one higher authority are adjacent to districts controlled by another, the edges where they meet form the borderline between the two authorities. Although this usage carries spatial implications because tenth-century administrative districts were centered on particular places, a border here is primarily about political control and only incidentally about territory.[10] This book is about a specific borderline, the one between the Liao and its southern neighbors, but there were many others in the same period, equally worthy of study.

Frontier or *borderland* will be used in the sense of a frontier zone, meaning a loosely defined geographical area straddling a borderline. In this case, however, "the frontier" will refer specifically to the area considered in this study, which lies roughly between the south bank of the Yellow and Wei rivers and roughly 41ºN (just north of the latitude of Hohhot and the northernmost point of the great bend of the Yellow River), and between the eastern edge of the Ordos and the Bohai Gulf (see maps in Chapter 3). This borderland embraces the region commonly known as the Central Plains or North China Plain, present-day Shanxi province, northern Liaoning, and the region astride the line of the Great Wall, including some of the southernmost parts of Inner Mongolia. The usage will free us from having to talk about "China" at a time when its existence was very much in doubt and will allow us to sidestep the corollary assumption that the only available categories are China and not-China.

Boundary will be used to discuss conceptual demarcations between groups distinguished by, for instance, culture, allegiance, or attitude.[11] Boundaries in this usage have no spatial component at all, but exist entirely in the minds of particular people writing history, commenting on events, or living their lives, although this does not, of course, prevent people from trying to give them a spatial dimension, as noted below. Since it is a purely mental (and sometimes emotional) construct, a particular boundary also has no fixed parameters. In the same way that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter, so a historian might identify a particular historical personage as being at any one moment on one side of, say, a cultural boundary, but another observer (or the person involved) might place that individual on the other side of the same boundary. Boundaries move constantly.

When I speak of frontier crossings, I mean actions that involve moving from one side to the other of at least one border or at least one boundary

(but always *within* the frontier zone). We will see, among others, cases where the boundary of political allegiance is crossed, but the administrative border is not (which, when done by an individual of suitable standing, has the effect of moving the borderline in space), and conversely, situations where a state borderline is crossed, but the boundary around political allegiance is not (resulting in fifth-column activities in the new state). All the crossings discussed here took place within the frontier zone as specified above. Using these definitions, we will be able to establish how our three problematical categories of borders, ethnicity, and loyalty were conceived differently at the beginning of the tenth century than at the end.

Borders: Territory and authority

In modern times, authority has come to be disbursed largely on the basis of territory, but it was not always so. We cannot understand the tenth century without separating out territory from authority, and examining, rather than presuming, the nature of their relationship. The problem we face is set out cogently by Thongchai Winichakul in *Siam mapped:* "The hegemony of modern geography, mapping, and the geo-body of a nation is far stronger than perhaps we are prepared to realize. It reproduces itself to subsume us under its regime." We think in terms of nations, and nations cannot be imagined without their borderlines.[12] In the present day, one of our chief methods of organizing the world is with borders that divide the surface layers of the Earth into discrete territories, each constituting a carefully delimited (if not always uncontested) political space. Modern borderlines mark the extent—and the limits—of a particular national or local authority. The international system of nation-states relies on general acceptance of the fundamental concept that borderlines demarcate national sovereignties from each other spatially and politically. We draw maps emphasizing these political divisions to such an extent that, in my experience, topographical maps are harder to find, suggesting that they are produced in smaller numbers to feed a smaller demand. Below the national level, much is decided on the basis of which side of a line we live, such as paying local taxes, voting in this district or that, and gaining access to children's schools.

The ubiquity of borderlines of one kind or another in modern times does not mean, of course, that they are unchallenged as an organizing principle. Individual governments may themselves violate the principles of territorial national sovereignty when it suits them. They may, for instance, seek to exert their authority beyond their borders using economic levers like trade embargoes or manipulation of aid spending, or political tools such as

military action or withdrawing ambassadors. Such activities challenge the sovereignty of those subjected to them, but at the same time they advance the specifically national interests of the stronger party, even as they draw ready (if not necessarily effective) condemnation as breaches of the international system. Challenges to individual sovereignty thus often have the effect of reinforcing the general principle from several different directions.

More of a problem because more indefinable—at least for national governments—are, for example, diaspora populations, large-scale migration, and other transnational or transfrontier phenomena including charities and other NGOs, religious communities, organized crime, and terrorism. Governments must concern themselves with such matters as managing interethnic relations, handling population mobility, providing access and protection for aid workers, dealing with clashes between national law and the requirements of international religious authorities (for example, ritual slaughter of animals for meat), participating in international policing cooperation, and erecting internal security against transnational threats. That so many things that do not fit within national borders—even when they are forces for good, or merely benign—provoke not just difficulties for governments, but anxiety or tension in national populations (such as concerns over immigration or preemptive warfare), suggests the deep roots of the prevailing system at all levels of society. We see how much borderlines are the normative way of arranging ourselves when we note what great scholarly and governmental effort we expend on trying to understand, control, or manage all the many things that contest, or simply do not fit, that norm.

The power of the modern borderline as a primary organizing principle even in the face of challenge may be seen, for instance, in the return of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Britain agreed that China would modify its geographical border, and on that basis of territoriality, would claim political authority over the Hong Kong population of British Dependent Territories Citizens, who would lose their British nationality and become citizens of the PRC. Beginning in 1986, Hong Kongers could apply—it was not automatic—to become British Nationals (Overseas) (BNOs), which allowed them to retain their British nationality after the handover in 1997, but did not give them right of residence in the British Isles, which territorial privilege was reserved for full citizens. Faced with a brain drain from Hong Kong after China's political crackdown in 1989, Britain reluctantly granted British citizenship—precisely to confer right of abode in the British Isles—to 50,000 families deemed important to the future of the colony. The pain of extracting even such limited concessions indicates that Britain had no more wish than China to abrogate the basic modern notion that the geographical

borderline should define the citizenship of the population residing therein.[13] To take just one more example, any Jew may become a citizen of Israel, but they have to go to the *territory* of Israel in order to claim that status. Conversely, Israel extended a limited form of citizenship, on a purely geographical basis, to Palestinians who chose not to leave their land in 1948. In complex situations it is rare to find that territorial borderlines are not the preferred final arbiter of where political authority should lie.

The most striking method of attempting to assert authority on the basis of borderlines is the attempt to reify a line on a map or a conceptual boundary by creating a physical demarcation. Examples include the Berlin Wall and Israel's "security fence" (or "Apartheid Wall"), the one enforcing a recognized political border, the other creating a deeply disputed borderline out of a conceptual division between Israelis and terrorists.[14] In historical terms the Great Wall of China is a classic example of this reifying endeavor, illustrating the multiple uses for such demarcation. Although we no longer believe in the monolithic or continuous existence of a real Great Wall,[15] there were certain times, notably the Han (202 BCE–220 CE) and Ming (1368–1644), when real walls marked the boundary between friend and foe.[16]

Much more influential, however, has been the *idea* of a physical Wall, which has recurred throughout Chinese history. The Wall remains the commonest conceptual division between steppe and sown in Northeast Asia, and it is the single constant feature on a series of historical maps from the Southern Song, even when they show the kingdom ruled by the legendary Shun, and the travels of the mythical Yu, two thousand years before the first Great Wall is supposed to have been created by Qin Shihuang in 221 BCE.[17]

This series provides us with some of the earliest maps of any kind surviving from the Chinese world,[18] but, as twelfth-century representations of former times, they clearly cannot be regarded as contemporary evidence for tenth-century views of the frontier, its borders or boundaries. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the maps for each of the Five Dynasties, and for the expansion under the first two Song emperors, show the borders of the states concerned.[19] While the same area—China Proper—is shown on each map, there is no fudging of reality: where districts within the Wall were administered by other powers, this situation is clearly marked. Hence although the Wall is there, it seems to function more as a point of reference than as a line to be held. It defines the limit of the empire as the Song cartographers wished the empire to be; it did not have to reflect the limit as it actually was. This territorial conception of the world was not necessarily dominant in the tenth century.

The representativeness of maps is always limited by the necessity they in-

troduce of rigidly defining situations, and particularly borders. Hence the Southern Song atlas provides one map for each of the Five Dynasties, but gives no indication of territorial changes within the period of each dynasty. The problem has not been surmounted in the present-day counterpart of this series, the set of historical atlases produced by the Cartographic Publishing House. The detailed maps for the Tang dynasty are drawn according to the treatises on geography in the Tang dynastic history and thus freeze the Tang empire as it was in 741. The addition of two further general maps of the Tang is inadequate to convey the many border changes which took place over nearly three centuries.[20] This is unavoidable if such reference works are not to become unwieldy, but it does tend to make borders look more fixed than they may have been at the time.

This is especially a problem in times of great upheaval like the tenth century. In this period administrative districts changed hands constantly between all the competing powers in our frontier zone, including the Liao. Borders were not the static entities they appear to be on maps, but shifted constantly. Contemporaries, however, may have found this less confusing than we do. Tenth-century people seem not to have thought so much in terms of borderlines but rather organized themselves according to administrative centers and allegiances, one of innumerable combinations available across premodern Eurasia.[21]

An administrative district typically comprised a number of households inhabiting a designated territory, headed by a prefect or other official located in a particular urban center that usually shared its name with the county, prefecture, or province. At the most local level borderlines between counties or even fields were well understood and had been mapped (and sometimes marked on the ground) since the Han dynasty.[22] The borders of prefectures consisted of the outside edges of the constituent counties, and provinces likewise could be demarcated according to the outer borderlines of their prefectures.

From the county level upwards, however, what counted was not where the borderlines lay (although these could always be calculated, and officials reported incursions across them), but where the official in charge placed his allegiance. If the official in his county, prefectural, or provincial seat decided to change his allegiance—say, by surrendering his city to a military attacker—his action affected the whole of his district by virtue of the taxation records and administrative machinery housed in the city's government offices.[23] When an official did this, the borderline around the district at the next level up moved to place the surrendered district on its other side.

But such a shift of the line was a symptom of political change, not a cause

as it would be in modern expectations. What mattered was that the official now placed his allegiance elsewhere and often remained in place under a new boss. Although this process sometimes created large numbers of refugees, this seems to have been a temporary phenomenon, and it was certainly in the interests of leaders to keep the population on the territory they were registered in, for without the people to pay taxes the land was worthless.

While we might find the subordinate role of borderlines disconcerting, this situation allowed ordinary people to maintain a clear sense of where they stood in relation to each other and the authorities that directly impinged on their lives, because for commoners a change of their official's allegiance did not automatically bring change to their daily lives. They might well suffer as a result of the military activity that frequently prompted or followed changes of allegiance, but if they escaped or survived, then they continued to pay or evade their taxes as they had done before, to the same district office as before, and frequently to the same individual as before.[24] Given the importance of individual choices in this scenario, we can approach the location of borderlines via the people whose decisions made the difference; those who, in our terms, could be said to have crossed a borderline, thereby consciously acknowledging its existence.

Rethinking borders highlights the difference between the late imperial world, when there was an identifiable and basically unified entity corresponding to "China" even if its government did not always control all the people or territory of China Proper, and the early imperial world when unification could not be taken for granted and the concept of China or a Middle Kingdom was frequently no more than an ideal, if that. Whether we regard imperial China as united or disunited during the confusing middle period from Tang to Yuan (1260–1368) depends on whether we consider territory or authority. During the Tang the *territory* of China Proper was deemed united under one imperial house, but *authority* was more or less divided after An Lushan began his rebellion in 755. During the Song the territory of China Proper was repeatedly divided by the encroachments of the three "conquest dynasties," but after the end of the last of the Ten Kingdoms in 979, authority within Song lands was remarkably unified under the imperial house. The dynasty is, of course, famous for its irredentism, and indeed, the greatest threats to its continuance came from outside the borders of the empire.

Before this, most notably in the post-Han period (220–589), authority and territory were frequently both divided, by conflicts that were essentially internal to the world centered on the frontier region discussed here. In the tenth century, although we can identify factors that subsequently

contributed to creating the late imperial paradigm of internal unity against external threat, the origins of tenth-century conflicts remained internal to that same frontier world. Even when the Song founders turned their attention from conquering those they were beginning to consider as their own rightful subjects to the enemy world to the north, the wars between Liao and Song took place within the frontier region and with the goal on both sides of controlling it strategically or politically.[25] It was the treaty of Shanyuan that, in establishing relations of equality between neighboring imperial states, marked the end of a process of creating an externalized Other out of what had previously been just another center of power within the framework of a unitary frontier world.

In the world order inaugurated by the Shanyuan treaty, as in the present day, borderlines were the primary means by which neighboring authorities were divided from each other. The treaty specified:

- Annual payments of 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels of silver from the Song, delivered at the frontier prefecture of Xiongzhou rather than to the Liao court.
- Border prefectures would maintain their current borderlines, with no encroachment either way by their inhabitants.
- Criminal fugitives would be returned whence they came.
- Neither court would sanction the disturbance of agriculture.
- Existing static defense works could be maintained, but no new ones (including waterways) were permitted.[26]

Of these five, the last four directly concerned territorial issues: demarcating the borderline, specifying permitted military and economic activity in its vicinity, and so on. Even the remaining article, regarding annual payments, located the handover point at the border. Authority was limited by the agreed borderline, but also bestowed by it, as seen most strikingly in the requirement to return fugitives. Individuals were expected to obey the law of the jurisdiction—now territorially defined—in which they physically resided, and they could not expect to find refuge simply by shifting their spatial location across the line. In effect, the terms of the treaty allowed both rulers to demand the permanent allegiance of all those living within specified geographical limits, an arrangement that reinforced the authority of both courts, at the expense of borderlanders and others who might have preferred to give their loyalty to, for instance, a particular person, group, or ideology. The location of authority within such carefully defined territorial bounds was a notable change from what had gone before.

The problem with ethnicity

In a modern world dominated by the concept of the nation-state, borders (of states) are intimately related to concepts of ethnicity (that is, nations). Yet whereas borderlines, critically reconsidered, may still be useful for studying premodern topics, the concept of ethnicity has been the greatest obstacle I have encountered in my efforts to understand the tenth-century frontier. The participants have routinely been described as Kitan and Chinese, labels that imply—however unintentionally—the existence of ethnic groups in the distant past that can accordingly serve as the roots of modern nations. The nationalist trope assumes and requires ethnic identity to be of determining importance in all historical periods, which makes it hard to offer satisfactory explanations for premodern choices and actions that transgress presumed ethnic boundaries. Ultimately I will suggest the need for other categories that will allow new analyses, but first it seems necessary to explain how, for premodern times, the concept of ethnicity creates more problems than it solves.

Ethnicity is as deeply ingrained in modern thinking as the idea of territorial borders. Indeed, ethnicity has been the main challenger to the primacy of territorially defined borderlines as organizers of our world. Some of the greatest headaches of the present day, both for individual governments and for the international community as a whole, rest upon the claims of ethnic groups to autonomy or independence, whether they are split by one or more state borderline (like the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey) or comprise a community within a single state (like the French Canadians). The irony, of course, is that territorial authority and ethnic groups, in their guises as states and nations, are the two defining principles of nationalist thinking, which ideally coincide but in reality never (or vanishingly rarely) do so. Examination of the tension between these two principles is essential for understanding the modern world but may not be terribly helpful when considering a period before nationalism was conceived. As Crossley noted long ago, ethnicity's link with the nation makes it anachronistic for periods before the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and its use distorts historical reality.[27]

On this basis my preference would be simply to set aside the whole notion of ethnicity as having no validity for the period considered here, but unfortunately the link between ethnicity and culture means that one cannot do this without explanation. It is, of course, not the case that there were no cultural differences before the modern period, nor that these were entirely unimportant, but rather that their significance was not necessarily what we, living—like it or not—in a highly ethnicized or national world, might expect. It may be helpful to be able to discuss how the salience of premodern culture

and cultural identity could change in response to circumstances, but it is important to be able to do so without being forced back to invoking the vocabulary of ethnicity, with all its accompanying baggage of nationalism.

The issue of ethnicity is not easy to disentangle because of the difficulty of defining exactly what it is[28] and, in particular, of establishing the nature of the connection between ethnicity and culture. In its classic conception, cultural identity derives from factors many of which were first identified by nineteenth-century theorists of nationalism and subsequently adopted by twentieth-century ethnographers, including language, dress, foodways, beliefs and attitudes, customs, propensity for particular occupations, and so on. Political scientists and others—though few historians—have subsequently elevated this type of cultural identity to *ethnic* identity by emphasizing the idea of a myth-symbol complex, of which an ethnographically distinctive culture is only one element. In the most influential formulation by Anthony Smith, this complex involves ideas such as a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.[29] Specific expressions of these ideas form the basis for *ethnie,* which will arise and persist if they can command, and continue to command, the loyalties of enough people willing to identify as members even in the times of challenge to be expected in periods of centuries or even millennia. This approach allows its adherents to identify many persisting ethnic groups in the premodern world and to claim them as the foundation of modern nations, but also makes it hard to explain what is different about modern nation-states.[30]

A more sharply defined approach has been developed for modern China in particular, seeking to explain how specifically ethnic identities came into being in early modern times. Ethnic discourse has been a vital, if confusing, component of modern China's nationalisms and nation-building, and new complexities in the construction and uses of ethnicity in the present day are continually being identified.[31] The beginnings of modern ethnic thinking may be traced in the late imperial period, and in recent years we have been treated to some superbly sophisticated analyses of where such thinking came from and what effects it had, particularly for the Qing (1644–1911).[32]

Conquest—carrying, as it does, the implication that the conquerors will always be aliens, foreigners, non-Chinese—is an important issue here. The Manchus as a group dominated the Chinese as conquerors over a subjugated people. Indeed, an army of occupation was settled in permanent garrisons, segregated from the civilian Chinese population. Despite formal spatial and legal separations, however, Manchus progressively adopted more and more practices characteristic of a Chinese cultural identity, notably language.[33]

Although such people never ceased to identify themselves as part of the conquering minority, the convergence of cultural practices led the Qing rulers to intensify the rhetoric and policing of difference to encourage (with little success) the maintenance of cultural traits held to define Manchus, including language, archery, and horsemanship. The onset of modernization in the nineteenth century saw increasing anti-Manchu feeling. At a popular level cultural similarities ceased to be recognized, so that previously insignificant details became ethnic markers. As such, the beards associated with Manchu men and the unbound feet associated with Manchu women provided sufficient cause for the Taipings (1853–1864) to slaughter thousands. Such challenges provoked a development of ethnicity in the modern sense among Manchus, exemplified by use of the neologism "Manzu." As Crossley argues, and subsequently Mark Elliott, the Manchus developed overtly ethnic coherence even as cultural incoherence grew.[34]

For the purposes of studying our tenth-century frontier, this work on the Qing suggests the importance of distinguishing between ethnicity as an inherently politicized identity and cultural identity as a simple descriptor for particular sets of beliefs and practices.[35] Cultural identity may be felt or ascribed, by individuals or by groups, but it does not become *ethnic* identity until political meaning is ascribed to cultural differences in the context of a struggle for control at the level of the state. This has been described for the nineteenth-century Manchus, but may also embrace separatist movements, for instance. It is only when cultural identity becomes the basis for asserting or claiming advantage (social, economic, but above all political) that it becomes ethnicity. It is not the cultural differences themselves that matter but what significance is attached to them. Since by this definition ethnicity is asserted solely for the purpose of distributing advantage (and the concomitant disadvantage) within or between polities (or aspiring polities), its character is "relational," "dialogic," or "inherently transactional."[36] This formulation stands in contrast to the nationalist conception of persisting premodern *ethnie,* in which culture itself, including a specific myth-symbol complex, is the autochthonous source of ethnicity for a particular ethnic group, which may or may not have contact with neighboring groups and whose ethnic identity may or may not survive that contact.

In the relational conception, cultural identity is a property internal to a person or group, not requiring any interactions outside the group for its existence. By contrast, it appears that the existence of a specifically ethnic identity relies on two things: first, the presence of a state sufficiently effective that its institutions, laws, or policies deliberately or unintentionally offer advantages to the highlighting of one group's differences from another; and second, the

perception of an ethnic Other (which may be internal to a particular state), to provide negative identification for the ethnic in-group as well as frequently being the party disadvantaged by the privileges exacted by the ethnic in-group. In other words, ethnicity cannot exist in and of itself, but only comes into being when there are advantageous contrasts to be made. This distinction, then, enables those studying the late imperial period to discuss with some precision the transition from a world in which cultural identity might be felt or even declared, but did not affect the decisions people made or the privileges they enjoyed, to one in which identity was transformed into a politicized ethnicity that was in dialog with a developing national state, and—crucially—was expected to determine behavior in situations where choices were required.

The problem here is that if ethnicity is defined like this—as an on-going dialog about the distribution of advantage and the criteria on which choices are made, between at least two sets of people, at least one of which is self-consciously a group, and involving at least one state—then the identification of such a dialog in premodern times will imply the existence of ethnicity and therefore nations. And indeed, the use of ethnic thinking has been identified as characteristic of the ruling groups of not just the Qing but also of the earlier conquest dynasties. However, as noted in the Introduction, a first problem here is that much of the work on the conquest dynasties has cast their relations with the Song and other southern neighbors as at least implicitly ethnic encounters, known in Chinese as *han-hu* relations.[37] If one assumes that ethnic thinking was fundamental to these interactions, it is no surprise if you find it going on.

Yet even if we are not skeptical about the *han-hu* approach, it is not clear how applicable the dialogic formulation of ethnicity can be to the Liao. While the Jin and Yuan may have been less obviously military occupations than the Qing, nevertheless the Jurchen and Mongols ruled as conquerors and worked to maintain distinctions between themselves and their conquered subjects, most famously by the use of ethnic categories and quotas. But since the Kitan were never conquerors with regard to the peoples of the Central Plains (other Inner Asian peoples were another matter), they did not need to establish the primacy of an entire group over subordinated populations. Liao rule was probably no more—though also no less—militarized than that of other tenth-century regimes in the borderlands. The ruling group consisted of two intermarrying clans, not the entire mass of victorious soldiers and their families, presiding over a steppe confederation in the Northern Administration based upon the allegiance of individual chieftains, and over taxpaying farmers in the Southern Administration governed largely by their own officials.[38] Ethnic

categories do not seem to have played a large role in organizing the empire, as can be seen, for instance, in the directional designations given to the government bodies named above, which seem to have been responsible for the population on the basis of how they lived rather than because of where they resided or because they were of one people or another.

From the other side, scholars considering the Song in its relations with all three conquest dynasties in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, have sometimes sought to trace the development of "protonationalist" or nascent ethnic feeling in this period. The geographical location of the Liao domain, and the nomadic origins and ongoing cultural orientation of its Kitan rulers, made it seemingly natural for people in the Northern Song to characterize their chief enemies as foreign barbarians.[39] The progressive conquests of the Jin and Mongol/Yuan regimes, headed by leaders who were self-consciously not Chinese, reinforced the tendency to cast relations between the Song and their northern neighbors in terms of an indelible cultural cleavage between nomad and farmer. Modern scholars readily equate these formulations with a developing sense of ethnicity during the Song, although this connection is more often asserted than demonstrated. Such assumptions persist because ethnicity has yet to be thoroughly examined for the Song period, and when it is, the outcomes will depend significantly on the categories employed.[40] What we should not do—heeding Duara's warning in *Rescuing history from the nation*—is to foreclose the issue, from either side, by adopting terms and categories, like ethnicity, that imply the inevitability of the modern Chinese nation-state or posit a linear development towards it.

We should not doubt, however, that many people in the tenth century did have a clear sense of belonging within a particular cultural nexus that they sometimes contrasted with one or more others. Individuals make statements of identity such as "I am a *hanren*" and comment upon cultural differences. One notable example calls the Kitan "the hosts of the mutton-reeking tents"! Such words can easily look like statements of ethnicity, but confusion can then arise if the actions of an individual do not correspond to their statement of identity.

On this score, it is important to note that whether or not you believe that ethnicity can exist in premodern times, everyone agrees that it is at least partly prescriptive, assuming that (where it exists) it will play a significant part in governing behavior in areas ranging from cultural norms to political allegiance.[41] Such strictures mean that ethnicity, however defined, is always self-reinforcing. Once somebody accepts that cultural traits should influence their actions, then their newly *ethnic* identity starts to make demands of its own, which may involve individuals making changes to previously unexcep-

tionable behavior or sacrifices in the name of a greater ethnic good. Every time an individual accedes to such a behest, they become that much more closely identified with the ethnic group.

The willingness of individuals to *perform* an ethnic identity in this way may become a measure of the extent to which ostensibly ethnic statements or policies are reflections of truly ethnic or merely cultural feeling. Hence we might consider the late-Qing insistence that those registered as Manchus *should* speak Manchu and support the Qing dynasty,[42] and the frequent modern demand, applied to all periods of history, that those identified as Chinese *must not* work with non-Chinese enemies, whether they be Japanese in the Republican era, Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, or even Kitan in the tenth century. While such strictures undoubtedly created dilemmas for many Chinese in Japanese-occupied Shanghai, and apparently influenced the decisions of some Chinese under Mongol rule (on both of which, more in the next section), we see that conversely the ability of bannermen in the Manchu language did not improve markedly, and, in like fashion, ostensibly ethnic declarations in the tenth century only sometimes seem to correlate with behavior. The person who found the Kitan smelly died rather than surrender to a Liao army, but the person who called himself a *hanren* achieved high office under the second Liao emperor. The huge significance given to ethnic identity in the modern period, and perhaps to some as yet unexamined extent in the Song, does not mean that it had the same influence over the actions of the individuals and groups inhabiting our tenth-century frontier.[43]

The crucial point to note here, then, is the dissonance (at least to us) between statements and behavior. It is this gap that upsets many modern scholars of relations between the Five Dynasties and Song over against the three classic conquest dynasties. But it may be that it is precisely in that dissonance that we can locate what was different about that world, and, accordingly it is here that this book proposes to inquire. It will be necessary to consider the ways in which cultural identity or cultural elements became more or less salient as circumstances changed, but it does not seem helpful to try to identify any of the results with the concept of ethnicity in any of its many guises.

So at a purely practical level, in order to attempt to discuss this period outside the discourse of ethnic or even cultural identity, we must adopt terminology that carries the minimum of ethnic or cultural baggage. We have already defined the region under discussion as simply "the frontier." In order to avoid mentioning "China" and so prejudging the issue, I will refer simply to the North and South within the frontier region. Wherever possible, I will

refer to specific regimes or leaders, and for this reason ignore the name changes of the Northern regime and refer to it instead as Liao throughout. I will try to reserve "Chinese" and "Kitan" for discussion of specifically cultural, as opposed to political, matters.

A further issue is the multicultural composition of the frontier region. In particular, leaders of Shatuo Turkish origin and culture played a significant military and political role in the tenth century, providing emperors and ruling groups for three of the Five Dynasties. Although they preserved certain distinctive cultural practices, the sources accepted them—in the same manner as the Tang dynasts—as culturally Chinese. It is not my purpose here to discuss this complex and little-studied issue.[44] Whatever the precise cultural identity of those labeled as Shatuo, the fact that the sources treat them as part of the South rather than the North is the significant feature here, and they are counted simply as southerners along with those identified purely by surname and place of origin in the Chinese manner. All those who crossed to the Liao from anywhere in the South are accordingly called "Liao southerners."[45]

Although of lesser relevance here, the Liao regime exerted authority over innumerable chiefs and their followers, whose cultural variety would have given lifetimes of work to tenth-century ethnographers. Sometimes groups are named, but we can be sure that those reported as undifferentiated "Kitan" included subgroups and individuals of many cultural orientations. All these people are referred to as northerners except where their cultural identity seems significant. Of course Liao southerners presumably become northerners at some point, but defining exactly when is not our concern. More pertinently, since it is the group that crossed from South to North that is of interest here, these usages allow us to keep tabs on them, and allow us to consider, among other things, whether or not there was a shift from a relatively unproblematical cultural identity to the beginnings of an expectation that culture should determine behavior and align with political allegiance, as part of a developing relationship between two entities increasingly differentiated in a variety of ways.

The question of loyalty

If ethnicity is not helpful as an organizing category, it may be more useful to deploy a concept that did have meaning for tenth-century people. The idea of loyalty, or *zhong,* is an obvious choice. Historians in the eleventh century developed a conception of *zhong* that demanded unwavering loyalty to a single master and insisted that death was preferable to changing allegiance. This conception has been used by historians ever since to condemn those in

the Five Dynasties who are held to have betrayed their Confucian obligations to their masters.[46] Since *zhong* is a moral concept, hallowed by mention in the *Analects (Lunyu),* its use in discussing those who changed their allegiance automatically implies moral failing in the frontier crossers. Under the influence of nationalism, numerous modern scholars have gone a step further and taken obligation to a master as equivalent to a requirement to remain loyal to *China.* The development of these views in late imperial and twentieth-century China is beyond the scope of this work, but this revision to the concept of *zhong* also gives a moral component to the prescriptive view of (presumed) ethnicity discussed above, making the cultural identity of the master an issue. Under this formulation, service to a non-Chinese master is no longer a simple matter of choice of one lord over another, but a question of right and wrong. It is this perspective that brings such anxiety to many who have written about the Liao southerners.

We can, if we choose, follow Ouyang Xiu and simply condemn an entire generation of officials (whether we take the ethnic line or not), almost all of whom changed their allegiance at least once. To do so, however, does not explain why these people made the choices they did or the significance their choices had for them. The demand for unwavering allegiance does not have the same moral force as, say, strictures against murder, which are wellnigh universal throughout world history.[47] Loyalty, by contrast, is always in the eye of the beholder: the same deed can be judged loyal in one context but disloyal in another, and over time the verdict can be reversed.[48] It is, in short, a relative concept, and we need to establish what it meant to those we study. To do this we have to separate it from both the concept of ethnicity and from associations with a particular territory, which are themselves inextricably entwined in most of the existing scholarship on loyalty.

In Chinese Studies, loyalty has been examined chiefly in the context of choices made by members of the educated classes under the Jin, Yuan, and Qing, and latterly during the period of Japanese encroachment and occupation, too. Behavior ranged from collaboration, through withdrawal from serving the dynasty, to loyalism. *Collaboration* meant taking service with the new dynasty more or less willingly. *Withdrawal* involved refusal to serve for a greater or lesser period. Sometimes called eremitism, it was a retreat into nonpolitical pursuits.[49] *Loyalism* was active resistance—which could be intellectual or cultural, not just military—even unto death or suicide. The literature on this topic is large and terminology varies. Frederic Wakeman speaks of "Romantics, Stoics and Martyrs in Seventeenth-century China," and Poshek Fu of *Passivity, resistance, and collaboration* in Japanese-occupied Shanghai.[50] This threefold typology is very similar to

that identified for the military occupation of Vichy France, suggesting a general applicability.[51]

Research on these topics has reached a high level of sophistication for late imperial China, but these scholars acknowledge that the categories they use did not apply before the Song dynasty. Such a spectrum of behaviors appears under the particular conditions of military occupation by a foreign power. This, in turn, presupposes a population with a cultural and political identity matched to a particular territory—that is, a national consciousness—which, I would contend, did not exist in the tenth-century frontier. Although conquest and subjugation were recurrent features of the tenth century, they chiefly involved one Southern regime expanding at the expense of another or Liao subjugation of other Northern leaders. The only long-term military conquest involving North and South was the Later Zhou (951–960) seizure of Yizhou and Mozhou from Liao in 959. In all these cases, although garrisons may have been involved, the conqueror was not perceived as a foreigner.[52]

In these circumstances conditions of occupation could not exist. Nevertheless, the Liao southerners studied here are still held guilty of collaboration because of the modern idea that political allegiance is owed according to territorial divisions and a perception of persistent (even if constructed) ethnic identities. Accordingly, modern scholars frequently expect southerners identified as Chinese to give their allegiance to a state controlling territory inhabited (chiefly) by other Chinese people. A similar expectation was created by the eleventh-century conception of loyalty when it was put to the test in the twelfth century. These interpretations of *zhong* came to fruition in the extraordinary displays of loyalism so characteristic of late-imperial instances of non-Chinese conquerors overthrowing Chinese dynasties, but this understanding of *zhong* was unknown in the tenth century.[53] The concept of collaboration is therefore irrelevant here.

Earlier ideas of loyalty, however, were essential to the working of the relationships central to the ways political order was achieved, challenged, and recreated before the Song. These ideas have been largely unexamined, and the chapter devoted to them here offers a preliminary survey in an attempt to establish the range of options available to tenth-century people.[54] As noted above, the placing of allegiances was crucial to the political history of the tenth century, but at the outset these choices were mostly made on strictly political and pragmatic grounds, among a relatively large number of available leaders, and were morally neutral. In the early tenth century, identity and allegiance were two separate things; an individual could identify as culturally Chinese yet place their political allegiance without reference to that identity or that of their master or masters. During the later tenth century, as

politics stabilized into an arena of two prime antagonists rather than many, allegiance was increasingly expected to be undying, and there may be hints of a nascent correlation between cultural differences and opposing states.

From the eleventh century, as morality became ever more important to literati living in a world transformed, some sought to apply their own high standards to predecessors living through the period in which the transformation had taken place. Northern Song historians demanded undying loyalty, still without reference to the master's cultural identity, but more emphasis was now laid on such identities. Non-Chinese lords could earn loyalty by behaving in a civilized fashion, but there may also have been a sharper marking of who was Chinese. Nonetheless there does not yet seem to have been an automatic equation of civilized behavior with acting in a Chinese manner.[55] From the material considered here it is not clear how strong this kind of thinking may have become by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. What we can trace by then is the developing importance of identifying historical individuals as self-consciously Chinese, such that they act on behalf of the South, in contexts where uncivilized behavior is attributed to foreign barbarians.

Historiographical boundaries and the sources for tenth-century history

The nature of the written sources for the tenth century can create considerable problems when we try to assess the contemporary view of the frontier and those who crossed it, because of their close filiation, illustrated in Figure 1. These problems are such that they justify consideration of what we might call the "historiographical boundary" as an inescapable part of our task.

The main source for the frontier region in the first half of the tenth century, and the earliest, is the *Jiu Wudai shi (JW),* produced by the Northern Song in less than two years (973–974) from an almost complete set of government records of varying quantity and quality. It was rewritten by Ouyang Xiu as the *Xin Wudai shi (XW)* during the middle decades of the eleventh century, and this revisionist work became so much preferred that the original was banned in 1207.[56] It was lost sometime after the early fifteenth century, but by then most of it had already been broken up and included in the *Yongle da dian (YLDD).* From this and other works on the same period Qing scholars were able to reconstruct between 80 and 90 percent of the *Jiu Wudai shi.* The annals and the biographies of commoners are almost completely intact, and despite some of the obvious problems with a reconstructed work, it has a good reputation. In its own day it was criticized for following the Five Dynasties Veritable Records *(shilu)* too closely.[57] We



Figure 1: The filiation of the *Liao shi* (adapted from Denis Twitchett, personal communication)

may be grateful for this, although we do not know exactly how close the correlation was.

The *Xin Wudai shi* was a rewriting of the *Jiu Wudai shi* using some additional materials.[58] Ouyang Xiu was critical of the *Jiu Wudai shi* for its lack of interpretation and moral judgment, and his own work was a conscious attempt to rectify this. He has himself been criticized for going too far; he used the selective presentation of information to argue his case for particular moral judgments, supplemented by anguished commentaries on the moral conclusions to be drawn.[59]

The major narrative work covering this period is the *Zizhi tongjian (TJ* or *Tongjian),* produced for the court under the direction of Sima Guang, with the explicit aim of providing instruction for rulers. Compiled between 1067 and 1085, it covers the period from 403 BCE to the end of the Five Dynasties in chronicle form, without biographies or other sections. It is known to have used 322 sources, ranging from the dynastic histories (including the *Jiu Wudai shi*) to various unofficial works, many little known. Despite being highly regarded for his adherence to declared historiographical principles, Sima Guang, like Ouyang Xiu, wrote from within the specific political context of the Northern Song court, which naturally colors his judgment of Five Dynasties figures, most notably the infamous side-changing chief minister Feng Dao. Although there are said to be many mistakes in the Five Dynasties section,[60] the *Tongjian* remains important for its quality and scope. It also has a vital role as a transmitter of information. When we come to the *Qidan guo zhi (QG)* and the *Liao shi (LS),* it is often the case that their ultimate source is the *Jiu Wudai shi,* a work which had been banned before either the *Qidan guo zhi* or *Liao shi* was compiled. When this happens, the information is always found in the *Tongjian* as well, suggesting that without the *Tongjian* to carry information forward from the *Jiu Wudai shi,* the *Qidan guo zhi* and *Liao shi* would have been more deficient sources.

The draft for the continuation of the *Tongjian,* Li Tao's *Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian (CB* or *Changbian),* was written in the same spirit as the *Tongjian* and partly as a reaction against the intrusion of Southern Song factionalism into historical works. It appeared in several installments before the final version of 1183, but parts of it were lost as early as the end of Southern Song. Like the *Jiu Wudai shi,* what remained was preserved by its inclusion in the *Yongle da dian* and recompiled by Qing historians under Qianlong (1735–1796).[61]

Surviving works specifically concerned with the Liao are all considerably later in date. The *Qidan guo zhi* was presented to the Southern Song court by Ye Longli, probably in 1247, when the Song were concerned to stave off Mongol advances.[62] It was based entirely upon Song written materials,

but most heavily used were the *Tongjian* and its continuation. Via the *Tongjian* there was an indirect link with the *Jiu Wudai shi.* There is said to have been a direct connection too, but the *Jiu Wudai shi* had been out of favor and falling into disuse for forty years, and its tolerant viewpoint was unfashionable. While copies must have existed and could have been used in theory, for the sections of the *Qidan guo zhi* used here, a direct link with the *Jiu Wudai shi* is not immediately obvious.

The *Liao shi* has been taken as the endpoint for materials, since the official history symbolically fixed the record of a dynasty. The *Liao shi* was not produced under normal circumstances and was not completed until 1344, some 350 years after the events discussed here.[63] Tang-style historiographical practice was adopted only slowly by the Liao,[64] and accordingly the *Liao shi* was chiefly compiled not from archival material collected by the Liao bureaucracy, but from a collection of works surviving in the fourteenth century, only some of which had any connection with the Liao history office. These included, directly or indirectly, almost all the Southern sources discussed above. There were three main works. First of these were the Veritable Records of the first seven Liao reigns, presented in 1085 and ultimately reaching the court of the Jurchen Jin. Second was an incomplete history presented to the Jin court by Chen Daren in 1207. It was based partly on the Veritable Records and also used an earlier Jin work, itself based on the Veritable Records. The third work was the *Qidan guo zhi.* The *Tongjian* would have been available, and there is evidence for its limited use. The *Jiu Wudai shi* was also a source for the *Liao shi,* both in its own right and in its use in the compilation of the Veritable Records, Chen Daren's history, and the *Qidan guo zhi.* At each stage of the compilation, the *Liao shi* ran into political problems, mostly concerned with the legitimacy of the Liao regime and the implications of recognizing it for the dynasties that coexisted with and followed it.[65]

The *Song shi (SS)* was compiled at the same time as the *Liao shi* and presented in 1345. The work was, however, conducted quite separately, save for the overall direction of the history projects by Toghto, Ouyang Xuan, and others.[66] The four *Liao shi* compilers appear to have had little communication with their twenty-three counterparts on the *Song shi* project. Discrepancies between the two works abound, making it unlikely that either made extensive use of material collected for the compilation of the other.[67] The *Song shi* was largely compiled from the well-kept government records of the Song and would have had less recourse to a chain of works derived one from another. The *Liao shi* and *Song shi* can therefore be regarded as independent of each other, with the exception of the commentaries, compiled by the Yuan editorial team working under the same contemporary constraints.

No dynastic history is contemporaneous; the *Liao shi* is just a particularly spectacular example. It is often claimed, however, that large amounts of the original records were simply copied verbatim into dynastic histories and that therefore we can treat them as contemporary works. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. Imperial Chinese historians had a responsibility to produce a "truthful record," but history also had didactic and legitimating functions, and our texts often have a point to make. Although the compilers did lift large amounts directly from their sources, nevertheless they would edit for style and would even rewrite when they thought it was necessary. Passages can often be very close, and odd phrases might survive untouched through a whole series of texts, but successive historians were not merely collectors and copiers; they were always, at the very least, active editors.[68]

Since these constitute most of the historical sources we have for the tenth century, we must treat them with particular care, but we are fortunate in two ways. First, there is more than one official source. Second, the sources leading to the *Liao shi* are, as we have seen, unusually closely related. This gives us the opportunity to use the sources comparatively, allowing close reading of sometimes tiny changes and lacunae to reveal changes in concerns and thus lead to consideration of questions which might otherwise be overlooked. Furthermore, tracing the shifting attitudes in the later texts can subsequently suggest something about what concerned the authors of the earliest texts, bringing us closer to the experiential world of the tenth century. Such an approach also reduces the danger of unconsciously internalizing the viewpoint of the canonical texts.

I have, therefore, taken a close comparative approach to a relatively small number of sources: chiefly the annals and biographies sections of the works mentioned above, supplemented where appropriate by collections such as the *Cefu yuangui (CFYG)* and the *Liao shi shiyi* (*LSSY,* a compilation from Song and Yuan works), along with the small amount of surviving poetry and personal writings. The subjects for the case studies were selected on the basis of available biographical material in order that a method of close textual comparison might be applied. The five individuals examined in this book constitute all of those first-generation Liao southerners who have their own biography in both the *Liao shi* and at least one of the Southern sources.[69] Choosing in this way was intended to maximize the limited possibilities for glimpsing alternative views of the same events and people, although in practice the *Liao shi* annals are a good deal more independent than the biographies for this period. Further information comes from the *Tongjian* and *Changbian,* as well as other texts which appear to have been used in the

compilation of the *Liao shi* and *Song shi,* such as the *Long ping ji (LPJ)* and *Dongdu shi lüe (DDSL).*

Deploying this method will allow detailed discussion of the relationship between politics (borders), culture (the boundaries around identity), and morality (the boundaries around loyalty). In each case the dividing lines were shifting during the tenth century and moved again as events and choices were successively rewritten. The common factor in all three elements is loyalty, to which we now turn.

CHAPTER 2

Fed or Dead

Notions and Uses of Loyalty *(zhong)*

. . . a whole complex of personal relationships.
—Marc Bloch, *Feudal society*

If our modern categories are of little help, then we must try to establish what ideas were available to the tenth-century frontier crossers as they made their decisions. The central concept is loyalty, translated from the Chinese word *zhong.* That this was understood differently in the early imperial period than in later times is clear, but its exact content before the Song dynasty is a topic largely untouched by scholarship in any language, although recently there have been some investigations of the pre-imperial period.[1] While it is impossible to do justice to the subject within the present project, a preliminary survey of conceptual developments up to the eleventh century will give us more chance of understanding tenth-century people in terms they might have recognized and so making better sense of their actions and their significance. The crucial issue here is the availability of *alternatives,* and the chief purpose of this chapter is to suggest how the range of plausible possibilities could change with political circumstances.

As noted in Chapter 1, the problem with the late imperial typology of loyalism, withdrawal, and collaboration is that it relies on the notion of conquest. This presupposes a clear political, geographical, and cultural division between conquered and conqueror, a separation creating a moral obligation to remain on one side of the divide and condemning anyone who crosses the line. A concomitant of this is the absence, for late imperial people, of morally acceptable political (or cultural or geographical) alternatives. Loyalty was due to one political-cultural entity and one alone, and the obligation was lifelong. When that entity was destroyed or replaced, individuals owing it loyalty were faced with painful choices. They were compelled to decide whether to fulfil a political loyalty (typically by active resistance), a cultural loyalty

(typically by withdrawal from political life), or a livelihood imperative (typically by taking office with the new rulers as "collaborators").

Before the Song, however, the lines were drawn differently. The political and cultural coherence of late imperial Chinese dynasties make it feasible to speak of territorial division as a concept carrying real weight with contemporaries. The notion of division implies an underlying ideal of unity: "China" can only be "divided" if you start out with the idea that it should be one. This stands in marked contrast to the situation frequently found in early imperial times where political fragmentation, and marked cultural differences within and between regimes, were so commonplace that a contemporary concept of division—and of unity lost—can be hard to locate, at least in practice.

A characteristic of such periods of "division" was the acceptance that there could be two or more centers of recognized authority at the same time.[2] These could be regimes claiming imperial status, like the Former Shu (907–925), Later Liang (907–923), and Liao (907–1125), or the Tibetan kingdom and the Tang empire, or most strikingly, the multiple polities of the post-Han period (220–589); or they could be provincial leaders exercising effective autonomy under the nominal authority of an emperor, like the Hebei governors and the Tang dynasts after An Lushan's rebellion. The simultaneous existence of more than one center of recognized authority offered officials more choices involving less pain or none at all.

Whereas the ruling classes from the eleventh century on perceived that their own dynasty was the only one to which they could legitimately give their loyalty, tenth-century people were not so constrained. Choice was forced upon tenth-century officials more frequently than in later times as regimes formed and collapsed at great speed, but it was also available as a voluntary option, giving officials, in particular, opportunities to affect political events at the highest level. Although allegiance was greatly valued and rewarded, changing allegiance was readily justified and rarely criticized, especially considering how common it was. In such a context loyalty could not mean the same as it did under more restricted circumstances. The sketch that follows makes no claim to comprehensiveness, but may suggest something of the more expansive range of meanings available for *zhong* in the period up to the eleventh century.

Studies on the meanings of loyalty in Chinese history have independently posited that there were two types of *zhong.* This is most often articulated for the late imperial period, where "absolutist" can be opposed to "relative" or "rational" loyalty.[3] While the early imperial period desperately lacks studies of this topic, a similar twofold division can be identified here

too, although, as is widely acknowledged, the content and implications of the two categories were profoundly different before and after the Song. There were some basic continuities, however.

The first type of loyalty emphasized the minister's duties to his lord and dynasty, frequently demanding that for their sake an official should be prepared to put his life on the line. I shall call this relational loyalty, since it expresses the official's interdependence with and attachment to a ruler. Relational loyalty in the early imperial period is fundamentally a function of the ruler-minister relationship. The second type, which I shall call idealistic loyalty, emphasized the minister's obligations to higher considerations such as moral imperatives, cultural survival, or especially to the *dao*. This interpretation supports the independent position of the minister vis-à-vis the lord, allowing officials to express their individuality, and from the moral high ground.

These two types of *zhong* can be mapped onto late imperial manifestations of loyalism and eremitism respectively, but the roots of the third choice in that schema—"collaboration"—can also be traced to some of the earliest conceptions of the ruler-minister relationship as defined under the rubric of *zhong*. This chapter suggests a general outline for how ideas of *zhong* developed between the eighth century BCE and the eleventh century CE, a scheme diagrammed in Figure 2. Different types of loyalty are associated with different political formations (basically unification or fragmentation), and a major shift in interpretation occurred when boundaries sharpened, borders hardened, and relational loyalty acquired a profoundly moral character that had previously been lacking.

A new concept: Loyalty in the first millennium BCE

Relational loyalty spans a spectrum from ideas stressing the minister's duty of obedience, to those positing an equal relationship between master and servant. At one end the relationship is founded on hierarchy, at the other it is reciprocal. Naturally, rulers tended to prefer the first interpretation and ministers the second, but rulers were trumped when ministers went over their heads to claim higher authority for their actions. Yuri Pines has traced the earliest development of such notions in the Springs and Autumns (Chunqiu, 722–453 BCE) and Warring States (Zhanguo, 453–221 BCE) periods. The following section largely restates his arguments, but places them within the general framework suggested here, which his analysis helped to shape.[4]

Originally the spectrum of relational loyalty from hierarchy to reciprocity was represented by two separate concepts with a word each. During the



Figure 2: The development of types of loyalty in Chinese polities

earlier Springs and Autumns the hereditary ministerial lineages *(qing dafu)* of the various states saw their chief obligation as serving the "altars of soil and grain," that is, the state. Service to the overlord *(zhuhou)* was secondary to this apparently higher goal, which justified frequent acts of opposition to overlords. Since unchecked ministerial ambition acting within a particular state was so obviously dangerous to political stability, overlords promoted the concept of faithfulness *(xin),* which meant unequivocal obedience in carrying out orders and in not working with the ruler's enemies.

Not surprisingly, ministers chafed at this requirement, with its hierarchical implications, and by the late Springs and Autumns *zhong* (loyalty) appeared as a codification that made a virtue of the ministers' propensity to oppose their own rulers.[5] *Zhong* balanced out the ruler-minister relationship by requiring a minister to act in the long-term interests of the state rather than the ruler, and to prefer the state's interests to his own. It rapidly became "the pivotal ministerial virtue."[6] Efforts were made to emphasize the complementarity of *zhong* and *xin,* but numerous conflicts arose, in which *zhong* was more often the winning principle. The new codification of *zhong* had the effect of holding the ruler responsible for following the rules for his behavior, and the ruler-minister relationship was defined as being highly conditional.[7]

The Springs and Autumns ministers who found *zhong* so useful in their dealings with their overlords were themselves rulers of their own fiefs, and *their* servants, the retainers *(shi),* developed a rather different notion of personal allegiance to their masters, not to the state. This was necessary because of the contractual position held by the retainers, in contrast to the hereditary positions of the ministers. Retainers received not land grants (like ministers) but salaries, which made their very livelihood entirely dependent on their masters' favor. Hence it is not surprising that their concept of loyalty was concerned solely for the person of their master, without regard for that master's personal morality: the principle was, "my master, right or wrong," even if the master was rebelling against his own ruler.

Here economic dependency reinforced hierarchical relationships. The degree to which this could foster a sense of the harsh realities (and opportunities) of service can be seen in a remark of a retainer loyally following his rebellious master in 479 BCE: "In such an undertaking (that is, the rebellion), if you succeed you become a high minister, and if not, you are boiled alive."[8] Springs and Autumns retainers expected to serve unto the death.

But things changed, and it proved necessary to appeal beyond the ruler-minister relationship to the higher authority of *dao.* From the late sixth century BCE retainers began to replace hereditary aristocrats as the chief ministers of overlords, and by the mid-Warring States the lowest retainer could

realistically aim for the highest ministerial positions. These newly confident retainers consciously borrowed ideas from the earlier ministerial class, but also modified them considerably.

Unlike Springs and Autumns ministers, Warring States ministers lacked hereditary position and job security; they frequently changed masters in the search for better appointments, with Confucius and Mencius providing two classic examples of the type. Claiming loyalty to the altars of state for such behavior was a stretch too far, but the thinking transmitted in the *Lunyu* provides the idea that a "great minister" is one who serves according to *dao* and who should stop serving a ruler who does not follow the *dao.* Confucius used this principle himself on the numerous occasions when he changed master. Mencius elaborated, producing a ranking of loyalties in which loyalty to the altars and personal loyalty to the ruler came lowest, and service to the *dao* at the top. Mozi (or his followers) and the Daoists also placed service to *dao* above all other loyalties.[9] These developments shifted the basis for loyalty beyond the confines of the ruler-minister relationship and provided the roots of the concept of idealistic loyalty.

Unfortunately, a genuine devotion to *dao* often required the most impractical of actions, as exemplified in the lives of Confucius and Mencius, who never found any ruler who would implement their high ideals. Accordingly, reciprocity came to the fore.

Confucius showed the way with his famous statement that "[a] prince should employ his ministers according to the rules of propriety *(li);* ministers should serve their prince loyally *(zhong).*"[10] This can be seen as merely moderating a persisting hierarchy in which ministerial obligations remained greater than those of rulers,[11] for while the ruler who breached propriety could make his ministers suffer (as, for instance, the tyrant Zhou enslaved the viscount of Ji and cut out the heart of his uncle Prince Bi Gan), the minister's ultimate recourse was only resignation from their office. In the Warring States context of political fragmentation, however, resignation was a powerful act because when ministers resigned, they took their skills to some other polity, thus posing a serious threat to their former master. Consequently, Pines argues that the *Lunyu* formulation was part of a much more radical reciprocity that dramatically undermined hierarchy in the ruler-minister relationship.[12]

Under this rubric the loyalty of ministers had to be earned by the ruler; it was not an obligation. Masters who wished to retain the allegiance of their ministers had to treat them at least politely and preferably as if they were teachers. Pines therefore reads *li* here as primarily about "polite treatment of the minister" and sees loyalty as something "traded in exchange for the ruler's respect."[13] The mutual obligations and absence of hierarchy are

summed up by the statement found in the texts discovered in a late-fourth-century BCE tomb at Guodian in Hubei that "[r]uler and minister are [like] friends; [they] select [each other].[14]

Although ministers were concerned to be regarded and remembered as loyal ministers *(zhongchen),*[15] it was evident that their real aim was earthly riches and not the pursuit of *dao* at all, and various anecdotes illustrate that wealth and power were the only source of respect in this period and the only things that motivated a minister to give his loyalty.[16] The roots of such ideas can be seen in the contractual nature of the lord-retainer relationship in the Springs and Autumns, by which it was already considered legitimate for retainers to change master in pursuit of their personal interests.[17] But such actions could not become widespread until the rising value of retainers/ministers and increased political fragmentation created a seller's market for their services.

The danger to rulers presented by ministerial resignations led to considerable mistrust between masters and putative servants, and rulers increasingly looked with disfavor on the Confucians, whose ideas justified ministerial fickleness. Right at the end of the Warring States, Xunzi developed a synthesis designed to protect the position of Confucians. He needed to convince rulers that Confucians were useful and could be trusted, while simultaneously ensuring they were not simply required to be obedient and nothing more. Xunzi's "Chen dao" chapter remained a guide for ministers for centuries. A minister's true loyalty must be to the state, for the sake of which he could reprimand or disobey his lord, but since Xunzi identified the interests of the state and of the ruler as one and the same, there was no danger to the lord, who was owed loyalty because of his position as ruler, not for his own personal qualities. Disobedience to a ruler was permitted, but only for the sake of *dao,* which was equated with state interests. Loyalty to *dao* was thus the same thing as loyalty to the state, which was the same thing as loyalty to the ruler.[18]

This attempt to draw together the two strands of relational loyalty with the imprimatur of idealistic loyalty allowed gains for all parties: the minister preserved his dignity, political stability was not endangered, and the ruler benefited personally.[19] But the greatest advantage surely accrued to the ruler. Xunzi, like his forebears and contemporaries, had to cross borders to find work, but he dealt with the morality of changing masters by simply not discussing it.[20] At the same time he noted that "Yu Shun and Xiao Ji were filial, but their relatives did not love them; Bi Gan and Zi Xu were *zhong,* but their lords did not employ them."[21] Classically, the dilemma was that of Qu Yuan, of whom more later. Xunzi thereby acknowledged that even if one possessed

the requisite qualities for serving a lord, that lord was not obliged to have the *dao* to recognize one's talents. He implied that resigned or exiled officials must simply wait for a better time.

Unlike his self-confident predecessors, Xunzi no longer assumed that ministers could find another job whenever they chose. Equality between master and minister was slipping from view and the balance of power was shifting back to the ruler. Although Xunzi's synthesis was not yet adopted in its entirety, his analysis did form the basis for subsequent notions of loyalty, which accordingly became a portmanteau concept comprising several intertwined strands.

The framing of options during the Han

The crucial development of the Han (and, briefly, of the Qin before it) was the concentration of recognized political authority upon a single source, with the concomitant loss to ministers of realistic options as to where to place their allegiance. Choices had flared brightly during the struggle for supremacy between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, but Liu's victory closed off the alternatives once more. The introduction of *dao* as a factor conditioning loyalty during the Warring States had suggested a connection between *zhong* and political legitimacy that now came into its own.

Where ministers had many possible masters to choose from, the belief that one ruler had *dao* did not preclude others from having it too. *Dao* was conceived as an infinite resource and *zhong* could be granted to any who possessed it. With unification under the Qin and Han, possession of *dao* was restricted to a single emperor, who thereby held title to the theoretically indivisible Mandate of Heaven *(tianming)* and exclusive rights to receive *zhong*.[22] Under a unified empire, ministers no longer had a choice of whom to serve, they could only choose whether to serve or not.

Although the concentration of authority in a single emperor limited the minister's options, challenges to the ruler nevertheless remained possible, justified by claims that the Mandate had been transferred. However, challengers were rebels unless and until their legitimacy was proved by military success.[23] Officials thus acquired a new problem: faced with rebellion, they were not permitted to wait and see who won, but had to choose between ruler and rebel when it was still impossible to know which would be successful. Those supporting a ruler who kept his throne would be praised under the rubric of undying (hierarchical) loyalty to a (provenly legitimate) regime under threat, while those backing a usurper who founded a dynasty (like Wang Mang, r. 9–25 CE; or indeed Liu Xiu—Han Guangwudi—r. 25–57 CE)

gained reward for practicing reciprocal loyalty, justifying their "premature" adherence to an unproven (but evidently legitimate) claimant to the Mandate by reference to his superior *dao.* Choosing the loser naturally brought hazards, frequently fatal, that wise folk sought to avoid. The morality of choices was judged according to the outcome of events, not measured against any absolute moral standard.

Under these conditions both the old practice of changing master and the new possibility of refusing to serve became acts it was possible to interpret as breaches of ethics. Accordingly, *zhong* ceased to simply describe a relationship between ruler and minister and became a broader moral concept offering a framework for articulation of the dilemmas posed by unenviable choices. Under the Han, the idealistic strand of loyalty came to the fore as the only recourse of those protesting a ruler to whom there was no alternative, but relational loyalty did not disappear entirely.

Refusal to serve the sole bearer of political authority was a very different decision from seeking a better master, and raised many new problems regarding what constituted loyalty and how best to practice it. Qu Yuan (338–278 BCE), who had committed suicide rather than serve a master he considered immoral, and had written the "Li sao" poem to explain himself, became a focus for discussion of these issues. Sima Qian and Ban Gu set out divergent opinions of him in the *Shiji* and *Han shu,* and Yang Xiong's (53 BCE–18 CE) critical "Contre sao" provoked spirited defenses of Qu's poetry and behavior.[24]

Although the topic was idealistic loyalty, the discussion was conducted entirely in terms of whether Qu's opposition and suicide were noble or selfish; whether he was justified in killing himself, or whether he would have done better to live and serve. Sima Qian at one point wondered why Qu Yuan did not simply take his talents into the service of another, but few others seemed to challenge the assumption that ministers could have only one master or none.[25] And even when Qu was praised for his choices, he was simultaneously seen to be afflicted with a kind of madness for making them. The more important discourse here is about nonconformity—seen chiefly as a problem—rather than about who should receive an official's loyalty.

The new range of options was also approached from the opposite direction, of continued service. As selected writings attributed to the Confucian school gradually became canonical under the Han, so they shaped the possibilities for future interpretations of the concept of loyalty. It was these, not Qu Yuan's approach, that developed into an orthodoxy on loyalty in the period before the eleventh century. The *Lunyu* itself includes little direct discussion of *zhong* other than a basic definition: "when dealing with others do

your best,"[26] and the statement of ruler-minister reciprocity noted above. Indirectly, however, the *Lunyu* as it has been transmitted since the Han dynasty provides us with a pivotal story, together with alternative readings of the events. These reveal the extent to which the requirement of loyalty unto death had taken hold, but they also offered opportunities to mediate real-life dilemmas and interpret the results.

In the *Lunyu*'s version of the tale of the Qi minister Guan Zhong, a disciple of Confucius supposes that Guan could not have had benevolence *(ren)* because he failed to die for his master, Prince Jiu, and, worse, went on to serve the very Duke Huan who had killed the prince. This voices an evidently widespread assumption that a minister should die in the service of his lord, which then allows Confucius to subvert the norm by setting Guan Zhong's achievements against this one shortcoming.

> It was due to Guan Zhong that Duke Huan was able, without a show of force, to assemble the overlords nine times. Such was his *ren.* Such was his *ren.* . . . [He] helped Duke Huan to become hegemon over the overlords and to bring unity and order to All under Heaven; to this day, the common people still enjoy the benefits [of these acts]. Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair loose and folding our robes to the left. Surely he was not like the common man or woman who, in their petty faithfulness, commit suicide in a ditch without anyone taking any notice.[27]

The positive response to Guan Zhong here did not prevent the *Lunyu* from criticizing Guan elsewhere for using rites above his station,[28] and other texts in the Han canon took the story of Guan Zhong in an entirely different light. The *Mencius* stated that any leader could become a true king and so was critical of Guan for allowing Duke Huan to remain merely a leader. Where the overriding need is for a true king, the means are secondary, and Mencius does not even consider the issue of whether Guan should have died for Prince Jiu. Meanwhile, contemporaries of Mencius saw Guan as a model for bringing order to chaos.[29]

Xunzi, accepting that true kings were rare and that a second-best ruler could still bring some order, regarded Guan Zhong as an "accomplished minister" or *gongchen* ranked middle in worth between the sage minister and the rebellious or flattering. It was, however, still clear to Xunzi that while Guan Zhong could be praised for his achievements, his lack of the great virtues of benevolence and integrity rendered him unfit for the highest position of minister of a true king.

The Guan Zhong story as deployed in the Han canon confirms a hierar-

chical norm—of dying for one's master—that had previously been practiced only during the Springs and Autumns and only by *shi* retainers, but it became widespread as a theory in the Han due to a shift in the available political options. The Warring States situation of morally unproblematical choice between many masters had been transformed into the much more difficult decision between service and withdrawal exemplified by the idealistic loyalty of the Qu Yuan story, where personal suffering could be compounded by doubts about the morality of withdrawal itself. The Guan Zhong story was an exemplar for those at the other end of the scale, offering alternatives to the norm of undying loyalty to those facing a change of regime or wider disorder, options reflected in different interpretations of *zhong* within the spectrum of relational loyalty. These alternatives would probably disqualify a minister from being ranked among the truly virtuous, but were nevertheless an acknowledgment that turbulent times required different rules. The implications of the various options charted through the two stories of Qu Yuan and Guan Zhong were thoroughly tested during the three-and-a-half centuries of political fragmentation that followed the end of the Han dynasty.

Ideal and reality after the Han

The period between the Han and the Sui provided plentiful opportunities to put into practice every aspect of loyalty, but in the face of overwhelming amounts of material I will draw my observations from just one work.[30] Yan Zhitui's *Yan shi jiaxun,* or *Family instructions for the Yan clan,* is one of the best-known works surviving from the period.[31] Yan looked back proudly to his grandfather, who, when Southern Qi was overthrown in 502, had starved himself to death in protest.[32] In its individualism, this was classic idealistic loyalty, which underpinned continued relational support for the previous ruler. Yan Zhitui's admiration for undying relational loyalty is also evident in his praise for a "southern barbarian" (educated to fidelity by assiduous study) who, when his master's enemies demanded to know where his master had fled to, was beaten to death without telling.[33] Yan states that "to lose one's own life in the protection of the whole family, and to sacrifice oneself in order to save the state: the *junzi* does not regret such acts."[34]

Nevertheless, Yan Zhitui himself served four dynasties and lived to see the Sui unification.[35] Despite his espousal of conventional virtues and the example of his illustrious forebears, he was entirely pragmatic. For his own conduct he perhaps found comfort in the *Lunyu* interpretation of the Guan Zhong story, and he passed on what he had learned to his sons in the *Instructions.* Although he strongly advocated the proper fulfillment of duties—an

important basic interpretation of *zhong*—his work is full of warnings that it is best to keep one's head down. He advised his sons against pushing themselves forward, whether with unsolicited advice or in competition for posts, and he warned of the dangers of opportunism in taking high office.[36] His final position on the issue of serving different regimes is this:

> Not to bend [the knee] before two [imperial] families was the integrity of [Bo] Yi and [Shu] Qi; to refuse to serve the wrongful ruler was the principle of Yi [Yin] and Ji[zi]. Since the Springs and Autumns period there have been many families annexed and states conquered; and thus the relationship between a prince and a minister cannot be permanently maintained. However, when a *junzi* breaks friendship with a person, he should never speak ill of the latter. If suddenly he has to bend his knee in serving another person, he should not change his thoughts toward his former chief, whether the chief still exists or not. When Chen Kongzhang was in charge of correspondence under [Yuan] Shao, he called [Cao] Cao a jackal or wolf; while later writing official proclamations for the Wei kingdom, he regarded [Yuan] Shao as a venomous serpent. He may have had no control over this, having been ordered to use such terms by the current ruler; nevertheless, this is a great source of trouble for men of letters. You must tactfully avoid it.[37]

This balance between awareness of an ideal and a pragmatic acceptance that circumstances may prevent living up to it is resolved here by accepting external necessity while maintaining internal integrity, and yet all without going to the extremes of a Qu Yuan. This resolution incorporates a nostalgia for a higher ideal of loyalty that could have had direct application in the next period of political fragmentation—the late ninth and tenth centuries—but instead seems largely absent.

A range of interpretations in the Tang

Before this, however, the Sui-Tang had their own share of upheavals and developed a corresponding set of practical interpretations of loyalty. Tang attitudes to the question of loyalty are worthy of extensive study in their own right, for which there is not space here.[38] We can make a start, however, by noting that during the Tang, the canonization titles awarded posthumously to exemplary individuals provide evidence for official interpretations of *zhong,* which is defined in the *Tang hui yao* as a list of specific behaviors:

> To place oneself in danger in the service of one's lord is called *zhong.*
> To place oneself in danger for the benefit of one's lord is called *zhong.*

To surrender one's position to someone more worthy and be completely faithful [to them] is called *zhong.*
To place oneself in danger out of dedication to the state is called *zhong.*
To be concerned for the state and not think of one's family is called *zhong.*
To be pure and steadfast [whether] in victory or defeat is called *zhong.*
To not turn away (that is, to rebel or flee) when facing calamity is called *zhong.*
To live a settled life without yearning [for more] is called *zhong.*
To be incorrupt and upright, just and impartial is called *zhong.*[39]

Various *topoi* emerge in the lives of those canonized *zhong,* such as energetic remonstrance, the demonstration of great filial piety, virtue unrecognized, and refusal to serve, but overall, the most important interpretation of *zhong* seems to be that involving undying military valor, which is a form of relational loyalty. From a random sample of twenty-one out of forty-seven *zhong* titleholders scattered chronologically through the main section of the *Jiu Tang shu* biographies, over half are clearly in the military valor category, while rather less than a third show *zhong* remonstrance, with little or no involvement in military campaigns. The remaining sixth show a mixture of the two strands, with neither clearly predominating.

In the Tang, then, being *zhong* was generally a risky business, regardless of whether the situation was inherently dangerous, as on the battlefield. Indeed, an essential part of the definition seems to be that one behaves in an upright and proper manner in precisely those situations where it is dangerous to do so, at least inasmuch as it is unusual in one's own day. According to Tang scholarship, the *Zhou shu* explicitly included this element of physical bravery, requiring that to be worthy of the title individuals had to risk their own person in the service of their lord, and without attempting to evade danger.[40] Hence if all around you were corrupt, but you were willing to speak out and risk at least your career prospects, that could be *zhong,* but if all around were already upright, your behavior would simply be what was expected. Mere proper behavior, without some degree of danger, however small, does not constitute *zhong.* There has to be some element of nonconformity, of running counter to the tide for the best of motives. As such, the virtue of *zhong* was simply a specific application of Confucian ideas regarding the unconventionality of the true *junzi,* as seen in the life of Confucius himself.[41] Such notions had been exemplified by the admirable if eccentric Qu Yuan, and by the Tang they had become institutionalized as an integral element of all strands of *zhong.*

The An Lushan rebellions were of course the most testing time for loyalty during the dynasty. Had An Lushan permanently overthrown the Tang, we

would expect to see formalized praise of those exhibiting *zhong* to him appear in the official history of his dynasty. As it was, the Tang recovery brought with it a greatly increased concern with loyalty and with encouraging loyal behavior.[42] In the aftermath of the rebellion a clear opposition developed between loyalism and collaboration as two new poles for conceptualizing *zhong.*

During the rebellions many officials fled, going south to an exile that gave them cause to reconsider their outlook.[43] However, not all could flee and numbers of officials in both capitals and provinces submitted to the rebels and took service under them. Most hurried to return their allegiance to the Tang once the capitals were recovered, but the suppression of rebellions took another five years, and in an atmosphere suggestive of witch-hunting, those who had served the rebels had to suffer deliberately humiliating treatment, followed by trial for treason, and in many cases the punishment of exile, before they were allowed back into the fold.[44]

One of those who "fell into rebel hands" was the intellectual Li Hua (c. 710–767). Although eventually welcomed back into Tang service, he felt that his integrity had been irredeemably compromised by the breach of allegiance implied by his service for the rebels, and he refused to take any official post, setting out his feelings in surviving poetry.[45] Li Hua's conscience plagued him at a time when the issue of *zhong* had once again become clear-cut. The Tang forces had won; the dynasty was restored. Now blessed with hindsight, Li Hua had no difficulty in knowing whom he *should* have served during the rebellion.

He was not alone in considering his actions tantamount to collaboration, for there is evidence of resentment towards those considered thus to have helped end the halcyon days of the period prior to the rebellion. David McMullen locates examples of this view in the *Quan Tang wen,* while Jia Zhi accused the Tang officials of having lost their vision of a moral order and of never having acquired the principles of ethical behavior, such that they "lacked the wherewithal to stay firm in the face of the An Lushan and Shi Siming (d. 761) rebellions. An Lushan 'gave one shout and all within the four seas were disturbed.'" The poet Wang Wei also had to be defended from accusations of voluntary collaboration.[46]

On the other hand, Dugu Ji (725–777) admired Li Hua's writing for its manifestation of loyalty and filial piety.[47] In so doing he separated Li Hua's laudable inner qualities from his circumstantial external actions, and did not deem it necessary to condemn Li as Li had condemned himself.[48] Dugu Ji also considered the *zhong* issue from a more theoretical standpoint, via commentary on the behavior of Ji Zha, who three times refused to take the throne of Wu.[49] Dugu acknowledged Ji Zha's concern to "preserve his integrity," but

felt he had failed the state by his refusal to help Zhou and keep the "barbarians" under control.

Dugu Ji emphasized the duty of service over the demands of personal morality and thus lent his support to an interpretation of *zhong* that could justify "collaboration" on the grounds of maintaining order, which was what the populace most needed.[50] Here the object of loyalty was shifted from an individual emperor to the abstract concept of a state capable of governing effectively, regardless of which dynasty (let alone individual) headed it.

With the punishment of collaborators came praise of loyalists. At about the same time as Dugu Ji's comments, Yuan Jie returned to the case of Guan Zhong, whom he thought overpraised.[51] Had Guan remained *zhong* to the Zhou, the dynasty would have survived and the rise of Qin been prevented. In this vein, the restored Tang dynasty granted the canonization title of *zhong* to several prominent loyalists, including Duan Xiushi, Guo Ziyi, and Yan Zhenqing, whose loyalty chiefly involved military valor and stubborn faithfulness to the death. They are also noted for their fearless remonstrance, for it is fitting that these most important among the exemplary should be recorded as absolute paragons, but the emphasis remains upon martial loyalty and (usually) violent ends.

The very stress given to these figures suggests the danger the dynasty had been in and the need for the idea of loyalism, but there was nevertheless some disagreement as to how fanatical this should be. In 757 the virtue of Zhang Xun was debated.[52] Zhang had been so determined not to be starved out by rebels that he and his troops are said to have killed and eaten the entire noncombatant population of their besieged city, apparently amounting to twenty or thirty thousand people by the time the city fell. Zhang Xun had encouraged his troops to the necessity of this by first killing and eating his own concubine. The rebels were said to have respected Zhang, but as he clearly would not serve them, they could only kill him.[53]

Some Tang memorialists now questioned whether Zhang Xun's behavior had not been excessive and suggested that surrender might have preserved more life. The emperor settled this question with an edict saying unequivocally that Zhang's actions were undoubtedly meritorious. Nevertheless, enough doubt remained that the *Tang hui yao* does not list Zhang Xun as receiving a *zhong* title, although his *Jiu Tang shu* biography appears in the "loyal and upright" *(zhongyi)* section. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the emperor should be concerned to praise precisely those actions that were the most extreme in their expression of loyalty to the dynasty. By the ninth century, loyalist martyrs from the An Lushan period were among several well known to a wide audience through semipopular biographies.[54] Similar figures

from earlier periods also entered the wider imagination and, in the case of Qi Taigong of the early Western Zhou, the Tang imperial house even promoted an official cult in his honor, which was continued by at least some of the Five Dynasties regimes.[55]

This intense discussion of *zhong* after the rebellion recast the framework within which the concept could be understood. The two aspects of relational loyalty each developed into one pole of an opposition. The hierarchical view that stressed service to the lord gave rise to loyalism directed towards a particular dynasty rather than an individual ruler, while the reciprocal approach that justified changing masters acquired negative connotations as collaborationism but could sometimes be defended by invoking the necessity for a state that could maintain order. Meanwhile, although idealistic loyalty continued to offer the option of withdrawal,[56] its appeal to higher authority was now also used more explicitly to endorse the other kinds of loyalty, both to bolster loyalism and at the same time to justify working for people who proved to be no more than rebels.

Ideas of *zhong* during the Five Dynasties

A further take on loyalty in the Tang comes from the biographies of "loyal and upright" *(zhongyi)* officials in the *Jiu Tang shu,* compiled during the Later Jin (936–947). Although the compilers worked from materials produced during the Tang itself, they made the final decisions about who was included in this section. The selection emphasizes different aspects of *zhong* at different times, in a manner that seems largely dictated by the legitimation needs of a conventional dynastic cycle. The *zhongyi* biographies fall into three groups: the foundation period; the years c. 684–712, including the reign of Wu Zetian (690–705); and the An Lushan rebellions. Partly due to an absence of material, the *zhongyi* section contains no one who lived after this.[57]

In the founding period eleven out of fourteen biographies are of people who exhibited great valor, often to the point of death, in maintaining their allegiance to the Tang against rebels and bandits. This kind of undying military *zhong* was crucial to the success of a would-be dynastic founder, whose legitimacy was bolstered significantly by the steadfast allegiance of others. But all the people in this group are also, by definition, those who changed sides, abandoning their allegiance to the Sui to join the new dynasty promised by those who would turn out to be the founders of the Tang. At such a time, accepting the reciprocal approach to relational loyalty was the inescapable price for ministerial support. The Later Jin compilers of the *Jiu Tang shu* were happy to praise those who transferred their loyalty to the

Tang because reinforcing the legitimacy of their predecessor also argued for their own legitimacy.

Only three of the fourteen *zhongyi* officials from Wu Zetian's reign are shown to exhibit undying military valor. By far the majority show their *zhong* in acts such as fearless memorialization, suffering false accusations, and protecting members of the imperial family against plots or calumniation. These reflect the stresses of court life in this period: it was the idealistic aspect of *zhong* that was valued. In the first half of the eighth century the Tang dynasty was firmly established and unquestionably legitimate, fostering a self-confidence among the ruling elite. Difficult decisions about where to place one's allegiance did not have to be made, and reflection upon the quality of *zhong* seems to have been restricted to genres such as the frontier poetry of Cen Shen and his ilk.[58] *Zhong* was thus retained within the bounds of an idealistic loyalty associated with unjustly exiled officials.

The An Lushan rebellions supply half the total *zhongyi* biographies. Eighteen of these twenty-eight exhibited military valor, more than from the other two groups put together, but even at this time displays of martial courage were still not the only thing to be regarded as *zhong.* The selection includes fearless memorialists, the deeply filial, people who tried to maintain respect for the Tang court in their regional positions, and those who refused to serve either rebel or court and retired from public life. Although the size of the threat produced a suitable proportion of courageous officials devoted to the Tang, nevertheless this was really no more than was expected of them, for the Tang dynasty was not the challenger of established power, but the challenged. For the Later Jin compilers, benefiting from hindsight, there was no question but that An Lushan and his followers were rebels. At the time, however, the choices were identical to those found around a successful transfer of the Mandate: in both situations individuals faced the same impossible task of deciding in advance who would be the ultimate victor.

Court attitudes towards loyalty during the Five Dynasties itself can be seen in the *zhong* canonization titles granted in that period. Of eleven titles granted, all but one emphasize military valor.[59] This is no surprise since the Five Dynasties regimes never got much beyond their various founding periods. Military loyalty fell into the relational category, which, as noted above, could be interpreted as hierarchical or reciprocal depending on whether it was given to a surviving dynast or a successful rebel. The possibilities for different interpretations of military valor corresponded precisely with the needs of a series of short-lived dynasties. The post-An Lushan remodeling of the spectrum of relational loyalty into opposing poles of loyalism and collaboration disappeared from view as untenable under tenth-century circumstances.

The Song dynasty began in exactly the same way, gladly receiving the loyalty of people who had abandoned their former masters,[60] but when it came to compiling the *Jiu Wudai shi* in 973–974, judgments had to be made on them and others who had changed sides during the Five Dynasties. As we shall see in later chapters, the Later Jin historians produced little condemnation of side-changing in either texts or commentaries, nor any explicit discussion of the issue. Only thirteen years into the Song and still some way from consolidation, those involved in the history project had themselves crossed to the Song from some previous regime. Many would also have served more than one of the Five Dynasties or Ten Kingdoms. Hence it is not surprising that the *Jiu Wudai shi* compilers were notably nonjudgmental about changes of allegiance by Five Dynasties officials.

Contemporary comment on the difficulties involved comes from the Southern Tang poet Xu Xuan, who joined the Song when Southern Tang was conquered in 975. His *Song shi* biography is that of a memorializing *zhong* official and contains a formulaic passage in which his virtue of *zhong* is recognized and respected by the new dynastic founder.[61] Taking literary office under Zhao Kuangyin (Song Taizu, 960–976), Xu set out a conventional case for relational loyalty and reciprocity between lord and minister in three discussions appended to his collected works.[62]

Returning to terrain well trodden in pre-imperial times, Xu noted that the relationship was one of mutual benefit: the lord needs the reflected merit and skills of the official; the official serves in pursuit of the wealth and honor which lords can give. The relationship is complementary, not like that between superior and inferior or father and son, and the minister may choose whether to serve a ruler according to whether or not the ruler has *dao*. A king with *dao* will naturally select worthy ministers, and the minister is then responsible for advising and supporting the chosen ruler, but in fact, possession of *dao* comes down to how the ruler treats the minister: "He who treats the minister as a teacher is a king, he who treats the minister as a friend-to-be-taught is an oppressor."

Accordingly, those who had served more than one dynasty were not seen to have lost their integrity, but had simply abandoned unworthy rulers. Five Dynasties side-changers were thus pardoned, and the regimes they served made legitimate so that the Song could be considered their successor.[63] Xu's reassertion of the ancient concept of reciprocal loyalty was a natural outcome of political fragmentation of the kind seen since the mid-eighth century, yet inside fifty years these conventional views had again lost their validity, but this time forever.

Northern Song historiography: A change of stance

According to previous patterns, we would expect the consolidation of the Song to bring a return to a chiefly idealistic approach to loyalty. In fact, although withdrawal always remained available (and was more noticeably used from the twelfth century onwards), the intellectual leaders of the day showed more concern with redefining the relational strand of loyalty, reviving and effectively institutionalizing the post-An Lushan opposition between loyalism and collaboration.

This shift was accomplished not least through a revaluation of ministerial behavior during the Five Dynasties that focused especially on Feng Dao, who thereby became the archetypal side-changing minister.[64] Criticism of Feng was symptomatic of an increasingly absolute view of *zhong* that was to dominate the late imperial period and, with nationalistic modifications, extended into Republican times and beyond. Since the eleventh-century reassessment took place chiefly in histories that are essential sources for the tenth century, it is particularly important that we consider how attitudes changed.[65]

Ouyang Xiu in the *Xin Wudai shi* (1077) says this about *zhong* with reference to Feng Dao:

> For the entire Five Dynasties era, I found three officials of complete virtue and fifteen to die honorably in service. It is perplexing that a great many literati presented themselves as Confucians and claimed to study antiquity, enjoyed the remuneration of mankind and served its empire. However, inasmuch as those to act on principles of righteous loyalty hailed solely from the ranks of military leaders and warriors, it only affirms the total absence of peers within Confucian ranks. Did literati of less lofty virtue so disdain the times that they dared not surface, their revulsion for the prevailing tumult notwithstanding? Or were monarchs then too undeserving to reach them? Confucius believed, "Even in a hamlet of ten families, the loyal and trustworthy are certain to exist"—no hollow words![66]

In Ouyang's earlier revision of the *zhongyi* biographies included in the *Xin Tang shu,* the range of behavior treated as *zhong* is greatly reduced, with the memorialists and others being left out and others substituted, leaving a definition of *zhong* almost exclusively confined to military valor. In his Five Dynasties history, however, Ouyang implicitly devalues the military loyalty displayed by *zhong* heroes of the Five Dynasties by his argument that this *zhong* by itself was insufficient to any age. The type of *zhong* he prefers here

is that idealistic principle which should keep virtuous Confucians in reclusion during times of disorder, protesting the immorality of their age through their refusal to serve.

Sima Guang, who quotes most of Ouyang's passage, takes the argument, and the redefinition of *zhong,* a stage further. Where Ouyang is quite clearly drawing the longstanding distinction between becoming a recluse and taking service at all, Sima addresses the issue of changing masters. In his hands such acts arise purely from moral failings, and the unfortunate Feng Dao is pilloried to make an example:

> . . . in the home there are husbands and wives, outside [in the world] there are rulers and ministers. Wives [should] follow their husbands, and not change (remarry) throughout their whole lives; ministers [should] serve their rulers and should not change their allegiance *(er)* even if [it means] their deaths; these are cardinal principles of human morality. If some abrogate them, there is no greater chaos than this! . . . [I] consider that an upright woman does not follow two husbands and a faithful *(zhong)* minister does not serve two rulers. When a woman is not upright, although she still has the beauty of her gorgeous appearance and the skill of her weaving, this is not enough for her to be considered virtuous; when a minister is not faithful, although he still has great talents and knowledge and the excellence of his administrative actions, this is not enough for him to be considered honorable. Why is this? It is because they have shown themselves deficient in virtue. Dao being a grand councilor to five dynasties and eight surnames in succession, was like an innkeeper watching travelers pass by; they would be enemies at daybreak and ruler and minister by evening. He changed his face and transformed his words and never once was he ashamed. With virtue like this, although he might have had some small good points, how can he be worthy of praise? . . . While the emperors followed one another closely in their rise and fall, Dao prospered as before. He is the worst of treacherous officials.[67]

Ouyang and Sima agree that there are at least two sides to any conflict and that one could not have a civil war unless officials were willing to abandon their integrity and ignore any sense of shame in order to go and serve masters other than their original lord. It is assumed that this original lord must be the sole legitimate emperor, and must continue to be so. Hence lack of integrity readily leads to disloyal behavior because it allows for the changing of master. The notion of the transfer of the Mandate to the person with the most *dao* is nowhere to be seen. Instead of seeing loyalty and changing allegiance as largely the products of political circumstances, the

sequence is reversed, and *zhong* or its absence are seen as the cause of political stability or disorder.

In one sense this takes the reciprocal approach to relational loyalty to its logical extreme: if ministers really are as important as the ruler for the stability of the state, then their choices can create order or foster strife. On the other hand, it is clear that the responsibility runs only in one direction; since both writers sought order above all, they expected the ruler-minister relationship to be as hierarchical as that of husband and wife. While always retaining the possibility of idealistic loyalty (which both men had occasion to practice as they spent time in provincial obscurity because their time was not then), the risks inherent in reciprocal loyalty were now deemed unacceptable. Accordingly, relational loyalty was domesticated by reducing its range of possibilities to the hierarchical end of the spectrum. The opposite of loyalty to a particular master was no longer justifiable loyalty to a different master, but treachery demonstrating moral turpitude.

The stinging condemnation of Feng Dao does not seem justified by the circumstances, unlike, for instance, the vengeful treatment of those who had served the An Lushan rebels. Where the latter was the immediate response, fuelled largely by panic, to the close shave the Tang dynasty had just had, the attitudes expressed by historians such as Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang were formed upon returning to the historical account at a distance allowing cool reappraisal. Ouyang and Sima wrote in a stable dynasty; the transfer of the Mandate due to internal upheaval was far from their minds, although they were increasingly exercised about external threats. The source of danger had shifted from rebels to foreigners.

Living under the terms of the treaty of Shanyuan, there was a foreign power available on which to heap all blame, so it is odd that Ouyang and Sima pick on Feng Dao rather than a Liao southerner who could easily have been characterized as traitorous. In fact, so much do Ouyang and Sima concentrate on the number of regimes which Feng Dao served, that they make nothing at all of his brief service to the Liao. The focus here is the issue of integrity and two masters, regardless of which particular two masters they happened to be. Mere foreignness, by itself, was still not the problem it would later become. What mattered was virtue.[68]

These transformations in the meanings of *zhong* remove the flexibility in the concept traced here for the earlier period. The actions of the Song loyalists at the fall of the Southern Song showed that the idea of *zhong* was developing further, from the early Song sense of integrity demanding service to a single house into something else, whether related to protonationalism or a masculinist reaction against the feminized luxuries of life south of

the Huai.[69] Those resisting the Mongols seem to have been particularly conscious of their loyalist role, and Jennifer Jay has argued that there is a "construction of loyalism" in the records left by the loyalists themselves that ensured a "fixing" of Song loyalism "as a paradigm of virtues unchanged through the passage of time."[70] But even so cursory a survey as this suggests that the early imperial vision of *zhong* was much richer, and offered many more acceptable options, than the loyalty demanded in late imperial times.

Conclusions

The survey given here of the shifting concept of *zhong* shows the range of behaviors allowed within what was a highly accommodating and constantly evolving framework. Particular attention has been paid to the facet of *zhong* that employed the idea of the transfer of the Mandate to legitimize the abandonment of one lord for another. It is clear that the behavior of those who pledged allegiance to the Song was permissible on this basis. Those who crossed between the regimes of the South during the Five Dynasties would have come under that same rubric, save for the short-lived nature of the dynasties they joined. This brevity meant that the Five Dynasties subsequently suffered a troubled legitimacy, so that even though they had to be recognized in order for the Song to make good its claims, Song writers were uncertain whether it was possible to be properly loyal to the early tenth-century regimes.

Inasmuch as the Liao was simply another borderland regime, the first-generation Liao southerners could also potentially be treated according to the same standard, but halfway through the century the Liao (briefly) conquered a relatively unified South, and those southerners who crossed to Liao subsequently appear rather more uncomfortable with their situation than had their predecessors. Song attitudes with regard to *zhong* were already hardening by the beginning of the eleventh century, and as these attitudes became increasingly uncompromising, Song rewriters of history grew unhappy about side-changers. Song historians sought didactic effect in their own day through providing moral assessments of their predecessors, but the actions of those predecessors had been predicated on the old range of options and simply did not make sense from a post-unification perspective.

The only solution was to revalue the actions and imputed motives of the side-changers. One significant outcome of this endeavor was the intense criticism of Feng Dao. Furthermore, because of the Song ambivalence towards the Liao resulting from the treaty of Shanyuan, the same rewriters were uncertain how to treat the Liao southerners, who had not only moved among

the Southern regimes (like Feng Dao) but had joined a regime now perceived as the Song's greatest enemy. The efforts of Song historians to negotiate these complexities are visible in the changing emphases to be found in successive sources.

The eleventh-century historians lived in a world where one interpretation of loyalty held unchallenged sway, but tenth-century people inhabited a quite different world where a whole range of understandings of loyalty was available to guide or justify their actions. Something of how these understandings worked may be seen in accounts of frontier crossing from the earliest sources surviving for the tenth century, and we will trace different views and changes in those views by comparing earlier and later sources with each other. First, however, we must establish what patterns we can see in a survey of all crossings recorded for the tenth century.

CHAPTER 3

Crossing Boundaries and Shifting Borders

The First-generation Liao Southerners

> . . . a fragile structure of intersecting relationships whose balance had to be constantly adjusted and renegotiated.
>
> —Simon Maclean, *Kingship and politics*

It is hard to overestimate the difference between the eleventh-century judgments and prescriptions of Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang and the overwhelming uncertainties of the late Tang and early Five Dynasties. In 1005 the treaty of Shanyuan laid down a well-defined borderline between Liao and Song, marking the beginning of 120 years of diplomatically maintained peace between two states that accepted a relationship of equality. The demarcated line was carefully mapped and was expected to determine allegiances. It was possible for individuals to feel themselves to be on the "wrong" side of the border, not just politically and geographically but also emotionally. In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, however, the frontier region discussed in this book was not a transitional zone between two established states but rather comprised a multitude of small, inconstant powers, whose relationships, and thus their borders, shifted continually as each strove for survival and advantage. These regimes were led by ruling groups variously of Bohai, Chinese, Kitan, Shatuo, Tangut, Xi, or other origin, but what mattered in this period was not cultural identity but the placing of allegiances. If cultural groupings were not determinants of where borders lay, neither was territorial demarcation. Rather, borders were first of all a matter of individual relationships, from which the division of territory followed as a consequence.[1]

Political borders in the first half of the tenth century were, therefore, defined to a significant extent by the actions of those who crossed them, sometimes willingly, sometimes not. Individuals could contribute to shifts of the borders by changing their allegiance and taking the people and territory

they controlled with them. Leaders down to the county level (or occasionally lower still) could make choices over which master to follow that had immediate and sometimes grave consequences, not only for themselves but for those under their authority. These commoners, the vast majority, are rarely mentioned in our sources and even more rarely appear as individuals.[2] Only occasionally did they actively change their own allegiance; instead they usually found that the district in which they lived had been shifted to the other side of the political borderline by the action of a local official. In other words, while leaders had the power to move the border, commoners generally found that it moved over their heads.

This chapter traces the changing role of individuals in defining where borderlines lay by analyzing changes in the pattern of southerners who came under Liao authority against the background of Liao relations with the Southern regimes.[3] In retrospect we know that a bilateral relationship eventually emerged, but I shall argue that early tenth-century people, working without the benefit of hindsight, would not have recognized the significance of choosing the Liao over the many other available masters. This, then, is not least an exercise in how the Liao came to be so significant, taking the relationship between borders and loyalties as the chief object of scrutiny.

Over two hundred cases of crossing are recorded in the annalistic sources, where an incident may involve anything from one individual up to over a million households. Information on each case is set out in the Appendix (including full citations). While we cannot assume consistency, it is not unreasonable to take the data thus created as a general indication of trends. Accordingly, this material has been analyzed chronologically, and in various categories, to establish how the pattern of crossings changed as state power grew in both North and South (Table 2). Since our concern here is with the act of crossing itself, certain data have been omitted. We know of many people who entered Liao service or are found in the sources as prisoners of the Liao, but in most cases we have no record of how they got there. Hence the family of Geng Yanyi is not found here, and records of prisoners presented at court are not used.[4] Cases of deliberate deception are also omitted, as is the quite different situation in the northwest, where the Tanguts were beginning to build themselves a state.[5]

Types of crossing

Crossings can be categorized by the degree of free choice involved. Clearly there are problems with defining something so nebulous, especially at such a distance and often with very little information. Nevertheless, it is usually

TABLE 2. Crossings to Liao, 900–1004

	Alliances		Voluntary					Duress					Involuntary					Totals	
PERIOD	NO.	%	INDIV	GROUPS	TOTAL	%	RETURNED	INDIV	GROUPS	TOTAL	%	RETURNED	INDIV	GROUPS	TOTAL	%	RETURNED	NO.	%
900–904													3	2	5			5	
905–909	3		1		1									1	1			2	
910–914			1	1	2								2	1	3		2	5	
915–919	2		3		3		3	1		1			1		1			5	
920–924	3		2		2		1	2		2		1	6	3	9		1	13	
925–929			2		2								1		1		1	3	
930–934			1		1		1		2	2								3	
Subtotals	**8**	18	10	1	**11**	25	5	3	2	**5**	11	1	13	7	**20**	45	4	**44**	20
935–939	1		11		11		2	7	1	8		5		2	2			21	
940–944	3		2		2		1						5	2	7		2	9	
945–949	1		16		16		10	21	2	23		10	17	9	26		4	65	
950–954	2		2		2				2	2			2	5	7			11	
Subtotals	**7**	6	31	0	**31**	27	13	28	5	**33**	29	15	24	18	**42**	37	6	**113**	50
955–959													1					1	
960–964													6				6	6	
965–969													3	2	5		4	5	
970–974																		0	
975–979								2		2				3	3			5	
980–984				2	2									3	3			5	
985–989			1	2	3				4	4			3	20	23			30	
990–994														2	2		1	2	
995–999													2		2			2	
1000–1004			1		1				1	1			8	2	10		1	12	
Subtotals	**0**	0	2	4	**6**	9	0	2	5	**7**	0	10	23	32	**55**	81	12	**68**	30
Totals	**15**	7	43	5	**48**	21	18	33	12	**45**	16	20	60	57	**117**	52	22	225	100

Note: The grouping of periods into three sections in this and Tables 3 and 4 follows the analysis in this chapter, which identifies a sharp change of patterns after mid-century, and sees the middle period of the Liao-Jin alliance as politically distinct and worthy of separate treatment. Note also that in Table 2 alliances are not counted in the total of crossings, for reasons explained in the text.

possible to establish where the initiative for the crossing seems to have come from.

In *voluntary crossings* the people concerned faced no immediate external threat, and the sources give the impression that they simply decided to change their master of their own free will. Such a decision was frequently made by people with ambitions of their own, on the basis of political advantage, very often as a means of winning support against a master whose commands or demands had become unwelcome. The court officials who showed their willingness to join Liao in 946–947 expressed an often similar motivation, as shown by the couple of instances where bribes were paid to try to secure re-employment (see Appendix, #110, 135). Exceptions to this are a wife who was allowed to go from Later Jin to join her husband in Liao (#64) and a group of leaderless civilian crossings towards the end of the century (#176, 177, 184, 208). Concerns for personal safety could also motivate voluntary crossing (#215).

Voluntary crossings must be distinguished from *alliances* with the Liao and any crossings that resulted. Alliances involved people who regarded themselves as the political equals of the Liao and who sought Liao assistance without losing their own autonomy. Alliances were thus only an option for those with at least a province under their control and are typically marked by a request to Liao for troops to assist against a militarily stronger power. The founders of the Later Jin and Northern Han, for instance, formed alliances, for both retained supremacy in their own realms even as they accepted Liao rulers as their formal overlords (#48, 148). The crossings resulting from such relationships were usually in the form of hostages detained as surety for continued loyalty (#138).

In *crossings under duress* the crossers appear reluctant to come over, but face a direct and immediate external threat, with death as a prominent alternative to crossing. The typical example was the surrender of commanders inside a besieged city, usually in preference to the risk of waiting for a relief force. In these circumstances we can suppose some, albeit small, element of choice. Also in this category are members of the staff attached to prominent leaders where these subordinates' own motivation is unclear. Being in a position to choose differently from their superiors, as occasionally happened, there was at least some freedom of decision here. This is the most fluid of the categories, as classification often depends on tiny fragments of information. Sometimes it seems best to emphasize even the smallest element of choice and sometimes to stress the lack of realistic alternatives. Consequently, some crossings are classified in both this category and in one of the other two.

Involuntary crossings involved not the slightest element of choice. This category consists chiefly of the capture of defeated or fleeing troops, many of

the crossings associated with conquest, and the seizure of populations in raids or war. It also includes smaller numbers of those captured when their city fell, as well as the detention of envoys and capture of spies. Involuntary crossings are the easiest to identify, with just a query over whether to distinguish between troops who "surrendered" and those who were "captured." Although these may well amount to the same thing in practice, this study requires recognition of the difference in vocabulary, since surrender implies some limited degree of choice, while capture suggests continued resistance to crossing.

As Table 2 indicates, patterns of crossing changed dramatically over the century considered here. Before mid-century less than half of all crossings were involuntary, at least a quarter were entirely voluntary, and alliances formed a notable proportion of the total. After 955 people were much less willing to change their allegiance. Eighty percent of crossings were entirely involuntary, and no new alliances arose. The middle period of the Liao-Jin alliance and war, and its aftermath, bears considerable resemblance to the first part of the century, but the difference in the political situation warrants separate treatment. Our discussion will thus fall into three periods.

Fragmentation and choice in the early tenth century

The end of the ninth and first third of the tenth century was a period of immense political complexity and confusion. The necessarily brief account here is not intended to disentangle every detail but to illustrate the fluidity of political borders and their crucial relationship with the placing of individual loyalties. This was largely a period of active choices by individuals. The best placed made alliances, while lesser folk deliberately changed their allegiance or had to be seized forcibly, but we rarely see the ambiguity of crossings under duress or the associated dilemmas.

At this time two main leaders competed for primacy in the dying Tang empire. Li Keyong, prince of Jin, governed Hedong from his base at Taiyuan, while the former Huang Chao rebel Zhu Wen, also known as Zhu Quanzhong, held Bianzhou and several other provinces, broadly comprising Henan (Map 1). The Hebei governors *(jiedushi)* remained autonomous, but the eroding of that autonomy dominated politics until the late 920s. In 895 Li Keyong of Hedong sponsored Liu Rengong's appointment to the northernmost Hebei province of Youzhou (895–907), so becoming Liu's patron.[6] Five years later Zhu Wen of Henan recommended Wang Chuzhi to the governorship of Yiwu province (900–921) in Hebei, comprising just two prefectures, but placed to outflank Youzhou. By 901 Zhu Wen held the allegiance of most

of the governors on both sides of the Yellow River and in Hebei extended his overlordship to Zhenzhou (the princedom of Zhao). The alliance between Youzhou in Hebei and the Jin in Hedong was meanwhile strengthened by Zhu Wen of Henan's attacks on Youzhou, beginning in 900. At this point the Kitan confederation in the North came under the dynamic leadership of a new commander in chief *(yuyue)* called Abaoji, the future founder of Liao.

Kitan groups already had longstanding raiding relationships with their immediate neighbors in Hedong and especially Youzhou.[7] Liu Rengong had raided from Youzhou against Kitans since his appointment, and they had surely reciprocated. Abaoji, however, signaled his arrival on the scene with a series of spectacular raids, carefully recorded in the *Liao shi* between 902 and 905, in which entire populations were taken from Youzhou and Hedong and resettled in the North as farmers (#1, 2, 7). All social categories were among those captured, including some individuals who developed ministerial careers in the nascent Liao bureaucracy, such as Han Zhigu and Kang Moji (#3, 4). Abaoji's seizures ended when he made an agreement of brotherhood with Li Keyong, who thereby recognized Abaoji as his equal (#6).

In 907 Zhu Wen of Henan finally overthrew the Tang and founded the Later Liang (Taizu, 907–913) as a consequence of a defection and corresponding shift of a borderline that illustrates the complexity of political relationships and the importance of allegiances. In 906 Zhu Wen had again attacked Liu Rengong of Youzhou, leading to a joint Youzhou-Jin assault on Zezhou and Luzhou in southern Hebei, intended to draw Zhu Wen back south. When Zhu Wen's old follower Ding Hui submitted to the allies with Luzhou, Zhu Wen was not only forced to abandon his attack on Youzhou's satellite Cangzhou, but also took the throne as a means of asserting control of the situation. The act of a single person changing their allegiance could have a tremendous impact. These events were initiated in the frontier zone, leaving the court to a secondary role.

Abaoji in the North promptly recognized Zhu Wen's supremacy as emperor of Liang, but Li Keyong of Hedong remained implacably opposed to Zhu, and considered that Abaoji had reneged on their brotherly relationship.[8] Meanwhile, in Youzhou, Liu Shouguang usurped his father's position as governor (*jiedushi*, 907–914), prompting responses that reflect the immediacies behind many decisions about allegiance. Even while proclaiming resistance to Zhu Wen's expansionism, Liu Shouguang still sought from him confirmation as governor. Two of Liu's brothers objected to the usurpation, however, and each turned to the nearest neighbor able to offer worthwhile assistance. Liu Shouqi abandoned his population in Pingzhou and fled to either Abaoji or Li Keyong (#8). Liu Shouwen asked his formal suzerain, Zhu



Map 1: The frontier zone, 907. Note: All maps drawn by the author, based on *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji 5* and *6*. Note that "zhou" (prefecture) has been omitted from names to save space.

Wen, to punish Liu Shouguang's unfiliality, choosing the Liang emperor over his practical ally and overlord—and Zhu Wen's greatest enemy—Li Keyong of Jin. Since Liu Shouwen's province of Cangzhou would be the first target of any renewed Liang hostilities against Youzhou, such pragmatism is understandable.

Liu Shouwen's choice of allegiance was important in helping to bolster Zhu Wen's authority in the crucial period around his accession. In Hedong, too, Li Cunxu's succession to his father Li Keyong in 908 was supported by demonstrations of continuing allegiance. The Jin general Zhou Dewei brought his army to Taiyuan, but more importantly, Li Cunxu enjoyed the stubborn—and unusual—adherence of Luzhou to Jin in the face of repeated Liang attacks. Abaoji, for his part, wavered between Zhu Wen and Li Keyong. Li Cunxu apparently received Liao cavalry assistance not because he offered payment but as the son of Abaoji's sworn brother (#9). Yet a few months later Abaoji sought investiture from Zhu Wen. The stated price was that Liao change sides to assist Liang against Jin, and although no decision is recorded, soon afterwards we find Liu Shouwen of Cangzhou hiring Kitan cavalry (#10) to help him fight his brother Liu Shouguang and Shouguang's Jin supporters.

The uncertainty over whether Liang or Jin was going to end up with the Mandate allowed leaders like Liu Shouguang to try to play the situation both ways. In 909 Liu offered Zhu Wen the opportunity to pacify the Jin and simultaneously presented to Jin the chance to destroy the usurping Liang. Zhu Wen thereupon elevated Liu Shouguang to be prince of Yan, thereby abandoning Liu Shouwen's party (now led by Shouwen's son). Abaoji likewise offered Liu Shouwen no further help; Cangzhou fell early in 910, and Shouwen was executed.

Thus secured in Youzhou, Liu Shouguang developed ever more grandiose ambitions and in 911 declared himself emperor of Great Yan. But loss of support soon destroyed him as it had his brother, though in more spectacular fashion. Shouguang first alienated all his neighbors by killing a Jin envoy, threatening to attack Jin, and finally invading Yiwu, conducting a despotic registration of his own population along the way. The Yiwu governor, Wang Chuzhi, sought Jin help.[9] Liu Shouguang turned to Zhu Wen, who overlooked Liu's presumption in the interests of fighting Jin.[10] But when Zhu Wen was killed, and the Liang throne changed hands twice within a year, Liu Shouguang found none who would come to his aid, including the Liao (following #15). Liu's generals, officials, and population fled. Some, like Feng Dao, went to Jin; others, like Han Yanhui, to Liao. Local officials often took their districts with them, until only Youzhou itself was left (#11–13).[11] The

city fell to Li Cunxu early in 914, Liu Shouguang was executed, and the Liang concentrated their attentions southwards. Abaoji was left with only one southern neighbor, the Jin (Map 2).

Headline events could contrast greatly with localized situations and be affected by them. In 915 a mutiny at WeiBo in southernmost Hebei provoked the next round of the Liang-Jin conflict, which ended eighteen months later with Li Cunxu master of all the Hebei provinces. During the fighting Abaoji had rejected Liang overlordship, declaring himself emperor (Taizu, 916–926), taking a reign title, and adopting his own calendar, although the Liang continued to send envoys. Meanwhile, Li Cunxu of Jin sent his aunt and uncle as hostages to the Liao court (#19–20), strongly suggesting a revived agreement with Abaoji. However, local events put paid to this. The Jin governor of Xinzhou_1, resented for his poor governance, was killed by his army under Lu Wenjin in 917. When Xinzhou_1 city refused him entry, Lu Wenjin led the army over to Liao, who appointed him Youzhou provisional governor *(liuhou)* and backed his attempt to take control there, which would have moved the borderline between Jin and Liao (#21–22). As it was, the Jin governor retained Youzhou city, but only after a siege of several months.

In the same period Abaoji also led more major raids against Jin, seizing populations in northern Hedong and sometimes capturing governors such as Li Siben and Song Yao (#18, 23–24, 28).[12] Yet the everyday realities of coexistence between Jin Youzhou and the Liao continued as before, without wider impact. Hence Kitan raids from Pingzhou on Youzhou are reported for some years, while Kitan groups also pastured flocks peacefully in Pingzhou and Yingzhou_3 with the knowledge of the Youzhou governor.[13]

This changed during the 920s, however, as Liang strength waned and Abaoji became increasingly the only viable backer for the minor leaders of the frontier region seeking to preserve their autonomy against the rising power of Jin at Taiyuan. In 921 the "elected" provisional governor of Zhenzhou, Zhang Wenli, took the province over to Liao allegiance (#25, 32). Zhang's predecessor had held his post from Jin, and Zhang Wenli sought confirmation from Li Cunxu accordingly, but he also asked the Liang for practical help. Both agreed but then changed their minds, so Zhang turned to Abaoji, giving Li Cunxu a pretext for besieging Zhenzhou.

Wang Chuzhi, governor of tiny, neighboring Yiwu, feared he would be next. He asked one of his sons, Wang Yu, then a Jin prefect, to seek Liao help to relieve the Jin siege of Zhenzhou, but Wang Chuzhi was deposed by another son, Wang Du, before the relief force arrived (#26–31). The deposer Wang Du switched sides to *support* Li Cunxu against Zhenzhou, and



Map 2: Liao, Taiyuan Jin, and Later Liang, 914

accordingly Wang Yu's Liao force attacked Wang Du's seat of Dingzhou, but could not prevent the Jin capture of Zhenzhou in 922. Abaoji, meanwhile, seems to have exploited the alliance with Wang Yu to seize further entire populations from Jin and take lasting control of Pingzhou (#33–36).

With the foundation of Later Tang in 923, Li Cunxu (Zhuangzong, 923–926) declared his mastery of the South, feeding a virtuous circle that drew followers and enhanced his confidence. Setting aside previous disagreements, he established cordial intercourt relations with Abaoji that were not upset by ongoing Kitan border raids and allowed both rulers to expand in other directions just before their deaths: Tang conquered Shu in 925, and the Liao conquered Bohai in 926 (Map 3). Crossings to Liao decreased greatly under Li Cunxu and his successor Li Siyuan (Mingzong, 926–933). Indeed, Lu Wenjin, Liao governor at Pingzhou since leaving Jin in 917, took a huge army *back* to Tang allegiance shortly after Li Siyuan's accession, apparently claiming that they missed their homeland.[14]

Although the new Liao emperor, Deguang (Taizong, 926–947), was not expansionist, Lu Wenjin's crossing shifted the borderline to take Pingzhou under Southern control, prompting Liao to retake it early in 928. Deguang also still assisted ambitious Tang governors on request, notably Wang Du of Yiwu. Wang's choice of allegiances had made him Jin governor in Yiwu before the foundation of the Later Tang, but now he was inciting other Hebei governors to refuse tribute, taxes, and participation in military actions. When Li Siyuan ordered a Tang punitive expedition in 928, Wang Du promptly enlisted reinforcements from his former enemies, the Liao (#40). But when the Liao forces were defeated, Lu Wenjin's replacement as Liao governor in Pingzhou in turn brought his army of 20,000 over to Tang. Dingzhou fell six months later (Map 4). And alongside these major actions, unofficial Kitan raids and official envoy relations continued unabated.

In this period individuals at a relatively low level in the provincial hierarchy were offered many choices of leader, and the options they took determined the political situation to a very large degree. As in earlier periods of competition among regimes, loyalties were overwhelmingly contingent on perceived advantage to individuals, who frequently demonstrated a disregard for their own families and treated localities as, at best, resource bases. In the frontier zone the nascent Liao competed alongside the various Southern regimes, and on much the same terms. Within the frontier region as a whole, no one power was yet dominant over both North and South, although the number of contenders did gradually fall.

Although only a fifth of the total, alliances were characteristic of the early century (see Table 2). Arising directly out of serious attempts by one



Map 3: Liao and Later Tang, 925

leader to resist the authority of another, they show clearly the readiness of frontier leaders to look North (as well as elsewhere) for support, reinforcement, and legitimation of their efforts to gain and retain a greater autonomy than the ostensible holders of the Mandate wished to allow. The lack of new alliances after 955 corresponds to an absence of such challenges to superior authority. In the early 900s, however, the Liao was not yet established, and Abaoji was only just making his reputation. In the early 910s the challenger to superior authority was Liu Shouguang, who sought a Liao alliance only at the very end, when Abaoji deemed his position untenable and unworthy of assistance. Between 926 and 933 Later Tang power was at its height under Li Siyuan, who won provincial support and precluded challenges partly by allowing some autonomy to his governors. When Wang Du tried to resist Li Siyuan in 928, it was this support that deprived Wang of friends in the South and weakened his position so that the implied parity of an alliance with Deguang was infeasible. To get Deguang's support, Wang Du had to offer him submission.

There were even fewer crossings under duress—a tenth of the total for this period, with none at all before 915.[15] These are also highly indicative, reflecting the fluid situation of raiding and easy realignments characteristic of late Tang and most of the Liang, when there were many contenders for power. Where every leader was searching for the decisive edge over their rivals, it seems nobody thought twice about heading North if that seemed to offer the greatest immediate advantage. The Liao were also far less closely involved in Southern politics than later became the case, which may have made it easier for frontier people to turn to them.

In this period Southern leaders seem to have regarded the Liao as providers of extra cavalry if in alliance and of alternative recognized title to powerful regional positions if submission was offered. As it became increasingly apparent from the late 920s that the Liao were a military and political power to be reckoned with and that Southern rulers were increasingly able to exercise their authority and reward their followers, enthusiasm for alliances and voluntary submissions by regional leaders tailed off, and by the mid-950s disappeared. It was thus more likely that situations would arise in which submission might come only under protest.

Alliance and war in the middle years

The enlargement of the surviving regimes of Liao and Tang allowed the creation of a new form of relationship between them in the middle years of the century, in which the Liao became preeminent.[16] Fewer political centers

meant fewer options for lesser leaders, and accordingly the power to alter borderlines shifted from those with regional authority to certain individuals who served their rulers directly, whether at court or on campaigns of conquest. Military conflict now pitted courts against courts, so that success could win not just a province or two but an entire regime claiming imperial status. Such dramatic changes at the highest level of politics produced a huge number of crossings: half of the century's total fall in just these two middle decades. While the proportion of voluntary crossings remained much the same as before, and involuntary crossings actually fell in percentage terms, the rate of crossings under duress more than doubled in this period.[17] In other words it was far more common for people in the middle decades to be placed unwillingly in situations where they were forced to choose their allegiance. That such choices strengthened one party while simultaneously weakening the other remained a constant of loyalty decisions.

A resister of court authority, Shi Jingtang, provides the first and chief example of this new situation. Under Deguang and Li Siyuan the Liao-Tang relationship was essentially equal, which may have prompted increasing Southern fears of Liao strength and intentions. Effective defenses and other responses in Tang Youzhou had pushed routine Kitan raids west to Yunzhou$_1$, and in response Li Siyuan's son-in-law Shi Jingtang was appointed governor of Hedong and commander in four other frontier provinces in 932 (Map 4). His base at Jinyang (Taiyuan) was almost impregnable. One prefect, Zhang Yanchao at Yuzhou, refused to serve under Shi Jingtang because of a grudge and offered his allegiance to Deguang of Liao (#42). Although the borderline might not have moved because Yuzhou did not have a border with Liao, nevertheless such evidence of Deguang's capacity to attract allegiance away from Tang helped to provoke court fear of the Liao, but government by paranoia brought only catastrophe.

Far more dangerous to the Tang was Li Siyuan's son Congrong, who in 933 attempted a coup. Although it was foiled, Li Siyuan died soon afterwards, and a time of suspicion ensued. Li Siyuan's successor (Mindi, 933–934) distrusted his adopted brother Li Congke and tried to transfer him. Li Congke resisted and took the throne in 934 (Modi, 934–936). In his turn he harbored suspicions of Shi Jingtang and his requests for more resources to control continuing Kitan raids, and in 936 Li Congke ordered Shi Jingtang's transfer from Hedong to Tianping in Henan.[18] Shi Jingtang challenged the court and quickly gained provincial support, reflecting a widespread loss of confidence in Li Congke. A Tang punitive force besieged Shi Jingtang's capital at Jinyang, and he turned for support to none other than Deguang of Liao.

In return for Deguang's huge army of assistance, Shi Jingtang offered

Map 4: Liao and Later Tang, 929

subordination, annual payments, and the districts known later as the Sixteen Prefectures (#46–48).[19] Surrounding the Tang army at Jinyang, Deguang invested Shi Jingtang as emperor of Later Jin (Gaozu, 936–942) before rejecting an offer of higher annual payments from the Youzhou governor, Zhao Dejun, who wanted to replace Shi Jingtang as ruler in the South. Conversely, the Tang commander in chief, Zhang Jingda, stubbornly refused to surrender and was murdered by one faction of his generals (#49–50, cf. 51–52). While accepting their submission, Deguang also pointedly praised Zhang's loyalty. After the Tang provincial armies surrendered, Deguang stayed behind while Shi Jingtang marched to the capital at Luoyang, where the chief minister, Feng Dao, led the ministers to submit. Serving the altars as rulers came and went, Feng Dao took office under Shi Jingtang as he had under Li Siyuan and his two successors.

Innumerable officials, army units, and ordinary civilians crossed to Liao as a result of the Jin conquest, supplying 10 percent of total crossings for the century (#59–66). Most of these must have been in the Sixteen Prefectures, which also produced a handful of holdouts against taking Liao allegiance (Map 5). Wu Luan, administrative assistant of Yunzhou_1, resisted for six months, had Shi Jingtang ask Deguang to lift the siege, and ultimately accepted recall to the South (#62).[20] An official at Yingzhou_2 "would not suffer the shame" of serving the Liao and removed himself to the South (#63). Since so few are recorded, these reactions were not necessarily typical.

In any case their significance was restricted by the alliance being at the highest possible level, offering subordinates limited room for maneuver. Hence the success of recurrent objections to Shi Jingtang's rule was ultimately limited by the removal of the Liao as possible supporters of armed opposition. The first challenger, the Weizhou governor Fan Yanguang in 937, tested the sincerity of the alliance by asking for Liao help against Shi Jingtang. Not only was this refused, but there were Liao-Jin discussions on how to handle the affair.[21] In return, Shi Jingtang also refused to help those resisting Liao rule. In 940 over a thousand tents of the Tuyuhun fled Liao for Jin, complaining of poverty and cruel treatment. Liao envoys chastised Shi Jingtang for accepting the fugitives, and he returned a portion to their original lands.[22]

Shi Jingtang's cooperation strengthened Deguang's hold on the North, and although it required repeated expression of Shi Jingtang's subordination, the results also enhanced his own image as a worthy ruler. More secure rule, together with Deguang's insistence on maintaining clear definitions of which peoples and districts came under which jurisdiction, helped to clarify and "harden" the border between the allies.



Map 5: Liao and Later Jin, 938

However, the very terms of the alliance also roused dangerous objections. In 941 the deputy governor of Liao Shuozhou drove out his Liao governor and offered his allegiance to Jin. But when he closed the city to a Jin envoy, a Liao expedition took it and executed all able-bodied males to avenge the death of a cherished commander in the siege. A greater threat was the Chengde governor at Zhenzhou, An Chongrong. Claiming resentment of Shi Jingtang's subordination and the annual payments, he killed some Liao envoys, raided into Liao Youzhou, and demanded war. An Chongrong's proposal was quashed, but he remained in place, leading the Liao to doubt Shi Jingtang's fidelity until An marched on Yedu (Weizhou). This time Shi Jingtang sent Deguang An Chongrong's head.

Such events highlight how the alliance made voluntary crossing—the recourse of challengers to authority—unprofitable if not impossible. In this period the only crossings from Jin to Liao were clearly involuntary: a Jin envoy detained during the An Chongrong crisis (#67) and thirty households from the Shuozhou commander's following (#68). By denying alternatives to challengers, the alliance allowed Deguang and Shi Jingtang to resolve disputes by diplomatic rather than military means, so prefiguring the post-Shanyuan relationship. But the alliance still rested upon Shi Jingtang's formal subordination to Deguang, which proved its undoing.

Advisors to Shi Jingtang's young successor Shi Chonggui (Chudi or Shaodi, 942–947) encouraged him to repudiate his subject status. The consequent approach of war reopened the field of choice as the allure of Liao allegiance became available once more (Map 6). First to seize upon it was Yang Guangyuan, governor of Jin Pinglu at Qingzhou, who reported Jin weaknesses and planned to join the advancing Liao forces (#71). The Northern armies that marched late in 943 were led by the Liao southerner Zhao Yanshou, who had been promised emperorship of the South. Zhao Yanshou's attack plunged deep into Jin, helped by the voluntary submission of Jin officials with grudges or ambitions (#72–73), but he withdrew after fighting two battles without a victory, and Yang Guangyuan was killed.

Fighting continued in the next campaign season, but not in 945–946. At this time the banditry fostered by war led some to take local security into their own hands, including Sun Fangjian in Dingzhou. Originally pledging allegiance to Jin, Sun Fangjian despaired of receiving the help he sought and so switched his loyalty to Liao, offering them safe passage through Dingzhou (#84) before the opening of the 946–947 season.

But Sun Fangjian's allegiance was not the most crucial. After months of persuasion the Liao commander, Zhao Yanshou, agreed to return his allegiance to the South, promising to combine his army with the Jin forces to



Map 6: Liao and Later Jin, 943

take over the Sixteen Prefectures. But once the entire Jin army was in the field, Zhao Yanshou revealed his continuing loyalty to Deguang. The main Jin force was defeated and cut off. Its general, Du Chongwei, responsible for Jin resistance, chose capitulation, greatly angering his troops (#88–90). Another Jin general (#92) who had surrendered took the Jin capital Bianzhou for Liao. Deguang kept on Feng Dao as chief minister and received the surrender of almost all the capital and provincial officials (#93–110, 119–122). Most of them reacted to the Liao conquest as just another change of dynasty, in which Deguang was understood to have full possession of the Mandate, suggesting that they did not find Liao rule to be inherently unacceptable. It was some weeks before the Hedong governor, Liu Zhiyuan, reneged on his initial acceptance of Deguang and declared himself emperor.

There followed five months of occupation, during which Deguang began removing the entire Jin governmental body to the North (#111–118, 123, 126–128). This greatly inflated crossing numbers, so that the period 945–949 accounts for nearly a third of total crossings. Deguang's intentions became apparent when he personally took several thousand officials with him as he headed for home in the third month. Although many capital officials had gone through a regime change in which they remained in their jobs while the ruling house was replaced, or at most were moved between Southern cities, to be uprooted and transported north was unprecedented. En route, however, Deguang fell into what proved to be his terminal illness, and although a few literati continued north along with the palace women, eunuchs, and musicians, the great majority of the officials were left behind at Zhenzhou. Most of them were still there in the autumn when the garrison drove out the Kitan commander before submitting to Liu Zhiyuan.

Although many who began the journey thus returned their allegiance to the South, they still had colleagues in the North who could not or would not return. In addition, Deguang also claimed to have "obtained" over a million households of the defeated population (#129). Some coercion was evidently involved, since in the conquest period from 946:11 to 947:5, we find two-fifths of crossings were made under duress and nearly a third involuntarily (see Table 2). Considered the other way, however, we can contrast the one-third of the diehards against Liao service with the 70 percent of submissions involving at least some limited choice, suggesting that most of these households were probably gained through the chosen submission of those in charge of them, albeit frequently with reluctance.

Deguang's departure and death created a power vacuum in both North and South, permitting a reversion to patterns of behavior common before the Liao-Jin alliance. The Liao commander Xiao Han forcibly installed a son of

Li Siyuan to head a puppet government for the South, but few of its members had much heart for their task (#130–136). Zhao Yanshou in effect opposed this court by declaring himself regent for the Southern realm in an effort to secure his promised reward. But the Kitan nobles backed Deguang's son Wuyu (Shizong, 947–951), who returned north in the fifth month to consolidate his position. In the South, Liu Zhiyuan had already declared himself emperor of Later Han (Gaozu, 947–948). He had ordered all circuits to punish the Liao, and the *Tongjian* records increasing resistance to the Liao due to forced provisioning and harsh taxation, which helped to create a following for Liu Zhiyuan.

But Liu Zhiyuan had no automatic mandate. Indeed, the first crossers from Liao went to Southern Tang as the best alternative source of higher authority. As the Liao forces departed, however, the Later Han annals naturally chronicle occupations of cities, killings of Liao envoys, and a widespread transfer of allegiance to Liu Zhiyuan. Yet he also faced some stubborn opposition. He received the submission of Du Chongwei, left behind at Yedu-Weizhou by the Liao withdrawal, but when Liu tried to transfer Du Chongwei, Du resisted, occupied Yedu, and sought help from his erstwhile captors in the shape of the Liao general Mada (#137–138). After Du Chongwei's execution, Mada headed north to Dingzhou, still governed by Sun Fangjian. Sun maintained Liao allegiance until Wuyu of Liao tried to transfer him, whereupon he submitted to Liu Zhiyuan of Later Han.

Thereafter allegiances returned to prewar patterns (Map 7), with the Liao available once more as aid to the ambitious. In the final month of the Liao withdrawal in 948, there were three challenges to Liu Zhiyuan around the Wei River. Joining forces with Zhao Siwan in Chang'an, Li Shouzhen in Hezhong sought Liao assistance (#140), while Liu Zhiyuan had to buy support from officials before he could raise a punitive army. Li Shouzhen, however, repeatedly failed to win Liao backing, and eventually turned to the Southern Tang. When their force was beaten back, the challengers submitted.

The Liao rejected the advances of minor challengers seeking assistance and instead discussed with Southern Tang a joint expedition against Han. To counter the resulting Liao raids, the new emperor Liu Chengyou (Yindi, 948–951) appointed Guo Wei as governor in Yedu in 950, placing considerable power in his hands. This kind of reaction to the Liao threat was just what had given Shi Jingtang his opportunity, and after half a year the previously loyal Guo Wei took his turn to challenge for supremacy. Guo Wei, however, placed one of Liu Zhiyuan's relatives on the throne and continued to be trusted so that when the next Liao raid hit, Guo Wei was sent to deal with it. En route, his army proclaimed him emperor. The real extent of the

Map 7: Liao and Later Han, 948

danger posed by the Liao raids may be measured by Guo Wei's willingness to ignore his mission and return forthwith to the capital, where in 951 he established the Later Zhou dynasty (Taizu, 951–954). Feng Dao continued to serve as chief minister.

As ever, differing circumstances produced mixed reactions to the new regime, and challengers appealed for support to the strongest alternative sources of authority. Wuyu of Liao requested peace, but at the same time Liu Zhiyuan's brother, Liu Chong, declared himself emperor of (Northern) Han (Shizu, 951–954) at Jinyang and joined the Liao in alliance (#148). After a joint attack on Zhou failed, the Liao congratulated Guo Wei on his accession, but when Liu Chong requested formal investiture from Wuyu, the Liao began detaining Zhou envoys (#149–150). At this point the Dingnan governor, Li Yiyin, pledged allegiance to his neighbors the Northern Han. After Yelü Jing's accession in Liao (Muzong, 951–969), the allies suffered a first defeat, while the people of Northern Han were taxed heavily. This, rather than the claimed resentment of Han subordination to Liao, may be why many fled to Zhou districts, reinforcing the perceived righteousness of Guo Wei's rule (Map 8). On the other hand, Murong Yanchao, the governor at $Yanzhou_2$ in Henan under Later Han, first sent tribute to Guo Wei, then in 952 joined with Southern Tang and the Northern allies to oppose Zhou (unsuccessfully) (#151).

Although this pattern was familiar, the context was changing, for by 936 the stakes were higher. A firmly established state in the North had helped to create the potential for a similar state in the South, reducing the options for lesser leaders to operate in the frontier region. During the 930s only the luckiest were able to make alliances with even the slightest pretence of parity, and voluntary submissions rose accordingly (see Table 2). Hence Shi Jingtang's alliance with Liao won him an empire. But when Zhao Dejun failed to replace Shi Jingtang, Zhao's choices were to submit voluntarily or wait to see what happened. Since the first meant the demise of Later Tang, Zhao Dejun waited, and entered Liao as a defeated general. Zhao's uncertainty was shared by many who hesitated before deciding to cross, including troops whose decisions are not attributed to a leader (e.g., #43, 44). But more active resistance was almost unheard of among those in a position to choose: the only involuntary crossings in this period were some captured troops (#45) and the populations of the Sixteen Prefectures (#65).

The potential offered by a two-state system was suggested by Shi Jingtang's reign, when crossings were effectively impossible, but his formal subordination to Deguang, followed by the conquest of 947, had highlighted the ritual and political difficulties attendant on accepting assistance from another state to found a new dynasty.[23] The end of the alliance saw crossings



Map 8: Liao, Later Zhou, and Northern Han, 952

under duress overtake voluntary crossings for the first time, and in sharp contrast to 936, there was a large number of involuntary crossings, mostly following the conquest but also during the war. These included not just high-status individuals with many options, but also groups of soldiers and commoners acting on their own behalf (#78, 80, 125). There was, apparently, a developing reluctance to change masters and an emerging capacity to exercise options on such matters at lower levels of society. Perhaps paradoxically, the alliance had done as much as the subsequent Liao-Jin war to create a sharp distinction between North and South in place of the previous system of multiple centers.

War and state formation in the later tenth century

Zhou rulers, and Song rulers after them, were concerned to define their northern border more sharply still.[24] They paid new attention to territory and clarified the boundaries of loyalty. The effectiveness of these policies can be seen in the huge fall in overall rates of crossing (the last half-century provides only 30 percent of total crossings) and dramatically increased unwillingness to change masters. These processes were accompanied and assisted by an escalation from mutual raiding and defense conducted largely at a local level, to a virtually permanent state of full-scale war or war readiness directed by the Northern and Southern courts.

Guo Wei worked to extend the reach of the Zhou court and proved an attractive ruler. In 952 he banned plundering raids heading north into Liao in an attempt to end the ongoing bilateral raiding that undermined court control of the frontier region. That winter, flooding in several Liao border prefectures forced refugees south into the nearest hospitable terrain, which happened to be Zhou-controlled Hebei, where Guo Wei ordered relief to be provided. And at the end of the year the prefect of Linzhou turned from Northern Han to Zhou allegiance.

Guo Wei's successor, Guo Rong (Shizong, 954–959), fought his first major battle against the Liao-Northern Han alliance in 954 at Gaoping. Liu Chong of Northern Han believed his troops could win without Liao assistance and hoped in a single battle to destroy not only the Zhou but also the Liao, to recover the South, and to rid Han of reliance on another power. Guo Rong calculated that victory would secure his position on the throne, and demonstrated his tightening expectations of loyalty by ordering the slaughter of over a thousand of his own troops who had surrendered on the battlefield (#155). These deaths of those who deserted him drew a precise line that soldiers, at least, were now clearly expected not to cross.

Guo Rong marked both borders and boundaries more clearly in the service of overt expansionism. He dredged rivers in Hebei, built fortifications, posted garrisons, and declared his desire to restore the old borders. He sought to deploy moral obligation by ordering senior ministers to write on remaining loyal to one's lord in times of trouble. Meanwhile, Liao support for Northern Han grew half-hearted, and when Liao did nothing to prevent Zhou conquests in Southern Tang in 955–958, Guo Rong immediately took Liao Shucheng and six Northern Han fortress towns *(zhen).* In 959 he struck along the newly cleared water routes and captured three Liao passes north of Mozhou (Map 9) from defenders who surrendered with little resistance. In the new context of fiercely enforced military loyalty to Guo Rong, these easy surrenders suggested a lack of attachment to Liao that reinforced Guo's position and must have encouraged solidarity among his own armies.

The immediate danger to the Northern allies receded when Guo Rong died later that year, but the uneventful succession of a child of seven (Gongdi, 959–960) showed the strength of the Zhou state. Governors were no longer players of consequence; only relations between—and within—regimes mattered now. Hence the Southern Tang tried to exploit the succession by asserting their independence and renewing their friendship with Liao, but Zhou agents stymied this by murdering the Liao envoys to Southern Tang. Then in the new year of 960 a routine allied raid once again provided the opportunity for regime change. The devoted army of the Zhou general Zhao Kuangyin refused to fight unless Zhao replaced the child-emperor. Like Guo Wei before him, the pretender ignored the supposed danger from the north in favor of marching to the capital to declare himself emperor of the new dynasty of Song (Taizu, 960–976). Only one Zhou governor resisted, weeping endlessly over a portrait of Guo Wei and seeking help from the allies, but their joint expedition was a disaster. Zhao Kuangyin's southern neighbors Wuyue and Southern Tang sent their congratulations, and the Song picked up where the Zhou had left off.

Challenges within Liao and consolidation in Song led both courts to focus recurrently on internal matters, but Zhao Kuangyin followed Guo Wei in seeking to sharpen his borders in the service of expansionism. Zhao reiterated the Zhou ban on cross-border raids, ordered the return of plundered horses, and made appointments aimed at stabilizing the northern border and so facilitating conquest south of the Huai. Throughout the wars that followed, Zhao Kuangyin continued to seek closer regulation of the northern border, issuing several edicts against undesirable trading practices.

The southerly kingdoms were unwilling to submit, and Zhao Kuangyin was fully occupied by their conquest until the Northern Han ruler Liu Jun



Map 9: Liao, Later Zhou, and Northern Han, 959

(Ruizong, 954–968) died in 968, followed shortly by the murder of Yelü Jing of Liao and his replacement by Yelü Xian (Jingzong, 969–982). The Song besieged and flooded the Northern Han capital at Taiyuan, but the new Han ruler Liu Jiyuan (Yingwudi, 968–979) refused to surrender and executed a minister who advised otherwise. That this apparently improved morale in the city suggests that the boundaries around loyalty were not hardening only in the Song. South of the Song, however, Southern Han (970–971) and Southern Tang (974–975) both fell quickly. Bilateral raiding with Liao continued throughout, and the continuing value to Song of officials able to provide border security is exemplified by the governor He Jiyun (d. 971), said to have understood and terrified the Liao for some twenty years. By 975, however, both sides desired peace, and regular envoy exchanges began between a greatly enlarged Song and a Liao that was no longer automatically the dominant partner in the North-South relationship.

Winning one victory after another during the 960s, the Song were increasingly the beneficiaries of frontier crossings. There was a steady trickle of Northern Han and sometimes Liao submissions, including the Kitan general Jieli in 961 and sixteen Kitan groups after the Song departure from Taiyuan in 969.[25] While the Liao sometimes pillaged in Song districts (#165), the Song engaged in more systematic seizures of entire populations, including in 969, 10,000 households from the Taiyuan district of Northern Han for resettlement in Henan and Shandong with gifts of grain, and some 37,000 people during the 976 campaign.[26] These recall Abaoji's efforts to increase his resources, but the Song purpose was not so much to build up themselves as to deplete Han.

Crossings from South to North, by contrast, display a striking gap in the two decades from the mid-950s, with Liao concern focused on relations with their subordinates in the North. Hence Liao demanded the return from Han of 400 Tuyuhun households, reminiscent of their similar demand to Shi Jingtang, and reentered a raiding/envoy relationship with the Jurchen to the northeast. But crossings from the South—whether Zhou/Song or Northern Han—amount to just three in twenty years (#158, 165, 169), in marked contrast to the steady trickle from Later Jin to Liao during the earlier alliance.[27] It is true that any crossers heading north would probably have gone to Northern Han rather than Liao. The Han were one of two contenders for Southern supremacy, providing justification for anybody choosing to cross from Zhou/Song, and at a practical level there was a very long border between Han and Zhou/Song. The Han could have acted as the channel and mediator for Liao contact with the South, but in fact Northern Han received few crossers either. The near cessation of crossings heading north thus indicates an

increased unwillingness to change allegiance. And since most of the crossings the other way, to Song, were seizures of unwilling populations, it seems that reluctance to cross existed in the North as well the South. In both North and South, such growing avoidance of crossing boundaries of allegiance helped to firm up political-geographical borderlines.

The Liao conquest of 947 had brought many thousands of people into Liao, but no territory. By contrast, the Song conquest of Northern Han in 979 completed an overtly territorial program of expansion (Map 10), but one that still rested upon crucial submissions. Begun by Zhao Kuangyin in 976, the conquest was completed by his brother Zhao Kuangyi (Taizong, 976–997), who attacked Taiyuan from all sides and defeated a Liao relief force. The main Northern Han army surrendered, and two generals fled to Liao rather than change allegiance (#171–172). Others held out, most notably Liu Jiye, whose rewarding by Zhao Kuangyi recalled Deguang's praise of the stubborn Zhang Jingda in 936. But the final destruction of Northern Han spelled a realignment of individual allegiances so that, for instance, the former Han general Yang Ye became a great fighter for the Song against the Liao.

Northern and Southern strategy now differed markedly. The Liao did not attempt to convert battlefield victories into permanent occupation; hence in 980 they withdrew after defeating the Song at Waqiaoguan. Then from 982 the Liao became preoccupied with the legitimation of Yelü Longxu (Shengzong, 982–1031) and the recalcitrance of subordinate peoples. Zhao Kuangyi, by contrast, wanted to exploit the Liao withdrawal of 980 to seize Youzhou. His focus was securing his frontier prefectures to encourage cultivation. He stockpiled provisions in the borderlands and built fortifications, indicating a growing reliance on fixed defenses and the sharper borders they implied. Pushed to respond, the Liao paid more attention to people, and their preparations included retrieving a thousand households that had migrated to Song (#177).

Many people at all levels were becoming more unwilling to change their allegiance. Zhao Kuangyi failed to subvert the Bohai from their half-century of subordination to Liao, but in 986 joined with Koryo for an attack which, helped by local risings, almost overran the Sixteen Prefectures before the Liao forced a withdrawal. One of the defeated Song commanders—formerly of Northern Han—exhibited his new and sharper adherence to Song (at least in one account) by starving himself to death after the Liao captured him (#185). Other generals moved whole populations into Song districts as they departed. Victorious again near the end of the year, Liao troops took Xingzhou and Shenzhou, conscripted the locals into their depleted armies, demanded frequent military training, and transferred populations in their turn (#188–197).



Map 10: Liao and Song, 979

After 989 a desire for peace brought a ten-year cessation of direct hostilities, which sublimated into support for two rivals fighting over Dingnan in the northwest. Li Jipeng at Xiazhou had presented five Dingnan prefectures to Song in 982,[28] but a distant cousin, Li Jiqian, opposed this subordination. In 985 Jiqian made himself Dingnan provisional governor at Yinzhou and offered his submission to Liao, who confirmed his position and married a princess to him. Although Li Jiqian was never an active or reliable ally, the Liao cheerfully encouraged him as an irritant to the Song, and through the 990s both cousins switched their allegiance back and forth between Liao and Song as they sought immediate advantage.

The Jurchens and Koreans also sought advantage from the Liao-Song rivalry, but under tighter constraints. Both sought Song military help against the expansion of Liao imperial authority in the early 990s, but Zhao Kuangyi was unwilling to upset the peace between the courts. Instead he tried to formalize it in 994. Accordingly the Jurchens were forced to reaffirm their allegiance to Liao, and the Koreans deepened their relationship, even receiving a royal bride from the Liao consort house. When the Song and Korean rulers both died in 997, the Koreans tried to return their allegiance to Song, but it was Liao envoys who invested the new king.

As in earlier times, peace between the courts neither prevented nor was disrupted by localized cross-border raiding that continued throughout (#206–207, 209–210). But now Yelü Longxu, like earlier Southern rulers, occasionally ordered the punishment of those who conducted such raids, and the return of people, livestock, and plunder (#211). Rulers in North and South were willingly confining themselves and their people within their own borders.

A decade of proxy wars flared into renewed Liao-Song hostilities in 999, culminating with the Liao invasion of 1004 and the peace talks that produced the treaty of Shanyuan. Regular envoy exchanges resumed, providing a successful, nonviolent means of resolving disputes between the two states (Map 11).[29] The terms of the treaty are noted in Chapter 1, but here we should draw attention to some less commonly cited that indicate the institutionalization of the border. The frontier populations were to "maintain" the borderline and not raid each other, while the emperors pledged to return fugitives. These arrangements imply the prior existence of a known borderline; the difference was that it was no longer locally negotiable. The treaty mapped a border and located one definite point on that line by naming Xiongzhou as the site for handing over Song payments to Liao. Although there was no provision for markets in the oath letters exchanged by the emperors, the new fixed border nevertheless came to be punctuated, and thus partly defined by,



Map 11: Liao, Song, and Xia after the treaty of Shanyuan, 1005

official trading posts on either side.[30] The intention seems to have been to freeze the situation exactly as it was when the treaty was made, and to seal the frontier except for limited and carefully controlled trading and diplomatic activity.

The treaty of 1005 marked the culmination of state-building processes that brought the South up to military and political parity with the Liao. Zhou and then Song rulers slowly became the sole source of legitimate authority in the South, denying options to its regional officials and enforcing a harsher standard of loyalty on the military. In this process the Liao provided a conveniently antagonistic Other that made the case for Southern unity and thereby justified the Song conquest of the remaining Ten Kingdoms. As individual loyalties lost their immediate political significance, so territorial concerns came to the fore. The new relationship between states that could not defeat each other was expressed in a treaty, which took territory as the primary determinant of where loyalty should lie, so reversing the circumstances of little more than a half-century before.

For most of the century individuals predominated among those who crossed voluntarily, but during the wars of the 980s there appear to be several entirely voluntary submissions by groups of Song civilians, without any clear leadership, and who are not stated to be refugees (Table 2). They include seventy border villages in 983 who apparently placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the Southern Circuit of Liao (#176). Three months later a thousand households returned from Song to Liao, seemingly persuaded by a Southern Circuit official who was probably following up the coup of obtaining the seventy villages (#177). The other two incidents are isolated, consisting of 240 Song people in 986 and 17 Song *jinshi* with their families in 989 (#184, 208). This implies that even in this period some elements of the borderland population may have been more flexible or pragmatic in their attitude towards the Liao than were the central authorities, although we should note that all of these cases are found only in the *Liao shi.* These crossings occur in a period of Chinese history notably lacking in "peasant uprisings." Such risings throughout history were rarely more than local, and if crushed quickly might not register in our sources, especially with so much else going on. Yet it could also be that there was no need for risings, at least among the frontier populations, when there was still an alternative power to which submission could be made. Some support for this suggestion can be derived from the activities of Sun Fangjian at Dingzhou in the 940s, noted above (#84).

These voluntary crossings by groups of commoners stand in contrast to the almost complete absence of voluntary individual crossings after 955. There were just two: a Song general who, unusually, chose active surrender

over defeat and capture (#205), and a well-to-do fugitive from justice (#215). The proportion of individuals submitting only under duress also fell drastically from its level before 955, amounting to just a couple of fleeing generals in 979 (#171–172). This suggests that social and military status was a significant factor in choosing to cross. Whereas in the early tenth century more people from the higher levels of society chose to cross, often taking with them the populations they controlled, in the latter half many fewer individuals took this option, dramatically shifting the balance of numbers towards involuntary crossings, which comprise four-fifths of the total crossings for this period. Given that higher status conferred greater freedom of choice, the change in behavior among the ruling classes seems to reflect a shift in attitudes. The continuing survival of the Zhou-Song regime and the evident energy of its first two rulers may have allowed a revival of ideals of loyalty associated with stable regimes, which would chiefly affect the official and educated classes.

But ideological considerations may have been less important than increased imperial control, especially over army commanders. The first two Song emperors succeeded in separating military command from administrative jurisdiction so that governors no longer controlled the empire's best armies. As a consequence the actions of individual military commanders were less likely to involve the transfer of districts and their populations. Given their reduced sphere of action, such commanders no longer benefited from choosing to cross to Liao, so they stopped doing it, and thus (with the exception of the Song general Guo Rong [#205]) stopped taking their troops with them. In short, individual military leaders were of less importance than they had been, even though there was still a premium on their capture.

This impression is reinforced by the proportionately large number of military crossings without leadership during the later tenth century, as soldiers were increasingly abandoned by their commanders or made decisions different from them (Table 3). In contrast to earlier periods, only twice during the Song war did officers lead troops over to Liao (#194, 205), and when left entirely to their own devices, the soldiery showed a greater tendency to fight on and risk capture rather than surrendering. Between the mid-970s and the mid-990s three leaderless groups crossed under duress (#203, 209, 219), while cases of soldiers taken prisoner (that is, involuntarily) were relatively numerous. Troops had never necessarily needed commanders to encourage them to hold out against the enemy (or to surrender when their situation looked impossible); indeed individual generals such as Du Chongwei are said to have made their armies surrender against their will. Hence we can add to the absence of alliances and the reduction in voluntary crossings

TABLE 3. Military and civilian crossings, 900–1004

Dates	Military crossings						Civilian crossings					
	Leader	No leader			Total	%	Leader	No leader			Total	%
		VOLUNTARY	DURESS	INVOLUNTARY				VOLUNTARY	DURESS	INVOLUNTARY		
900–904										2	**2**	
905–909	1				**1**					1	**1**	
910–914		1			**1**					1	**1**	
915–919	2				**2**		2				**2**	
920–924	5			1	**6**		2			2	**4**	
925–929	1				**1**		1				**1**	
930–934	1		2		**3**		1			1	**2**	
Subtotals	10	1	2	1	**14**	20	6			7	**13**	21
935–939	8		1		**9**		6			2	**8**	
940–944	2			1	**3**		2			1	**3**	
945–949	12		2	1	**15**		7		1	5	**13**	
950–954	1		2	1	**4**		1			4	**5**	
Subtotals	23		5	3	**31**	45	16		1	12	**29**	47
955–959												
960–964												
965–969				1	**1**					1	**1**	
970–974												
975–979				3	**3**							
980–984				2	**2**			2		2	**4**	
985–989	3		2	10	**15**			2	1	8	**11**	
990–994				1	**1**					2	**2**	
995–999												
1000–1004			1	1	**2**					2	**2**	
Subtotals	3		3	18	**24**	35		4	1	15	**20**	32
Totals	36	1	10	22	**69**		22	4	2	34	**62**	

for this period the suggestion of a growing inclination, at all levels in the Song army, to resist the Liao to the end. Changes in the style of warfare, involving more and smaller fortifications and a Song army closely controlled by the emperor himself may well have contributed to a preference to fight and be captured rather than make a pragmatic surrender.[31] Some materials also hint at a period of great brutality towards prisoners, with an increase in mass executions, which would have encouraged armies to fight on.[32]

Yet the marked change in who decided to hold out against the enemy should also be set against the consistent absence of voluntary crossings by leaderless troops throughout the century. The single case, in an entire century, is that of Liu Shouguang's troops (#11), who evidently had good reason to flee. On this basis we might speculate that the mood of the common soldiery remained more stable with regard to crossing to Liao than did that of their commanders.

Most civilian crossings in this period—with the striking exception of the voluntary, leaderless cases noted above—were involuntary. That is, most commoners crossed because they were captured, whether in raids or as a result of full-scale war. As in the case of the military, civilian crossings in the earlier tenth century were made under the leadership of generals and officials, usually named, while later in the century the population acted largely without clear leadership. About two-thirds of these come from the late 980s, at the same time as mass defections of Liao frontier officials pledging their administrations to Song allegiance. The captives are those taken as a result of the Liao campaign to recover these districts, and although they reflect a failure to fulfill Song ambitions, they also contribute to a sense that there was a great deal of determination at all levels on the Song side. The *Liao shi* records these crossings most assiduously, indicating the importance to the Liao of acquiring population. But a great many civilian crossings arose not from court-directed action but from local cross-border raiding, which is likely to have affected more communities for more of the time than did war.[33] A couple of instances from the texts mention ransoming as a common feature of frontier life (#165, 211),[34] and the scale of this kind of activity is suggested by the explicit strictures against it to be found in the oath-letters confirming the treaty of Shanyuan.

Other patterns in frontier crossing

Crossings must be considered in the context of what happened to people after they arrived in Liao. For voluntary crossers and individuals of the ruling classes, the likely outcome would have been a factor in decision-making.

Naturally, larger groups and regional populations rarely had the same range of choices as individuals, and the majority found themselves relocated, often to cities and prefectures established especially for them.[35] There they seem to have been encouraged to farm, and artisans were sought out and employed by the Liao court. Armies and smaller groups of soldiers were almost always redeployed as Liao troops, sometimes in their old units, sometimes reorganized or split up under new commanders.

For individuals, though, the Liao regime could offer a deal similar to or better than that available from the other frontier regimes. The vast majority of recorded individual crossers did reasonably well out of their change of allegiance. Their immediate fates, where known, are noted in the Appendix. Generally, the least they obtained was to be left in their post, with only the source of their orders changed. Where the crosser's sincerity was doubted, a small Liao force or an inspector of some kind might keep an eye on the new subject—for instance, an inspector and 300 cavalry went to "oversee" Lu Wenjin's replacement at Lulong after Lu returned to the South (#12). In many cases the rewards of crossing came in material form, such as gold, silks, and so forth, which must have eased the transition considerably. It was not unusual for promotion to be part of the package as well. From the earliest tenth century and right through the conquest of Later Jin, it was fairly common for senior generals to be given high honorific court posts and important regional positions at the level of governor and vicegerent *(liushou).* After the conquest there are fewer individual crossings, and as the officials are less important they are recorded in less detail. What information we have shows the same tendency continuing. Pan Yunian, Zhao Anren, and Wang Jizhong attained high positions within Liao (#147, 158, 217); the general Guo Rong appears to have retained his post (#205); a half-dozen captive literati received official positions (preceding #211); and Wang Jien and Wu Bo both developed their careers while in Liao (#218, 225).

On the down side, more crossers ended up dead as the century wore on, but many of these were either not at Liao command or entirely comprehensible in the circumstances. Up to the conquest of Jin there are a couple of suicides, both of people unusually torn apart by the pressures they faced. Li Jida felt forced to turn to the Liao when he saw his father and brothers killed for plotting against the Later Tang (#37). Huangfu Yu was a general under Du Chongwei when he surrendered at Zhongduqiao; having declined a commission in the Liao army, Huangfu Yu refused to eat and soon killed himself in despair (#98). He died just too soon to see the comeuppance of his fellow commander Zhang Yanze, who had embraced Liao allegiance and taken the Jin capital on Deguang's behalf. Zhang Yanze had let his troops enjoy two

days of pillaging and settled some personal scores by killing the chief minister, Sang Weihan, and others. For this Deguang had him executed and let the populace feast on his body (#92).

During the Song war there were more massacres of enemy prisoners, usually in a ritual manner apparently intended to increase the chances of victory, but it is only an increase from no recorded incidents to four, concentrated within seven years (#175, preceding #183, following #186, #196).[36] After this there are several cases showing good treatment of prisoners, such as giving them fur clothing and rewards (#203, 219). Before this the only time we hear of a captive population being massacred is when several hundred able-bodied men of Jizhou$_2$ turned recalcitrant (#152). While undeniably brutal, this was nevertheless not gratuitous. In addition, there are two further cases of spies being executed, a fate which must have been accepted as one of the risks of the job (#178, following #217).

For a sizeable proportion of those who crossed to Liao, the Southern regimes were in fact the preferred location, leading a significant percentage of people to head south again when they had the chance (see Table 2). These are almost always individuals; we only hear of a handful of groups returning. These are populations from Shucheng, Luancheng, and Wuqing counties (#65, 85, 211); the prefectural and capital officials of what had been Later Jin (#119, 123); a group of sixty-seven soldiers captured at Bozhou (#73); and several hundred Song troops rescued by their fellows (#169). It is clear that more still would have liked to return, and several failed attempts are recorded (e.g., #34, 41, 57, 98, 126, 158, 217), but for our purposes only those who actually made it back are counted. If we discount the anomalous cases of the Northern Han envoys detained by their Liao ally, then fifty-one of our recorded crossers returned to Southern service, nearly a quarter of the total. All but a couple of the relevant, recorded returns fell between around 912 and 947.[37] Between these years the proportion of returners to crossers in any one period fluctuated between nearly a quarter and just three-fifths. The tiny number of three returns after 947 (discounting Northern Han envoys) does nothing to reduce the overall impression of a sharp cut-off in such incidents.

Clearly it was quite possible to return south, at least in the first half of the century. We might assume that it would be those taken to Liao entirely against their will who would be most likely to return. In fact the opposite is true: it was more likely for those making some kind of choice about their crossing to later choose to cross back again. Of all those returning, more than six of ten had some kind of say in their original crossing, whether they chose entirely voluntarily or under duress. Only slightly fewer returners had originally crossed without any pressure at all.

This high proportion of returners who had crossed voluntarily suggests that the treatment of those southerners arriving in Liao was affected by the manner of their crossing. It looks as if those who showed more willingness to come to Liao in the first place were given more freedom, and perhaps treated with more generosity, than those who had done their utmost to avoid entering Liao. That some of these people made use of their freedom to return south was perhaps a price the Liao were willing to pay for the sake of encouraging faithful service from those who had made their own decision to cross. If an individual stayed, the Liao stood to gain servants made reliable through the exercise of their own free will, and if those individuals chose to return, then at least the Liao were spared uncertainty. The freedom of movement apparently granted by the Liao was no different from that permitted by the other regimes who shared control of the frontier in this period, at least up to mid-century. Rulers were all trying to entice the best people from other regimes and thus stood to lose their own best people to better prospects, but if they wanted to acquire talent, they had to be prepared to risk losing it too. These pressures appear to have contributed to an improvement in the conditions of service, if not the remuneration, of those with services to offer, and to a necessity for wider consultation and rule-by-consensus, at least among the elite.[38]

Perhaps the most striking example of what happened when such a consensus was lost was the manner in which the autonomous governor Liu Shouguang of Youzhou met his end. When he declared himself emperor in 911, Liu is said to have set up an executioner's block and axe in his courtyard, aiming to terrorize his officials into subordination. But when he was attacked by the Taiyuan Jin, most of his troops, population, and officials fled. The historians are evidently outraged by Liu's violently coercive behavior towards his officials and delight at his downfall. Their records reflect conventional ideals regarding the relationship between rulers and ministers, but in this period, unusually, officials were able to put into practice the principles upon which they claimed to serve, rather than merely paying lip service to them. They were able to wield some of the power for which they were always willing to argue, but which they rarely actually had.

Cultural categories

As explained in Chapter 1, this book starts from the premise that ethnicity is not a determining factor in this period. However, since so much of the historiography talks in terms of a "Han Chinese" group opposed to a "non-Han" group, it seems necessary to analyze the data briefly in these terms, if only to illustrate how unhelpful they are for explaining what was actually going on (Table 4).

TABLE 4. "Han" and "non-Han" crossings, 900–1004

"Han"					
DATES	ALLIANCE	VOLUNTARY	DURESS	INVOLUNTARY	TOTAL
900–934	4	6		4	14
935–954		12	17	6	35
955–1004				6	6
Total	4	18	17	16	55

"Non-Han"					
DATES	ALLIANCE	VOLUNTARY	DURESS	INVOLUNTARY	TOTAL
900–934	3	1	1		5
935–954	5	7	1	5	18
955–1004				1	1
Total	8	8	2	6	24

Only a third of crossers are given any origins at all in our records. Of these, 70 percent are not identified by anything other than birthplace, and so are implied to be of "Han" descent, while the remainder are assigned to one or other of the neighboring ("non-Han") peoples distinguished by the historians.[39] Both groups could be equally active in making the decision to cross since in each case a third of total crossings were voluntary. The "non-Han," however, were five times as likely (7 percent as against a third) to make alliances with the Liao. This may have been a result of a greater understanding among "non-Han" people of steppe power structures based upon confederation rather than hierarchy. Alternatively, the alliance sought by the "non-Han" leader and the allegiance pledged by the "Han" official might have been functional equivalents framed within two different traditions. Or it may simply be that those less deeply immured in the imperial tradition of formalized bureaucratic service were more likely to develop ambitions of their own that would make them unwilling to submit themselves fully to an overlord.

Those claimed as "Han" were much more likely to show unwillingness to cross (see Table 4, "Duress" columns), but the crossers in this category all came across during the period when Liao invasions (936 and 947) brought about dynastic change in the South. The reluctance of these people is a function of their membership in a defeated group, not of a particular cultural category. "Han" crossers were also twice as likely to leave Liao and return to the Southern regimes (42 percent as against 21 percent). This, however, reflects exactly the circumstances for crossers taken as a whole, in which those who

cross voluntarily are also more likely to return south. It may be that the rate of "Han" returners reflects their attachment to the South, but evidence for that cannot be found in the numerical data alone.

In sum, "Han" people comprise a large majority of crossers, and were as likely as anyone else to cross voluntarily. The fact that more "Han" showed reluctance to cross reflects their circumstances not their cultural ascription, while the larger number of "Han" returners correlates with the general tendency for voluntary crossers to be more likely to return. It is quite clear that a considerable minority of "Han Chinese" found Liao service no more of a problem than did their "non-Han" colleagues. We will see repeated illustrations of this viewpoint, and how it changed, in the case studies that form the main part of this study.

Christian Schwarz-Schilling notes that the treaty of Shanyuan put an end to crossings,[40] but we must look at the preceding century to see just what had changed. At the beginning of the tenth century individual commanders and regional officials played a major role in determining the line of the many political borders in the frontier region. Their freedom of movement, both physical and with regard to allegiances, became progressively more restricted in the second half of the century as the multiple rivalries in the region coalesced into the two powers of Liao and Song. By the beginning of the eleventh century the imperial centers had taken over control of their shared borderline and were able to prevent further changes of allegiance by anybody who was not a ruler in their own right. Although the demarcated borderline remained notably porous at the most local level, this activity seems to have been largely for economic purposes, and did not involve changes of allegiance.[41] The power of the frontier to influence events had been lost, and the focus shifted into the interiors, symbolized in both cases by the removal of the emperor from the battlefield, and from close personal contact with his aides, into the ritualized remoteness of the inner palace. The multiple options of the earlier years had been reduced to a polarized duality, made concrete in the borderline fixed by the treaty. The political reality represented by the borderline was reinforced by the creation and continued maintenance of ideological boundaries, including a more rigid definition of what constituted loyalty and where that loyalty should be placed. The history of the eleventh-century border is one of competition or cooperation between *centers,* to the exclusion of those who actually lived and worked in the frontier zone. The case studies that follow put a human face on these changes, tracing revaluations of loyalty that accompanied redefinitions of borders, during the tenth century itself and through the subsequent historiography.

PART II

Working for the Liao

Life Stories

CHAPTER 4

Loyalties in the Borderlands

The Founder and the Confucian

> . . . a few years later King Harald sent [Halldor] a message to come to Norway and stay with him. The king said Halldor would be given as much honor as before, and should he accept the invitation and come to Norway the king would give him a position higher than that of any man not nobly born.
>
> —*Hrafnkel's saga* (13th cent.)

Han Yanhui and Zhang Li topped and tailed the earliest phase of Liao relations with the Southern regimes (c. 900–936), when the frontier region was very much a borderland. Han Yanhui crossed to the young Liao dynasty and made important contributions there establishing the institutions of a Tang-style administration. Zhang Li would go to Liao at the end of this period, but at this time he crossed between regimes in the South and made a name for himself as a model of Confucian probity. The two of them must have come to know each other when they served together in the Liao administration from the 930s. In the changing emphases of successive sources we can see Han Yanhui and Zhang Li making a variety of choices, at different times and in different circumstances, that together illustrate a range of possible relationships between borders and loyalties in the borderlands of the early tenth century. The shifting interpretations of past lives also show us something of how later writers tried to make sense of decisions that did not fit what was by then the dominant ideology.

Serving the Liao

Information on Han Yanhui is relatively scarce, and several uncertainties remain.[1] He is not so much as mentioned in the *Jiu Wudai shi,* so that although Ouyang Xiu offers no more than a thumbnail sketch in the *Xin Wudai shi,* he

deserves much of the credit for retrieving Han Yanhui from what could otherwise have been total obscurity (although given Ouyang's moralistic motives in writing, we may guess he had a good reason). The *Zizhi tongjian* includes a great deal of extra information, much finding its way into the *Qidan guo zhi* and then the *Liao shi,* which also contains unique material.

Han Yanhui (882–959) was born at the time of the Huang Chao rebellions (875–885), in the border province of Youzhou (known as Lulong under the Tang) and into a world of frequent choices over allegiance.[2] By the time he was twenty-five, he and his father before him had served under at least three leaders, two of whom had seized power from their predecessors. This region had had a long tradition of autonomy under hereditary governors *(jiedushi),*[3] most recently the families of Li Maoxun, which governed c. 873–885, and of Li Quanzhong (no relation), which took over.[4] Governors of one or both of these families appointed Han Yanhui's father, Han Mengyin, to be prefect successively in Jizhou_1, Ruzhou_1, and Shunzhou.[5]

In 895, when Han Yanhui was thirteen, the latest governor, Li Kuangchou, was displaced by a Youzhou retinue officer called Liu Rengong. We do not know Han Mengyin's reaction to this change of master, nor what happened to him, but his "talented" son must have received his first appointments from Liu Rengong (who "appreciated his worth") sometime during the next decade or so. Han Yanhui's administrative posts probably kept him largely or wholly in the regional capital at Youzhou, and for a while he worked with Feng Dao in the Court of Ushers *(zhihou yuan),* which appears to have been some kind of court of reception.[6]

Then in the spring of 907 Liu Rengong was himself displaced by his son Shouguang. Han Yanhui had clearly received considerable favor from Liu Rengong, but he now took service with Liu Shouguang as adjutant *(canjun).*[7] Although it was quite in order to serve the son of one's original master, the usurpation potentially complicated matters, as the *Liao shi* biography's silence on this subject may suggest. At the same time this biography, written by a sympathetic hand and probably little edited, reflects something of the contemporary pragmatism by simply listing Han Yanhui's masters in an entirely matter-of-fact manner, usurpation notwithstanding. Han Yanhui's choice of continuing in his post was unremarkable in the circumstances. It only attracts our attention because of the contrast it offers with later norms.

Early achievements in Liao

Conversely, Han Yanhui's arrival and early activities in Liao were considered so important that they are recorded seven times in our four sources.[8] Everyone agrees that it was Liu Shouguang who sent Han Yanhui on his fate-

ful mission to Abaoji of the Liao, probably in 907.[9] In audience with Abaoji, Han Yanhui refused to bow or to make obeisance as required. Angered, Abaoji detained Han and sent him out to pasture horses. Later, Abaoji summoned Han Yanhui to an audience at which Han Yanhui so impressed Abaoji that he was made a planner *(mouzhu).* In his new employment Han Yanhui oversaw the settlement of displaced Southern populations as well as the establishment of a Tang-style administration. He also helped to "pacify" a number of tribal groups.[10]

The bare events indicate that Han Yanhui was prepared to stand up to the powerful and was a valued and effective administrator, capable of offering leadership and building institutions from scratch. They also illustrate the value that rulers of the time placed on officials like Han. They do not tell us how he felt about his own situation and the choices he made, but analysis of the interpretations offered by the sources does suggest some answers. As the texts were compiled and edited over more than three centuries, naturally each exhibits different concerns. By contrasting these shifting emphases with the earliest material, we can gain some insight, if not into the tenth century itself, at least into what was *not* important to its first recorders.

The *Tongjian* version of Han Yanhui's early experiences in Liao portrays him as a man whose moral uprightness works as a civilizing influence on Abaoji and as a prime mover behind the settlement of the Southern subject population. He is also turned into something of a prodigy, because Sima Guang prefers to date Han Yanhui's arrival to the winter of 911–912, giving him a maximum of less than two years, ending in 913, in which to pasture horses, get appointed, settle Southern households, help pacify tribes, and organize the Liao administration, among other things.[11]

However, the main addition to the *Tongjian* account, carried over into the later works, is to credit the Shulü empress with pointing out to Abaoji the virtues he should be making use of, not insulting with menial labor: ". . . the Shulü empress advised the ruler of the Kitan saying, 'Yanhui is able to hold onto his moral integrity without wavering; he is a sage of our times, why shamefully use [him] as a herder? You ought to treat him courteously and employ him (in the administration).'"[12] This contribution serves to emphasize Han Yanhui's qualities beyond the brief account of the *Xin Wudai shi,* which notes merely that the emperor "came to understand [Han Yanhui's] talents."[13] The *Tongjian* does not criticize Han Yanhui for serving Abaoji, but suggests instead courage and moral uprightness. It may also be significant that Han's moral integrity makes him "a sage *of our times*" (my emphasis). Furthermore, Sima Guang's choice of the Shulü empress to deliver these

sentiments accepts that some in the Liao regime (and a woman to boot) recognized upright principles when they saw them.

But it would be unwise to take the story as indicative of the values exhibited and recognized in the early tenth century, since it is a classic *topos,* showing the earliest Southern servants of the Liao as civilizers of the barbarian. Abaoji starts as an uncivilized autocrat who cannot recognize a principled stand when he sees one, but with Han Yanhui's example as the catalyst for learning, helped along by the empress's wise advice, Abaoji comes to recognize morality and acquires the imperial virtue of choosing good ministers. Although he gives the credit to Han Yanhui, Sima Guang has allowed Abaoji to move from being an insecure despot who cannot cope with being crossed, to being a true emperor who can see the point of standing on principle, is willing to learn from his ministers, and who rewards merit. The faithful service of an official thus reinforces a ruler's right to rule, and by showing this, Sima Guang tacitly accepts Abaoji's legitimacy as emperor of Liao. Accordingly, Ouyang Xiu's omission of this incident suggests that he was disinclined to concede Abaoji any such learning process and that he drew the line between civilized and barbarian more rigidly than either the protagonists in the story or his own contemporary, Sima Guang.

Sima's chief concern seems to be the establishment of a proper state, and the *Tongjian* is the first text to tell us of Han Yanhui's contribution to the settlement of the displaced southerners recently acquired by Abaoji. While most of these were probably seized in Abaoji's raids, many also came as economic refugees or as a result of Liu Shouguang's misrule.[14] Han Yanhui ". . . began to teach the Kitan [how] to set up a court and institute government agencies, to build city walls, and establish markets and wards in order to manage the *hanren,* causing each one to have a spouse, and to bring wasteland and abandoned fields under cultivation. As a result, the *hanren* each had a settled livelihood, and those who absconded were ever fewer."[15] Han Yanhui is seen as one bringing stability to the people, providing for their welfare and reducing the numbers of refugees, which would in turn improve tax returns. In short, he strikes the ideal Confucian balance of nurturing the people while strengthening the regime. That the *Tongjian* talks of *"hanren"* may be Sima Guang suggesting that Han Yanhui was helping his own, but Han's primary concern here is clearly not with cultural orientation but with tax-paying capacity. Here he is nothing if not an assiduous minister.

Ouyang Xiu, however, highlights a cultural contrast to show Han Yanhui's ministerial virtue. All the texts mention Han's part in bringing under Abaoji's control "tribes" neighboring on the Liao, but the *Xin Wudai shi* specifies that the "pacification" of two major groupings, the Tangut and Shi-

wei, was Han Yanhui's plan, while omitting the details of his settlement and administrative work.[16] So although Ouyang Xiu gives Han no credit for establishing Tang-style institutions, when it comes to sorting out "barbarians"—who were, it is implied, even more uncivilized than Abaoji himself—then Han Yanhui is seen as a representative virtuous official bringing order to the world. Curiously, it is impossible to link Han Yanhui satisfactorily to any known campaigns of "pacification" against the Tangut and Shiwei.[17] The *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi* speak only of the subjugation of "the various states *(guo).*" Ouyang Xiu may, therefore, have exaggerated the extent of Han Yanhui's role in tribal subjugation in order to support his line of argument.

The *Liao shi* emphasizes institutions rather than the moral imperatives underpinning good governance. Han Yanhui was apparently responsible for "building capitals and [other] cities, establishing imperial palaces and halls, rectifying relations between ruler and officials, determining titles and ranks, and systematizing the legal system."[18] Coming on top of three references to Han Yanhui as the systematizer of Liao national finances, and the financial experience implied by his previous Youzhou posting as surveillance and revenue commissioner *(guancha duzhishi),*[19] we simply have a specialist without notable virtues or vices, and with no reference to either *hanren* or tribal groups.

In the *Liao shi,* Han Yanhui's initiatives reflect well on Abaoji as a ruler able to select ministers and place his trust in them, but Han's enthusiasm in his work for Abaoji further suggests a transfer of loyalty on Han Yanhui's part, which comes across in all the texts. From a purely practical point of view, this was a wise move. Han Yanhui's previous master, Liu Shouguang, was dangerously ambitious, and after he came under heavy assault from the Taiyuan Jin in 911, it was unlikely he would survive long. There was nothing to return to there, and it may have seemed most sensible for Han to accept the situation in which he found himself and be thankful to have escaped the final destruction of Liu Shouguang. We should also remember that to rise above the limited promotion and opportunities available within a provincial administration, Han Yanhui would either have had to move to an imperial court or to have been lucky enough to serve a provincial leader who won the empire—a highly unpredictable occurrence, not to be expected.

But there were pull factors too. In Liao, Han found himself in demand and, apparently, in the exciting position of being given free rein to design the institutional structures of a new regime more or less from scratch, which he seems to have had the ambition to tackle. From the master's perspective, the practical experience of people like Han Yanhui was invaluable in this early stage of the Liao, when Abaoji's development of his rulership required the

acquisition of an agricultural subject population that could not be treated in the same way as subjugated pastoralists. Han Yanhui was only in his twenties when he took on the task, so that his administrative experience must have been limited accordingly, but his evident willingness to take on a vastly increased responsibility and to do what was needful may have been sufficient recommendation. More importantly, we must assume that what he did possess was a wide-ranging understanding of the social variety of the frontier zone, with its mixture of farmers, herders, and traders, several languages, and any amount of cultural variation. Growing up in an official family in Lulong/Youzhou, and taking his first posts there, would have exposed him to the methods for administering an agricultural population while also giving him a familiarity with the patterns and needs of pastoralists, relations with whom must have been one of the things that Han Yanhui's father had to manage as a frontier prefect.

These accounts also demonstrate how, in Han Yanhui's day, a ruler's own authority depended at least partly on his ability to entice the followers of others into allegiance to him. Preventing officials such as Han Yanhui from choosing a different master was a difficult and delicate task, requiring the incentives of security and a livelihood. As the three later sources all observe, Han Yanhui was made a planner because "such of his conduct were sought after there (in Liao)."[20] From the servitor's point of view there were, in effect, no borders, but only a free choice of masters, each with more or less to offer by way of rewards and opportunities. A valued minister could exploit his rarity to gain better treatment or promotion, and Han Yanhui was among those who benefited. As such, he was a fine exponent of the kind of reciprocal loyalty typical among servitors at all levels in this period and characteristic of times of political fragmentation. In illustrating this loyalty, all the sources, despite their different emphases, show clearly that Abaoji had the charisma to help him win over the many non-Kitan officials and generals who administered his empire. Even if the eleventh-century writers are attempting to give the credit for Liao achievements to a southerner in accordance with imperatives operating in their own time, they cannot escape the logic that the southerner in question has given his loyalty to a Northern ruler and as such has contributed to that ruler's legitimacy.

Departure and return

Despite Han Yanhui's achievements, his trusted position, and any attachment to Abaoji, something was missing, for after the subjugation of the tribal groups and the settlement of the Chinese population, Han Yanhui "fled back" south to the Taiyuan court of the prince of Jin, Li Cunxu (885–

926), the son of Li Keyong, and the future Tang Zhuangzong.[21] This departure is readily seen as evidence of Han Yanhui's attachment to the South and even of his desire to serve a Chinese ruler.[22] However, such an argument is hard to sustain, first because Li Cunxu was not Chinese but a Shatuo Turk, and second—and more importantly—because, as we shall see, Han Yanhui subsequently returned voluntarily to Liao. Han's flight to Taiyuan makes more sense if we consider his actions as, once again, the practice of reciprocal loyalty. The only difference from Han's earlier move to the Liao is that on this occasion he was moving south instead of north.

At this time Li Cunxu was setting himself up as an effective and avowedly virtuous ruler, and acquiring Han Yanhui's service contributed to this wider goal, with concomitant benefits for Han himself.[23] Unfortunately, while in Taiyuan Han fell out with one Wang Jian, and fearing what would happen, sought leave to visit his mother in Youzhou, then still under Liu Shouguang. Asked by a friend what he would do, Han Yanhui replied that he would return to Liao, and did not fear to do so because he was so indispensable to the regime. He was proved right by Abaoji's delight at his return, and received a number of senior posts.[24]

As usual for Han Yanhui, the dating of these events is unclear. Han's nemesis Wang Jian was killed in 913:12,[25] but we do not know exactly when Han had gone to Taiyuan, nor when he left there for Youzhou. We next hear of Han Yanhui in Liao in 916. It is therefore possible that he did not depart from his sojourn in Youzhou and head to Liao until after Wang Jian's death. This raises an intriguing possibility. If Han Yanhui did not leave Youzhou for Liao until his enemy's demise had made it safe to stay on in Jin, then this may suggest that Wang Jian's animosity was simply a convenient excuse for Han Yanhui to return to a position of power and influence—in Liao—greater than seemed possible under Li Cunxu, who was still a decade away from founding his own dynasty.[26]

Comparing accounts once again, we find that these events comprise over half of Han Yanhui's potted biography in the *Xin Wudai shi.* But Ouyang Xiu's interest was widely shared, as successive rewriters made Han's double frontier crossing a vehicle for comment on matters of concern in their own day. The *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi* again emphasize Han Yanhui's value to rulers, noting that Li Cunxu "wanted to appoint him to his private secretariat," thereby also explaining the animosity of Wang Jian, whom Han presumably would have replaced.[27] These sources also suggest that Han Yanhui's filial regard was genuine and not merely a pretext. They have him not only seeking to visit his mother, but actually doing so, and subsequently explaining to Abaoji that he left Liao in secret because he feared denial of leave to make this trip.[28]

The *Liao shi* takes the opportunity to comment on the ancient tension between filial piety and loyalty to master. On his return to Liao, Han Yanhui explains his departure: "To forsake your parents is not filial and to abandon one's master is not loyal. Although I roused myself to flee, my heart was with your Majesty, and this is what made me come back again."[29] Here filial piety is still satisfied, but now the ultimate choice is for loyalty to Han Yanhui's master. The parallels for the Yuan dynasty compilers—for whom the decision to serve the conquering Mongols could be problematical—are plain. Meanwhile, a substitution in the *Liao shi* downplays Han Yanhui's value to his rulers. Whereas the earlier sources have Abaoji delightedly greeting the returned Han Yanhui with the exclamation that he has fallen from heaven, the *Liao shi* recounts matter-of-factly that Han Yanhui was given a Kitan name, Xialie, meaning "come back." Han Yanhui is here simply expected to serve, effacing awareness of the options he possessed.

The *Liao shi* dwells further on Han Yanhui's return, explaining that, "sighing with emotion, his thoughts turned towards his native place, he composed poetry expressing his feelings, then fled."[30] By the fourteenth century, mourning for home was commonplace and entirely acceptable. In attributing Han Yanhui's departure south to such an emotional attachment, the Yuan historians have removed any criticism of Abaoji which Han Yanhui's leaving might imply. There is no suggestion of poor treatment, which under the Yuan would have offered dangerous opportunities for comparison (justified or otherwise) with contemporary circumstances. Furthermore, Han Yanhui's *Liao shi* biography recounts that when Han fled, "Abaoji dreamt that a white crane came out from inside his tent, then returned and went back into the tent again. The next morning he spoke with his servitors, saying, 'Yanhui has arrived,' and so it turned out."[31] The supernatural element dramatizes the whole incident, thereby raising its significance and emphasizing the tensions at work. Han Yanhui is depicted as a southerner properly missing his homeland, and his value to his Kitan lord is stressed. For the *Liao shi* historians the boundary was as clear as for the eleventh-century writers, but they offered a morally acceptable way out for each of the protagonists.

Following his return north, Han Yanhui's leadership of the Liao administration was formalized by the granting of senior posts, and there is everything to suggest that he picked up his institutional work where he had left off. Abaoji may well have been offering Han Yanhui "more generous treatment" to get him to stay, and this claim by the *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi* correlates with their account of a letter to Li Cunxu explaining in familiar terms Han Yanhui's reasons for flight: "It is not that I do not miss my sagacious master, nor that I do not think of my native place, the reason I did not stay (in the

South) was just that I feared the calumniations of Wang Jian. Therefore I used my aged mother as a pretext."[32] Having previously shown Han Yanhui as genuinely filial, Sima Guang now has Han state that his wish to see his mother was a pretext after all. Perhaps Sima wished to show Han Yanhui as more concerned with his breach of loyalty to Li Cunxu than to Abaoji, even at the expense of sincere filiality. We should note, though, that the *Tongjian*'s letter endows Han Yanhui with no more concern for Abaoji being a Kitan than for the Shatuo origins of the Taiyuan ruler; there is no link between the cultural affiliation of the master and the loyalty considered owing to him.

Sima then adds a new twist: "It also said, 'While Yanhui is here, the Kitan will certainly not pasture horses in the South.'" When he then observes that through the Tongguang era (923–926) the Kitan did not penetrate deeply into the South, the eleventh-century implication is that pasturing automatically involved raiding, which simultaneously allows Han Yanhui all the credit for preventing such damaging activity.[33] But Han Yanhui's promise should not automatically be interpreted as a concern for territorial integrity. Border security was a genuine issue for regimes in the frontier region, but this had to do with retaining control of resources—chiefly people and their movable property—rather than fixating on particular pieces of land. More importantly, Han Yanhui's promise to protect the South contributes to the impression that the *Tongjian* emphasizes such emotional attachments in those who crossed into Liao service. Not surprisingly, the *Liao shi* omits all this, instead discussing Han's military role in subjugating the Bohai in 925–926.[34]

The *Liao shi* also omits the *Tongjian*'s account of Yao Kun's mission to report the death of Li Cunxu of Later Tang in 926.[35] When Abaoji seized this moment to offer to suspend raids in return for prefectures, Yao Kun angered Abaoji by replying that such negotiations were beyond his brief, and Han Yanhui apparently saved the envoy's life by remonstrating with the emperor.[36] This incident has usually been read as another instance of Chinese-"barbarian" conflict over territory, with Han protecting his fellow Chinese by deflecting Abaoji's ambitions.[37] But we might instead see Han Yanhui's disagreement as marking the boundary between the accepted treatment of envoys and inappropriate coercion—something that must have been frequently necessary, since envoys were mistreated all the time.

For a minister who seems to have believed it important to incorporate as many people as possible into the Liao regime, regardless of where they lived, it is anachronistic to suggest that Han Yanhui's chief concern was to protect Southern territory or indeed to foster the interests of his master's political rivals in Later Tang. It is not impossible that Han Yanhui had a precocious concern with territory and an unusually strong cultural attachment to the

South, but this would be inconsistent with his previous behavior. It would make sense, however, for him to be concerned that his master present an appropriately stately image to neighboring rulers whom Abaoji believed no better—and probably less—than his equals. If Abaoji were to breach the norms of intercourt behavior that he shared with his fellow rulers in the borderlands, his moral—and thus his political—position with them would be that much weakened. Hence we could instead read this incident as further evidence of Han Yanhui's loyalty to Abaoji, expressed classically as fearless remonstrance. Subsequently, the *Liao shi*'s omission of both indications of Han Yanhui's attachment to the South suggests a deliberate editorial policy.

The ease with which Han Yanhui seems to have moved back and forth between Northern and Southern leaders suggests strongly that cultural differences were not a factor in his decision making. Such differences are never mentioned in the body of our texts, whereas the reason for Han Yanhui's return to the North is clearly stated to be a matter of personal disharmony and concomitant political danger. One could, of course, argue that it was only the potential danger from Wang Jian that compelled Han Yanhui to set aside cultural differences and head north once more, and indeed Sima Guang makes just this argument in a supplementary discussion. But this view rests wholly on assumptions, not evidence. If Han Yanhui had really been bothered by cultural differences he could just as easily have headed south to one of the several gubernatorial capitals in central and southern Hebei, or even to the Liang court (see Map 1), yet he chose to go north.

After Abaoji's death, we hear no more of Han Yanhui until the new Liao ruler, Deguang, sends him as an envoy to the Later Jin (936–947), probably during or just after Shi Jingtang's founding war with Later Tang, but we have no details of the mission.[38] That war ended with the surrender of the armies of Zhao Dejun and Zhao Yanshou (see Chapter 5), among whose administrators was one Zhang Li, whose previous career provides an instructive comparison to the case of Han Yanhui.

Serving in the South

The sources for Zhang Li's life are particularly abundant, with three full biographies, of which the earliest comes in two distinctive versions.[39] This *Jiu Wudai shi* material brings us much closer to tenth-century mores than was possible for Han Yanhui.

Zhang Li was from the opposite edge of the borderlands from Han Yanhui, in southwestern Hebei. Into the 920s Zhang's native place of Fuyang fronted against both the Taiyuan Jin in Hedong and the Zhao princedom in central He-

bei, and it changed hands more than once in the late Tang and early Five Dynasties as part of Xiangzhou prefecture.[40] This does not seem to have affected Zhang Li personally, for his ancestors were farmers, and the *Jiu Wudai shi* describes him as a classic example of talent discovered. For Zhang, it was the relationship with his sponsor for the examinations, Li Yu, that was crucial, and Zhang seems to have taken the sense of his obligations to Li into his subsequent dealings with other patrons, of whom there were several.[41] Li Yu's biography emphasizes talents and Confucian virtues that may have made him an exemplar for Zhang Li, and it is for his principled maintenance of moral standards, including personal loyalty, that Zhang is remembered in the texts.

We can imagine that Li Yu met Zhang Li as Zhang was reporting to the local yamen, as was his wont, on the disputes he had resolved among his fellow commoners.[42] Li Yu's biography tells us that during the Zhenming reign era (915–921), Zhang Li left Later Liang, where his sponsor served at court, and pledged allegiance to Li Cunxu, leader of the Taiyuan Jin and the implacable enemy of Liang. Like Han Yanhui before him, Zhang Li immediately received a post in the Taiyuan administration, and there is nothing in the *Jiu Wudai shi* to indicate that this was anything but a sound career move for a young and ambitious provincial graduate. We may be surprised at Zhang Li's action, but his contemporaries probably were not.

By later standards Zhang Li had abandoned and even shamed his erstwhile sponsor Li Yu by going to the Taiyuan Jin regime, especially in the period that turned out to be the final showdown between Liang and Taiyuan. However, once there Zhang Li "circulated among the highly placed publicizing Yu's upright and spirited [character]" and telling the "northerners" about Li Yu's writings.[43] Meanwhile, Li Yu was exiled from the Liang court for speaking against the Liang ruler's brother. When Li Cunxu took the throne and restored the Tang, Li Yu came to the new court, presumably as a surrendering official, whereupon Li Cunxu restored him to his former posts. The new regime was likely to have taken on Li Yu anyway, but his biographer's point in mentioning Zhang Li here is that Li Yu's virtue had won him help in time of need. It is only as a by-product that the story also shows Zhang Li's personal loyalty to Li Yu. In this case, loyalty and changing masters under the reciprocal principle could go hand in hand.

Zhang Li became a *jinshi* around 923 and received minor court posts. Then, in 925, he served under Li Yu as an administrator on the Tang campaign against Shu (present-day Sichuan) led by the young prince Li Jiji.[44] In Zhang Li's earliest biography, however, he is associated not with Li Yu but with the campaign's effective commander, Guo Chongtao, who is said to have specifically requested Zhang Li's appointment.

This time the association serves to highlight Zhang Li's own virtue. After Shu was conquered, Guo Chongtao's name was blackened by his enemies at court and the empress dowager ordered Li Jiji to kill him. When Guo Chongtao was murdered in Li Jiji's residence, Guo's retainers fled in fear, but Zhang Li went alone to the scene of the crime and wept outside for Guo Chongtao, thereby upbraiding and embarrassing Jiji for this moral transgression, regardless of personal danger, for which "the people of that time all admired his (Zhang Li's) great righteousness."[45] Perhaps more importantly to him, he was also returning the favor received when Guo Chongtao secured his appointment to the campaign staff.

Zhang Li's personal loyalty remained important to later writers, as seen in the *Qidan guo zhi,* which condenses the *Tongjian* version so much that Ye Longli mistakenly places Zhang Li directly under Li Jiji and has Zhang mourn the murder of the prince, with no mention of Guo Chongtao. Despite the factual error, the key point remains the same. Zhang Li's commitment remains a personal one to individuals, not an ideological devotion to a ruler or regime.

Yet Zhang Li could also exhibit just such an ideological (and indeed, hierarchical) loyalty. Despite protesting Guo Chongtao's murder, Zhang Li nevertheless accepted a position under Guo's deputy and successor Ren Huan, who had played no part in Guo Chongtao's death.[46] Then, as the Tang army marched back east in early 926, an experienced Tang general called Kang Yanxiao rose in resistance behind them, but was defeated and captured in an ambush suggested by Zhang Li. When they reached Fengxiang, the local army supervisor, having heard news of Li Siyuan's challenge for the Later Tang throne, took Kang Yanxiao into protective custody, hoping to steal the credit for his capture.

In his earliest biography, Zhang Li again offered robust advice: ". . . how can you go against an imperial order and foster calamity? This is destroying the cage and releasing the tiger, bringing blame upon yourself. If my lord will not put him to death, I will personally kill this bandit."[47] So Ren Huan "had no choice but to execute Yanxiao." Zhang Li's ministerial virtue comes to the fore as he fearlessly insists on ruthlessness against disruptions of order. Zhang's loyalty here is to the state responsible for ordering the world, and his remonstration reinforces the legitimacy of the state itself at the precise moment when, as the tenth-century writer would have known, the particular ruler of that state, Li Cunxu, was about to be displaced by another.

But we may also read Zhang Li's advice as demonstrating his continuing personal loyalty to Li Cunxu himself, to whom Zhang Li had transferred his allegiance over a decade before. This interpretation is consistent with the *Jiu Wudai shi*'s earlier depiction of Zhang Li's character and may even

tint him with shades of unequivocal loyalty. By contrast, the *Tongjian* relates essentially the same story, but dates it a couple of months earlier, with the resister named Li Shaochen. Although the events and attitudes are identical, the different dating removes the connection with Li Cunxu's downfall and so allows Zhang Li only his loyalties to the concept of order and to the authoritative state, perhaps in accordance with eleventh-century concerns.

Yet most importantly, we should note that, despite the implications of undying loyalty in his biography, Zhang Li took service under the new emperor Li Siyuan. In the early tenth century it would have been almost unthinkable to withhold service on the grounds of a ruler's lack of *dao;* the only people who did not transfer their allegiance to a new emperor were those who actively opposed him by military means. As in the Liao, officials were in demand and jobs easy to come by. Accordingly, standards could be lax. Li Siyuan made Zhang Li a Hanlin academician on the strength of his literary reputation, but the poems he and a colleague composed as model *jinshi* answers were rejected as inappropriate by the chief ministers.[48] The next person asked to do the job refused on the grounds that his *jinshi* had been awarded out of kindness, and that he lacked the skill to set standards for measuring future talent. This modest response implies that Zhang Li had pretensions beyond his abilities, but such underachievement was clearly widespread, reflecting both the poor state of examination education and the desperate shortage of candidates.[49] It would also explain why Zhang Li is famous for his virtue rather than his skills.

Outside the scholarly realm, principle remained an important motivator for Zhang Li. At the end of the 920s Zhang Li withdrew to mourn his parents' deaths, returning to court service in 931.[50] Shortly after that, his father's concubine died. Zhang Li had been so close to her that his children called her "grandmother," and although concubines were not entitled to official mourning, he sought to mourn her nevertheless. When his colleagues offered no advice, Zhang found his own compromise, returning to Fuyang on a pretext and living a life of retirement for the full parental mourning period. Those who knew him apparently approved, and when he returned to court he was promoted.[51] This extreme filial behavior contributes to the *Jiu Wudai shi*'s portrait of Zhang Li as a deeply moral individual, but it is not carried over into the later texts, for perhaps it was too tangential to the main action.

The portrayal of choices

If we adopt the view that North and South in the early tenth century were direct precursors of the polarized Liao and Song of the post-Shanyuan period,

then only Han Yanhui had crossed the frontier, by joining the Liao. However, if we look solely at the *actions* of the two men, then Han Yanhui and Zhang Li did similar things, both changing their allegiances very early in their careers. Han Yanhui is noted for doing so because two of his shifts were to Abaoji of the Liao, but he (or his family) had already accepted more than one new master under a variety of circumstances, some more dubious than others. These early changes, before Han Yanhui's departure to Liao, passed without comment, first because they were unremarkable at the time they happened, and then because they remained within the cultural world of the later historians who produced the only surviving records. In the same manner Zhang Li's changes of allegiance in his early career receive no attention at all in the later sources because they do not transgress the boundaries then in existence. They are given slightly more attention in the *Jiu Wudai shi*, but only when they are deemed relevant to the making of some other point. Changing allegiances was unremarkable to the tenth-century compilers.

At the same time the contrast between the *Jiu Wudai shi* material on Zhang Li's early life and the accounts offered for Han Yanhui in the later sources suggest something of how attitudes towards changing allegiance shifted over the period when the sources were produced. In the *Jiu Wudai shi,* the younger Zhang Li comes across as a regular biographical subject, displaying many of the conventional Confucian virtues even in his youth. This source includes details absent from later works, notably Zhang Li's display of filial piety towards his father's concubine. Most importantly, we see an emphasis on Zhang Li's personal loyalty to individual superiors such as Li Yu and Guo Chongtao.

The later sources, by contrast, drop virtually all mention of Zhang Li's early life save for the barest outlines. Gone are his filial piety, early demonstrations of virtue, and his personal loyalty to Li Yu. All that remains in the *Tongjian* is Zhang Li's principled weeping for Guo Chongtao, and his ruthless advice regarding the Shu resister named as Li Shaochen. The *Qidan guo zhi* keeps only the weeping. This may simply be abbreviation on the part of later writers anxious to keep their focus on major figures such as Guo Chongtao rather than minor players like Li Yu. Nevertheless, Sima Guang and Ye Longli still retain the most telling details regarding Zhang Li's personal loyalty and present the tale of his weeping with evident approval. We shall hear more of Zhang Li in the next chapter, but should note that in 925 he was still serving a Southern regime. Han Yanhui was not.

Han Yanhui was retrieved from oblivion by the attentions of Ouyang Xiu, and his story was greatly elaborated in the *Tongjian,* where new emphases bring the image of Han's general virtue up to the level expected of a

regular biography. The Shulü empress recognizes his principled character, and his filial piety may be more than a pretext. As to the much expanded account of how Han Yanhui brought order to Abaoji's dominions, it may appear that the eleventh-century historians are writing up Han Yanhui as the virtuous minister bringing light to the "barbarians," but their chief concerns are actually order and civilization, and they approve of any ruler who furthers those goals, regardless of cultural affiliation.

The *Qidan guo zhi,* which gives Han Yanhui his first regular biography, presents almost exactly the same picture as the *Tongjian,* but for a remarkable piece of manipulation from Han's earliest career. When Liu Shouguang usurps his father's governorship of Youzhou in 907, Han Yanhui is nowhere reported to have protested, despite the breach of filial piety and overthrow of an imperial appointee. Hence we may be rather surprised to find him in the *Qidan guo zhi,* just four years later, speaking out against Liu Shouguang setting himself up as emperor of Yan. According to Ye Longli's version of the biography, the new emperor responded by setting up an executioner's axe and block in his court, threatening to behead those who dared to remonstrate. One Sun He risked a trial of his master's resolve by objecting strongly and suffered the penalty. Ye Longli reports that Han Yanhui escaped similar punishment for his own remonstration because he was a longstanding aide to Liu Shouguang and hitherto had been highly regarded, whereas Sun He, although a senior minister, had been a staunch supporter of Shouguang's brother Liu Shouwen against the usurpation.[52]

The story of the axe in the court is also related in the two *Wudai shi* and in the *Tongjian,* main source for the *Qidan guo zhi.* In these earlier sources, however, the hero of the story is the senior minister Sun He, and there is no mention of Han Yanhui at all.[53] There is also considerably more detail, including what Sun He said to arouse Liu Shouguang's wrath and a full account of the horrible punishment meted out to him. This has all been cut in the *Qidan guo zhi,* leaving only a brief mention of Sun He's misfortune to provide a pointed contrast to Han Yanhui's courage and luck. The *Qidan guo zhi* has emphasized one aspect of the *Tongjian*'s image of Han Yanhui to make him unequivocally a loyal official of the type who spoke his mind on points of principle, even if this placed him in personal danger.[54] This is not merely one of the *Qidan guo zhi*'s notorious inaccuracies, but a deliberate refocusing of the measured interpretation in the *Tongjian.* Whereas Sima Guang is content to portray Han Yanhui as a minister of conventional virtue, the *Qidan guo zhi* invents for him a hagiography.

The *Liao shi* offers a rather different take on Han Yanhui's story, chiefly through omitting items from the *Qidan guo zhi* account that might throw

doubt upon Han Yanhui's loyalty to the Liao emperors, whether by his continued concern for the interests of the South or through his disagreements with the Liao rulers. Han Yanhui's differences with his masters are stressed in the *Qidan guo zhi* but absent from the *Liao shi* version except for Han's initial lack of obeisance to Abaoji, when Abaoji is not yet Han Yanhui's lord. Most notably, the "axe incident," specifically inserted into the *Qidan guo zhi,* is not transferred to the *Liao shi.* Even when the *Liao shi* records Han Yanhui's explanation of his departure, it is not to emphasize Han Yanhui's action but rather to absolve the emperor Abaoji of any responsibility for it.

We must assume that the Yuan compilers made these changes, which suggests that the History Office, and presumably the emperor who approved their output, had developed concerns about issues that had not been regarded as problematical during the Song or earlier dynasties. Contemporaries frequently compared the Mongols with the Kitan, bracketing both as alien invaders. Yet whereas the Mongols had notable difficulties in getting some former Song officials to work for them, the example of Han Yanhui suggests that the Kitan had fewer such problems. Rather than seeing this as evidence of a difference between the dynasties, the Mongol state may have found Han Yanhui a useful historical exemplar of early and willing cooperation with an ostensibly comparable regime. Yet it seems at least equally likely that the historians of the late Yuan could no longer tolerate either the tenth century's relaxed view of changing masters or Sima Guang's willingness to present the complexities of a situation, let alone the stark contrast presented by the *Qidan guo zhi*'s hagiographical approach.

The contrast between Han Yanhui's and Zhang Li's early careers is not between one person who departed for Liao and another who remained behind, but rather between a pragmatist with great administrative talent and a perhaps more idealistic character prepared to risk much for the sake of personal loyalty to individuals. Both gained enormously when they chose to leave their first masters and seek employment elsewhere. The circumstances in which each then found himself made a difference to the opportunities that arose and the achievements that were possible. Han Yanhui went to a regime in the making and evidently relished the challenge of building an administration from scratch. Zhang Li also went to a regime in the making, but one that had longstanding administrative structures in place. Han Yanhui had scope for invention and no predecessors to live up to. His contributions helped give definition to the Liao regime and thereby create a new political force. By contrast, Zhang Li's ambitions were constrained by the career patterns available within an established bureaucracy

and the burdens of its illustrious past. The differences between the political circumstances of their new masters were important, but their cultural orientation was not.

For both men we can see that the relationship between political boundaries (with their associated borderlines) and cultural identities was not a close one. Their personal loyalties cut across the ever-shifting political boundaries of the early tenth century, and in choosing where to place their allegiance, they afforded no significance to cultural boundaries that were in any case minimal, nor to cultural differences familiar to those raised in the world of the borderland. What mattered to them was creating opportunities for themselves and where possible for those important to them. This could be seen as mercenary, but that would simply be another way of condemning them for actions that made sense within the range of concepts available at the time, and which were not criticized by contemporaries. From the records we have, both Han Yanhui, and in his early career Zhang Li too, seem to have done more good than harm and displayed more virtue than vice. We might criticize them for other things, such as Han Yanhui's involvement in the violent subjugation of Abaoji's neighboring chieftains, or Zhang Li's ruthlessness towards dissent, but these are not relevant to whether or not they can be deemed loyal and to what. In the following period the relatively straightforward approaches to loyalty of the early tenth century began to become complicated by the direction of political events in which Zhang Li, together with his master Zhao Yanshou, played significant parts.

CHAPTER 5

An Emerging Boundary

Two Approaches to Serving the Liao

> . . . you are well aware that I now feel but little affection for my countrymen, who robbed me of my hereditary power and privileges and made me a fugitive without a home—whereas your father welcomed me at his court and gave me the means of livelihood and somewhere to live. Surely it is unreasonable to reject kindness; any sensible man will cherish it.
>
> —Herodotus, *The histories*

Zhang Li crossed to Liao in 936 alongside his superior Zhao Yanshou. Zhang and Zhao served alongside Han Yanhui at the Liao court of the 930s and 940s, until both died in the late 940s. Zhao Yanshou was half a generation younger than Han Yanhui and Zhang Li, but in a fashion similar to them, he was living under his fourth different regime by the time he received his first recorded post in the 920s. Zhao Yanshou, however, was raised in very different circumstances from his older counterpart, which shaped the opportunities he sought and the choices he made.

Zhao Yanshou's wider historical importance was such that we have several accounts of his early life, all deriving ultimately from the *Jiu Wudai shi,* and highlighting the options available to him.[1] Zhao's biological father, Liu Yuan or Liu Kang, was from the mountains north of Zhenzhou, an area that changed hands probably more than anywhere else in this period (see maps).[2] He was killed in his county of Tiaoxian in southernmost Youzhou when Liu Shouwen of Cangzhou attacked during the fighting that led to the establishment of Later Liang. Tiaoxian was part of Liu Shouwen's province, suggesting that Zhao Yanshou's father was resisting his local overlord, perhaps in support of the Liang founder Zhu Wen.[3] This choice seems to have cost the Tiaoxian Liu his life, for his wife and son—the lady Chong and the infant Yanshou—were captured by one of Liu Shouwen's officers, Zhao Dejun, who took the pair into his household and treated Yanshou as his own son.[4] A few years later Liu Shouwen was killed by his brother Liu Shouguang, who by

912 was himself losing badly to Li Cunxu of the Taiyuan Jin. On both occasions Zhao Dejun pragmatically joined the winning side.

A view from the inner court

Zhao Dejun rose rapidly. He received from Li Cunxu the honorific name of Li Shaobin (for ease of reference, I shall continue to call him Zhao Dejun), and served the Taiyuan Jin throughout the war with the Liang. Then in the restored Tang dynasty, he became governor *(jiedushi)* of Youzhou in 925, where he worked for ten years to extend his authority and bring order.[5] Li Siyuan took over the dynasty in 926, and although Zhao Dejun does not feature in accounts of this until after it was over, he was well rewarded nevertheless. His original name was restored, and Zhao Yanshou married Li Siyuan's thirteenth daughter, the Xingping princess, forging a lasting link with the imperial family.[6] Zhao Yanshou now received successive, uneventful appointments as governor. Like most others at this senior level, the Zhaos consistently practiced a form of reciprocal loyalty, transferring their allegiance to the person most likely to offer them both the greatest personal advantage and the political (and military) leadership to preserve or extend those benefits.

In the early 930s Zhao Yanshou found himself facing unwelcome dangers. In 931 he came to the court in Luoyang as one of two military affairs commissioners *(shumishi)*.[7] Although the commissioners headed the administration, the real power at court lay with the eunuch Meng Hanqiong and the concubine Pure Consort Wang. They, however, faced a challenge from Li Siyuan's son, Congrong, who was trying to parlay his control of the capital armies into wider political power. Prioritizing their own survival, Zhao Yanshou and his fellow commissioner Fan Yanguang both sought safer postings in the provinces. Unable to check Li Congrong, their increasingly desperate transfer requests joined a flood leading Li Siyuan to accuse his ministers of deserting him. Zhao Yanshou finally sent his wife to plead with her father in the inner palace, and was made governor at Bianzhou (later Kaifeng) just a couple of months before Congrong marched a thousand troops into the capital, where he was killed.[8]

In the late Tang and Five Dynasties a leader's authority extended only as far as the loyalties of his governors and prefects. Authority ostensibly had a territorial manifestation, but the spatial limits of control could be a good deal tighter in reality than they appear on a map. What mattered was who acknowledged whose superiority, what those subordinates controlled in terms of military and economic resources, and what they brought in the way of

their own networks of loyalties.[9] Anyone with a provincial posting had a vital prerequisite to insurrection, because a regional position gave freedom from direct court control but could not be retained without the formal consent of the emperor. This made the court-provincial structure of power one of delicate negotiation, good judgment, and personal relationships, which had to be renegotiated whenever any party to them was replaced. A new emperor inheriting existing governors had to hope that the benefits offered would be enough to retain the governors' loyalties, but he was always taking a chance. The tense and uncertain relationships that could result are typified in the new attitude to Zhao Yanshou under successive emperors.

Li Siyuan died of a longstanding illness just a few days after Congrong. Congrong's younger brother, Li Conghou, succeeded briefly before Li Siyuan's adopted son, Li Congke, usurped the throne. Zhao Yanshou at Bianzhou, out of immediate danger, continued the normal practice of reciprocal loyalty, transferring his allegiance smoothly to each new emperor and receiving honors from both. However, as a regional magnate he was himself now a possible threat to court interests, particularly because his brother-in-law, the Hedong governor Shi Jingtang, was a longstanding rival of Li Congke. Li's concerns over Shi Jingtang's loyalty are not articulated in the *Jiu Wudai shi*, but the eleventh-century sources note the potential for an alliance between Shi and the two Zhaos, who between the three of them controlled about half of the districts north of the Yellow River (Youzhou and Hedong) and had a foothold close to the capital (Bianzhou).[10] Maybe it was to keep an eye on Zhao Yanshou that, within a year, he was brought back to court as military affairs commissioner and (nominal) governor at Xuzhou, deep in Henan. Once again he was impotent in his court post, for power now lay with the commissioner of the Court of Palace Attendants *(xuanhuishi)* Liu Yanlang, a notorious bribe-taker.

Perhaps fearing another power struggle in the capital, Zhao Yanshou once again sought a posting away from the court; when it came, it offered an entirely new set of opportunities. In 936 the relationship between Li Congke and Shi Jingtang finally broke down, and Shi Jingtang challenged the court, seeking assistance from Deguang of Liao.[11] The allies quickly defeated the Tang armies and laid siege to them in Jin'anzhai, just south of Taiyuan (then known as Jinyang). Zhao Yanshou was chosen with the blessing of the powerholders to lead a relief force from the capital to join up with Zhao Dejun's Youzhou army. However, just because it now suited Liu Yanlang's party to adopt Zhao Yanshou did not mean that they trusted him. As commander of 20,000 imperial troops, Zhao Yanshou's choice of allegiance could be crucial to determining the outcome of the conflict, making Zhao Yanshou poten-

tially as dangerous as Shi Jingtang. The court's different strategies for dealing with the two of them were all driven by that essential fear.

To keep tabs on Zhao Yanshou, Liu Yanlang himself was made Zhao's deputy, while the administrative assistant *(panguan)* for the expedition was none other than Zhang Li. Zhang's double period of mourning had kept him away from court while his colleagues were trying to cope with Meng Hanqiong, Prince Congrong, and the succession to Li Siyuan, and he was not first choice for the job. Zhang's detachment from recent politics, and perhaps his demonstrated capacity for loyal behavior, may have been his strongest recommendations for the post, but his practical ability to operate according to court rather than Zhao orders would have been severely limited.

Zhang Li's first test came after the Zhaos met near Luzhou on 22 November. Dejun had been trying and mostly failing to bring other provincial forces under his command, while the court was harassing him to advance. Receiving both Zhao Yanshou's reinforcements and appointment as overall campaign commander, Zhao Dejun advanced to Tuanboyu, 100 *li* south of Jinyang, but then for some weeks did nothing to relieve the siege, while repeatedly asking for Zhao Yanshou to be made governor of Chengde. Chengde was essentially the old princedom of Zhao, neighboring Youzhou, and Dejun claimed Yanshou's proximity to Youzhou would assure Dejun's interests there while he was away campaigning. Li Congke, however, saw only a plot to enlarge the Zhaos' provincial base and responded with an angry outburst.[12]

The virtuous Zhang Li should surely have been urging the Zhaos to relieve the siege as quickly as possible, but only a pragmatic silence is recorded. This may have been because the complexities of the situation had multiplied greatly. Shortly before the Zhaos moved to Tuanboyu, the Liao emperor Deguang had invested Shi Jingtang as emperor of a new dynasty of (Later) Jin in the allied camp at Jin'an. It is not clear whether the Zhaos knew about this, but in the later part of December Dejun sent to Deguang an envoy, named only in the *Tongjian* as Zhao Yanshou. According to Sima Guang, Yanshou offered Deguang a false letter seeking an agreement on behalf of the Tang, but also made a secret request for Deguang to sponsor Zhao Dejun for the emperorship of the South in return for the conquest of Later Tang and fraternal relations between the two emperors, while Shi Jingtang would be allowed a permanent seat in Hedong.

However determined Zhang Li may have been to uphold moral principles in general, in this situation he had an unenviable choice. Li Congke was Zhang Li's emperor, but the military support with which he won the throne had been purchased rather than earned, and he had already shown

signs of inadequacy for the job.[13] Shi Jingtang was still only a challenger, but one whose remarkable success so far could have suggested that he possessed the *dao* and was thus worthy of the Mandate. On the other hand, if it was known that Shi Jingtang had been invested as emperor by another, that may have made it harder to see him as a legitimate holder of the Mandate, which Heaven was meant to bestow directly. The Zhaos were Zhang Li's superiors and Zhao Dejun's public offer to Deguang claimed to be acting on behalf of the Later Tang. Zhang Li had no personal connection to any of the protagonists. Pragmatically, it must have been evident to everyone that Li Congke was on the way out. The question was whether to accept Shi Jingtang and the new dynasty or to back Zhao Dejun in the name of the old dynasty. While Jin'an remained under siege it was not yet clear who would be the ultimate victor, and Zhang Li's silence on the moral issues may have reflected a general holding of breath as those with the power to choose awaited a more certain indication of the eventual outcome.

Our sources offer no consideration of the general dilemma shared by Zhang Li, but the *Tongjian* does expound on Zhao Dejun's offer, thereby contributing to the eleventh-century discourse on loyalty. Zhao Dejun commanded imperial armies that Deguang had no wish to fight, and this alone tempted Deguang more than all Shi Jingtang's offers of annual payments, taxable districts, and formal subordination in a father-son relationship. Shi Jingtang was so worried that he sent Sang Weihan to defend the original agreement:

> Your great state has raised a righteous army to help the unaided in danger, in one battle the Tang troops have been smashed to pieces and have withdrawn to defend a single palisade, their food is used up and their strength exhausted. Zhao Beiping (Dejun) father and son are neither loyal nor trustworthy. Fearing the strength of your great state, they have been storing up rebellious inclinations during times of peace and have now halted their troops to watch the changing situation; they are not men who would serve their state to the death. How can [you] fear them and believe their preposterous fabrications [when] they covet the last grain of profit and throw away the merit they are about to achieve! However [if you] let the Jin gain the *tianxia* they will devote the products of the Middle Kingdom to the service of your great state. How can this be compared to those minor benefits![14]

The argument is complex. The rhetoric of undying loyalty ("they are not men who would serve their state to the death") places great emphasis on the Zhaos' lack of *zhong,* cast in hierarchical terms. Although the *Tongjian* com-

pilers could portray the complexities of some individual situations, here unfaithfulness is roundly condemned in terms of a loyalism that could not have applied in the circumstances.[15]

For Sang Weihan, an accusation in terms of undying loyalty seems a curious card to play, since his lord Shi Jingtang was himself an open challenger against the Tang, and Sang Weihan, a member of Shi Jingtang's regional staff since around 931, had himself transferred his loyalty from the Tang to his immediate master.[16] Sang Weihan, however, has invested in the belief that Shi Jingtang has the will of Heaven on his side, and the historians know he was right. In this case the appeal to the higher authority of *dao* obviates the need to negotiate the slippery terrain of the reciprocal conception of loyalty. Correspondingly, the historians can have Sang Weihan stress the unfaithfulness of the Zhaos because he has to believe they did not have the Mandate, and the historians know he was right about that too. On another level Sang Weihan is implying that the Zhaos are generally unreliable and so likely to be no more trustworthy with the Liao than they were with the Tang. That Deguang subscribed to some such thinking is suggested by numerous instances in which he shows respect for those who held out loyally against him and criticized or punished those who changed sides.[17]

The second part of Sang Weihan's argument shows just how central were immediate, material benefits to interstate relations in this period. Shi Jingtang and his advisors believed that Deguang would respond to the offer of the wealth of the Middle Kingdom, but in fact this did not work. Deguang apologized that although he had never reneged on an agreement, he had no alternative but to accept Zhao Dejun's offer. In the end, though, Sang Weihan's arguments (not to mention his persistent weeping) persuaded Deguang to maintain the original agreement.[18] Whereas in the other versions of the story Sang Weihan's arguments are not detailed, here Deguang is seen to be reacting against the disloyalty of the Zhaos on the one hand and responding to financial inducements on the other.

Jin'an fell to the allies only days after Zhao Yanshou returned from Deguang's camp, and the Later Tang collapsed. Deguang praised the loyalty of the Jin'an commander, Zhang Jingda, whose refusal to surrender had brought his death at the hands of his own officers. Now the surrendered Tang armies joined the allies, while the Zhaos led a disastrous retreat. At Luzhou city, Governor Gao Xingzhou (a Tang general from Jin'an newly reemployed by the allies) offered his "honest advice" that the Zhaos had best submit swiftly to the new Jin emperor.[19] In the Southern sources the Zhaos surrender in gentlemanly fashion to the allied emperors, but the *Liao shi* makes their crossing more a matter of capture than choice, recounting that they surrendered only

when caught by pursuing horsemen.[20] The Southern sources say that Zhang Li "fell into the hands of" *(xian yu)* the Kitan, "entered" *(ru)* Liao with Zhao Yanshou, or "followed" *(sui)* Zhao Dejun, giving him some choice in his own crossing, but less than his masters. The *Liao shi,* however, places Zhang Li's surrender four days earlier at the fall of Jin'an and does not place him in company with the Zhaos. Since the *Liao shi* compiler could scarcely have missed the connection between Zhang Li and the Zhaos, this may have been a deliberate attempt to protect Zhang Li from association with Zhao Yanshou, for reasons that will become apparent.

Shi Jingtang found it hard to forgive Zhao Dejun's attempt to displace him, which may explain why the Zhaos were taken to Liao and not Jin, and why all sources except the *Liao shi* say that they were chained.[21] Yet whatever the circumstances of their arrival, they were treated well in Liao. Zhao Dejun remained governor of Youzhou, but was dead in six months.[22] Zhao Yanshou succeeded him and was also made prince of Yan. By the end of 938 Zhao Yanshou's provincial seat at Youzhou became the Liao Southern Capital (Nanjing), and he became responsible for the Sixteen Prefectures, giving him a status he had never reached in the South.[23]

Zhao Yanshou seems to have settled in readily, but Zhang Li felt differently. Zhang's willingness to take a principled stand had never prevented him from accepting a job; his *zi* of Mengchen, after all, meant "dreaming of being a minister." This move, like his first from Liang to Taiyuan, quickly worked to his advantage, for he was immediately made a Hanlin academician. The *Xin Wudai shi,* for instance, notes that Deguang "regarded his learning," while the two latest biographies note his willingness to speak his mind.[24] Deguang is here a conventionally virtuous emperor and Zhang Li a conventionally upright minister. And yet shortly after Zhang's arrival in Liao, he attempted to return to the South.

The incident appears in all the sources and is the only notice of Zhang Li which survives into the gazetteers.[25] It first appears at the end of the *Jiu Wudai shi* account:

> When he first fell into the hands of the Kitan he had turned his back on the Kitan and returned south, but he was apprehended by pursuing cavalry. The ruler of the Kitan was angry, saying, "Why did you abandon me and depart?" Li said, "Li is a *hanren,* and (Chinese) clothes, and food and drink are not the same as those here; it would be better to die than to live and I request that [I] may swiftly die by the sword." The ruler of the Kitan looked round at the interpreter Gao Tangying, saying, "We have often warned all of you to treat this person exceptionally well, and that if he fled the fault would lie with all of you."

> Because of this he had Tangying beaten a hundred strokes with the light bamboo; this was how the ruler of the Kitan treated people exceptionally well.[26]

The main point of the story is to illustrate Zhang Li's value to Deguang, and here some of the later sources reiterate their observations of Zhang's outspokenness. Instead of punishing Zhang Li, Deguang instead blames the interlocutor *(tongshi)* Gao Tangying[27] for neglecting his duty and allowing Zhang Li to become unhappy enough to depart. Gao and his like were not merely translators, but also seem to have acted as cultural intermediaries.[28] As such, Gao (and his staff) had failed badly in their duty and perhaps in their understanding.

Some of the cultural issues involved become visible in the changing accounts of Zhang Li's explanation for his actions. Zhang's complaint in the *Jiu Wudai shi* is repeated in the *Tongjian* and twice more in the *Qidan guo zhi,*[29] while Ouyang Xiu's version retains the essentials: "I am originally a *hanren,* and (Chinese) clothes, food and drink, and language are not the same [as those here]; now I think of my home but cannot get [there], it would be better to die than to live."[30] In each case the point is the same: Zhang Li, complaining about the food, was suffering so badly from culture shock that the prospect of competing for position at the Later Jin court seemed preferable to staying where he was.

In the *Liao shi,* however, Zhang Li says: "I am not accustomed to the local customs of the North, to the food and drink, or to the living accommodation, so I often feel depressed (implied: by remembrances of home), and it was simply because of this that I ran away."[31] This is a complete rewrite within a longer passage that is otherwise lifted intact from the Southern sources. The crucial omission is the clear statement of what appears to modern eyes to be ethnic identification, while retaining the references to the cultural concerns underlying Zhang Li's homesickness. It is no surprise that Yuan historians from varied cultural backgrounds recognized the day-to-day significance of preferences for this or that foodstuff or beverage, variations in dress and habitation, and special customs.[32] This was not the issue. What seems to bother them is Zhang Li associating the label of *hanren* with a cultural complex starkly contrasted to Deguang's.

Of course, it could be that the historians simply wished to avoid confusion. Whether ethnicity existed in the Yuan is a thorny issue, and I make no assumptions here. What we can say is that under the Yuan, *hanren* had a specific meaning, referring to those from precisely the frontier region defined in this book, who ranked higher in the Yuan pecking order than their counterparts from south of the Huai. But Yuan compilers would not have clarified by removing *hanren,* first because Zhang Li *was* a *hanren* by Yuan definitions

and second because the final compilation of the *Liao shi* was done so hurriedly that we may reasonably suppose that alterations (as opposed to cuts) were only made when a serious issue was at stake.

Hence this change suggests that the Yuan historians, doubtless with an eye on the court, were unhappy about the implied link between explicit identification as a *hanren* and what could be read as a reluctance to serve a master marked as culturally non-Chinese. At the time the *Liao shi* was compiled, *hanren* served the Yuan without comment, but some had (famously) withdrawn their service early in the dynasty.[33] This was perhaps not so long ago that the compilers felt comfortable about retaining a historical example of someone who appeared, in fourteenth-century eyes, to place himself within a Yuan category and use that identity as a reason for refusing to serve.

If we next think back to the Song sources, then from a modern world of nations and ethnicity, we may easily suppose that our eleventh- and thirteenth-century writers were transmitting an early example of a specifically ethnic identity among the Chinese. However, taking their perspective, it is also possible that they did not register Zhang Li's words as a statement of ethnicity at all. Only at the fall of the Song to the Yuan (or perhaps the Jin) did literati begin to supplement the old ideological argument—that loyalty required righteous officials to withdraw their service from an immoral emperor—with the idea that an emperor's cultural affiliation could affect his capacity for morality; and this was still not a widespread belief even by the Ming, when Wang Fuzhi's strong opinions on the subject were an oddity.[34] During the Song an emperor was still judged to be good or bad independently of his preferred cultural practices, and in any case he was, in theoretical terms, there to be served.

Accordingly, the sources from which the eleventh-century historians worked did not register "I am a *hanren*" as an identification that could condition Zhang Li's behavior, but simply as a shorthand for the everyday cultural differences between Zhang Li and Deguang. We might note that the *Jiu Wudai shi* twice refers to Zhang Li as "the Hanlin academician recipient of edicts who had come north" *(bei lai Hanlin xueshi chengzhi),* which may be a tag analogous to the Kitan name Han Yanhui received after his return to Liao, reflecting Zhang Li's own self-identification.[35] Deguang evidently understood the problem, and his punishment of the interlocutor Gao implies that ways of overcoming homesickness were known, if not always practiced. Indeed a cynic could be moved to think that Zhang Li may have attempted to leave Liao as a means of improving his own conditions of service. Whether or not this was the case, after his return Zhang Li served Deguang faithfully for the ten years before they both died.

Liao and Jin: Loyalties and borders in alliance and war

The alliance and close personal relationship between Deguang and Shi Jingtang provided peaceful solutions to cross-border problems such as localized raiding and absconding populations.[36] The importance of certain among Deguang's southerner ministers in mediating this relationship is suggested by the rich presents required of the regular envoy missions from Jin for leading figures in Liao, among whom Han Yanhui and Zhao Yanshou, as joint heads of the Southern Administration, were listed as second only to the imperial clan and the twin heads of the Northern bureaucracy.[37] For Han Yanhui the gifts were perhaps fair recompense for his establishment of institutions in Liao capable of conducting interstate relations at this level of sophistication. For Zhao Yanshou the gifts were perhaps more by way of inducements to stay in Liao, sponsored by both parties to the alliance. Deguang also arranged for Zhao Yanshou's wife to join him from Luoyang, receiving in thanks a gift of horses (in the *Jiu Wudai shi*) and Zhao's unstinting service (in the *Liao shi*).[38] Zhao Yanshou's gratitude might have helped to bind him more closely to Deguang, but the Liao emperor's concern may have been more to sever Zhao Yanshou's high-level connections with the Jin court. Yet Zhao Yanshou's political significance in the South may have elevated him above Han Yanhui. From 940 or 942 Zhao held both top positions in the Liao Southern bureaucracy simultaneously, while retaining a viceregal role and possibility of a territorial base "south of the mountains" that Han Yanhui lacked.[39] Zhang Li, meanwhile, continued as Hanlin academician and received unremarkable promotion at best.[40]

The situation remained stable for Han, Zhao, and Zhang until Shi Jingtang's death in 942 brought a rapid deterioration in relations between Deguang and the new Jin emperor, Shi Chonggui, that resulted in four years of war and the Liao destruction of Jin.[41] Han Yanhui played no recorded part in these events (although as a chief minister he must have had some role), but Zhang Li was involved, and Zhao Yanshou was central. The construction placed upon Zhao Yanshou's role in each of the texts reflects how the relationship between loyalty and borders changed during the war, and how understandings of that relationship shifted in successive histories. The *Tongjian* amplifies Zhao Yanshou's role, while the *Liao shi* emphasizes his abilities, perhaps to the extent of falsification.

The *Jiu Wudai shi* blames the war on the provocative advice of the chief commander of the Imperial Guard *(shizwei qinjun du zhihuishi),* Jing Yanguang, who advised the Jin emperor Shi Chonggui to reject his designation as "subject" by the Liao.[42] This text does not mention Zhao Yanshou until

active hostilities begin in 944. The *Tongjian* incorporates Jing Yanguang's advice in its unified narrative, but adds elaborations that implicate Zhao Yanshou too: "The emperor of the Northern court should not believe Zhao Yanshou's deceitful beguilings and treat the Middle Kingdom without proper respect, for you (the emperor) have seen the soldiers and horses of the Middle Kingdom with your own eyes."[43] This refers to an earlier *Tongjian* report that just six months after Shi Jingtang's death, Zhao Yanshou had advised an attack on the South because he "wanted to replace the Jin as emperor of the Middle Kingdom."[44] Jing Yanguang is unlikely to have known about this, even if it was true, but the *Tongjian* nevertheless shows him here not as the sole provocateur, but as a general responding—albeit intemperately—to plans already laid in Liao. The *Liao shi* annals, however, reinforce the impression that the provocation came from Jin by dating this exchange a year earlier than the *Tongjian* and noting that it was only afterwards that "the emperor started to consider a southern punitive expedition," in consultation with Zhao Yanshou among others. Since the *Liao shi* agrees with the *Jiu Wudai shi* on this, it may indeed be that the *Tongjian* is painting Zhao Yanshou blacker than he deserves.[45]

It may be that Sima Guang had a hard time forgiving Zhao Yanshou for commanding the campaign against Jin, but from Zhao Yanshou's point of view, he was simply fighting for what had been promised to his father. Since the failure of Zhao Dejun's bid for rulership in 936–937, the Zhao family had not had the independent military strength to establish their own regime, but now Zhao Yanshou was a senior official in the most powerful regime of his day, conducting a punitive invasion of a recalcitrant subordinate. Any personal gains for Zhao Yanshou were underwritten by Deguang's backing (as had been those of Shi Jingtang), which placed Zhao in a strong political and ritual position vis-à-vis any potential rivals for control of the South, including the Jin house itself.[46] The greater stability brought by the cooperation between Deguang and Jin had handicapped the development of autonomous powers within Jin, while the centralized Liao military system did not provide the same potential as that of the Southern regimes for establishing regional power bases.[47] Jing Yanguang's disruption of the resulting equilibrium gave Zhao Yanshou an opportunity he intended to seize.

It took the Liao three campaigns over four seasons to conquer the Jin. The military details do not concern us here, but the depiction of Zhao Yanshou's part in them does. During the first season of campaigning, 943–944, all five sources record that Zhao Yanshou led a huge army that captured Beizhou and reached the banks of the Yellow River, where Zhao's achievements brought appointment as WeiBo governor and prince of Wei. His *Liao*

shi biography tells that he defeated the Jin again and captured the general Sai Xiangyu, but then lost the next encounter at Yuancheng.[48] Following a failed ambush led by Deguang himself, Zhao Yanshou suggested that the day could still be saved by taking the bridge at Shanzhou on the river, which would have exposed the Jin capital. But the Jin army put up an unexpectedly strong defense at Qicheng, described by the Southern sources as a hard-fought draw followed by a Liao withdrawal, but in the *Liao shi* as a Liao victory. Evidently Zhao Yanshou's plan could not be seen to fail by the Yuan compilers.[49]

The second season, 944–945, saw a slower Liao advance. Sources from the *Xin Wudai shi* onwards add to the *Jiu Wudai shi* account with notes regarding pillage, a small point, but one implicating Zhao Yanshou in the destruction of his homeland. The *Tongjian* also records how Zhao was outwitted at Xiangzhou. On the city walls a tiny force of 500 Jin defenders confronted a Liao cavalry force with a show of good morale and lined up for battle against them, prompting the cavalry to depart. There were "over ten thousand" Liao cavalry in the *Jiu Wudai shi,* but the *Tongjian* claims "several tens of thousands"—which would have been a large portion of the Liao army—and names their commander as Zhao Yanshou.[50] The *Tongjian* emphasizes the courage of the Southern defenders by raising the odds, while Zhao Yanshou's involvement is another reminder of his central role in the war against his homeland, and of an enemy—even a traitor—outwitted.

The sources also present alternatives regarding loyalty. When the Jin took the offensive, Zhao Yanshou led the Liao army north via Hengzhou-Zhenzhou to Qizhou. The prefect, Shen Yun, attacked, only to lose his gates to the elite Liao cavalry. Zhao Yanshou tried to persuade him to surrender: "Prefect Shen is an old friend of mine. 'If you can choose your misfortune, it is better to choose the lighter'; if you bring your city to surrender sooner (rather than later), you will bring no disgrace to yourself."[51] But Shen Yun berated Zhao Yanshou from the city wall: "[You and your father] miscalculated and fell into the hands of the Kitan. You are willing to use the hordes from the mutton-reeking tents to violate the land of your father and mother without feeling ashamed of yourself; on the contrary you seem pleased at your own achievement. Shen Yun would rather die for country and family, and certainly will not imitate what you have done."[52]

Shen Yun was that rare thing in the tenth century: an official who did indeed die for his defiant loyalty, and by his own hand. Ouyang Xiu seizes upon the story from the *Jiu Wudai shi* biographies and ranks Shen Yun as a "martyr in service."[53] The *Tongjian* also includes a detailed account.[54] Neither could have hoped for a better contrast to Zhao Yanshou's approach, and one perhaps better reflecting their own views on the behavior appropriate to

Shen Yun's situation.[55] For the eleventh-century writers the exchange clearly presents the choice of being a loyal suicide, going to one's grave with an easy conscience and confident of remembrance as an adherent to the virtuous path, or being one who changed allegiance in order to live, and who, even if his own conscience is untroubled, may pass into posterity as a wicked man. The exchange appears in all the texts except the *Liao shi*,[56] so Shen Yun's viewpoint is not simply an eleventh-century emphasis. But his actions would have been understood in the tenth century as the oddity they were, and not as the exemplar they became in later hands.

The way the war ended is firmly placed at Zhao Yanshou's feet, but the reasons vary. Toward the end of the second season of fighting, a correspondence of uncertain sequence and dating invited Zhao to return to Jin allegiance, finally producing, on the eve of the fourth campaign season, the response that Zhao Yanshou "would like to return to the Middle Kingdom" and would do so if an army was sent to meet him.[57] Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang do not see these as communications with an enemy, but with the regime where the Song writers thought Zhao Yanshou really belonged. The *Liao shi,* for its part, offers a curiously ambiguous statement in which Zhao Yanshou says: "I fell into captivity a long time ago," and then either "how could I," or "I would rather," "forget the country of my parents."[58] Either interpretation works in context, and each would satisfy a different constituency of the *Liao shi*'s prospective readership.

If Zhao Yanshou's own feelings here are unfathomable, the eleventh-century sources are clear: the Jin armies walked into a trap set by Zhao, but then Deguang let him down. Zhao's earliest biography says that he had been promised the throne in "the South," and the *Tongjian* adds that this led him to serve in the war with all his might.[59] But once Deguang had the Jin armies pinned down at Zhongduqiao, he encouraged the surrender of the Jin commander, Du Chongwei, by offering him the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom in place of Zhao Yanshou. This was ostensibly because (in the *Tongjian*) Zhao's "prestige and renown are superficial, [and] I fear he is not capable of being emperor over the Middle Kingdom."[60] The sources disagree about how this turned out. Zhao Yanshou's earliest and latest biographies give him full or partial command (with Du Chongwei) of the surrendered Jin armies. The *Tongjian,* however, claims that neither Zhao Yanshou nor Du Chongwei received either a throne or military command, suggesting the duplicity of Deguang, whose acceptance of the throne in Bianzhou shortly afterwards broke his promises to both generals.[61]

Zhao Yanshou felt misused and Zhang Li along with him. Zhao had been worried that he would not get his reward for some time and had already

solicited Zhang's help to remind Deguang of his promise by requesting the position of heir apparent, but without success.[62] According to the *Xin Wudai shi,* it all came back to the official caps Feng Dao had brought to Liao in 938:

> [When] Deguang was about to hold court (in 947), the attendants gave Yanshou a cap with the marten-tail and cicada-wing ornaments of an imperial prince or one of the three dukes, [and gave] Li the cap and robes of the third grade; Yanshou and Li were both unwilling to wear them. Yanshou instead had made a prince's cap in order to distinguish himself. Li said, "When I was [first] in the upper kingdom, the Jin sent Feng Dao . . . [who] bestowed two marten-tail caps: one was worn by the chief minister Han Yanhui, and one ordered to be worn by me. Am I now going to wear something of lesser rank!" And in the end, he wore the marten-tail and cicada-wing cap to attend court.[63]

The caps offered in 947 were correct Tang court dress for the ranks they then held. Furthermore, the new post and appointments that Zhang Li received during this court session were the same rank (3a) in the Tang system as his old ones. But both men laid claim to more senior positions; Zhao Yanshou to the emperorship Deguang had promised him and Zhang Li to the supreme post within the Liao's Southern Administration. Neither were to achieve these ambitions.

Ouyang Xiu emphasizes the petulance of Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li, but Sima Guang also transmits a number of incidents depicting Zhao Yanshou in a more positive light than the ambitious warmonger we have seen until now, together with others confirming a general approval of Zhang Li. On the final march toward the Jin capital, Zhang Li offered Deguang some advice first noted in the *Tongjian:*

> Now that Great Liao has gained the *tianxia,* it is proper to employ people of the Middle Kingdom to act as generals and ministers for the Middle Kingdom, and it is not proper to employ northerners *(beiren)* and the intimates and favorites of the emperor. If government orders are contradicted or neglected, then the hearts of the people will not be obedient and even though [you] have obtained [control over] them [now], you could still lose them in future.[64]

In the *Tongjian* this is a *topos* of the virtuous official disregarded by his ruler but vindicated by events, since in this account Deguang is forced to withdraw north chiefly because the destructive and arrogant behavior of his Northern followers and inner circle does indeed lose the hearts of the people.

Sima Guang places this advice shortly before the surrendered Jin general, Zhang Yanze, having captured Bianzhou for the Liao with scarcely a blow struck, allowed his Southern troops two days of savage plunder.[65] However, Zhang Li's biographies in the last two sources upend the whole incident. They blame the plundering on named Northern generals—the *Qidan guo zhi* calls them "foreign" *(fan)*—and follow up with Zhang's advice, thereby implying that it was the plundering—by *northerners*—that provoked Zhang Li to speak against having northerners govern the South. The effect in the *Qidan guo zhi* and *Liao shi* is to show a Zhang Li concerned for his homeland and trying to defend it against the ravages of the enemy.

Deguang also comes out of this well in one respect, because although he rejects the advice, within two days of entering Bianzhou in person he has heard evidence of Zhang Yanze's long record of unchecked cruelty and handed him over to his chief victim for (gruesome) punishment. Deguang swiftly achieves what the Jin emperors could not, reinforcing his portrayal as one properly deserving of rulership.

Zhao Yanshou, too, gets to play the part of wise minister winning over the emperor, in deciding the fate of the surrendered Jin army. Du Chongwei's troops had not wanted to surrender, but had wept and ground their teeth, and Deguang thought that extermination would prevent mutiny.[66] The *Tongjian* picks up a long conversation from Zhao Yanshou's earliest biography in which Zhao first goads Deguang into asking Zhao's opinion, then explains that Jin detachments could usefully defend the southern and western borders of their former regime, leading Deguang to exclaim, "Excellent! Only a great prince could manage it like this!"[67] Here the *Tongjian* does not alter the positive import of the *Jiu Wudai shi,* and the commentary to his biography in the *Qidan guo zhi* goes so far as to say that it shows his loyal and honest disposition.[68] In the *Jiu Wudai shi* this story is just another *topos* of the virtuous minister, but in the *Tongjian* it is part of a narrative that frequently highlights the difference between the advice of civil ministers offered to a receptive monarch (regardless of his being a northerner) and the destructive behavior of military men (who are often Southern, and certainly lead Southern troops).

The *Tongjian*'s more balanced approach also contrasts with the *Xin Wudai shi*'s negativity as Deguang departs for home, accompanied by several ministers including Zhang Li. Ouyang Xiu is first to record that when Deguang saw the cities laid waste by the war, he said: "'Bringing the Middle Kingdom to this [state of affairs] is all chiefly the fault of the Prince of Yan (Zhao Yanshou).' He then turned to Zhang Li saying, 'You were also instrumental in this.'"[69] The implication is that Zhang Li, as a notably upright official, should have tried to prevent the damage. Although Sima Guang

picks up the complaint, this story is set against Zhang's advice on how to avoid losing the hearts of the people. The portrayal shifts again in the *Qidan guo zhi,* which is negative about Zhao Yanshou but highly positive about Zhang Li. Accordingly, both Ye Longli and the *Liao shi* compilers omit this account of blame for duty failed.

Shortly after this, Deguang died on the road near the new Liao Central Capital (Zhongjing) at Zhenzhou. The succession was messy, and the situation was confused by the recent conquest. The *Jiu Wudai shi* records that Zhao Yanshou, who was vicegerent of the Central Capital, rode there straightaway and—since Deguang had given him precisely this job—took control of "southern affairs," which now included the conquered Jin empire. But after about a week Zhao was imprisoned by Deguang's nephew Wuyu (Shizong, 947–951), who claimed the Liao throne with the help of a forged will.[70] Such events were common enough when a leader died and warrant no further comment in this earliest account.

The *Xin Wudai shi* elaborates, but Ouyang Xiu's version remains a typical story of an untidy succession. Here Wuyu and the leading figures in Deguang's retinue also went to Zhenzhou, where Zhao Yanshou requested Wuyu to hand over the city keys. Wuyu refused. Zhao Yanshou's advisors said: "Those powerful Kitan who are gathering and plotting look scared and uneasy; there is certain to be upheaval, and you ought to prepare for it. At present there are still ten thousand soldiers of the Middle Kingdom army, which can be used to strike at the enemy. If you do not do this, your affairs will surely not succeed."[71] The "enemy" are presumably the primarily Kitan nobles who might dispute Zhao Yanshou's control of Southern affairs (the new conquests), but this was not the only consideration. Wuyu was not the obvious heir to Deguang, and an internecine struggle was only to be expected, which could well affect Zhao Yanshou's region even if nobody tried to displace him. Uncertain what to do, Zhao hesitated long enough for Wuyu to have him arrested at a banquet. In this text the will is simply missing, but without it none could gainsay Wuyu's claim that his uncle had promised him control of the South. This delegitimized Zhao Yanshou's position as vicegerent, while Wuyu plainly intended that his control of the southern part of the empire would also make him Deguang's heir to the whole of Liao.

The *Tongjian* makes Zhao Yanshou much more active in his own downfall and ties it into a larger pattern. Sima Guang makes the crucial addition that Zhao had become disenchanted on the march back to Liao and declared that he would not go back to the North. Subsequently, at Deguang's death the *Tongjian* notes that the leading figures all marched into Zhenzhou with troops in tow, first among them being Zhao Yanshou. "Yanshou wanted to

resist them (the other leading figures), but feared to lose their considerable assistance, and therefore sent them contributions."[72] Unknown to Zhao, the Liao nobility had already decided to accept Wuyu as their emperor, so when Sima Guang records that Zhao Yanshou claimed authority in the South and rewarded Wuyu as if he were just another general, Zhao is unwittingly challenging Wuyu's position. The combined effect of this narrative is to imply, without stating it explicitly, that Zhao Yanshou believed himself to be a contender for an imperial throne, at least in the Southern realm.

Sima Guang's final addition to the story confirms this impression. He, like Ouyang Xiu, records that Zhao Yanshou's advisors told him to prepare for trouble, but in the context established by the *Tongjian,* the threat is to Zhao's quasi-imperial position with scarcely a hint of the internecine background. Zhao Yanshou dithers as in the *Xin Wudai shi,* but in the *Tongjian* he eventually produces a decision: to hold a ceremony of receiving congratulations as emperor. Although he is talked out of this by his advisor Li Song, this account has produced a logical culmination to Deguang's much-recorded original offer of the Southern throne to Zhao Yanshou.

The parallel with Zhao Dejun's mistimed attempt to take over the Later Tang is striking and suggests the possibility that Zhao Yanshou may simply have been (loyally) trying to maintain order in the South until the succession was settled in the Supreme Capital.[73] Sima Guang suggests as much when he attributes the same concern to the new Liao governor of Bianzhou, Xiao Han, who shortly after Wuyu's accession placed one of Li Siyuan's younger sons in charge of Southern affairs (including the conquests) so that Xiao Han himself could leave for the North (thereby also escaping the advance of the newly declared emperor of Later Han, Liu Zhiyuan). There is also material in the *Tongjian* account for a debate over the proper course of action in such complicated circumstances, and Li Song is made to observe helpfully that the principles of the matter were difficult to fathom. The political situation had changed enormously since Zhao Yanshou's youth, so that one of his advisors warns, "you cannot act as you have in the past."[74]

With his lord dead, Zhao Yanshou's loyalty lay only with himself until such time as a suitable new master should present himself, and since the consolidation of the borderlands into two distinct political units by the alliance and then war between Liao and Jin, there were fewer options for choosing a new allegiance than there had been even in the Later Tang. Zhao's preferred option was apparently to become a master in his own right, but if he could not be an emperor himself, he still needed either legitimizing recognition from a Northern or Southern emperor, or the military strength or strategic position to sustain himself as a border power between the two in the manner

of the governors of his youth. Zhao Yanshou may also have found contemporary inspiration in the case of Sun Fangjian, who retained considerable autonomy in Dingzhou for a couple of years by switching his allegiance back and forth between Northern and Southern emperors. But both emperors were determined to increase their control over characters like Sun Fangjian and ultimately he was forced to accept a greater degree of subordination.[75] Autonomy was no longer such a ready possibility, leaving independence as the only alternative to full submission, and that required more determination and resources than most governors could now muster.[76]

If Zhao Yanshou was moving at a level demanding momentous decisions, Zhang Li's situation had changed very little. Where the *Jiu Wudai shi* notes simply that Zhao Yanshou was imprisoned by Wuyu, the *Tongjian* inserts a piece of theatricality that creates a tense atmosphere for Zhao Yanshou's arrest and provides Wuyu with opportunities to make pointed remarks to a group of Southern Chinese ministers, first among whom is Zhang Li.

> . . . Wuyu summoned Yanshou and Zhang Li, He Ning, Li Song, and Feng Dao to his lodgings to drink. Wuyu's wife had always treated Yanshou as an older brother, and now Wuyu casually spoke to Yanshou, saying, "Your younger sister has arrived from the upper kingdom, would you like to see her?" Yanshou joyfully went in together with him. After a very long time, Wuyu came out and spoke to [Zhang] Li and the others, saying, "The prince of Yan was plotting to rebel, but I have now locked him up." He further said, (that Deguang had promised him control of the South, then released all those in Yanshou's party). . . . Wuyu reached Daixianguan and received the *fan* and *han* officials who came to offer their congratulations, and laughing he spoke to Zhang Li and the others saying, "If the prince of Yan had really performed this ceremony here, I would have surrounded him with armored cavalry and all you worthies would also not have escaped."[77]

Wuyu speaks to Zhang Li as if he were involved in Zhao Yanshou's venture, reflecting the close connection implied by Deguang blaming Zhang and Zhao for the despoliation of the South and the incident when Zhang Li had requested posts for Zhao Yanshou. Ouyang Xiu almost makes the connection explicit when he observes, contrary to the *Tongjian,* that Zhang Li was chief among those sacked by Wuyu after Zhao Yanshou's arrest.[78]

This suggested association is carried through into the *Qidan guo zhi* but is notably absent from the *Liao shi.* This has Zhang Li accompanying Deguang as he headed north, which would dissociate Zhang from Zhao Yanshou's attempt to take the throne if only that event appeared anywhere at all

in the *Liao shi* account. The omission of this whole incident—and indeed the substitution of a note that Wuyu made Zhao Yanshou military commissioner for his "merit in assisting and supporting the emperor"—suggests a cover-up by the *Liao shi.*[79]

Where the *Tongjian* account once again shows Zhao Yanshou eager for power but incompetent to achieve it—out of his depth, and ultimately excluded from the real politics of the Liao court—the *Liao shi* excludes him by silence, protecting his reputation but confirming his lack of political importance within Liao.[80] This was the first Liao accession that Zhao Yanshou or Zhang Li had seen, and the difference in political culture at this level and in these circumstances clearly caught both of them completely by surprise. In such a situation their two different understandings of loyalty—conditioned as they were by the political status each held—were inadequate to allow them to play any effective part in events.

The *Liao shi* annals claim that Zhao Yanshou died as vicegerent of the Southern Capital and prince of Wei, but it seems more likely that he perished, imprisoned, within a year or two of his arrest. Either way he outlived Zhang Li, whose outspokenness, so esteemed by the historians, had made him deadly enemies. In 947 Zhang Li was lying ill at Zhenzhou, when his residence was surrounded by troops of the Liao general, Xiao Han. According to the *Jiu Wudai shi:*

> . . . Han went in to see Li and berated him, saying, "You advised the late emperor and told him that he should not appoint *fanren* as provincial governors, and that if he did then the state would not persist; then when the late emperor came and ordered me to manage things in the palace of Bianzhou, you advised that this was not permissible; again when I was governor at Bianzhou and you were in the Secretariat *(zhongshu),* for what reason did you submit comments about me?" Li raised his voice and replied with unyielding words. Han then chained up Li and departed. The governor of Zhenzhou, Mada, shortly afterwards released his chains, but that night he died of his illness.[81]

The *Tongjian* adds further complaints: "Furthermore, you slandered me and Jieli to the late emperor, saying that Jieli loved to plunder people's property and that I loved to plunder other men's sons and daughters. Now I will surely kill you!"[82] It also provides Zhang Li's response: "This is the guiding principle of the entire country: I spoke truly about it. [If you] want to kill me, then kill me. How will chaining me up do that?"[83] And when Zhang Li dies, it is no longer of his illness, but "of rage and indignation." The same interpretation is carried into the two latest sources.[84]

At the end Sima Guang emphasizes Zhang Li's passionate espousal of principle, for which he is prepared to die, and offers a contrast with the uncivilized behavior of Xiao Han, who is made responsible for Zhang Li's death. The subtle rewrite conveys an implication that Zhang Li preserves his moral center, while Xiao Han behaves like a barbarian. But, however he may have been read, Sima Guang himself does not attribute Zhang Li's uprightness to his being Chinese, nor Xiao Han's intemperance to his being a Kitan. Indeed, he has consistently depicted Xiao Han's fellow Kitan, the emperor Deguang, as worthy of his position by all the standard criteria, while the Chinese Zhao Yanshou has been subject to considerable criticism.

Borders and loyalties: Culture or politics?

Although both Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou changed master more than once earlier in their careers, they never did so again after 936 (although Zhang Li did try, and Zhao Yanshou attempted to become a master himself). Both faithfully served the Liao emperor Deguang until his death, and although both felt they deserved greater recognition than they got, neither showed any sign of regretting their choice of allegiance or the deeds that resulted, and neither showed any serious desire to return to the South.

A rare example of writing from the hand of a Liao southerner may provide a hint of how Zhao Yanshou felt:

> Yellow sand is gathered in curls by the wind and thrown into mid-air
> Clouds drift over Yinshan and snow fills the outskirts of the city.
> Someone returns from their search for water and, moving their tents, heads off.
> He shoots at a hawk, the arrow falls and, putting away his bow, he goes to retrieve it.
> A bird comes across frosted fruit and in its hunger pecks at it
> A horse crossing a frozen river, feeling thirsty, paws the ice with its hoof.
> Occupying the plentiful grasslands of the high plain.
> In the deep night we break forest twigs to light a fire.[85]

The poem displays the ambiguity typical of the Tang genre of frontier poetry, expressing a certain melancholy, to be sure, but predominantly a calm wistfulness.[86] If this is an expression of Zhao Yanshou's genuine emotions, he seems content and at peace with himself rather than frustrated or troubled in his mind.

Although Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li may have found their own actions unproblematical, this view was no longer shared by all their contemporaries.

Whereas Han Yanhui, and Zhang Li while he served in the South, changed master without adverse comment from any quarter (including in the texts), the choices made by Zhao and Zhang in 936 laid them open to criticism, actual or implied, both from contemporaries and historians.

The problem for both men was that in 936 the political situation changed strikingly (though by no means irreversibly). Although the Later Tang had brought the Liang and Taiyuan Jin regimes under a single ruler and begun to limit the powers of provincial governors, leaders with regional bases could still pose a serious challenge to the authority of the court.[87] In extreme cases governors could even seize control of the empire for themselves, as Li Siyuan did in 926 and, of course, Shi Jingtang in 936. The Liao-Jin alliance allowed Shi Jingtang to encroach much further upon the autonomy of his governors and also gave Deguang a breathing space in which to consolidate an authority already more secure than that of the Southern court. By the time hostilities began in 943, the Liao faced not merely a coalition of governors that could collapse if just a few people broke ranks, as in 936, but something with enough coherence as a state to be able to sustain a full-scale war over several years.

War crystallized choices as neighbors and allies were transformed into enemies, and this shift also brought a change in the valuation of allegiance. Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li had crossed to Liao during a military campaign, and their decision—or at least that of Zhao Yanshou and his father—had determined the success of Shi Jingtang's challenge for the Southern throne and Deguang's intervention. This might have been acceptable had Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li not been so strongly implicated in the subsequent war effort against the South.

We see signs of contemporary disquiet at their behavior in the dramatic (and dramatized) accusations of Shen Yun against the Zhaos at Qizhou, which feature in our earliest surviving texts. Since it is extremely rare to find this view of loyalty expressed in this period, it is significant that it is voiced at all. Although it seems most likely that Shen Yun was very much in the minority in his own time, the records of how Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li conducted themselves during the war and its immediate aftermath show the emergence in the texts of the idea that it was possible to be on "the wrong side" in a war. Whereas Han Yanhui and others who had joined Liao in its formative period were not blamed for continuing to serve during the war, Zhao and Zhang were held liable for their war service.

When Han Yanhui chose to serve the Liao instead of Youzhou, his action did not have immediate and significant political consequences because at the time he was young and unimportant, albeit ambitious, and Abaoji's regime was barely taking shape. Although in the long term Han Yanhui's con-

tribution may have been much greater by enabling Liao to become a state, in the short term Han was himself the main beneficiary of his action. Han Yanhui's move was directly comparable to Zhang Li's early choice to move from Liang service to Taiyuan, at a time when he too was an untried youth. But by contrast, the choices made by Zhao Yanshou and Zhang Li in 936, together with their corollaries in the 940s, were not politically neutral but involved exchanging one strongly established allegiance for another, rather than simply forming a new bond where there had been no preexisting strong tie to break.

The difference, then, is partly one of status: the higher the position, the greater the impact of the decision, and so the more culpability attaches if the decision is deemed to have been wrong. But the consolidation of the political situation into two main powers, first as allies and then as enemies, also drew a much clearer line between them that made changes of allegiance at once more visible and more significant, and this contributed to a general raising of the stakes. The import of this change in attitude remained firmly political. Nevertheless, moral overtones inevitably began to creep in the moment it became possible to judge that someone "should" have made one choice rather than another, and we see this, again, in Shen Yun's railing against the Zhaos.

An implication that the enthusiasm of Zhao Yanshou's and Zhang Li's service to the enemy of the Southern regimes raised new moral concerns can also be seen in some advice offered to Zhao Yanshou's son Kuangzan, found in the *Tongjian.* The advisor, an old servant of Zhao Yanshou's called Li Shu, wanted Zhao Kuangzan to leave Liao and join the new regime of Later Han, but Kuangzan was worried that he would be turned away because of his father's actions. Li Shu said, "As to the prince of Yan entering [the Liao] court, how could this be something that he wanted!"[88] Li Shu recognized that Zhao Yanshou's choices might be problematical, but suggested they could be excused if he were held to be acting under compulsion. Although this must have stretched the bounds of credibility, Liu Zhiyuan of the Han apparently accepted the argument. Of course, his decision may also have been influenced by the likelihood that if he did not accept Zhao Kuangzan's allegiance, he would lose Zhao to the Shu regime, in a reversion to the competition for servitors common to the first third of the century.

But it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which changing sides had become a moral issue by mid-century. As Liu Zhiyuan's acceptance of Zhao Kuangzan's service suggests, selection of one master over another remained normal and entirely acceptable behavior whenever the political situation offered numerous choices, as it did once again in 947 after the departure of the Liao. It was only changing sides in the particular circumstances of a war between two established states, and by people whose decisions had major

political significance, that could arouse concern among a tiny minority of the official classes. The possibility of such circumstances would not arise again until 951, with the foundation of the Later Zhou and the Liao decision to back the Northern Han resistance to the Zhou in Taiyuan. All we see during the Liao-Jin war is a disquiet confined to people disposed to think along what were, at the time, unusual lines.

Perhaps more surprisingly, remarkably little concern over the rights and wrongs of Zhao Yanshou's and Zhang Li's crossing to and service of Liao appears in the eleventh-century texts. The clearest judgment comes from Ouyang Xiu, as we might expect. His chief concern is precisely the issue of frontier crossing, and he drops incidents showing Zhang Li's earlier personal loyalty and Zhao Yanshou preventing the massacre of the Jin army, while adding the accusation that the destruction of the South was their fault and the tale of the official caps that highlights the pretensions of both men. Curiously, however, Ouyang Xiu neither accuses Zhao Yanshou of inciting the war against Jin, nor claims that he fought on the promise of the emperorship (even though the latter information appears in the *Jiu Wudai shi*). Moreover, his version of Wuyu's accession shows Zhao Yanshou out of his depth rather than actively plotting. The moral may be: "This is what happens when you tangle with things you don't understand," but even so it seems that for Ouyang Xiu it is a matter of poor judgment rather than immorality.

Sima Guang, for his part, is positive about Zhang Li, emphasizing his persistence in the highest principles even unto death, but Zhao Yanshou comes in for considerable disapproval. It is the *Tongjian* that details Zhao's inability to stand up to the powerholders at the Later Tang court, that first mentions his enthusiasm for war against Jin, and that structures the events after Deguang's death to argue that Zhao Yanshou sought an imperial throne. But it also retains incidents like Zhao's pleading for the lives of the surrendered Jin troops and adds a note on his importance as a recipient of regular Jin presents. Most significantly, Sima Guang includes several incidents showing Zhao Yanshou as a regular virtuous official, advising his master in the proper manner.

So the picture here is complex. Although Zhao is criticized for crossing the political border into Liao, the disapproval does not arise because the Liao are morally suspect, for Deguang learns to heed Zhao Yanshou in upright-minister mode, thereby showing himself worthy of receiving service from good officials. The judgment here is not about the morality of the lord to whom Zhao Yanshou transferred his allegiance, but about the rightness of Zhao's choice to serve the political enemy of the Southern regimes. Zhao Yanshou helped to create the situation in which Northern and Southern re-

gimes became more clearly defined, but for Sima Guang these differences were longstanding and of the greatest significance. We should not be surprised if his own current concerns obscured his view of how things might have been different just over a century earlier. However honorable Deguang may have been, for Sima Guang he remained an adversary, and Zhao Yanshou should not have served him for that reason.

But such judgments still carried no cultural content and certainly no "ethnic" element. Neither Zhao Yanshou nor Zhang Li have any problem with fighting wars against people of the same cultural bent as themselves, and neither does anyone else for that matter. Leaders in the territories of the Great Tang empire had been fighting each other for decades without reference to anything but political advantage, military strength, and economic resources. Cultural affiliation, let alone what we would call ethnicity, was simply not a factor. Even when Zhang Li offers advice about not allowing "northerners" to govern the South, his concern is about the dominance of particular cliques at least as much as it is about any worries that the northerners' cultural identity will make their political supremacy obnoxious to the conquered population.

But if cultural identity was not a factor in decision making, cultural *difference* was recognized and could become an element affecting the circumstances in which individual lives were lived. Zhang Li's declared reasons for attempting to leave Liao are the obvious case in point, but Zhao Yanshou's evident inability to comprehend the realities of a Liao succession dispute may be another. He had never experienced a succession in the Liao, and, working as he did at the highest levels of the Liao Southern Administration and according to Tang norms, it may not have occurred to him that the rules might be different among the Liao nobility or that someone in his position might be quite so thoroughly excluded from the process.

In the *Qidan guo zhi* and more so in the *Liao shi* we see a rather different set of concerns. The *Qidan guo zhi* does little more than transmit material from the *Tongjian,* but it does imply that Kitan plundering *led to* Zhang Li's advice to employ southerners to rule southerners, rather than simply allowing the advice to *precede* an account of *Southern* plunder of the Jin capital. This suggests greater awareness of cultural boundaries by the mid-thirteenth century, when the Southern Song were at war with the Mongols. For the *Liao shi* cultural identity is also an issue, as suggested by the omission of Zhang Li's statement "I am a *hanren.*" But the omission is driven by political rather than moral concerns. Chinese must be shown as enthusiastic servants of their non-Chinese masters, and to this end Zhao Yanshou is written up even more positively than the events would seem to permit. He is made a better

general than the other texts suggest he really was, and the Yuan commentary speaks of his "great achievements." The *Liao shi* completely omits all mention of the uncomfortable events that followed Deguang's death, admitting a degree of embarrassment only in its comment about Zhao Yanshou's earlier request to be heir apparent: "Although achievements such as Yanshou's were outstanding, going to the lengths of presuming to the position of emperor was an error."[89]

For Zhang Li, but much more for Zhao Yanshou, the act of changing allegiance acquired new valuations during their own lifetimes. The texts reflect these changes in a discourse that starts to consider the moral issues of crossing a frontier in the earliest materials but that does not begin to add considerations of cultural identity until at least the thirteenth century. During the second half of the tenth century, however, attitudes began to shift closer to those espoused by the writers of some of our later texts, as we shall see in the stories of Li Huan and Wang Jizhong.

CHAPTER 6

Drawing the Line

Redefinitions of Loyalty

> The mayor of La Rochelle at that time was a very sharp-witted man, shrewd in all his undertakings, and a good Frenchman at heart, as he was to show. When he saw that the moment had come, he put his scheme into operation, having already consulted some of the citizens who were of the same mind.
>
> —Froissart, *Chronicles*

In the half-century between the crossing of Li Huan in 947 and that of Wang Jizhong in 1003, the definition of the frontier changed greatly and in several aspects. In mid-century, Li Huan could still work on the premise that persuading one official to transfer his loyalty would have geopolitical significance, but by 1003 individual choices of allegiance no longer had any impact on borderlines, whether at the level of localities or courts.

Li Huan was among the Jin officials selected by Wuyu in 947 to continue to Liao after most of the bureaucrats were left behind at Zhenzhou. Li had filled literary roles at court during Later Tang and Later Jin, and was reemployed in Liao for his literary talents. Whereas Li Huan would have known all three of our earlier subjects, he would never have met Wang Jizhong, a general who did not arrive in Liao until 1003, forty years after Li Huan's death and the foundation of the Song. By then the world was much changed. The Southern generals had been coopted by the Song founders, who conquered regional regimes if they would not submit. There had been two smooth successions to the Song throne. Unlike his predecessors, Wang Jizhong knew no other regime and had never experienced a transfer of dynastic power. For the Song ruling elite there was no question of competition for control of the South; instead their focus was the struggle over the location and nature of the political border with the neighboring state of Liao.

In this changed environment Wang Jizhong's case was unusual, and

indeed his was among the last permanent crossings before the treaty of Shanyuan effectively put a stop to them. Wang Jizhong is famous for helping to negotiate this treaty, but he was also the first to feel its concrete effects, since its provisions prevented him from returning home. He thus straddled the transition from one "world order" to the next. For the writers of our texts, looking through the prism of later understandings and expectations of loyalty, the ambiguities and uncertainties of these two cases presented great challenges of interpretation.

Although Li Huan is not one of the earliest arrivals in Liao, information on him is scattered and confused.[1] Unusually, the accounts we have (with one exception) do not derive clearly from any single predecessor, and close borrowings amount to only a few sentences, so we are less able to draw inferences about editorial input. The texts for Wang Jizhong suffer from the same problems of scattered filiation, but for him as for Li Huan, we also have an independent biography in the *Song shi*.[2] Li Huan's was probably compiled from materials supplied by his brother Li Tao, in the South, while Wang Jizhong's is closely derived in places from two twelfth-century private histories.[3] For both people we also have an unusual quantity of information absent from the standard histories, collected in the *Liao shi jishi benmo* (Qing period) and its antecedents. Li Huan's own writings were collected into the *Dingnian ji* after his death, but unfortunately this does not survive. We do, however, have one poem, preserved in the *Yuhu qinghua* (1078).[4]

Loyalty unto death? Li Huan after the Liao conquest of 947

Li Huan was the great-grandson of Li Hui, a grand councilor under Tang Wuzong (840–846) and distantly related to the Li imperial house.[5] Consequently, he probably had access to the best education available and needed no official position to move comfortably at the highest levels of society. His literary talent seems genuine, for his *Song shi* biography supplements convention by remarking that he imitated the Four Worthies of early Tang, whose *pianwen* style was the standard for court documents, and he is praised repeatedly in the independent sources.[6]

Li Huan's most important characteristic was his literary talent. He was a *jinshi* of especial promise when he joined the staff of the Later Tang prince Li Congrong, but he suffered by association when the prince attempted his coup early in December 933. Although Li Huan was then serving in Henan, he was tried and exiled to the countryside along with several others. Happily for Li Huan, Li Conghou's accession followed immediately, and Li Huan was probably back at court, working on the Imperial Diary, by

the end of January.[7] Without the transfer of power, there is no telling how long he might have remained in provincial obscurity despite his abilities. Li Huan must have witnessed the accessions of Li Congke (934) and Shi Jingtang (936) and became a Hanlin academician in the extensive round of appointments accompanying Shi Jingtang's accession.[8] A few months later he received the scarlet robes and fish tally of a fifth-rank official, even though his substantive post of "reminder" *(shiyi)* was only eighth rank, perhaps in recognition of his literary talent.[9]

A similar reason may also explain his immediate reemployment (with promotion) after Shi Jingtang abolished the academicians of the Hanlin, Duanming palace, and the Bureau of Military Affairs in 940. Bizarrely, however, the eleventh-century sources note that Li "often drank to excess, and Gaozu considered him frivolous. In [940]:9, he ordered the abolition"[10] of the academicians. Also the sources say that Li Huan "was irreverent and flippant, and often did things under the influence of strong drink; the emperor detested him, (and) on 17th October discontinued the office. . . ."[11] A causal relationship is implied by proximity, although there is nothing in the Chinese to make this explicit.[12] How this account would square with Li Huan's promotion is hard to fathom.

Li Huan's drinking may have been one aspect of a more general eccentricity associated with great creativity and exemplified by Qu Yuan of the ancient state of Chu, and more recently by the Tang poets Li Bo and Du Fu. One story, probably also from 940, relates that

> When Huan graduated as a *jinshi,* he was examined by He Ning. Later he served with the official in charge of the examinations (He Ning), both as [Hanlin] academicians. When Ning was made a chief minister (940), Huan became a recipient of edicts *(chengzhi),* with responsibility for commenting on edicts. The next day in [He's] private residence, [Huan] opened up Grand Councilor He's cupboards without permission, took all the books and objets d'art and went off with them, and left a poem on the bed which said,
>
> > The official in charge of the examinations has risen in his employment and ended up in the phoenix palace,. . . .
> > (But) your disciple who is commenting upon edicts was the top graduate.
> > In the cupboards of your private residence there are many precious objects;
> > These can be gifts in gratitude for my literary efforts, can't they?
>
> People all laughed at his presumptuousness.[13]

Li Huan benefited from patronage nevertheless. When war broke out between Liao and Jin in 943, respected senior ministers like Feng Dao

redoubled their efforts to have the Bureau of Military Affairs reestablished in order to relieve themselves of an excessive workload for which they felt unqualified.[14] They got their way in 944, when Sang Weihan resumed his position as military affairs commissioner and leading minister at court, and the Hanlin academicians were reinstated a fortnight later.[15] Li Huan again benefited from other people's political maneuverings, for he was among the numerous "intimates and long-standing officials" who returned to office with Sang Weihan, and furthermore was promoted to the fifth rank. These people directed policy for the remainder of the war, then submitted to Deguang when the capital fell to him in 947.

Deguang had planned to take the entire body of Jin officials north with him, but after he died, the need for his nephew, Wuyu, to secure his claim to the Liao throne made it impractical to continue north at the slow pace of such a large entourage. Deguang had already picked out a select group of ministers with literary reputations to travel in his personal company. These included the chief ministers Feng Dao, Li Song, and He Ning, but also especially talented but relatively junior literati like Li Huan.[16] Zhang Li, who knew practically all of these people from serving with them at the Later Tang court, also traveled in this party, perhaps acting as an informal interlocutor. These were the people summoned to the drinking party at which Wuyu had Zhao Yanshou arrested,[17] but when he raced north, Wuyu left behind the three Jin chief ministers, taking with him only a handful of people, including Li Huan.[18] According to the *Wudai shi bu,* Li Huan was "specially detained because of his talent"[19] and upon reaching the Supreme Capital (Shangjing), he became a Hanlin academician there.[20]

In 951 Li Huan yet again benefited from a change of ruler, but did not repay the trust shown him. That autumn Wuyu supported an unsuccessful Northern Han attack on the Later Zhou, during which Wuyu was assassinated and replaced by his cousin Yelü Jing, the emperor Muzong (951–969), who promoted Li Huan to the fourth rank.[21] Yelü Jing rapidly acquired a reputation for laziness and unreasonable behavior, at a time when the Southern court was headed by a breed of ruler—not seen since the days of Great Tang—with explicitly expansionist intentions. Li Huan had transferred his loyalty from one Southern emperor to the next and seems to have served successive Liao rulers willingly enough up until this point. Now, however, he showed a willingness to take great risks by communicating with the Later Zhou over a plan to bring the governor *(jiedushi)* of the Liao Southern Capital (Nanjing) and its dependent circuit, based at Youzhou, over to Later Zhou allegiance.

Perhaps remarkably, we have seven accounts of Li Huan's subversive activities, but most tell only part of the story.[22] The basic story is that in 952

Li Huan convinced the Kitan governor Xiao Haizhen (also known as Meigude) that he should transfer his allegiance to the South, and that Li Huan communicated secretly with the Zhou court about this via Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou. The *Jiu Wudai shi* annals are short and to the point: "[On] 12th July (952), the former Hanlin academician Li Huan sent up a report from within Kitan memorializing on top-secret matters, and saying that the false Youzhou *jiedushi* Xiao Haizhen intended to submit; the emperor was greatly delighted at this."[23]

Xiao Haizhen is unknown except for this incident, but the texts offer no satisfactory motive for his action. The *Cefu yuangui* says he "admired" the Middle Kingdom (and perhaps desired to go there),[24] but this was surely insufficient to lead a highly placed Kitan nobleman to choose deliberately to change his allegiance; even the sinophile Kitan prince Yelü Bei did not flee Liao until his life was threatened.[25] A political explanation is more likely. Xiao Haizhen's older sister had married the Liao emperor Wuyu. After Yelü Jing assassinated Wuyu, Xiao Haizhen—as an immediate member of the consort clan—may well have feared for his safety in Liao. To be sure, the new emperor had given Xiao his posting to the Liao Southern Capital at Youzhou, but whether this boded good or ill for Xiao Haizhen is unclear.

Whatever Xiao Haizhen's motives, Li Huan's role seems to have been to convince Xiao that he would obtain succor and even support from the Zhou. Neither seems to have taken any action, however, until a spy called Tian Chongba turned up from Dingzhou and carried a letter from Li Huan back to his governor, Sun Fangjian. Sun informed Guo Wei of Zhou, and thereafter Tian Chongba carried Li Huan's communications directly to the Zhou court. By now Xiao Haizhen was apparently planning to ask Guo Wei to send troops, and offered the reports of a detained Zhou envoy as evidence of good faith. But Li Huan reported to Guo Wei that Xiao Haizhen hesitated to actually send his letter, apparently for lack of response from the Zhou court. Li Huan convinced Xiao to continue his discussions with Tian Chongba by showing one of Xiao's followers an imperial decree from Guo Wei.[26]

Li Huan's report indicates that he was working hard to bring about Xiao Haizhen's change of allegiance, which of course served Zhou interests. Tian Chongba had also brought Li Huan a letter offering "family greetings" from his brother at the Zhou court, Li Tao, and returned with a reply urging Li Tao that swift action would secure the best outcome for the South:

> The present emperor (Yelü Jing) is naive and has no understanding of affairs of state, all he likes doing is playing polo and devoting himself to his favorites, and he certainly has no strategy for the *tianxia.* One can see that he is not as strong

> as his forebears, and his intimates and senior ministers also harbor rebellious intentions; and accordingly one recognizes a weakness. . . . (If you) take advantage of this moment of disorder and weakness, [you can] expect [this will] also bring peace. If [you] plan to come with a punitive expedition, [I] hope that [you will act] urgently; if [you] would rather make peace, [I] also hope that [you will act] urgently. In the future [you] will certainly not have the wherewithal to help Hedong [so] much [as now].[27]

The *Song shi* version of events emphasizes Li Huan's initiative in this matter and thereby his attachment to the Southern court: "He seized the opportunity to tactfully suggest to Haizhen a plan to return to the South, and Haizhen accepted it. In 952 Huan, by way of Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou, secretly reported on the declining power of the Kitan. . . ."[28] Where the *Cefu yuangui* implies that Tian Chongba's arrival was decisive, the *Song shi* gives the impression that Li Huan had already primed his target to switch allegiances and was now casting around for ways to bring the Zhou in on the scheme, further adding that Li Huan was asked to continue providing information to Zhou. The message that Li Huan was loyal to the Zhou court is thereby reinforced.

We should consider, however, the possibility that Li Huan protested too much of his continuing loyalty to the Zhou. It is possible to read the evidence above to suggest that Li Huan's actions were aimed chiefly at establishing Xiao Haizhen in a semiautonomous frontier province similar to the position enjoyed by his first contact, Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou, who had successfully offered his allegiance—and his province—first to Liao (in 946) and then to Later Han in 948. Youzhou was better placed than Dingzhou to make this switch successfully (see Map 8) and had a legacy of independence from Southern courts dating from the mid-eighth century. With Guo Wei of Later Zhou on an upward trajectory and Liao stagnating under Yelü Jing, Xiao Haizhen may have been attempting to secure the transfer of his whole Southern Circuit from Liao to Zhou allegiance.

If this was the case, Li Huan's relationship with the Zhou was incidental rather than an end in itself. As we have seen, appeals to neighboring suzerain powers were the stock in trade of those seeking regional autonomy even into the mid-tenth century. The standard way to gain from such a relationship was to invite an attack on one's current master, and Xiao Haizhen asked Guo Wei not just for safe passage to Zhou, but for troops. Given that Li Huan had seen steady rather than rapid promotion since arriving in Liao, he may have descried advantages in being the right-hand man of a semiautonomous frontier governor rather than one of many middle-ranking literati at an imperial court.

Whatever his aims, all of Li Huan's efforts came to nothing, because "[on] 12 July, Chongba reached Daliang (Bianzhou), but at that time the Middle Kingdom had many concerns and did not proceed in this matter."[29] The *Liao shi* annals report a Zhou attack on Northern Han on this same day,[30] but the Zhou were already dealing with a challenge from Murong Yanchao.[31] Guo Wei might have been delighted if Xiao Haizhen had brought the Southern Circuit over on his own account, but he could not afford to open another front just then.[32]

But by now the moment had passed. The *Liao shi* mentions no spying or communications with the Zhou, but on 2 July, Li Huan, Xiao Haizhen, and others were discovered to have "planned to flee south," perhaps ten days before Guo Wei rejected Xiao Haizhen's request for help and maybe not long after Tian Chongba had departed.[33] There is no indication that this involved more than a few individuals, perhaps suggesting a damage-limitation exercise in the *Liao shi*, as we have already seen done for Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou. Alternatively, the Liao may never have known the full extent of the plot.

Either way, Li Huan was serious about getting away, but knew it would not be easy. He was based in the Supreme Capital but managed to shorten the distance to the borderline without arousing suspicion, for ". . . he used a pretext to request medical treatment in the Southern Capital, substituted his clothes and slipped out at night, wanting to escape back to Bian[zhou]."[34]

It was still about 150 km to Zhou districts, and Li only got halfway—to Zhuozhou—before he was captured by a frontier patrol and escorted back to the Southern Capital. (One wonders how Tian Chongba avoided these patrols when he had crossed the frontier at least three times and probably traveled to the Supreme Capital itself.) Li Huan was demoted to the minor ranks, but then "Huan watched until his jailers were sound asleep, then used his belt to hang himself. [However,] he did not die and he was guarded more closely. Fettered to go to Shangjing, he threw himself into the Huang River midstream, [but] a cable restrained him and again he did not die."[35]

The contrast with the departures and returns of Han Yanhui and Zhang Li is striking. The immediate spur for Li Huan's suicide attempts was evidently his failure to escape, but there is no indication of why his response was so extreme. Although it is easy to suggest that he could not bear to serve the alien Kitan,[36] his apparent lack of concern over working for Liao emperors until he got caught out in a plot suggests that escape or suicide were ways of trying to avoid the wrath of Yelü Jing rather than expressions of continuing loyalty to the South.

The emperor did want to execute Li Huan, but he was saved by the intervention of another patron—his colleague Gao Xun, who had come to

Liao at the same time and was now military affairs commissioner.[37] In repeated representations to the emperor, Gao Xun argued: "Huan is not fundamentally ungrateful for the generosity he has received, [but] because his mother is eighty years old, his worry about visiting her has brought him to his misdeeds. Moreover, Huan is rich in literary ability, and at present there are few who could compare with him, and if he were kept to supervise the wording of edicts, he could glorify the prestige of the state."[38] As in previous explanations for why southerners attempted to leave Liao, Gao Xun adduces Li Huan's filial attachment to his aged mother to excuse Li's behavior and sets this against the assumption that Li Huan's actions will be seen as ingratitude, tantamount to disloyalty.

This is scarcely more than convention, but Gao Xun also has a substantive argument, resting on Li Huan's exceptional talent. Yet things had changed since the days of Han Yanhui, and even of Zhang Li just fifteen years before. Whereas rulers had once badly needed the services of any literati they could find, however mediocre, now Yelü Jing is construed to be doing Li Huan a favor. Executing him would be a minor loss rather than a major setback to the development of Liao administrative institutions. Accordingly, Gao Xun appeals to his emperor's generosity rather than to political necessity.

Li Huan escaped the death sentence and suffered only a beating. Having faced Yelü Jing, he did not attempt to commit suicide again. His fellow conspirators were not so lucky. Xiao Haizhen and four Kitan ministers were executed a few weeks later. As in the South, those in the inner circle of power were considered more dangerous than outsiders. Li Huan, like Zhao Yanshou in 947, could be allowed to live because he was not important enough to have to die.

The *Liao shi* places far more stress on Li Huan's reluctance to serve Liao than any of the other texts, among which only the *Song shi* mentions the actual escape attempt. The story reflects badly on Yelü Jing, in keeping with the generally unsympathetic portrayal he receives from the Yuan compilers, who detail his excesses and even comment that the plots and challenges against him "were indeed proper!"[39] Gao Xun's intervention may suggest that virtuous ministers could have a good influence on bad rulers, but it is not clear from this account whether it is intended to be significant that Gao Xun is Chinese and his master is not.

Although Li Huan survived the wrath of the emperor, he was confined at the Fengguo temple, surrounded by mountains, suffering "all forms of privations and hardships."[40] Six years later it was again Gao Xun who came to his rescue, recommending that nobody else was capable of writing the planned

commemorative tablet for Deguang, now known posthumously as Taizong. Li Huan was freed, promoted to the third rank and made an academician of the Xuanzheng palace. He died shortly afterwards in 962.

Li Huan's draft for the tablet was probably the most important piece he ever wrote: according to the *Liao shi* it was not until the emperor had approved the text that Li was released. Hence it is seen to be Li Huan's own talent that ultimately brought him freedom, although he needed a sponsor in order to get the chance to exercise his skill. This is the only mention of Li Huan's literary abilities in the *Liao shi*, but the remark reinforces the importance of learning to every regime in the region. The Chinese compilers under the Yuan may be reflecting the revival of the idea that *wen* could civilize the barbarian, which was largely absent from the early tenth century, and even irrelevant. For Gao Xun, however, recommending Li Huan's literary talent was more likely to have been a way of giving an old colleague a chance to redeem himself than a means to edify their Kitan masters.

The idea that Li Huan had exhibited extraordinary loyalty to the Southern court was emphasized soon after his death by his brother. Li Tao gathered Li Huan's writings into the *Dingnian ji*, named with reference to the Han official Su Wu (c. 143–60 BCE), who had received his first commission in the year he came of age *(dingnian)*. Su Wu had been sent as an envoy to the Xiongnu and was held for nineteen years without submitting to them, thereby becoming a watchword for continuing loyalty to the South while in captivity. Li Tao's compilation would not only have shown the Li family in a good light, but also the Zhou emperor, whom—according to the compilation—Li Huan continued to serve in his heart even when working and writing for the Northern court.

But Li Tao's efforts may have been as much a defense of the family honor as an expression of pride in his brother. Li Huan's active establishment of a connection with a Southern court contrasts markedly with the behavior of earlier Liao southerners, but even so, he accepted the opportunity for rehabilitation offered him by Gao Xun and returned to Liao employment. In turning down the chance to refuse office and thereby publicly display an ongoing loyalty to the South, Li Huan himself—regardless of what his brother might have wished to convey—ultimately rejected black-and-white morality in favor of a practical shade of gray. In so doing, he prefigured the choices of the Southern Song loyalists, most of whom did not commit suicide and who sooner or later emerged from retirement and worked under the Yuan.[41]

Ultimately, we can only guess how Li Huan felt about working for the Liao, but we can compare his actions and those of Han Yanhui in the same

period. As a chief minister in Liao, Han Yanhui must have helped to run the war against the Later Jin in the 940s, and the fact that we hear nothing of this suggests that he offered no objections to removing an incumbent Southern regime and that he had forgotten any promise he might have made to protect the South from Liao incursions. If Li Huan sought to suborn Xiao Haizhen because of a genuine attachment to the South, then his outlook contrasts markedly with Han Yanhui's. But if Li Huan acted out of purely political considerations, perhaps hoping for rapid promotion in an autonomous Youzhou regime, then he was not so very different from Han Yanhui. Maybe the greatest distinction is that Han Yanhui never did anything to bring his loyalty to the Liao into question,[42] whereas Li Huan, in acting against the Northern regime but not actually being martyred for the Zhou, could only be redeemed in the sources by emphasizing an apparent loyalty to the South. Considerable ambiguity remained in his actions.

Li Huan's experience reflects at an individual level the changing circumstances brought by the political developments of the first half of the century. There was no longer such a shortage of Chinese bureaucrats in the Liao regime, and the work of establishing an administrative apparatus for which the earliest arrivals were enlisted had been more or less completed by 947, with such success that an ineffective and unpopular emperor could hold the throne for eighteen years without the state collapsing. This (and Yelü Jing's temperament) meant that escapers could no longer be certain of generous treatment. Meanwhile in the South, the trauma of the Liao conquest added impetus to the recovery of central power by helping to start the polarization of the South and North into two clear sides demanding an unequivocal choice. Wang Jizhong was a product of this new situation.

Loyalty betrayed: Wang Jizhong's crossing and the effects of the treaty of Shanyuan

Wang Jizhong was a military man who served Song Zhenzong man and boy. Whereas Han Yanhui, Zhang Li, and Zhao Yanshou all hailed from the Hebei borderlands, Wang Jizhong was from the Song capital, Kaifeng (formerly Bianzhou), much further south.[43] Han Yanhui, Zhang Li, and Li Huan also gained their first appointments on their own merits, whereas Wang Jizhong received a sinecure appointment in the palace as a minor attendant at the age of five, after his father's death in service at the strategic pass of Waqiaoguan in Mozhou.[44]

Whereas the Zhaos probably never anticipated that Li Siyuan would sit on the throne, Wang Jizhong knew from the moment of his appointment

that his prospects were better than average. Wang Jizhong's first substantive posting was in the establishment of Zhao Heng, the future Song Zhenzong. According to the *Song shi,* Wang Jizhong's prudence and virtue won him the personal confidence of the prince, and when Zhao Heng acceded in 997, Wang accompanied him to Kaifeng, in the same way that Li Siyuan of the Later Tang brought Zhao Yanshou and Zhao Dejun to court with him when he became emperor.[45] Patronage flourished in every one of the post-Tang regimes, and as in earlier decades, the heir apparent's household remained an important avenue for advancement. But by the end of the century its significance had increased as the erosion of regional power left the emperor—and his designated heir—as the only sources of favor. The heir apparent whom Wang served was also not regarded as a danger to his predecessor, as Li Congrong had been to Li Siyuan in the early 930s, so Wang Jizhong was spared the choice, faced by Zhao Yanshou and Li Huan, between escaping his posting or suffering the consequences. In short, Wang Jizhong enjoyed the advantages of living under a unitary empire.

Soon after Zhao Heng's accession, the emperor marched in person to fight the Liao, and Wang Jizhong was rapidly promoted through the military hierarchy to Yunzhou$_1$ surveillance commissioner *(guanchashi),* then in 1001 and 1002 to increasingly responsible positions in military field administration.[46] This career pattern reflected both the great importance of the military in the early Song, and the shift, started by Zhao Kuangyin, that made it unusual for senior court officials, let alone the emperor, to campaign in person.[47] As officers like Wang Jizhong came to predominate in the frontier armies, it became much less likely that court officials would find themselves faced with the option of crossing the frontier, which helps to explain the great reduction in individual crossings after 947.

Wang Jizhong's arrival in Liao is detailed from two completely different viewpoints. The *Liao shi* downplays his capture: "In 1003 the Song sent Jizhong to camp [with his troops] at Wangdu in Ding[zhou]. With his light horse he went scouting against our (Liao) army and ran into the Grand Councilor of the Southern Administration *(nanfu zaixiang)* Yelü Nugua and others, who captured him."[48] The Southern sources forswear such a dispassionate account. Having stressed that the Liao "made an incursion" into the northern borders of Song, Wang Jizhong's part in the defense becomes more dramatic with each retelling.

Hence, in striking contrast to the *Liao shi,* the twelfth-century sources imply great praise for Wang Jizhong's courage. Wang was part of an army led by Wang Chao, Sang Zan, and Zhou Ying, but neither source mentions either the main Song defending force or its senior generals. According to

them, Wang Jizhong, apparently alone, led the local military to fight the Liao.

> At the end of Xianping (c. 1003) the Kitan made an incursion. Jizhong led the military of Ding[zhou] out to fight to the north of Wangdu. Because of the generosity of the favor he had received, he fought hard in his efforts to repay this, but his dress and accouterments were quite distinctive, [so] the Kitan, recognizing him, fought [with him] in one place after another over several days. Reinforcements did not arrive and so he fell into the hands of the Kitan. The court presumed he was dead and gave him the posthumous title of Datong governor.[49]

The *Changbian* account is more detailed, and the *Qidan guo zhi* copies it word for word, with two alterations (the *Qidan guo zhi* version shown within <> brackets) and extensive cutting (shown in {} brackets):

> {[On] 20 May} the Kitan made an incursion <attacked Song>. The <Song> Dingzhou administrator of the Expeditionary Imperial Quarters *(xingying dubushu)* Wang Chao {sent messengers to summon} Sang Zan of Zhenzhou and Zhou Ying of Gaoyangguan {each to bring the troops under their command to assist. Chao sent 1500 infantry ahead to} oppose (the Liao) at Wangdu xian; the next day, arriving 6 *li* south of the county [town], {they met the enemy, and many were killed}. The vice-administrator of the Imperial Quarters *(fubushu),* {Inspector-in-chief of the Palace Armies *(dianqian duyuhou)* and Yunzhou$_1$ surveillance commissioner *(guanchashi)*} Wang Jizhong, {because he had often met with great generosity, longed to exert himself and was willing to give his all; he fought with the enemy [at] Kangcun from sunset until the second division of the night, and the enemy force retreated slightly. At daybreak they fought again; the whole enemy host attacked the east flank, they went out behind (the Song) lines and fired the supply route, cutting it off. Jizhong} led the troops under his personal command to {gallop there at full speed} <fight to their last breath. Jizhong> usually displayed [himself in] ritual clothing [so] the {enemy} < Kitan> recognized him and surrounded him several tens deep. {His soldiers were all badly wounded, [but] fought to their last breath}, alternately fighting and pulling back; close to Xishan they [turned] north, [but] when they reached Baicheng, {they fell into the hands of the enemy} <Jizhong was captured by the Kitan>. {Chao and the others accordingly led their troops back to Dingzhou, and sent messengers to report to the court}.[50]

The *Changbian* is relatively balanced. It has no stake in emphasizing Wang Jizhong's role: it makes clear that he was only one member of a much

larger force, with no explicit suggestion that reinforcements might have been expected. On the other hand, the details given of the battle show Wang facing overwhelming odds, highlighting his courage, and thus implying his loyalty. The abridged *Qidan guo zhi* account keeps Wang Jizhong as part of a larger force, but uses only the more dramatic second phase of the battle as ample demonstration of Wang's courage.

The *Song shi* biography quotes sections of the *Changbian* verbatim, but it also embellishes to enhance Wang's heroism.[51] It introduces the incident with the vision of a huge Liao invading army and makes Wang Jizhong the first Song leader to meet the Liao force: "In 1003 several tens of thousands of Kitan cavalry invaded south. [When] they reached Wangdu (in Dingzhou), Jizhong and the great general Wang Chao, along with Sang Zan and others, led troops to assist it. Jizhong reached Kangcun and fought with the Kitan. . . ." After the Liao cut the Song supply line, "Chao and Zan both timidly pulled back their troops, and did not, in the end, go to assist. Jizhong alone, with the troops under his personal command, galloped there at full speed. . . ." The cowardice of the other generals in simply abandoning Wang Jizhong to his fate intensifies his heroism as he "galloped there at full speed."[52]

This increasingly admiring view of Wang Jizhong contrasts with the measured Liao account in which he was simply captured while on reconnaissance, without any hard-fought melée or serious resistance. Indeed, the Northern source suggests he may have had no opportunity for resistance. If the *Liao shi* has minimized how much conflict surrounded Wang Jizhong's capture, this is only to be expected, as it was clearly in Liao interests to show crossing to be as painless as possible. Equally, it was in Song interests to make the most of Wang's brave resistance.

These accounts set Wang Jizhong completely apart from our earlier crossers, who are all said to have crossed in nonviolent (though not always voluntary) circumstances. To be sure, the situations in which they crossed generally resulted from war, but none showed the least sign of individual, active resistance, whether this meant taking up arms, as Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou could have done, or noncooperation, an option for all four. Even Li Huan did not refuse his services when offered rehabilitation. As a military officer, Wang Jizhong clearly had more opportunity for violent resistance than did a bureaucrat, but the changed circumstances must also have been a factor. Whereas the general Zhao Yanshou had seen service to the North as an opportunity, Wang Jizhong—whose personal name meant "continuing faithfulness"—found it less attractive than the fulfillment of his duty to the Song, even at the risk of death.

The contemporary appreciation of such behavior is demonstrated by the Song court's reaction. Believing that Wang Jizhong had died in the battle, Zhao Heng posthumously appointed him Datong governor, while his sons received official posts in an echo of Wang Jizhong's own first appointment.[53] The frontier attitude towards Wang was also highly favorable, as quoted in the *Liao shi shiyi:* "Some of the common people and literati of those lands (Hejian) praised him saying, 'The ancients considered that to be entirely loyal, one could only be loyal to a single lord. Now that the prince of Hejian (Wang Jizhong) has concluded such a happy peace between the North and South, we can say that he is entirely loyal to the rulers of two states.'"[54] Evidently a view from shortly after 1005, this seems to reflect the gratitude of those in the frontier region for the stability brought by the treaty of Shanyuan. It is, however, immediately qualified by the court-based eleventh-century compiler: "However, Jizhong himself fell into the hands of a strange state, and could not die accordingly; he brought no benefit to his master and, as one who [continued to] live [even] at the expense of honor, betrayed [that master]."[55] The uncompromising "correction" of the contemporary view by the later writer reflects the increasing uncertainty about the morality of Wang Jizhong's actions as it became harder and harder for court historians to imagine a world in which his choices made sense.

Indeed, some of Wang Jizhong's contemporaries already showed some ambivalence towards his fate. The *Song shi* biography of Zhao Anren records that after Wang's crossing, a Song official called Yao Dongzhi "repeatedly praised (Wang Jizhong's) talents." But Zhao Anren said: "Early [in his career] Jizhong served in the establishment of the heir apparent, [I've] heard that he is very observant [of ritual], [but] I do not know anything else about him."[56] Zhao Anren's unwillingness to commit himself on the subject of Wang Jizhong's talent, let alone his virtue, constitutes damnation with faint praise, especially when Zhao Anren is then himself commended for his ability to cut straight to the heart of matters.

In the eleventh century Wang Jizhong could sometimes be used as a reference point in discussions on the morality of crossing to the North and how to deal with it. The early eleventh-century Song court official Jia Changchao advanced a pragmatic view in defense of one Liu Ping, who was captured by the Xi Xia. The minor frontier officials accused Liu Ping of submitting to the enemy and wanted to execute his whole family in punishment. Jia Changchao responded: "The [Former] Han wiped out Li Ling's family [c. 99 BCE]; Ling did not return, and the Han hated him. The former emperor (Zhao Heng) treated Wang Jizhong's family generously and in the end obtained service from Jizhong. We cannot know what Ping did; if we wipe out

his family, then even if Ping is alive, we will not get him to return."[57] Such an open-minded approach focused upon the importance of recovering even single officials from across the borders, or at least retaining their services. Jia Changchao's comments show that in the earlier part of the eleventh century alternative interpretations of *zhong* could still be deployed, which may have complicated matters for those who still felt ambivalent towards Wang Jizhong and his ilk.

From the 1070s onwards the writings of Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang promulgated a much more critical stance towards changes of allegiance, but not all of their contemporaries shared their moral certitude. The *Yuhu qinghua*, compiled in 1078, claims to record a fortune-teller's prediction about Wang Jizhong, made to the future Song Zhenzong: "This person will amaze [you]; for half his life he will eat Chinese rice, for half his life he will eat foreign rice."[58] Zhao Heng (Zhenzong) scoffed at the time, but of course the account goes on to prove the fortune-teller right. Zhao Heng's confidence in Wang Jizhong's faithfulness is shown to be misplaced, but at the same time fate becomes a factor in Wang's behavior, diminishing his responsibility for what happened to him. Because he was not in control of events, he cannot be judged so harshly.

Later in the same account we hear of Wang Jizhong's attempt to return home: "Jizhong dressed in Chinese *(han)* formal attire and looked south to the (Song) emperor's court; he called himself a subject who had not died *(weisi chen),* and weeping, he bowed and did not rise." The picture is sympathetic, portraying a Wang Jizhong who remained loyal to the Song, which faithfulness further mitigates his questionable behavior in crossing the frontier. The name he gives himself, "a subject who had not died," shows him subscribing to the ideal of loyalism even though he has broken the principle of unequivocal loyalty by taking service with the Liao rather than dying for the Song.

In the eleventh century the uncompromising ideas of Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang were not yet part of an orthodoxy. By the fourteenth century, however, there was no longer any room for doubt on the matter of *zhong,* and the commentators in both dynastic histories regard Wang Jizhong with considerable antipathy. The *Song shi* commentary is clear that he "was willing to serve to the death," but because Wang took service with the Liao, the writer concludes that "his moral integrity was most certainly compromised."[59] Such a verdict sets up a striking dissonance with the enhanced heroism found in the biography itself. Moreover, the *Liao shi* commentary declares: "Since Jizhong was unable to die for his country, even though he concluded peace between the South and the North and was a mirror for

knowing people('s character), how could he be worthy of esteem?"[60] His fault in allowing himself to be captured, rather than fighting to the death or committing suicide, here outweighs any positive service.

It is quite possible that the main compiler of the Yuan dynasty's three histories project, Ouyang Xuan, wrote both commentaries, which would account for the similarity of views. Whoever the author, there is no mistaking that there is little to be said for Wang Jizhong's behavior from the official historiographical standpoint of the late Yuan.[61] By this time the ideal of loyal behavior was much more rigid than it had been possible to practice in the tenth century, and the interpretation of crossing more unforgiving even than that set out by Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang. By contrast, Han Yanhui and Zhang Li, Zhao Yanshou and Li Huan, when commented on at all, are generally appraised positively, in line with their biographies. Wang Jizhong, however, suffered from being the last significant crosser before the frontier, and attitudes, had solidified. There is an impression that the fourteenth-century commentators would have liked Wang to have been a precursor of the "new world order" promulgated by neo-Confucian thinking that had become the orthodoxy, and that they were disappointed that he had failed them.

The range of viewpoints found here illustrates the fluidity of attitudes towards the practice of loyalty in the period between Wang Jizhong's arrival in Liao and the compilation of the official histories. Although the earlier crossers contributed a certain amount to the continuing discourse on *zhong*, the difficult political circumstances of the Five Dynasties rendered it hard to make clear judgments about loyalty in that period. In addition, the position of the *Jiu Wudai shi* compilers, who had themselves all crossed from another regime to Song, disinclined them to treat their fellows too harshly.[62] It is only when we reach the established Song dynasty of the eleventh century that we begin to find unforgiving criticism of crossings between the different Five Dynasties regimes. But even then, where a historian like Ouyang Xiu dismisses the officials of the period with blanket condemnation, other interpretations of *zhong* could still be voiced, and Ouyang Xiu's contemporary Sima Guang is a great deal more measured, reserving his judgment and criticisms for Feng Dao.[63]

Service under the Liao

Wang Jizhong's actions after his capture suggest that he did not anticipate ever getting back to Song. He promptly accepted employment as a tax commissioner *(hubushi)* under Yelü Longxu (Liao Shengzong, 982–1031), and the *Liao shi* credits the empress dowager Chengtian with knowledge of Wang Jizhong's worthiness and with getting him this first Liao appoint-

ment.[64] As in the case of Han Yanhui, the women of the imperial clan greatly influenced the career prospects of arrivals from the South. The dowager also got Wang Jizhong a good marriage, into the clan of Kang Moji, an early arrival in Liao whose family was now well established in the Liao bureaucracy.[65] A son resulted, but Wang Jizhong already had three or even four others in the South, and even if his first wife in the Song was still alive, she could not have been sent for as Zhao Yanshou's wife had been, because she was in enemy, not allied, territory. The marriage seems to confirm that Wang Jizhong expected to stay in Liao.

Gratitude for these favors is said to have earned energetic service from Wang Jizhong, notably in the negotiations producing the treaty of Shanyuan.[66] If we are to believe the Southern sources, then Wang, having gained the trust of the Liao, "seized the opportunity to argue the benefits of a peace," thereby tapping into the wishes of the empress dowager to end the fighting.[67] He drafted the letters asking the Song to send envoys to negotiate, and when the chief Song envoy was detained by a Song border official, wrote further letters to secure the envoy's release, after which peace was swiftly concluded.[68]

Christian Schwarz-Schilling points out how Wang Jizhong's first communication not only explained the reasons for ending the war, but also justified his own conduct in taking service with the Liao.[69] Han Yanhui had also offered justification for his crossing back to Liao from Taiyuan, but on the strictly practical grounds of escaping an antagonistic colleague. Han Yanhui had been confident that this rationale would be accepted, and although Han felt he should explain his behavior, he did not apologize for it. Wang Jizhong seems less self-assured. First he describes the battle in which he was captured, noting how long he fought, the troops' unpreparedness, the lack of supplies and the exhausting effects on his forces, the resumption of battle on the second day, and the nonappearance of reinforcements, leading to his capture. He goes on:

> It is not only that Wang Chao and the others underestimated the enemy and had not planned carefully enough, it was also my fault [that I was captured]. The Northern court, because I had previously served in the palace, and have borne frontier responsibilities, treats [me] with special favor, and places [me] among the various ministers. I often recall my parting audience last year, and the kind words which I personally received from your majesty, and [I] serve [the Liao] only in order to rest the people and end fighting.[70]

Wang Jizhong is not merely explaining what he did; he is trying to excuse it. He details the battle to scotch any accusations of cowardice, and he melio-

rates his criticisms of his superiors by frankly admitting his own share of responsibility. In assuring Zhao Heng that he has not forgotten the favor received from him, Wang addresses the issue of his personal loyalty to his lord. In arguing that his sole aim is to end hostilities, he appeals both to the general mood of war-weariness and, obliquely, to the Confucian principle that rulers and officials should seek the best interests of the people, choosing peace in preference to war.[71]

If we accept that Wang Jizhong really did write something resembling what the *Changbian* quotes, this shows his own consciousness of, and subscription to, a standard of loyal behavior far more rigid than that practiced by our earlier subjects. Where frontier crossing had been regarded as normal behavior in earlier decades, and martyrdom considered extraordinary, now Wang Jizhong felt he had fallen so far short of the expected standard that even as he justifies his actions, he apologizes for not dying. Like many later individuals classified as collaborators, he exhibits signs of guilt over what he has (or has not) done.[72] Although we cannot be certain that this passage really reflects Wang's feelings, it is nevertheless a fine illustration of Song ambivalence towards the treaty of Shanyuan, and thus to Wang Jizhong. The positive aspects of the peace (from the Song point of view) are reflected in efforts to show Wang's courage and continuing loyalty, but the uncertainty as to the long-term wisdom of the arrangement comes through in the indications that Wang Jizhong ultimately failed the Song morality test.

The *Liao shi* version of the opening of negotiations also refers to the benefit of the common people. Here, Song envoys bring Wang gifts of a bow, arrows, and a whip, together with an imperial directive that he should ask for peace. The directive opens by flattering Wang Jizhong: "You yourself are in a high position and love to nurture the masses." More significantly, it ends, "You can report secretly (to the Song), and if they [the Liao] consent to make peace, then at that time different envoys will immediately come and request it."[73] In requesting a communication from Wang Jizhong, the Song are acting in a tradition of inviting Liao southerners to act in the interests of the Southern regimes; Li Huan and Zhao Yanshou were also approached in this way.

Talk of secret reports has led to much discussion of whether Wang Jizhong was sent by Zhao Heng as a Song spy to the Liao court, but the *Liao shi*'s reporting of this request suggests that little was secret here.[74] Wang Jizhong is central to the initiation of negotiations in both Northern and Southern sources, but the interpretation is very different. The *Liao shi* suggests that the Song were simply seeking to use Wang's inside information to ensure that their peace initiative stood the best chance of success, while the Southern sources show Wang Jizhong making the first approach for the

Liao with many professions of good faith, and being received initially with mistrust by Zhao Heng.[75]

Since Wang's actions furthered the peace that was the ultimate goal of both sides, this may be less a matter of espionage at the time than of uncertainty on the part of the successive recorders, historians, and compilers about whom Wang Jizhong was really working for and where his loyalties lay. The Southern sources say that after the treaty established regular envoy exchanges, the Song missions often brought presents for Wang. There were precedents for this: Han Yanhui and Zhao Yanshou had both received regular gifts from the Southern regimes. These earlier presents can be explained by the senior positions of the recipients. Wang Jizhong became a Liao military affairs commissioner in 1019, but his rank in 1005 did not justify regular gifts, unless in recognition of his efforts in securing peace. Wang received the presents openly, so if he was being rewarded for helping Song, then it was only with the collusion of the Liao.

According to the Southern sources, Wang Jizhong was quite open in expressing a desire to return to the South.[76] He wept on receiving the Song gifts and petitioned for recall via various Song envoys. We have seen earlier attempts to return south by one means or another, but this is the first request for a formal recall. Given that peace had just broken out, Wang's request does not seem unreasonable, and again there was a precedent: Zhao Yanshou's wife had been allowed to move between the friendly states of Liao and Later Jin. These, however, had been allies in a hierarchical relationship and not, like Liao and Song, enemies reluctantly accepting a relationship of mutual equality that could only work through strict adherence to the terms of the 1005 treaty. These included the commonplace provision for returning fugitives from the other side, and the sources state explicitly that it is because of the sworn treaty that the Song emperor refused to grant Wang Jizhong's request. Disappointing Wang gave continuous practical effect to a line of demarcation that had previously been observed only when someone crossed it, and thus allowed Zhao Heng to show how serious he was about sticking to the treaty.

At the same time Zhao Heng was not inherently opposed to the idea of Wang Jizhong's return, for according to the *Changbian* he also had the message conveyed that "if the (Liao) ruler would let the minister go of his own volition, then a great payment would be made in thanks."[77] Such a volunteering of the initiative suggests how tentative was the Liao-Song relationship at this early stage. There is a distinct sense that despite the fixed terms of the treaty, there was still much working out of ground rules to be done, and Zhao Heng did not want to be the one to upset things before an equilibrium had been reached.

Thus it was Wang Jizhong who paid the price for the peace he had worked so hard to bring about, when that peace, ironically, turned out to be the instrument that prevented him from getting what he wanted for himself. Faced with no opportunity of returning home, Wang continued in Liao service.

Wang Jizhong was treated generously and served the Liao in senior regional posts and as a campaign general against Koryo.[78] He retired in 1022 and died the same year, after nineteen years of service to Liao Shengzong. The Song sources naturally skip over all this, but the *Liao shi* adds a final anecdote in which Wang Jizhong speaks his mind and ranks morality over scholarship, thereby demonstrating classical characteristics of a Confucian official. Only elsewhere do we learn that Wang was simply reiterating widely held views and that his comments may have been influenced by his factional interests.[79]

Uncertainties

Like Han Yanhui and Zhang Li, our last two subjects come from opposite ends of a period of development. In the contrast between the cases of Li Huan and Wang Jizhong, we see the development and spread of ideas of loyalty in which expectations grew that political allegiance should remain constant, no matter what. Whereas Li Huan's alignment with Xiao Haizhen can be interpreted as evidence of Li's continued allegiance to the Southern regimes, it may also have represented a last fling for the idea of an independent frontier regime. For Wang Jizhong, by contrast, the idea of actively choosing a new master was unequivocally unthinkable. If we cannot be sure how reluctant Li Huan was in serving the Liao, it is certain that Wang Jizhong would have chosen to act otherwise if that had been possible.

There are also contrasts between Li Huan and Wang Jizhong on the one hand and our earlier subjects on the other. Li and Wang both started life in much higher circles than Han Yanhui, Zhang Li, or Zhao Yanshou. Those three were sons of the borderlands, accustomed to seizing opportunities and willing to try new things. They benefited from the political confusion in the first half of the tenth century, and their achievements were their own. By the time of Li Huan the period of these "new men" was coming to an end as increasing political stability in the frontier zone reduced the options for advancement by transferal of allegiance. At the same time, in both North and South, the maturing of institutions and reduced turnover of personnel at court meant that rulers—especially in Liao—did not need to worry so much about keeping the services of particular individuals. Whereas poor treatment of Han Yanhui or Zhang Li was seen as a potentially catastrophic threat to the

establishment of the Liao state, the execution of Li Huan would have been no more than a minor loss of literary embellishment for an empire that could continue to function effectively even with an incompetent on the throne.

The views of Li Huan and Wang Jizhong found in successive sources reflect opposite tendencies. Li Huan's character is evaluated more positively with time, as his personal failings fade in the light of his actions as at least an ostensible fifth columnist. By contrast, accounts of Wang Jizhong show an increasing ambivalence about his actions, which were already seen as problematical for the protagonists themselves and for their contemporaries.

The *Jiu Wudai shi* account of Li Huan records a balance between general commendation and a continued loyalty to the South. Li Huan has literary talent, though it is important to note that no moral qualities are mentioned. The *Xin Wudai shi* pays scant attention to Li Huan, but what it does say is telling. It makes specific Li's lack of moral qualities by implying a connection between his drunkenness and Shi Jingtang's abolition of the Hanlin academy. Nor is Li Huan redeemed by his espionage activities, for Ouyang Xiu says nothing of these. The *Tongjian,* however, balances Li Huan's drunkenness and implied moral deficiency with a newly detailed account of his espionage, suggesting his continued allegiance to the South. The *Song shi* makes even more of Li's spying, implying that he was a Southern agent in the Liao court perhaps for some time. (The *Cefu yuangui* has the most detailed account of all, demonstrating how far Li Huan would go on behalf of Zhou.) Perhaps surprisingly, the *Song shi* mentions his escape only in passing, but the removal of Li Huan's drunkenness means that his morality is no longer questioned, creating a consistently positive picture. The uncertainty about Li Huan's motives that is visible in some of the sources has disappeared in the official Song dynastic history, which by the fourteenth century could surely only justify inclusion of a Liao official by claiming him as "one of ours."

The portrayals of Wang Jizhong in the Southern sources reflect an increasingly uncomfortable attitude towards frontier crossing. The *Dongdu shi lue* and *Long ping ji* show Wang's escaping his father's reflected virtue and repaying the court's favor by fighting hard against the Liao. The Song believed he had died heroically, but subsequently the Liao made him ask for peace, and he became the architect of the Shanyuan treaty. His continued loyalty, in the form of a wish to return home, was frustrated by the very same treaty. The *Changbian* gives the most detailed account of Wang Jizhong's efforts to avoid capture and of his request to return south. Now he is not made to ask for peace but himself encourages the Liao to seek negotiations. Furthermore, his own discomfort over his position appears in his letter apologizing for serving the Liao. The *Qidan guo zhi* omits this letter, but the *Song shi* reports

it. The *Song shi* also seems most concerned to shift the blame for Wang's crossing, heightening the danger he faced and accusing his fellow generals of cowardice. All these sources notably fail to comment upon Wang Jizhong's inherent moral qualities. The most we find is the *Song shi* remark that he gained the personal confidence of the future Song emperor. Lacking other laudable aspects to his character, Wang Jizhong's entire reputation rests upon his resistance to capture and his efforts towards the peace treaty. Although his attachment to the South is undoubted by any source but the *Qidan guo zhi*, his case troubled later commentators, as shown by their sheer number, and by their ambivalence, with several criticizing his failure to die for his cause.

By contrast, the *Liao shi* gives Wang an orthodox treatment. His crossing is apparently painless, and he is noted for his service. He is the virtuous Confucian official, upright in character, defending morality, properly fulfilling his duty, and fearlessly advising the emperor.[80] Only in combination with the Southern sources do we uncover the more complex aspects of Wang Jizhong's situation. His key role in the negotiations leading to the treaty of Shanyuan suggests an ability to straddle the emerging border, giving grounds for the contemporary comment that he was "entirely loyal to the rulers of two states." In working on behalf of the South, he was heir to the tradition claimed for Han Yanhui and his ilk, but his attachment seems much stronger, not least because he was trying to practice a different ideal of loyalty.

Earlier crossers had generally acted on their own behalf and found that their actions could have wider ramifications, but Wang Jizhong's ability to work change arose from political circumstances transformed by the consolidation of two rival states. He was different from his predecessors because he helped to define formally a political and territorial border that reflected the political boundary around allegiance to which he himself already subscribed; whereas his predecessors had merely marked, by crossing it, the existence of one among several political borders that were only slowly acquiring territorial and other dimensions. Yet when return to the South was ultimately denied him, Wang, like his earlier counterparts, was apparently willing enough to serve the Liao. Wang Jizhong lived up to his name, "continuing faithfulness," and his case demonstrates that interpretation of the concept of *zhong* had completed its shift from pragmatism in a context of many opportunities to idealism in a situation of drastically limited choices. Unfortunately for Wang Jizhong himself, events had yet to catch up; later commentators did not regard his actions so sympathetically.

Whereas the earlier crossers are largely exonerated in the Southern sources, chiefly through an increased emphasis on their continuing political

attachment to the South, Wang Jizhong is condemned by the fourteenth-century commentators on his biographies in both the *Liao shi* and *Song shi.* The two commentaries set themselves firmly against the efforts of Wang's Song biographer to highlight his heroic resistance, and give him no credit for his subsequent role in bringing peace, nor for his clear desire to return home. The difference between Wang Jizhong and the earlier crossers is that Wang served an established dynasty, and by the fourteenth century it was this that determined how he was seen. To abandon a stable dynasty was by then the greatest of crimes against morality, so for these writers it was the act of crossing itself that was unforgivable and colored all else that might be said about Wang. It was no longer relevant to consider *how* he crossed or what good things he did afterwards, it mattered only that he *did* cross. Wang Jizhong had contributed greatly to making the world in which the historians of the late Yuan dynasty lived, where political, territorial, and cultural boundaries were demarcated clearly enough to be able to govern people's actions. But having helped to create those conditions, Wang Jizhong fell foul of them both immediately, when he could not return home, and three and a half centuries later in the official record of his life, when it was decreed that for all his continuing faithfulness, he had not gone far enough. To satisfy the Yuan commentators, Wang Jizhong would have had to die rather than cross the frontier. But if he had, the world of the fourteenth century might have looked very different.

CONCLUSION

Locating Borders

Then, Now, and In Between

. . . our virtues lie in th'interpretation of the time
—William Shakespeare, *Coriolanus,* Act IV, Scene 7

In the opening decades of the tenth century the existence of multiple political centers in our frontier zone favored a highly pragmatic approach to borders and loyalty. Allegiances and boundaries were both largely personal or political in nature, and borders between regimes in the frontier zone were determined largely by the shifting and contingent allegiances of individual commanders and regional officials. But whereas spatial, political, and ideological boundaries in the North did not coincide at all in 900, by 1005 and the treaty of Shanyuan there was a great deal more convergence. By then, two powerful states had developed in tandem and could exercise a significant degree of control over the people and territory they claimed as their own, so that it was no longer possible to act in ways that had been commonplace a century before. The earlier relationship between borders and loyalties had been reversed: allegiances no longer determined the location of borders but instead were supposed to flow from an individual's physical location on one side or other of a borderline agreed between the two opposing states of Liao and Song. As the power to determine the locations of borderlines shifted from individuals in the frontier zones to state actors, so the significance of frontier crossing changed. What had been a relatively simple matter of choosing a new master became transformed into something more complicated and more difficult for the individuals concerned, involving a physical movement across a fixed geographical borderline decided at the highest level. Allegiances no longer determined borderlines but were supposed to be determined by them.

Changing understandings of loyalty during the tenth century

Such spatial movements were the concrete manifestations of a change in the basis on which decisions about allegiance were made. At the beginning of the century political fragmentation permitted relational loyalty to hold sway, whether in the reciprocal form that justified changing allegiance or the hierarchical form that required the expression of personal loyalty to specific individuals, the latter, in particular, often involving some appeal to the higher authority of moral principle. Under this definition of loyalty the behavior of those who crossed to the Liao was quite normal; it did not involve betrayal of their lords, but was merely in keeping with the conventions of a time of multiple options for service. Figures such as Han Yanhui, as well as Zhang Li in his early career, could benefit greatly from the seller's market for their highly valued services and could be praised for virtues both administrative and moral.

In mid-century the Liao established formal suzerainty over a Later Jin regime that claimed the whole of the Southern frontier zone, and it was some years before the alliance collapsed into a hard-fought war. Understandings of loyalty did not change significantly in this period, but the stakes were raised because the political units were bigger and because the alliance helped both Northern and Southern courts to assert their authority more effectively over their own people. Hence in 936 the decision by Zhao Yanshou and his father to shift their allegiance away from the Later Tang court meant not just the loss of a province or two but the end of that dynasty. Their choice rested still on the concept of reciprocal loyalty even though the reward sought was rule of a whole regime and not merely place and favor. Zhao Yanshou lived to enjoy a successful career in Liao through a time when direct dealing between allied courts prevented further changes of allegiance, and his reciprocal loyalty was secured for the Liao campaigns against Jin by an understanding of generous reward to follow. In an exact parallel with 936, it was again the choice of a crucial general to shift his allegiance away from the Later Jin in 947 that brought not just the loss of armies or provinces, but the end of another dynasty. This general, Du Chongwei, also understood loyalty to be reciprocal, seeking first a throne from the Liao as his reward for surrendering and then shifting his allegiance to them again in the hope of gaining autonomy in the province granted him by Liu Zhiyuan of Later Han. But it is also in this period of chronically, incrementally increasing political cohesion that we see the first hints that support for the untrammeled principle of reciprocal loyalty was no longer quite so universal. We find commanders and soldiers willing to die, or at least fight on, rather than surrender, like Zhang Jingda at Jinyang in 936 and Du Chongwei's troops in 947. And we find, in

our earliest sources, a contemporary condemning Zhao Yanshou for his service to the Liao.

During the later tenth century, choice of master became restricted by the consolidation of the two states of Liao and Song in opposition to each other. And by the early eleventh century the Liao emperors no longer had the potential to be alternative overlords for disgruntled or ambitious Southern officials, but had become clearly marked as the enemy and as such were impossible to serve under a rubric of loyalty that had changed considerably. Loyalty was no longer a commodity for which rulers competed and which subordinate leaders could bestow and withdraw at will in the service of their own political, personal, or familial agendas. Instead it had become a duty owing from officials to rulers, embracing not only political allegiance but now also carrying geographical and even emotional connotations. *Zhong* now meant hierarchical loyalty, an understanding that did not permit allegiance to be changed under any circumstances.

But hierarchical loyalty had not yet been transformed into loyalism as we understand it from the Jurchen Jin conquest onwards. Li Huan's work to bring over Youzhou to Zhou allegiance, and his subsequent suicide attempts, may be expressions of a continuing hierarchical loyalty to a rather abstracted South even in captivity, but the same actions may also be seen as a bid for gains from a new frontier regime under the rubric of reciprocal loyalty, followed by a desperate effort to avoid punishment from a capricious Liao emperor. Late-imperial loyalism was characterized by its unequivocal nature, whether in word or deed, so the doubt about Li Huan's intentions, if nothing else, keeps him within the older range of definitions rather than making him a precursor of the new.

There is no doubt, however, that Wang Jizhong's preference was to go home and serve the Song, but the decision was out of his hands. Wang felt an emotional attachment to his homeland that he would have preferred to match with his political allegiance, but it is not clear whether this desire was based on his long-standing personal relationship with the Song emperor Zhenzong or on a more abstract allegiance to the office of the emperor or to the Song dynasty. Furthermore, the sadness implied in Wang Jizhong's resignation to his fate shows how much more difficult the choices had become under the early Song. In mid-century Zhao Yanshou had already suffered contemporary criticism over working for a regime regarded by some—but only some—as the enemy; by Wang Jizhong's day it was no longer possible for Song subjects to see the Liao as suitable masters for any southerner, so that Wang's decision was not a matter of choosing between several legitimate options but a question of morality.

Even so, the understanding of *zhong* exhibited by him and his contemporaries was still not quite on the continuum from loyalism to collaboration.[1] Although Wang Jizhong expressed shame at not fighting to the death to avoid capture, he ended his career serving the Liao faithfully. He could be seen as a loyalist justifying his political actions by claiming to be bringing peace or (implicitly) enlightenment to the "barbarian." Such claims certainly became commonplace later among those who took service with the Jin or Yuan dynasties.[2] But to make Wang Jizhong a full-blown loyalist would suggest that people of his time were clear about what *zhong* should mean, whereas what we find instead is the ambivalence of the early comments on his case, most strikingly that he was "entirely loyal to the rulers of two states." Wang Jizhong remained, in the end, a practitioner of hierarchical loyalty in a time of transition.

So whereas in 900 the changing of masters was regarded as unexceptionable and largely unproblematical, by 1005 the equivalent action had become a transgression of boundaries not just political but also moral and perhaps emotional. A simple matter of political, personal, practical *allegiance* had become a question of *loyalty* that would by the twelfth century reach to the core of social identity.

From pragmatism to eternal verities: The historiography of the Liao southerners

We see the effects of these attitudinal changes in the historiography of frontier crossing, where the tenth-century contraction of plausible possibilities is overlaid with layers of later interpretation showing little recognition of alternative views of what constitutes loyal behavior. At the same time we find in the later sources attempts to salvage and justify the actions of people whom the later historians identified as their own and badly in need of redemption, even if, in their own time, these people did not, it seems, feel quite the same way. An increasingly rigid definition of loyalty after the tenth century was accompanied by an increase in the salience of cultural identity. As we have seen, emotional connections rooted in cultural differences were not a prominent theme in the earliest accounts of the Five Dynasties, but arose only here and there among a welter of other topics. This was to change as the sources were repeatedly rewritten. When the explicitly territorial revanchism of the Song produced a need for a more sharply defined Other that could justify military aggression post-Shanyuan, conditions were ripe for the conversion of cultural identity into something much more politicized.

The filiated accounts of departure, attempted departure, and return in the texts for this period reveal the evolving workings of the frontier more

clearly than would a set of independent records. But more than that, they are also an important medium for the articulation of the debate on loyalty in the different periods when the various texts were compiled. I have argued that concepts of what constituted loyalty changed markedly over the course of the tenth century, but this is not necessarily apparent from the earliest sources taken by themselves. Rather we see it most clearly when we compare the—supposedly minor—editorial changes made between earlier and later accounts that are substantially, but not quite, identical. The concerns of the later sources, expressed in careful selection and often subtle alterations in vocabulary, reveal which issues needed no explanation or justification by the writers of the earlier texts. Hence when the later texts emphasize, say, Zhao Yanshou's role as a southerner on the Northern side in the Liao-Jin war, we may understand that the earlier writers felt differently on the question of which side Zhao should have been on. But attitudes changed at different rates depending on the issue. For instance, when the *Xin Wudai shi* and all the later texts omit any mention of Zhang Li's extreme filial piety as detailed in the *Jiu Wudai shi,* this may suggest that in the eleventh-century texts filiality had already been supplanted as a virtue in its own right. But cultural identity may not have become a problematical issue until the *Liao shi,* as suggested by the striking omission there of Zhang Li's declaration that he is a *hanren,* after centuries of verbatim transmission. Using the texts in this way has, I hope, been revealing of tenth-century attitudes, but at this point we turn to the stages by which changes in historiographical attitudes occurred after the tenth century.

The eleventh-century sources—the *Xin Wudai shi* and *Zizhi tongjian*—provide the first clear shift of viewpoint, not least because both Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang were consciously writing interpretative *history* rather than merely trying to transmit a preexisting record. They do not, however, take the same approach to the subject of loyalty. For Ouyang Xiu it is a major concern, serving as a prime motivation in his selection and organization of material. His creation of special categories of biographies for loyalists is widely noted, but he simultaneously refused a full biography to any Liao southerner, although he does grant them thumbnail sketches in the "Appendices on Barbarians."[3] This material can sometimes be crucial to the historical record, but this relegation of frontier crossers effectively damns them all by noting them only in terms of their service to those Ouyang saw as the enemy. We see this perhaps most clearly in the case of Han Yanhui, whose survival in the record owes much to Ouyang Xiu, but who is shown in the *Xin Wudai shi* not as the constructor of Tang-style institutions in Liao for which he is most famous, but only as the subjugator of neighboring steppe peoples. It is

also Ouyang Xiu who is most likely to dredge up stories, often omitted elsewhere, that show these people in a bad light, such as the "cap incident" involving both Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou.

Sima Guang offers a more sympathetic and nuanced picture and includes in the main text a huge amount of material on the North that Ouyang Xiu relegates to the Appendices. In the *Tongjian,* and to a large extent in the *Qidan guo zhi* that follows it so closely, the individuals examined here are treated exactly the same as any other worthy official, often with stress on their moral qualities. These include Han Yanhui maintaining his dignity as envoy to Abaoji and refusing to bow, for which he was detained and banished, and also Han speaking out to prevent the execution of the Later Tang envoy Yao Kun in 926. Zhang Li is lauded in the same texts for his implied criticism of those responsible for the murderers of Guo Chongtao in 925, and his condemnation of wrongdoing brings the wrath of the powerful upon him, ending in his death. Even Zhao Yanshou is noted in the *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi* as having spoken out in order to save the surrendered Later Jin army in 947. This is not to say that Sima Guang is uniformly positive about Liao southerners, but whereas Ouyang Xiu's approach to them exudes unmitigated disapproval, Sima Guang dispenses praise and blame equally to them as to any other character in his history. Sima Guang is much more content for the historical record as he presents it to reflect the ambiguities around tenth-century cases of crossing into Liao service.

And despite the hard line he takes in his commentary on Feng Dao, it is important to note that Sima Guang does not raise here the issue of Feng's surrender and brief service to Deguang in 947; it is the general principle of changing allegiance that he objects to, not the cultural affiliation of the new master. Sima finds virtue (or vice) in the behavior itself, without reference to the political or cultural affiliations of either subject or object of a particular act. But even for Ouyang Xiu the issue is legitimacy rather than cultural identity: loyalty can be owing only to what he regards as legitimate regimes. For him these do not include any of the regimes of the tenth century until the Song; the Liao are excluded along with the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.[4]

The Southern Song works vary greatly in quality, from the continuation of Sima Guang's methods in the *Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian* to the distortions of the *Qidan guo zhi.* The *Changbian* provides a great deal of information, but the parameters of this study do not permit extensively informed comment on its approach to loyalty. As for the *Qidan guo zhi,* perhaps understandably in the context of the Jurchen conquest and the Mongol threat, it takes a viewpoint on loyalty that may suggest an increased concern with cultural allegiance, and this is accordingly more familiar to us. The author

dramatically—and probably falsely—extols the courage of Han Yanhui by adding him into the "axe incident" at the foundation of Liu Shouguang's short-lived Yan regime in 911. He emphasizes (by omission of other items) Zhang Li's principled weeping for his murdered master in 925, reverses a sequence of events to imply that Northern (rather than Southern) plundering led Zhang to advise that only "people of the Middle Kingdom" should be used to govern the South, and omits Deguang's accusation that Zhang Li is partly to blame for the destruction caused by the Liao-Jin war. Ye Longli also transmits from the *Tongjian* mostly negative information about Zhao Yanshou, the southerner who fought against the South, and mostly positive information about Wang Jizhong, the southerner who arguably served the South by making peace. These choices appear to suggest that service to the Liao was unavoidable for some of these people, but that their high principles, and where appropriate, their efforts on behalf of fellow southerners were enough to secure a positive reputation.

Finally, the official dynastic histories compiled under the Yuan had to satisfy political obligations to the Mongol emperors who sponsored the work, while also seeking to express the judgments of an age in which the meaning of loyalty had become sharply delineated and state-defined categories of identity were a major constituent of political organization and social interaction. Perhaps because of the speed of compilation, it is hard to see at work any editorial policy regarding loyalty. The commentaries to the biographies in both *Liao shi* and *Song shi,* probably written by the Yuan compilers, sometimes express strong criticism of Liao southerners for their change of allegiance, although the main texts also provide a certain balance. For instance, the *Liao shi* includes justifications of frontier crossing such as Han Yanhui's, and details Li Huan's attempted suicide, and the *Song shi* highlights Wang Jizhong's militant resistance to capture.[5] But the approach of the *Liao shi* also diverges from that of the *Song shi* in certain aspects, and it is useful to separate out the *Liao shi* and compare it with the Southern sources taken as a whole.

The portrayal of attachment to the South in the Southern sources and the *Liao shi*

When we read all the texts together (including the *Liao shi*), we arrive at a complex negotiation of different approaches to different borders and boundaries. At the same time it is possible to trace in the Southern sources a developing anxiety over the transference of service from Southern regimes to the Liao, expressed in an increasing emphasis on the emotional attachment of these people to the South. The concern to highlight anything that looks like

any kind of loyalty to the South manifests itself particularly in accounts of Liao southerners' attempts to return to Southern regimes, of which our case studies offer four examples: only Zhao Yanshou showed no sign of wishing to leave Liao.

Zhang Li presents the clearest picture of how the emphases change. As we have seen, the *Jiu Wudai shi* presents the fullest picture of him as a rounded individual displaying considerable virtue. His attempt to return to the South could be interpreted as demonstrating a degree of loyalty to the Southern regimes, but upon his recapture he appears to give up any idea of returning south, and while this story rounds off the biography, it does not dominate the account. The *Xin Wudai shi,* however, concentrates on his transferal and service to the Liao. The attempt to return is included but with nothing further to emphasize his loyal nature. Moreover, it is Ouyang Xiu who adds Deguang's accusation regarding the destruction of the South. The *Tongjian* drops most of the material on Zhang Li's early life, leaving only minimal evidence of his personal loyalty to various masters. The reduced enumeration of his general virtues serves to place more emphasis on his attempt to leave Liao and the implication of a continuing attachment to the South. The *Qidan guo zhi* further omits parts of the *Tongjian* account, regardless of whether they show Zhang Li in a good or bad light, so that his attempt to return south is given still greater prominence.

Hence, in an increasingly abbreviated picture of Zhang Li, the most lasting elements of his story are precisely those showing his attachment to the South, which is explained by his view of the North: "Li is a *hanren,* and (Chinese) clothes, and food and drink are not the same as those here; it would be better to die than to live." It is highly likely, of course, that Zhang Li continued to identify as Chinese in cultural terms, but I have argued that for Zhang this did not necessarily equate with a desire, much less an obligation, to live in a particular geographical location, serve a particular regime, or be loyal to a ruler of the same cultural bent. The Southern texts, though, seem to become increasingly concerned to demonstrate that although Zhang Li might have served in Liao for many years, in truth his heart lay in the South, understood at once geographically, politically, morally, and emotionally.

As noted earlier, fully half of the *Xin Wudai shi*'s account of Han Yanhui concerns his departure from and return to Liao. That it ends with Abaoji's delighted exclamation that Han has "come from heaven" suggests that Han Yanhui ultimately gave his adherence to the Liao. The *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi,* however, add here Han's explanatory letter to the Taiyuan Jin, which not only justifies his actions but declares his attachment to the South through his promise to ensure that the Liao will not raid there.

This effectively scotches Ouyang Xiu's implication of a transfer of loyalty. Instead we see a southerner who, though he returned to the North, still remained ultimately loyal to the Southern regimes and did what he could on their behalf.

Li Huan and Wang Jizhong fall into a rather different category. I have already discussed in Chapter 6 the portrayal of their attachment to the South, because in their cases it is much harder to separate this issue from the recorders' general appraisal of their characters. Although I have suggested why we might be skeptical about the degree and nature of the attachment felt by our earliest subjects, Han Yanhui and Zhang Li, it seems to have offered the Song historians something of a lifeline. The *Tongjian* and *Qidan guo zhi* can judge that the Liao southerners retained their virtue by progressively emphasizing their continuing attachment to the South. In the *Song shi,* however, views seem to be changing, because our later cases, Li Huan and Wang Jizhong, are shown to have no virtue at all independent of their loyalty to the South. In the *Song shi, Changbian,* and other Southern Song and Yuan sources there also seems to be a growing ambivalence to the literally borderline case of Wang Jizhong.

The *Liao shi* presents a rather different view or set of views. Zhang Li's moral stance against Xiao Han is retained, as is his willingness to speak out, but overall he appears as just another good minister. Most importantly, the only loyalty seen here is to Deguang, and although Zhang Li's escape attempt remains, he explains himself without implying that death would be preferable to life in Liao. For Han Yanhui, his formulation of the Liao administrative system is hammered home so much that he appears to have created it single-handedly. This stresses faithful service, but events showing the sincerity of his filial piety are omitted, along with anything showing his practical attachment to the Southern regimes: he does not promise to keep the Liao out of Taiyuan, and he does not save any Chinese lives. In addition it is no longer explicitly noted that he receives better treatment after his return to Liao, rather it is made clear that Abaoji firmly expects Han Yanhui to return and, unlike in the earlier sources, he is neither surprised nor overjoyed when Han does come back. Instead, Han declares his allegiance to Abaoji. Here, Han Yanhui has fully transferred his loyalty to the Liao, even though he also wrote poetry about his sadness at being away from home.

Unsurprisingly, Zhao Yanshou, who has a generally hard time in the Southern sources, is treated much more generously in the *Liao shi,* which not only exaggerates his military achievements in the Liao-Jin war but also omits criticisms leveled at him by contemporaries such as Shen Yun at the siege of Qizhou, together with any mention whatsoever of Zhao's attempt to

succeed Deguang. Zhao Yanshou is not only utterly loyal to the Liao but also above censure.

The image of Li Huan is less clear, but whereas the earlier sources do not mention the moment when he entered Liao service, the *Liao shi* says that he "pledged allegiance." It nevertheless allows for a continued attachment to the South by recording Li Huan's escape attempt as responding to his brother's invitation and then, bizarrely, by adding Li's repeated attempts at suicide. Hence in the same account we have both allegiance pledged to the Liao and apparently extreme loyalty to the South. Turning to Wang Jizhong, the *Liao shi* omits his heroism, and the loyalty it implies, by having him captured while on reconnaissance. It says that he served Liao energetically to repay kindnesses shown him, and later we see him on a Liao expedition against Koryo. This is a transference of loyalty indeed.

Although the *Liao shi* cuts some incidents showing continued attachment to the South, others remain. Evidence of such an attachment does not have to be eliminated altogether, *provided* that there was *also* evidence of allegiance to the Liao. Consequently, the *Liao shi* proves unexpectedly tolerant of attachment to the South. At least some of the Chinese compilers of the *Liao shi* were sympathetic to those showing such a continued attachment,[6] and one may suppose that Mongol emperors may have been as understanding of cultural allegiances as Liao emperors seem to have been.[7] But it may be that, overall, the emphasis in the *Liao shi* is on the positive outcomes of Southern interaction with Northern lords—as exemplified by the case of Zhao Yanshou—perhaps in an attempt to show by analogy that the boundary existing in the fourteenth century between *hanren* and their Mongol or *semu* (Western and Central Asian) superiors was one that could be breached. It is perhaps in the *Liao shi* that we can see most clearly the many hands and attitudes inevitably represented in any compilation, supplemented in this case by its belated and hasty character and its serious problems with the source materials.[8] This preservation of radically different viewpoints makes the *Liao shi* an even richer text in which to conduct historical excavations.[9]

The renegotiations of what constituted loyalty in successive versions of tenth-century history illustrate the gradual and unsteady transition between two different conceptualizations of *zhong,* from the relational loyalty of the tenth century itself towards the loyalism-collaboration continuum that has dominated since late imperial times. Those who crossed from the South into Liao service acted entirely within the mores of a time of political upheaval, but their stories were soon being edited according to the changed, harsher standards of a moral loyalty born of the opposition between the Song and its Northern neighbors.

Beyond ethnicity and nations

The developing political cleavage between the dynasties that ruled the Northern and Southern portions of the frontier zone in the later tenth century and beyond was accompanied and fostered by the highlighting of North-South differences on the Southern side in particular.[10] This increasing emphasis on differences between North and South coincided with a growing political similarity between the two, as certain Tang-style practices and institutions became more firmly established in Liao after 947.[11] The determination to nevertheless find indications of long-standing antagonism between Song and Liao implies an increasing salience for cultural identity, which, deployed for political ends, may ostensibly start to resemble our modern conception of ethnicity. But, as may now be apparent, to seek the roots of a burgeoning sense of ethnic identity in the earlier tenth century would be to impose on that time a set of categories quite alien to those who lived in it.

Because the concept of ethnicity presupposes the existence of groupings based on politically motivated and territorially based cultural affiliation, it cannot help us to see how such groupings might develop. If we assume that political groupings are based on ethnic affiliations, we cannot easily articulate explanations revolving around material gain or personal bonds between individuals, and where cultural identity is not a salient factor. If we assume that ethnic groups are associated with a particular territory, we cannot readily consider a politics based on networks of allegiances between individuals located in particular fortified towns, but who may control only parts of the supposedly dependent districts. In short, if you start by considering ethnic groups, you have to assume that ethnicity plays an important role in determining behavior because that's what an ethnic group is. Ethnicity thereby becomes part of the answer, when it needs to be part of the question.

However, by taking *zhong* as our primary category of analysis, we can see how the boundaries between various cultural affiliations and political groupings, which had been quite distinct from each other, slowly and unevenly began to converge, and to coalesce into a binary opposition between Song and Liao. These two formed a pair of constitutive Others, at first characterized as enemies without a strong cultural element, but which subsequently became characterized more and more as Chinese and barbarian. From one perspective this could, perhaps, allow us to trace the constitution of ethnicity from several quite different elements, but—more helpfully—it also permits us to remain outside the national and ethnic box when considering eleventh-century and later developments. Furthermore, considering loyalty in its own right allows us to see that it, too, was not static; a notion originally based on

contingency became increasingly beholden to ideology as the power of states grew in both North and South. Most importantly, trying to view the events by means of a concept that mattered to people at the time helps us to understand better the ways in which those people, in their concerns and actions, resembled and differed from ourselves.

We can also see how the changing practice of loyalty contributed to political developments. At first, the placing of loyalties determined borders and helped to select and strengthen the more effective regimes. Later, adherence to a changing standard of loyalty confirmed and helped to reinforce the authority of centralizing states to determine the nature and location of their borders without reference to their subordinates, and ensured that the resulting interstate agreements could be enforced. States that could define their own borders because they did not have to worry about keeping their followers loyal were able to pay less attention to individual servitors. Now that governors, prefects, and generals no longer had to be kept sweet, the emphasis could shift to an administrative concern with the management of districts and their produce, which enabled territoriality to come to the fore. The Five Dynasties conception of a polity as a ruler and his network of subordinates, connected by ties of allegiance contingent upon continuing benefits of various kinds, was replaced by a system of states that divided all available resources between them on the basis of geographical location. This division was agreed by treaty and enshrined in the exchange of maps showing a linear demarcation. Territory thus became the primary determinant of where loyalty should lie.

Taking loyalty as our starting point further offers us a new perspective on identity in this period. Identities only become visible in the context of choices or challenges. An official facing a hostile army had no option but to decide whether to resist or surrender. In other words he had to decide where his loyalties lay. Which was more important to him: cultural affiliation or political allegiance, material benefit or abstract moral principles, military advantage or the welfare of the people, his own interests or those of a wider constituency? The act of choosing between such a multitude of loyalties made the official *someone who was capable of* acting in particular ways, perhaps previously unanticipated. Thus he modified his identity, perhaps minutely, perhaps drastically. Whatever the outcome, his choice took place in a political, social, and ideological context in which only a particular range of alternatives was thinkable. Although the current understanding(s) of *zhong* comprised only one element among many involved in such a decision, it could determine which among the other factors our official deemed salient. Hence the analysis here of changes in the understanding and practice of

zhong over time suggests that the concept of loyalty at one time could preclude consideration of, say, military advantages and abstract moral principles in choosing how to act in a crisis, while at other times it could set them at the head of the list of concerns.

The perceived morality of the choice made in such circumstances varies in line with the range of options considered permissible in the world inhabited by the observer. As the range of acceptable alternatives changes over time so historical choices are revalued in the record, as we have seen. In the first half of the tenth century the boundary around moral behavior included anyone who behaved without egregious damage to others; cruelty and excessive violence were morally transgressive, but changing political loyalties was not. By 1005 Wang Jizhong felt himself to be painfully on the wrong side of a political border when it was important to him to be physically on the right side. He and his contemporaries were uncertain as to the moral status of his actions, but found a certain resolution in the argument that he had been instrumental in bringing a peace that benefited the multitudes. Later historians, however, operated under a much-altered set of permissible alternatives, and for them nothing could excuse Wang's behavior.

Crossing a political border at any point during the tenth century did not have to involve a breach of morals; neither did it pose any threat to cultural identity. There are no indications that anyone was ever expected to cross a cultural boundary; rather the opposite was the case. As we see from Deguang's response to Zhang Li's attempt to return to the South, it was evidently important to the first Liao rulers that their Southern servitors be made to feel as much at home as possible. This was no problem until difference began to be emphasized in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, creating a painfully dissonant situation for people like Wang Jizhong, who was already morally and emotionally uncomfortable about his political position on the wrong side of the border, even if his cultural difference from those around him was not yet politically charged. Although it did not help Wang Jizhong in his lifetime or in the later interpretations of his life, adherence to morality, and cultural loyalty, subsequently came to be widely used justifications for what came to be regarded as the political and cultural transgressions of serving a specifically foreign conqueror in the late-imperial context where cultural identity had become highly significant.

This book has argued that territorial understandings of borders, ethnic understandings of identity, and moralistic understandings of loyalty obscure the political, cultural, and moral realities of the crucial tenth-century transition between the very different worlds of the Tang and Song dynasties. Instead of adopting categories of analysis from the narrative of the nation-state,

I have attempted to describe one of the concepts—*zhong*—by which tenth-century people may have arranged their world and made certain decisions. By considering what loyalty meant in different periods, it has been possible to separate out tenth-century behavior from later interpretations of that behavior, thereby bringing us, perhaps, to a better understanding of a world long buried under the accretions of centuries of moralizing historiography. In this analysis, relationships with the Liao, at the individual or state level, have been crucial to developing our understanding. Although crossings to Liao from the Southern regimes have been the focus here, the remaining conclusion is that under the tenth-century definitions of loyalty offered here, it is impossible to distinguish crossings to Liao from crossings to anywhere else. The next task, then, is to consider the workings of loyalty *within* the whole borderland, which must necessarily raise further questions as to the nature of China's borders and boundaries.

Appendix

Frontier crossings arranged by date

- Reference numbers: All crossings have a reference number. Incidents where people considered crossing or tried to cross, but were unsuccessful, are enclosed in brackets and not numbered. Offers to cross used to deceive the other side have been omitted altogether.
- Types of crossing: V = voluntary crossing, D = crossing under duress, N = involuntary crossing, A = alliance; crossers are further identified as C = civilian, M = military, X = mixed military and civilian, and R = returned.
- Classifications: Where different sources suggest different reasons for crossing, one classification has been chosen and the others appear in brackets.
- Sources: First, source giving preferred date; second, sources appear in date order; third, sources appear in the following sequence: *LS* (because it covers the whole period), followed by *JW, TJ, XW,* or *CB, SS.*
- Groups: H = Han, Sh = Shatuo, Turk = "Tuque" Turkish, Kit = Kitan, Bo = Bohai.
- Notes: These reflect the wording of the sources, so are not consistent with the vocabulary employed in the main text. Notably, the Liao frequently are called "the Kitan," and temple names are used for rulers.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
1	95,000 people	902:7	Daibei, Hedong	NC	*LS* 1:2			Captured in raids; set up in cities.
	Large population	?	?		*TJ* 266:8677			Abaoji claimed he acquired many *hanren* in his early years.
2	Prisoners	903:10	$Jizhou_1$	NC	*LS* 1:2			Captured in raids; set up in cities.
3	Han Zhigu	903:10?	$Jizhou_1$	N	*LS* 74:1233	H	*LS* 74:1233	Captured in raid as a child; later given post. The date of Han Zhigu's crossing is likely to have been earlier than this. Otherwise he would have been too young to do what he is said to have done. Probable date is c. 886. See Tang Tongtian, "Han Zhigu ru Liao nianling."
4	Kang Moji	903:10?	$Jizhou_1$	N	*LS* 74:1230	H?	*LS* 74:1230	Captured in raid; placed under general.
5	Zhao Ba	904:9	Wuzhou Taoshan	N	*LS* 1:2	H?		Captured in battle.
6	Li Keyong	905:10	Taiyuan Jin	A	*LS* 1:2	Sh	*JW* 25:331ff	Alliance against Liu Rengong; prefectures taken.
7	Populations	905:10	Youzhou territory	NC	*LS* 1:2			Captured in raids; set up in cities.
8	Liu Shouqi & several thousand troops	907:7	Pingzhou	VM	*LS* 1:3 *TJ* 266:8672	H		Liu Shouguang's brother. Submitted; set up in Pinglucheng; fled to Liao; then to Hedong.
9	Li Cunxu	908:4	Hedong	A	*TJ* 266:8694	Sh		Bribed Abaoji, requesting cavalry to fight Liang.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
10	Liu Shouwen	909:3	Cangzhou	A	*LS* 1:4	H		Asked for troops to fight brother Shouguang; Shouguang pushed back.
		909:5			*TJ* 267:8710			Paid heavy bribe for troops to fight Shouguang; captured by Shouguang.
11	Many Shouguang troops	911–913?	Youzhou	VM	*TJ* 269:8808			Because of Shouguang's cruelty; recorded c. 916.
					JW 137:1828			Because of Shouguang's cruelty.
			Youzhou, Zhuozhou		*XW* 72:886			Because of Shouguang's cruelty.
12	Zhang Xichong	911:8?	Pingzhou	NR	*TJ* 276:9023	H	*JW* 88:1147	Captured defending Pingzhou for Liu Shouguang; R with 20,000, 928:8. (*JW* 39:541, 928:int 8). Cf. *LS* 34:396, Abaoji raid on Youzhou, 912 spring.
13	Gentry and commoners	c. 912:1	N frontier	NC	*TJ* 269:8808			Captured while Shouguang besieged in Youzhou.
			Youzhou		*JW* 137:1828			Captured while Shouguang besieged in Youzhou.
			frontier		*XW* 72:886			Abaoji took advantage to raid; set up Tang-style cities to settle captives.
14	Han Yanhui	c. 912:1?	Yan envoy	NR	*TJ* 269:8810	H	see Ch. 4	Detained for not making obeisance; herded flocks, given posts.
					XW 72:890			Detained for not making obeisance; herded flocks, given posts.
15	Han Yanhui	c. 913:12?	Taiyuan Jin	V	*TJ* 269:8810			Escapes quarrel; given posts.
					XW 72:890			Escapes false accusation; given posts.
	[Liu Shouguang	913:10	Yan [Youzhou]	[A]	*TJ* 268:8777	H	*JW* 135:1799	To fight Taiyuan Jin; refused.]
16	Qi Xingben & 3,000 men/women	915:6	Youzhou	VCR	*LS* 1:10	?		Asked to submit with family, troops; fled to Youzhou; on Zhou Dewei's staff.
17	Lu Guoyong	916:4	Youzhou	VR	*LS* 1:11	H		Came to submit; R 926:10, *LS* 2:23.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
18	Li Siben	916:8	Yuzhou-Zhenwu	NX	*JW* 28:388	?	*JW* 52:709	Fell into Liao hands when they entered city. Cf. *LS* 34:396. Abaoji captured innumerable people in Yuzhou, Xinzhou$_1$, Wuzhou, Guizhou, and Ruzhou.
			Yuzhou-Zhenwu		*XW* 5:43; 72:887			Captured when Yuzhou taken.
	& city		Yuzhou-Zhenwu		*TJ* 269:8805			City fell, Li captured.
			Shuozhou		*LS* 1:11			City fell, Li captured.
19	Li Cunxu's uncle	916:12	Taiyuan	A	*TJ* 269:8810	Sh		Served emperor.
20	Li Cunxu's aunt	916:12	Taiyuan	A	*TJ* 269:8810	Sh?		Served empress dowager.
21	Lu Wenjin	917:2	Xinzhou$_1$	VMR	*LS* 1:11	H	*JW* 97:1294	Came to submit; took Xinzhou for Liao.
					JW 28:389			Killed governor, rebelled, fled to Liao; led Kitan against Xinzhou; R 926:10, *JW* 37:511, *TJ* 275:8994. In *TJ* comes with 100,000 & baggage carts. Fled to Wu 936:12, *TJ* 280:9166. See also *JW* 137:1828–1829.
					XW 72:887			Killed governor for poor rule, came over; Kitan took Xinzhou.
	& army			[D]	*TJ* 269:8812			Lu reluctant to kill governor; Jin sent punitive force; fled; led Kitan against Xinzhou.
22	Liu Yin	917:2	Xinzhou$_1$	D	*LS* 1:12	?		General of Lu Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect.
					JW 28:389			General of Lu Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect.
		917:3			*TJ* 269:8814			General of Lu Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect.
					XW 72:887			General of Lu Wenjin; posted to defend Xinzhou.
23	Song Yao & army	920:10	Tiande	DMR	*LS* 2:16	?		Besieged, submitted; given gifts, army renamed.
24	Song Yao & family, city	920:10	Tiande	NX	*LS* 2:16			Rebelled, city fell, captured; population moved.
25	Zhang Wenli (aka Wang Deming)	921:7	Zhenzhou-Zhao	A	*TJ* 271:8866–8	H	*JW* 62:829	Sent to Lu Wenjin for Liao help; Jin sent punitive force; Zhang died of fear.
		922:4			*LS* 2:18			Li Cunxu besieged Zhenzhou; Zhang requested help; defeated Jin.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
26	Wang Chuzhi	921:10	Yiwu	A	*TJ* 271:8868–9	H	*XW* 39:419	Asked son Yu to bribe Liao for help against Jin; son Du imprisoned him.
				[VR]	*XW* 5:44; 72:888			Rebelled, swore allegiance to Liao; son Du imprisoned him, Du submitted to Liang.
27	Wang Yu & troops	921:10	$Xinzhou_1$	VMR	*LS* 2:17	H	*LS* 75:1241	Came to allegiance; rewarded well; died having R to $Yizhou_2$, *LS* 75:1242.
	Wang Yu	921:11		[A]	*TJ* 271:8870			Jealous of brother, offered Liao wealth of Zhenzhou; Kitan came south as allies.
		921:12		[V]	*JW* 29:399–400			Enticed Abaoji to invade Youzhou; led Liao to take Zhuozhou.
				[A]	*XW* 72:888			Offered Liao the wealth of Zhenzhou; Kitan took Zhuozhou.
28	Populations	921:11	Tanzhou, Shunzhou, Anyuan, Sanhe, Liangxiang, Wangdu, Luzhou, Mancheng, Suicheng, etc. (more than ten cities)	NC	*LS* 2:17			Captured in raid; people sent into interior. Also *LS* 34:396.
29	Li Sibi & city	921:12	Zhuozhou	DX	*LS* 2:17	Sh	*JW* 50:683	Surrendered with city.
				[N]	*JW* 137:1829			Captured when city fell. Also in *JW* 29:399, without names.
					TJ 271:8870			City besieged, assaulted, Li captured.
30	200 of Li Cunxu's cavalry	921:12	near Youzhou	NM	*LS* 2:17			In pursuit; captured when their quarry turned on them.
					JW 137:1830			Reconnaissance troops. Captured.
31	Unnamed Youzhou assistant general	921:12	Tanzhou	N	*LS* 2:17			Captured in battle.
32	Zhang Chujin	922:4	Zhenzhou	A	*TJ* 271:8868	H		Zhang Wenli's son. Continued father's cause.
		922:5			*LS* 2:18			Continued allegiance.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
33	Hu Qiong	922:4	Jizhou$_1$	N	*LS* 2:17	?		Captured when prefecture fell.
34	Zhao Siwen	923:1	Pingzhou	N[R]	*LS* 2:18; 3:27	H	*LS* 76:1250	Captured when prefecture fell; son failed to negotiate return, *TJ* 281:9189.
35	Zhang Chong	923:1	Pingzhou	NR	*LS* 2:18; 3:27	?		Captured when prefecture fell; rebelled and fled to Tang 926:7, *LS* 2:23.
36	Pei Xin & son, tens	923:4	E or S of Youzhou	NM	*LS* 2:18; 3:27	?		Captured in battle.
	(Li Jitao	923:12		[VR]	*TJ* 272:8908–9	?	*JW* 52:706	Considered crossing when heard of fall of Liang; debate with close followers, decided not to).
37	Li Jida	923:12		V	*TJ* 272:8909	?	*JW* 52:708	Family destroyed as headed for Liao, followers dispersed, suicide before arrived.
38	Prisoners presented	924:9	SW from Liao	NC	*LS* 2:20			Presented by chief minister (Yelü Su).
39	Yao Kun	926:7	Jin envoy	NR	*TJ* 275:8989–90	?		Returned after life saved by Han Yanhui.
40	Wang Du & province	928:3	Yiwu-Dingzhou	VX	*LS* 3:28	H	*JW* 54:731	Pledged allegiance of province; suicide when Dingzhou fell 929:2, *TJ* 286:9027.
					JW 137:1832			Rebelled, requested Liao help; rebellion crushed 929.
					XW 72:891			Rebelled, requested Liao help; defeated.
41	Wang Wei	c. 928		V[R]	*TJ* 282:9204	H		Fled brother Wang Du's rebellion; Taizong wanted him to succeed father Wang Chuzhi.
42	Zhang Yanchao & city	932:11	Yuzhou	VXR	*TJ* 278:9080	Sh	*JW* 129:1706	Grudge against Shi Jingtang; made Datong governor; R to Han 947, *JW* 129:706.
43	City	934:11	Yangcheng (Wu)	DM	*LS* 3:36			Besieged, surrendered.
44	City	934:11	Wazhicheng	DX	*LS* 3:36			Surrendered; able-bodied registered.
45	Live prisoners	935:12	Jinpingluo area	NC	*LS* 3:37			Captured by officials Huage, Kululi, Alusaogu.
46	Sang Weihan	936:5	Jingtang retinue	V	*TJ* 280:9143	H	*JW* 89:1161	Argued for Liao alliance.
					XW 8:79			Agreed should ask for Liao help.
47	Liu Zhiyuan	936:5	Jingtang retinue	V	*XW* 8:79	Sh		Agreed should ask for Liao help.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
48	Shi Jingtang	936:7	Hedong	A	*LS* 3:38	Sh		Tang were sending punitive force against him, sent for help.
				[V]	*TJ* 280:9146			Asked for help, offered to be subject and son, offered districts.
					XW 8:79; 72:892			Asked for Liao help.
		936			*JW* 137:1833			Besieged by Zhang Jingda, requested troops, willing to be subject.
49	Yang Guangyuan	936:int 11	Jin'anzhai	VMR	*LS* 3:39-40	Sh	*JW* 97:1290	Killed Zhang Jingda in order to surrender; served Jin Gaozu.
	& army				*JW* 48:666; 76:992; 137:1833			Killed Zhang Jingda, surrendered to Liao; (berated for wickedness).
					XW 8:75			Killed Zhang Jingda, rebelled, surrendered to Liao.
					TJ 280:9157–8			Urged Zhang Jingda to surrender, beheaded him, letter of surrender to Kitan; berated, troops given to Jin.
50	An Shenqi	936:int 11	Jin'anzhai	VMR	*LS* 3:39–40	Sh	*JW* 123:1614	Killed Zhang Jingda in order to surrender; served Jin Gaozu.
	& troops				*TJ* 280:9157–8			Urged Zhang Jingda to surrender, not prepared to kill him; troops given to Jin.
51	Gao Xingzhou	936:int 11	Jin'anzhai	DR	*TJ* 280:9157–60	H	*JW* 123:1611	Backed Zhang Jingda, in Jin'an at surrender; remained in governorship, urged Zhao Dejun to surrender.
52	Fu Yanqing	936:int 11	Jin'anzhai	DR	*TJ* 280:9157–60	H	*JW* 56:760	Backed Zhang Jingda, in Jin'an at surrender; served Jin Gaozu.
53	Ding Shenqi & city	936:int 11	$Xinzhou_2$	VX	*TJ* 280:9158	?		Refused to follow Lü Qi to Zhenzhou, surrendered to Liao.
54	10,000 of Dejun's infantry	936:int 11	Tuanboyu	DM	*LS* 3:39			Caught fleeing, surrendered.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
55	Zhao Dejun	936:int 11		[A]	*TJ* 280:9155–6	H	see Ch. 5	Sent Zhao Yanshou to offer alliance against Tang; Liao wanted to accept.
					JW 137:1833			Asked to be emperor.
			Zhaoyi	[V]	*JW* 76:992			Jin Gaozu received surrender.
			Luzhou	V	*JW* 137:1833			Came out to surrender to Liao, Liao Taizong chained him.
			Gaohe		*TJ* 280:9159–60			Came to greet Jin Gaozu, Liao Taizong near Luzhou; died 937, *TJ* 280:9161.
					XW 8:79			Rebelled against Tang, came to submit; sent to Liao in chains.
			Luzhou	[N]	*XW* 72:893			Liao Taizong seized him; sent to Liao.
	& troops		near Tuanboyu	[DM]	*LS* 3:39			Caught fleeing, surrendered.
56	Zhao Yanshou	936:int 11		[A]	*TJ* 280:9155–6	H	see Ch. 5	Requested alliance for Zhao Dejun against Tang; Liao wanted to accept.
			Zhaoyi	[V]	*JW* 76:992			Jin Gaozu received surrender.
			Luzhou	V	*JW* 137:1833			Came out to surrender to Liao, Liao Taizong chained him.
			Gaohe		*TJ* 280:9159–60			Came to greet Jin Gaozu, Liao Taizong near Luzhou.
					XW 8:79			Rebelled against Tang, came to submit; sent to Liao in chains.
			Luzhou	[N]	*XW* 72:893			Liao Taizong seized him; sent to Liao.
	& troops		near Tuanboyu	[DM]	*LS* 3:39			Caught fleeing, surrendered.
57	Zhang Li	936:int 11	Luzhou	D[R]	*TJ* 280:9161	H	see Ch. 5	On Zhao Yanshou's staff; given posts. R, *TJ* 281:9170; recaptured.
			near Tuanboyu		*XW* 72:898			sent to oversee Zhao Yanshou, transferred to Liao with him; learning valued.
58	Qiao Rong	936:int 11		D	*TJ* 283:9253	?		Was a general. Followed Zhao Yanshou into Liao; made *huitushi*.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
59	Sha Yanxun & province & troops	936:12	Datong	VX	*LS* 3:40	?		Welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post.
		937:2			*TJ* 280:9169			Came to welcome Liao Taizong; detained, not allowed back to province.
60	Zhangguo governor & province	936:12		VX	*LS* 3:40			Welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post. (Could not further identify governor.)
61	An Shuqian & province	936:12	Zhenwu	VX	*LS* 3:40	Sh	*JW* 123:1622	Welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post. (Zhenwu identified in *JW* 48:661).
62	Wu Luan & city	937:1	Datong	DXR	*LS* 3:40	H	*JW* 95:1267	Opposed Liao, besieged, surrendered to Liao Taizong; served Jin Gaozu.
63	Guo Chongwei	937:2	$Yingzhou_2$	DXR	*TJ* 281:9169	?		Official of one of 16 Prefs. Ashamed to be subject to Liao; returned S.
64	Lady Zhao	938:9	Luojing	V	*JW* 77:1018	Sh		Liao envoy to fetch her.
					TJ 281:9190			Zhao Yanshou's wife, Later Tang princess. Liao envoy to fetch her.
	(Yang Guangyuan	938:11	Tianxiong	[A]	*TJ* 281:9194		see above	Rebellious because Sang Weihan dividing Yang Guangyuan's army, talks with Liao).
65	Registers	938:11	You, Ji_1, $Ying_1$, Mo, Zhuo, Tan, Shun, Gui, Ru, Xin_1, Wu, Yun, $Ying_2$, Shuo, Huan, Yu	NC[R]	*LS* 4:44			The 16 prefectures, given by Jin Gaozu. Shucheng (Hejian) asked to R 946:11, *TJ* 285:9314. (*TJ* 280:9154 notes their offer; this appears to be the formal or administrative handover, as they were clearly already under Liao control. The return of Shucheng has been counted.)
66	Zhe Congyuan	938:11	Fuzhou (16 prefs)	DR	*TJ* 284:9273	H	*JW* 125:1647	Prefect. Kept in post, rebelled in opposition to transfer of population 944:6, *TJ* 284:9273; to Han 947:4, *TJ* 286:9352.
67	Yang Yanxun	941:9	Jin envoy	NR	*TJ* 282:9228	H	*JW* 90:1186	Nearly killed; sent back 941:12, *LS* 4:50; allowed back *TJ* 282:9232.
68	30 senior rebel households	941:12	Shuozhou	NC	*LS* 4:50–1			An Congjin rebellion against Jin; able-bodied killed, rest given to Niaoguzhi.
69	Shi Yanxu	943:8	Jin court	A	*LS* 4:53	Sh	*JW* 87:1141	Jin Chudi sent him as a hostage.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
70	Jin spy	943:11		N	*LS* 4:53			Captured; information that Jin treacherous.
71	Yang Guangyuan	943:12	Qingzhou	A	*TJ* 283:9256		see above	Information to Liao about weakness of Jin.
		944:1			*JW* 82:1084			Rebelled against Jin.
					XW 72:894			Rebelled; Jin sent punitive force.
72	Shao Ke	944:1	Beizhou	V	*LS* 4:53	?		Officer, besieged, opened gate to Liao; commander Wu Luan suicide.
					TJ 283:9260–1			Resented governor; gave info to Liao, let them in; population comforted *TJ* 284:9266.
73	Zhou Ru & city	944:1	Bozhou	VX[R]	*TJ* 283:9264	?		Communication with Yang Guangyuan; population comforted *TJ* 284:9266.
		944:1			*XW* 9:93			Rebelled, submitted.
		944:2			*JW* 82:1086	?		Communication with Yang Guangyuan; 67 soldiers escaped Liao (this return has been counted).
		944:2		[DX]	*LS* 4:54			Attacked, surrendered.
74	Cai Xingyu	944:1	Majiadu	N	*TJ* 283:9264	?		Captured in battle.
		944:2			*JW* 82:1086			Ambushed, captured; so badly wounded he had to travel in a basket.
75	Yang Chengxin	944:1	Qingzhou	A	*LS* 4:59	Sh	*SS* 252:8857	Backed his father against Jin and brothers Yang Chengxun, Chengzuo.
76	Yin Jufan	944:3	Dezhou	NX	*TJ* 284:9268	?		Mada took prefecture as main Liao army withdrew, captured prefect Yin.
		944:4			*JW* 82:1089			Captured when prefecture fell.
	& 27 generals, officials	944:5			*LS* 4:54			Captured when prefecture fell.
77	Zhang Hui	944:7	Jin envoy	NR	*LS* 4:54	H	*SS* 272:9318	Peace letter, detained; welcomed Han Taizu *SS* 272:9318.
78	City garrisons	c. 944	Shanzhou to Yedu	NM	*TJ* 284:9286			Distance of 150 *li;* defenses improved as a result.
79	Du Zhimin	945:1	Yulindian	NR	*TJ* 284:9281	?		Captured in battle; rescued by lord Murong Yanchao.
80	Several Jin	945:2	Yulin(dian)	NM	*XW* 72:895			Captured in battle.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
81	Thousands/hundreds Chinese *(huaren)* prisoners	c. 945:5	Tianxiong prov	NC	*TJ* 284:9292			Du (Chong)wei would not rescue prisoners driven beneath his walls.
82	Jin spies	945:12	$Yunzhou_1$	N	*LS* 4:56			Captured by Governor Yelü Konga.
83	Liu Yanhan	946:4						
				NR	*TJ* 285:9304	H	*SS* 260:9025	Du Wei general, buying horses for him, captured by Sun Fangjian, given to Liao; fled back.
84	Sun Fangjian	946:5	Yizhou	VMR	*LS* 4:57	Bo?	*JW* 125:1649	Asked to come to allegiance.
	& fortress	946:6	Langshan		*JW* 84:1115			Rebelled, occupied Langshan, allegiance to Liao.
		946:4			*TJ* 285:9303–4			Self-defense, Jin court mistrusted him, allegiance to Liao, raided for them. 948:3 rebelled against Liao, went to Han, kept out Kitan *TJ* 288:9389.
		946:6			*XW* 9:96			Rebelled, pledged allegiance to Liao.
85	1000 & garrison, population	946:11	Luancheng	DXR	*TJ* 285:9316			Surprised by Liao advance, helpless, surrendered; Jin people tattooed, released S.
	1000 cavalry				*XW* 72:896			Luancheng xian taken, submitted; Jin people tattooed, released S.
	several thousand cavalry				*LS* 4:58			Taken after assault; population tattooed, released.
86	An Shuqian & city	946:11?	Xingzhou	VX	*LS* 4:58		see above	Secretly asked to come to allegiance early in war; made general, governor.
		947:1			*TJ* 286:9327			Had secretly asked to come to allegiance; made general.
87	Zhang Zuo, etc.	946:12	Du Wei messenger	N	*TJ* 285:9317	?		Captured returning from court; court-Du Wei communications cut.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
88	Du (Chong)wei & armies	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	*TJ* 285:9318–9	H	*JW* 109:1433	Planned surrender, army unhappy; received robe, made grand mentor. Allegiance to Han 947:7, *TJ* 287:9368 below.
					JW 99:1324; 137:1835			Surrendered.
					XW 9:97			Rebelled, surrendered.
				[DM]	*JW* 85:1123			Cut off, surrendered.
					XW 72:896			Besieged, cut off, surrendered.
	& 200,000	946:12		[VM]	*LS* 4:58			Led armies to surrender; made acting grand mentor, Yedu vicegerent, kept half of army, half placed under Zhao Yanshou.
89	Li Shouzhen & armies	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	*TJ* 285:9318–9	H	*JW* 109:1437	Planned surrender, army unhappy; made minister of education. Allegiance to Han 947:7, *TJ* 287:9368 below.
					XW 9:97			Rebelled, surrendered.
				[DM]	*JW* 85:1123			Cut off, surrendered.
					XW 72:896			Besieged, cut off, surrendered.
	& 200,000	946:12		[VM]	*LS* 4:58			Led armies to surrender; made Tianping governor.
90	Song Yanyun	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	*TJ* 285:9318	H	*JW* 123:1623	Planned surrender; army unhappy; retained in post *LS* 4:58.
91	Gao Xun	946:12	Du Wei army	D	*TJ* 285:9318	?	*LS* 85:1317	Messenger to Liao; retained in post *LS* 4:58.
92	Zhang Yanze & armies	946:12	Xiangzhou	VM	*JW* 85:1123–4	Turk	*JW* 98:1305	Accepted Liao orders after surrender; pillaged Jin capital; executed *JW* 85:1126.
					JW 99:1324			Accepted Liao orders; took Jin capital Daliang.
					TJ 285:9320			Sent to take Jin capital Daliang.
					XW 9:97			Rebelled, surrendered.
				[DM]	*XW* 72:896			Besieged, cut off, surrendered; sent ahead to capital.
	& 200,000	946:12		[VM]	*LS* 4:58			Led armies to surrender; retained in post, took edict to capital; executed *LS* 4:59.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
93	Wang Zhou & city	946:12	Heng/Zhenzhou	DXR	*TJ* 285:9319	H	*JW* 106:1391	Surrendered in person to Taizong after hearing of Du Wei's surrender; Liao entered Hengzhou, Wang Zhou given posts.
94	Wang Hui & city	946:12	Daizhou	DX	*TJ* 285:9319	Sh?	*SS* 261:9049	Surprise attack, surrendered; executed when Han Shi Hongzhao retook Daizhou, *TJ* 286:9344. (Wang Hui was from Taiyuan and may have been Shatuo.)
		bef 947:2		[V]	*JW* 99:1325			Rebelled, allegiance to Liao; executed when Han Shi Hongzhao retook Daizhou.
95	Jin force	946:12	Yizhou	DM	*TJ* 285:9319			Surrender requested after Du Wei's submission, commander Guo Lin could not prevent host's surrender; killed by Geng Chongmei.
96	Li Yin & province	946:12	Yiwu	[VXR]	*TJ* 285:9319	H	*JW* 106:1395	Governor. Simple surrender; replaced by Sun Fangjian.
		946:11		DXR	*LS* 4:58			To rear of main Liao advance, Zhenzhou besieged, surrendered; joined Liao army.
97	Fang Tai & province	946:12	Anguo	VXR	*TJ* 285:9319	H	*JW* 94:1244	Provisional governor. Simple surrender; replaced by Mada, given posts. Chosen by rebellious troops 947:4, fled to Luoyang, killed before could submit to Taiyuan (Han) *TJ* 286:9353–4.
98	Huangfu Yu	946:12		D[R]	*TJ* 285:9320	H	*JW* 95:1259	In Du Wei's army. Did not help plan Du Wei's surrender; refused Liao commission, suicide.
99	Li Song	946:12	Daliang-Bian	VR	*TJ* 285:9323	H	*JW* 108:1419	Refused to give wine to imprisoned Jin emperor. R 947:9, *TJ* 287:9377.
		947:1			*LS* 4:59			Made military affairs commissioner, went N with Taizong 947:4, *LS* 4:60.
					JW 137:1835			Made *xiting* military affairs commissioner.
100	Li Yantao	946:12	Daliang-Bian	V	*TJ* 285:9323	H	*JW* 88:1146	Refused to visit imprisoned Jin emperor, accompanied him N 947:1, *TJ* 286:9332; *JW* 85:1126; *LS* 4:59.
101	Gao Xingzhou	946:12	Shanzhou area	VR	*TJ* 285:9324		*JW* 123:1611	Came to Liao camp; returned to governorship *JW* 123:1613.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
102	Fu Yanqing	946:12	Shanzhou area	VR	*TJ* 285:9324		*SS* 251:8837	Came to Liao camp; returned to governorship *SS* 251:8838.
103	Civil & military officials	946:12	Dongjing	DR	*TJ* 285:9325			Retained posts. Welcomed Liu Zhiyuan (Han), pardoned 947:6, *TJ* 287:9366.
104	Wang Bai	946:12?	Daliang-Bian	D	*LS* 108:1476	H	*LS* 108:1476	Official in Board of Astronomy when capital fell; given posts.
105	Wei Lin	946:12?	Daliang-Bian	D	*LS* 108:1476	?	*LS* 108:1476	Known as a diviner, in capital when it fell; exiled to Wugu.
106	Feng Dao	947:1	Dengzhou	VR	*TJ* 286:9330	H	*JW* 126:1655	Came to court; honored for reputation, made acting grand mentor. R 947:9, *TJ* 287:9377.
					LS 4:59			Made grand mentor, N with Taizong 947:4, *LS* 4:60.
					JW 137:1835			Made grand mentor.
107	He Ning	947:1		DR	*LS* 4:59	H	*JW* 127:1671	Made Hanlin scholar, N with Taizong 947:4, *LS* 4:60. R 947:9, *TJ* 287:9377.
					JW 137:1835			Made chief minister.
108	Zhao Ying	947:1		D	*LS* 4:59	H	*JW* 89:1169	Made grand guardian of the heir apparent, accompanied Jin emperor N.
					TJ 286:9332			Accompanied Jin emperor N.
					JW 85:1126			Accompanied Jin emperor N.
109	Liu Xu	947:1		D	*LS* 4:59	H	*JW* 89:1171	Made provisional grand guardian, did not go N, died that year *JW* 89:1173.
110	Feng Yu	947:1		V	*LS* 4:59	H	*JW* 89:1173	Bribed Zhang Yanze for posts, made junior guardian of the heir apparent, accompanied Jin emperor N. Son fled back 952, Yu died of fear *JW* 89:1174.
					TJ 286:9332			Accompanied Jin emperor N.
					JW 85:1126			Accompanied Jin emperor N.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
111	Jin Shaodi	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332 *XW* 10:100; 72:896	Sh		Transferred N.
112	Empress Dowager Li	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332 *XW* 72:896	Sh	*JW* 86:1131	Transferred N.
113	Concubine Dowager An	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332	?	*JW* 86:1133	Transferred N.
114	Empress Feng	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332	?	*JW* 86:1133	Transferred N.
115	Shi Chongrui	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332	Sh	*JW* 87:1141	Emperor's younger brother. Transferred N.
116	Shi Yanxu	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332	Sh	see above	Emperor's son. Transferred N.
117	Shi Yanbao	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126 *LS* 4:59, *TJ* 286:9332	Sh	*JW* 87:1142	Emperor's son. Transferred N.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
118	50 palace women, 3 eunuchs, 50 of the *dongxi ban* (function unknown), doctor, 4 falconers, 7 cooks, 3 wine and tea officials, 3 salt & silk officials, 20 soldiers	947:1		N	*JW* 85:1126			Transferred N.
	50 palace women, 30 eunuchs, 50 of the *dongxi ban* (function unknown), doctor, 4 falconers, 7 cooks, 3 wine and tea officials, 3 salt & silk officials, 10 soldiers					*LS* 4:59		Transferred N.
	100+ palace attendants				*TJ* 286:9332			Transferred N.
119	Prefectural generals	947:1		DR	*JW* 85:1127			Accepted Liao orders, retained posts. Surrendered to Han 947:6, *TJ* 287:9366.
120	Hou Yi	c.947:1	Qizhou$_1$	D[R]	*JW* 101:1344	H	*SS* 254:8879	Accepted Liao orders, retained post, uneasy when Han entered Luoyang, 948:2 asked Shu for help.
121	Zhao Zan	c.947:1	Puzhou	D[R]	*JW* 101:1344	H	*JW* 98:1313	Zhao Yanshou's son. Accepted Liao orders, retained post, uneasy when Han entered Luoyang, 948:2 asked Shu for help.
122	Ma Yinqing	c.947:1?	Qingzhou	N	*LS* 105:1461	H	*LS* 105:1461	Resolute defense, captured when city fell, family transferred to Yiwulüshan.
123	Several thousand Jin civilian & military officials, several thousand functionaries & soldiers of armies, several hundred palace women & eunuchs	947:3	Daliang-Bian	N[R]	*TJ* 286:9350			N with emperor, cf. 947:2, *TJ* 286:9348. (This return is counted.)
	Jin officials, female court attendants, eunuchs, diviners, workmen				*LS* 4:59–60			Sent to Shangjing, most R c. 954, *JW* 85:1129.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
124	Liang Hui & city	947:3	Xiangzhou	DXR	*TJ* 286:9351	?		City attacked, asked to submit; pardoned, made defense commissioner, resisted again.
125	Women	947:4	Xiangzhou	NC	*TJ* 286:9351			City assaulted, all males slaughtered, women driven N.
					XW 72:899			All males slaughtered, women driven N.
126	Li Huan	947:4	Hengzhou	N[R]	*LS* 4:60	?	see Ch. 6	N with Taizong.
		947:5			*TJ* 287:9364			N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou. Information 952:6, *JW* 112:1482–3, *TJ* 290:9479; planned flight *LS* 6:70.
127	Xu Taifu	947:4	Hengzhou	NR	*LS* 4:60	?		N with Taizong.
		947:5			*TJ* 287:9364			N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou; disappeared *TJ* 287:9371–2; R 948:5, *JW* 101:1348; 948:4, *TJ* 288:9393.
128	Harem, eunuchs, musicians	947:5	Hengzhou	N	*TJ* 287:9364			N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou.
129	1,090,118 households	947:4	Later Jin regime	NC	*LS* 4:60			Population of 76 districts acquired.
130	Li Congyi	947:5		D	*JW* 100:1331–2	Sh	*JW* 51:696	Left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han; killed by Han emperor.
					TJ 287:9362–3			Left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han.
				[V]	*XW* 10:101			Left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han.
131	Pure Consort Wang	947:5		D	*TJ* 287:9362–3	H	*XW* 15:158	Regent in rump Liao S court; unhappy, officials looked to N, killed by Han *XW* 15:160.
132	Wang Song	947:5		DR	*TJ* 287:9362–3	H?	*XW* 57:660	Chief minister in rump Liao S court; pardoned by Han Gaozu *XW* 57:660.
133	Zhao Yuan	947:5		DR	*TJ* 287:9362–3	H	*SS* 262:9065	Chief minister in rump S court; urged Li Congyi to turn against Liao *SS* 262:9066–7.
134	Zhai Guangye	947:5		DR	*TJ* 287:9362–3	H	*JW* 129:1698	military affairs commissioner in rump Liao S court; posts under Han *JW* 129:1698–9.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
135	Wang Jingchong	947:5		VR	*TJ* 287:9362–3	H	*XW* 53:603	Bribed Gao Mouhan for job under Liao occupation, commissioner of the Court of Palace Attendants in rump Liao S court; fled with gold to welcome Han Taizu, made general.
136	Liu Zuo	947:5		D	*TJ* 287:9362–3	?		Commander of palace guards in rump Liao S court.
137	Du Chongwei & province	947:7	Guide	VXR	*TJ* 287:9369	see above		Allegiance to Liao, turned from Han, rebelled; killed 948:1, *TJ* 287:9384.
138	Du Hongsui	947:7		V	*TJ* 287:9369	H	*JW* 109:1437	Du Chongwei's son. Sent as hostage to Mada with request for troops.
139	Population	948:3	Dingzhou	NC	*TJ* 288:9389			Pillaged and driven N by Mada.
140	Li Shouzhen	948:3		A	*TJ* 288:9391		see above	Did not respect Han, contact with Liao; killed 949:7, *TJ* 288:9411.
141	Jin princess, singers	948:4		N	*JW* 85:1128			Jin Shaodi's daughter. Taken by Liao Shizong, given to Kitan noble Channu.
	Jin princess	948:4			*TJ* 288:9393			Jin Shaodi's daughter. Taken by Liao Shizong, given to Kitan noble Channu.
142	Lady Zhao	949		N	*JW* 85:1128	?		Jin Shaodi's favored concubine, taken by Shulü prince (Muzong).
143	Lady Nie	949		N	*JW* 85:1128	?		Jin Shaodi's favored concubine, taken by Shulü prince (Muzong).
144	Very many prisoners	949:10	Beizhou Gaolaozhen, Yedu, Nangong, Tangyang, Shenzhou	NC	*LS* 5:65			Generals sent to lead attacks.
145	Many people	950:10	Anping, Neiqiu, Shulu, etc.	NC	*LS* 5:65			Emperor personally led raid.
146	500 imperial troops & city	950:11	Neiqiu city	DM	*JW* 103:1375			Small but secure, held out 5 days, attack critical, surrendered.
				[V]	*TJ* 289:9443			Held out 5 days; rebelled, led Liao into city.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
147	Pan Yunian	951:1	Henghai	V	*TJ* 290:9455	?		Abandoned governorship, went N with Shizong; made SW pacification commissioner.
148	Liu Chong	951:1	Hedong	A	*TJ* 290:9455	Sh		Asked for help against Zhou.
		951:6			*LS* 5:66			Attacked by Zhou, sent letter calling himself "nephew," asking for help.
149	Yao Hanying	951:2	Zhou envoy	N	*LS* 5:66	H	*LS* 96:1402	Carried letter treating Liao as equal; detained.
		951:5			*TJ* 290:9460			Detained.
150	Hua Zhaoyin	951:2	Zhou envoy	N	*LS* 5:66	?		Carried letter treating Liao as equal; detained.
	Murong Yanchao	952:1		A	*TJ* 290:9473	Sh	*JW* 130:1716	Did not want to be transferred, asked for help (also from S) against Zhou.
151	Several hundred able-bodied	952:9	Jibu	NC	*JW* 112:1484			Taken when heard Zhou army coming; killed when showed support for Zhou.
			$Jizhou_2$		*TJ* 291:9482			Plundered from prefecture; killed when showed support for Zhou.
153	Middle Kingdom population (*Zhongguo min*)	952:10	Hebei	NC	*TJ* 291:9484			50–60 percent previously pillaged population returned as refugees from floods in Liao Ying, Mo, You; given relief.
154	Liu Hanzhang & city	953:9	$Qizhou_2$	VX	*TJ* 291:9496	?		Kitan raided Leshou, Liu planned to help; failed, executed.
155	Zhou troops	954:3	Gaoping	DM	*TJ* 291:9506			Surrendered after defeat; Zhou got them back, killed them.
156	Zhou army prisoners	954:6	Xinkou	NM	*LS* 6:72			Presented to court by Talie.
157	Northern Han population	954:7		NC	*LS* 6:72			Mistakenly pillaged; returned on request.
	[Chen Chuyao	956	S Tang envoy	[N]	*TJ* 293:9562, 6			Worked for Liao, died there.] The Southern Tang were not directly involved in borderland affairs, and Chen Chuyao's case is an oddity.
158	Zhao Anren	958:4?	Shenzhou Leshou	N[R]	*LS* 109:1481	H	*LS* 109:1481	Captured as a child; eunuch.
159	Northern Han envoy	963:int 12	N Han court	NR	*CB* 4:114			Bearing gift in thanks, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241.
160	Northern Han envoy	963:int 12	N Han court	NR	*CB* 4:114			Restoring payments, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
161	4 sets of N Han envoys	964:12	N Han court	NR	*CB* 5:140			With New Year, birthday, *Duanwu jie* greetings, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241. (The envoys are not listed separately.)
165	Population	965:11	Yizhou	NC[R?]	*CB* 6:160			Provoked Song counterraid to force exchange of captives.
166	Bai Sheng	965	N Han court	NR	*CB* 6:161	?		Requesting release of envoys, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241.
167	Liu Jiwen	965	N Han court	NR	*CB* 6:161	Sh		Further mission, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241.
168	Li Guangmei	965	N Han court	NR	*CB* 6:161	H	*TJ* 290:9454	Further mission, detained. R 970:1, *CB* 11:241.
	[Chen Da	967:2	Shenzhou	[V]	*CB* 8:190	?		Tried and exiled before he could cross.]
169	Several hundred Song troops	969:int 5	Taiyuan	NMR	*CB* 10:225–6			Force sent to recover those falling into Kitan hands.
	[Fu Tinghan	973:1	Dizhou	[V]	*CB* 14:297	?		Planned to flee; discovered, executed.]
170	Song army prisoners	977:3		NM	*LS* 9:99			Captured while aiding Han; presented to court.
	[Xin Zhongfu	977:5	Song court	[N]	*CB* 18:405	H	*SS* 266:9178	Liao emperor considered detaining him; returned him for his uprightness.]
171	Liu Jiwen	979:5	Hedong	D	*LS* 9:101		see above	Fled N Han army after defeat. Cf. *CB* 11:241, suspected by Song of contact with Liao after return from there, examined, died of fear.
172	Lu Jun	979:5	Hedong	D	*LS* 9:101	?		Fled from N Han army after defeat.
173	Song army prisoners	979:7	Gaoliang	NM	*LS* 9:102			Captured in battle, presented to court by Yelü Sha.
174	Song army prisoners	979:8	Gaoliang?	NM	*LS* 9:102			Captured in battle, presented to court by Yelü Sha and others.
175	Enemy people	980:10		NX	*LS* 9:103			Captured; shot with devil arrows.
176	70 Song border villages	983:2	Nanjing	VC	*LS* 10:109			Came to allegiance; ordered to be treated kindly.
177	1000+ households back from Song	983:5		VC	*LS* 10:110			Persuaded by Nanjing military commander Yelü Shanbu, comforted.
178	Song spies	983:11	Yingzhou$_2$	N	*LS* 10:112			Captured; information: Song building Wutai shan road, executed with helpers.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
179	Prisoners	984:2	Hedong	NX	*LS* 10:113			Captured in attack, presented by Han Dewei.
180	Military officials	986:3	Gu'an	N	*LS* 11:120			Captured in battle where Song defeated by Yelü Pode, Xiuge.
181	Prisoners	986:4	Zhuozhou region?	NX	*LS* 11:122			Captured during war; ordered generals to present prisoners.
182	Prisoners	986:4	Gu'an	NX	*LS* 11:122			Captured in plunder after fall of city to assault.
	[Duoluo	986:4	Yuzhou, etc.	[V]	*CB* 27:611	Kit?		Liao official. Having surrendered to Song, planned return to Liao, discovered.]
	[Geng Shaozhong	986:4	Yuzhou, etc.	[V]	*CB* 27:611	H		Liao southerner official. Having surrendered to Song, planned return to Liao, discovered.]
	[Captured Song people	986:5		[NC]	*LS* 11:122			Shot with devil arrows.]
183	Prisoners	986:5		NX	*LS* 11:122			Captured; presented to court by Xiuge, Chouning, Pununing.
	[Surrendered soldiers	986:5		[DM]	*LS* 11:123			Distributed to retinue.]
184	240 Song	986:7		VC	*LS* 11:123			Came to swear allegiance; divided among ministers.
185	Yang (Ji)ye	986:7	Shuozhou	N	*LS* 11:124	?		Came off his horse, captured; died of hunger because of his wounds.
		986:8			*CB* 27:622			Frontier experience *CB* 20:464. Captured in battle; loyalty, refused to eat, died.
186	Prisoners	986:8		NM	*LS* 11:124			Presented to court by general Yelü Xiezhen.
	[Captured Song soldiers	986:11	frontier	[NM]	*LS* 11:125			Shot with devil arrows.]
187	2 Song spies	986:11		N	*LS* 11:126			Captured; presented to court, given clothing, sent to Taizhou with a letter.
188	9 Song vanguard soldiers	986:11	Wangdu	NM	*LS* 11:126			Captured by Shuangguli.
189	Army prisoners	986:12	Wangdu	NM	*LS* 11:126			Captured in battle; presented to court by (Yelü) Xiuge.
190	Very many Song from a supply train	986:12	Wangdu	NM	*LS* 11:126			Captured by Hezhu; food and fodder burnt.
191	He Lingtu	986:12	Mozhou Leshou	N	*LS* 11:126	H	*SS* 463:13540	Song general. Captured in battle.
					CB 27:625–6			Fell for offer of allegiance, lost to the enemy.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
192	Yang Chongjin	986:12	Mozhou Leshou	N	*LS* 11:126	H	*SS* 463:13541	Song general. Captured in battle.
					CB 27:625–6			Lost to the enemy; killed in battle. (The *CB* says He Lingtu & Yang Chongjin "were lost to the enemy," then notes in passing that Yang was killed in the battle. His biography says he "died in the line of battle," *SS* 463:13541.)
193	Messengers	986:12	Daizhou	N	*CB* 27:626			Communicating on side-routes between Zhang Qixian and Pan Mei (Song).
194	Defending general & city	986:12	Yangtuancheng	DX	*LS* 11:126			Assault on city, surrender; pillaging banned.
195	Prisoners	986:12	Fengmuzhen	NX	*LS* 11:127			Allowed great pillaging.
196	Old and young	987:1	Wenan (Mozhou)	NC	*LS* 12:129			Invitation to surrender refused; all able-bodied males killed.
197	Village women, children	987:1	N of Wei & Bo	NC	*CB* 28:631			Where failed to take cities, pillaged surrounding rural areas.
198	Song spies	988:9		N	*LS* 12:131			Captured; presented to court by Yelü Xiuge's official Yideli.
	[Surrendered troops	988:10		[DM]	*LS* 12:132			Divided into 7 units, called the Guisheng army.]
199	Soldiers?	988:11	Changcheng kou	NM	*LS* 12:132			Leadership escaped city, rest rejected offer to surrender, assault, some captured; placed under Yan armies. (It is unclear whether the *shi* here are civil or military or both, cf. #202. That those captured were attached to an army suggests that they were soldiers.)
200	Soldiers' wives, children	988:11	Yizhou	NC	*CB* 29:658			Left behind in the city, captured.
201	Commanders & host	988:11	Mancheng	DC	*LS* 12:132			Besieged, assault, soldiers *(junshi)* fled? Letter to commanders, surrendered.
202	20 soldiers	988:11	Mozhou	NM	*LS* 12:132			Captured; presented to court, given clothes, belts, attached to Yanjing.
203	200+ soldiers	988:11	western route	DM	*LS* 12:132			Surrendered; those who were cold given fur clothes.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
204	Song spies	988:12		N	*LS* 12:132			Captured by Xi official Yelu; presented to court by Yelü Xiuge.
205	Guo Rong & host	989:1	Jibizhai	VM	*LS* 12:133	?		Came to submit, ordered to camp at Nanjing.
206	5 Song unit commanders	989:1	Suicheng	N	*LS* 12:133			Captured in battle.
207	800 people	989:1	Yizhou	NC	*LS* 12:133			Yizhou fell; escorted back to be attached to their original homes.
208	17 Song *jinshi* & families	989:3		VC	*LS* 12:134			Came to submit; tested, given minor posts at court and in counties.
209	700 soldiers	989:5	Mancheng	DM	*LS* 12:135			Called for their surrender; presented to court, attached to Dongjing.
	[Song prisoners	990:3		[NX]	*LS* 12:139			Populated newly walled Xingguo.]
	[Song surrendered troops	990:5		[DM]	*LS* 12:139			Divided and placed under various armies.]
210	Song prisoners	990:9		NX	*LS* 12:140			Presented to court by Li Jiqian.
	[500 surrendered Song soldiers	991:1		[DM]	*LS* 12:141			Selected to form Xuanli army.]
	[Song officials, functionaries, Confucian scholars, craftworkers, good fighters	994:11	by various tribes	[NX]	*LS* 13:145			Names to be reported.]
	[Wei Desheng & 5 people	994:11		[N]	*LS* 13:145	?		Song prisoners. Made officials.]
211	Song population	995:3	near Wuqing xian	NCR	*LS* 13:146			Taken by local Liao population; Liao punished plunderers, ordered those plundered to be returned.
212	Kang Zhaoyi	999:10	Yingzhou$_1$	N	*LS* 14:154–5	?		Song general. Captured in battle.
213	Song Shun	999:10	Yingzhou$_1$	N	*LS* 14:154–5	?		Song general. Captured in battle.
214	Zhou Jing	1001	Heilukou	NR	*CB* 55:1211	?		Captured; escaped back to Song, made assistant unit commander.
215	Li Xu	1002:2	Daizhou	V	*CB* 51:1116	?		Committed crime, fled; goods not confiscated, family not punished.
216	Prisoners	1002:4	S campaign	NX	*LS* 14:157			Presented by generals.

NO.	NAME OR DESCRIPTION	DATE	CROSSING PLACE	TYPE	SOURCES	GROUP	BIOGRAPHY	NOTES
217	Wang Jizhong	1003:4	Wangdu	N[R]	*LS* 14:158	H	see Ch. 6	Captured in battle by Yelü Nugua and Xiao Talin.
			Baicheng		*CB* 54:1190; 57:1268			Fell into enemy hands; troops to rescue him, employed as offical by Liao.
					SS 7:121			Fell into enemy hands; troops to rescue him, asked to return *SS* 279:9472.
	[Captured spies	1004:int 9	Gu'an	[N]	*LS* 14:160			Shot with devil arrows.]
218	Wang Jien	1004:int 9?	Dizhou	N	*LS* 109:1480	H	*LS* 109:1480	Captured as a child; eunuch.
219	Troops	1004:10	$Qizhou_3$	DM	*LS* 14:160			Those surrendering were rewarded.
220	Tian Fengji	1004:11	Weifu	N	*LS* 14:160	?		Official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya.
221	Guo Shourong	1004:11	Weifu	N	*LS* 14:160	?		Official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya.
222	Chang Xian	1004:11	Weifu	N	*LS* 14:160	?		Official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya.
223	Liu Chuo	1004:11	Weifu	N	*LS* 14:160	?		Official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya.
224	Population	1004:12	Tongli	NC	*CB* 58:1290			Military official fled, town plundered of inhabitants.
225	Wu Bai	1004:12?	Tongli	N	*LS* 82:1294	?	*LS* 82:1294	Captured en route to Xiangzhou post; served Liao.

Abbreviations

CB	*Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian*
CFYG	*Cefu yuangui*
CHC	*Cambridge history of China*
DDSL	*Dongdu shi lüe*
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*
JAS	*Journal of Asian Studies*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JTS	*Jiu Tang shu*
JW	*Jiu Wudai shi*
LDN	*Liao dachen nianbiao*
LFN	*Liao fangzhen nianbiao*
LPJ	*Long ping ji*
LS	*Liao shi*
LSH	*Liao shi hua*
LSJ	*Liao shi ji*
LSJSBM	*Liao shi jishi benmo*
LSSY	*Liao shi shiyi*
LSSYB	*Liao shi shiyi bu*
LWC	*Liao wen cun*
LWK	*Liaodai wenxue kao*
QG	*Qidan guo zhi*
QLW	*Quan Liao wen*
QTS	*Quan Tang shi*
QTSB	*Quan Tang shi bubian*
QTW	*Quan Tang wen*
QWDS	*Quan Wudai shi*
QWDSB	*Quan Wudai shi fubuyi*
SS	*Song shi*
SSXB	*Song shi xinbian*
THY	*Tang hui yao*
TJ	*Zizhi tongjian*
WDHY	*Wudai hui yao*

WDSB	*Wudai shi bu*
Liao	Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Jiasheng, *History of Chinese society: Liao* (1949)
XTS	*Xin Tang shu*
XW	*Xin Wudai shi*
YLDD	*Yongle da dian*

Notes

Introduction

1. Pulleyblank, "An Lu-shan and militarism"; Peterson, "Court and province"; Twitchett, "Varied patterns of provincial autonomy."

2. Historians constantly confront this problem of teleology. Clear expositions can be found in Cohen, *History in three keys,* Prologue 1; and from a more theoretical bent, Duara, *Rescuing history from the nation.* Although most premodern Europhone scholars are probably not deliberately seeking a history that will serve to bolster modern China's claims to nationhood, there remains among this community an inclination for seeing China as ultimately and inevitably a unity (however diverse). See, for example, Ng-Quinn, "National identity in premodern China"; cf. Wang Lei, "Definition of 'nation.'" Certainly there were some conscious efforts to reconstitute the empire on one basis or another, as there had also been in the post-Han period, but contemporaries could not predict their results. See, for example, Chiu-Duke, *To rebuild the empire;* Holcombe, "Re-imagining China."

3. The term "state" is problematical in medieval European history but less so for the premodern Chinese empire, where it is widely used simply to indicate the more or less centralized and bureaucratized government machinery that was commonplace from no later than the third century BCE.

4. The Song became distinguished into Northern and Southern (1127–1276) only after the Jurchen Jin conquest. On the developing significance of the distinction, see Wyatt, "Invention of the *Northern* Song."

5. It is still more common to take frontiers as a way of understanding a wider society or larger polity, which is usually related to a modern nation-state. A recent example dealing with premodern East Asia is Batten, *To the ends of Japan.* Some problems with this approach are discussed in Chapter 1. Baud and Van Schendel, "Toward a comparative history of borderlands," raise important general considerations in their quest for a model for treating borderlands as entities in their own right, but their explicitly modern perspective ultimately compels a state-centered analysis which, while it rejects the idea of two separate borderlands, still splits the singular borderland into two parts. Cf. Sahlins, *Boundaries.*

6. Constant renegotiation was also the hallmark of relationships between rulers and aristocracies in early medieval western Europe, perhaps most notably in the tenth century. For example, Leyser, *Rule and conflict;* Maclean, *Kingship and politics;* Reynolds, *Fiefs and vassals.* Like the present volume, these works reinterpret existing evidence, reconsider categories and vocabulary, and take into account servitors'

perspectives on issues such as loyalty. A trans-Eurasian comparison of tenth-century politics is currently getting under way, with reference to the ideas advanced in Moore, *First European revolution,* among others.

7. See *XW* 54:611–612; *TJ* 291:9511–9513; and discussion in Chapter 2. Richard Davis regards this as Ouyang Xiu's chief concern in the *XW,* see *Historical records,* Introduction.

8. Ming writers could become particularly virulent. See, for example, Fincher, "China as a race, culture, and nation." For a stimulating discussion of border-crossing in the present day, see Clifford, "Sites of crossing."

9. Modern writers have explicitly credited Chinese ministers with Liao achievements, their civilizing influence offsetting any transfer of loyalty; e.g., Cen Jiawu, "Liaodai Qidan he Hanzu"; Wang Mingsun, "Liaodai de hanren jituan"; Yan Yuqi, "Liaochao de hanzu"; Wang Chengguo, "Liaochao de er Han"; Meng Guangyao, "Shilun Liaodai Hanzu rushi de 'huayi zhi bian' guannian." On the general theme of the superiority of Chinese culture and its inevitable dominance in cultural exchanges, see Ren Chongyue, "Qidanzu dui Hanzu wenhua"; Li Xihou, "Yutian Han"; Liang Shuqin, "Cong chutu wenwu kan Qidanzu dui Hanzu wenhua"; cf. Lin Ronggui and Chen Liankai, "Wudai Shiguo Qidan, Shatuo, Hanzu de jiaoliu"; Yao Congwu, "Qidan hanhua de fenxi."

10. Naitō Torajiro's (1866–1934) famous theory is outlined in Hiyazuki Miyakawa, "Naitō hypothesis." There are, of course, challengers for the crown of significance, most recently the Song-Yuan-Ming transition, in an eponymous volume edited by Paul Smith and Richard von Glahn.

11. Naitō dated the end of the transition to the end of the Five Dynasties. However, several developments fundamental to the hypothesis remained embryonic in 960, and Naitō paid little attention to intellectual unfoldings now regarded as crucial—that is, the rise of neo-Confucianism. Accordingly, the end of the Transition is now usually taken as sometime in the eleventh century, although neo-Confucian developments, in particular, continued unabated through at least the twelfth century. One way into a voluminous literature is James T. C. Liu, *China turning inward.*

12. The remaining Ten Kingdoms (902–979) were (using present-day provinces) Wu (902–937) in Jiangsu and Anhui; succeeded and expanded into Jiangxi, Hunan, and Fujian by Southern Tang (937–975); Former Shu (907–925) and Later Shu (934–965) in Sichuan; Wuyue (907–978) in Zhejiang and Jiangsu; Min (909–945) in Fujian; Southern Han (917–971) in Guangdong and Guangxi; Chu (927–951) in Hunan; Nanping or Jingnan (924–963) in Hubei.

13. Sudō Yoshiyuki, *Tō Sō shakai keizaishi;* Aoyama Sadao, *Tō Sō jidai no kōtsū to chishi chizu;* Elvin, *Pattern of the Chinese past;* Hartwell, "Demographic, political, and social transformations"; articles by Denis Twitchett, including "Provincial autonomy and central finance" and "Merchant, trade and government"; Johnson, *Medieval Chinese oligarchy* and "Last years of a great clan"; Ebrey, *Aristocratic families;* Chen Jo-shui, "Culture as identity"; James T. C. Liu, "Polo and cultural change." Further examples include Han Guopan, *Sui Tang Wudai shi lunji;* Ōsawa

Masaaki, *Tō Sō henkakuki nōgyō shakai;* cf. Lin Liping, "Tang Song shiqi shangren shehui diwei."

14. For instance, Bol, *"This culture of ours";* Yao Yingting, "Tang Song zhiji de 'tianming' yu 'fan tianming' sixiang" and "Whither the emperor?"

15. For example, Chaffee, *Branches of heaven* and "Empress Liu"; Lau, "Waging war for peace"; Lorge, "War and the creation of the Northern Song."

16. Chinese scholars have done most work on these aspects, notably Lü Simian, *Sui Tang Wudai shi;* Tao Maobing, *Wudai shi lüe;* Mao Hanguang, "Weibo erbai nian shilun." In English there is now Frederick Mote's synthesis, *Imperial China, 900–1800;* and Lorge, "War and the creation of the Northern Song," but a full narrative covering all regions and the whole century awaits publication of the *Five Dynasties and Sung* volume of the *Cambridge history of China.*

17. E.g., Hino Kaizaburō, "Godai Binkoku no taichūgen chōko to bōeki"; Aoyama Sadao, "Newly risen bureaucrats"; Worthy, "Diplomacy for survival," the only essay in *China among equals* on the early tenth century; Satake Yasuhiko, *Tō Sō henkaku no chi-ikiteki;* Clark, *Community, trade, and networks;* Otagi Hajime, "Tōmatsu Godai ki ni okeru jōkaku no taikibōka"; Schottenhammer, "Politico-economic particulars."

18. These provide essential background for students of the period. On institutions: Hino Kaizaburō, "Godai chinshō ko"; Sudō Yoshiyuki, "Godai setsudoshi no shihai taisei"; Miyazaki Ichisada, "Godai gunbatsu no keitō"; Wang Gungwu, *Structure of power;* Worthy, "Founding of Sung China."

19. The major exception and finest work on the period remains Wittfogel and Feng, *History of Chinese society: Liao,* published in 1949 (henceforth cited as *Liao*). More recent general treatments include Shu Fen, *Liao shi gao,* Yang Shusen, *Liao shi jianbian,* Twitchett and Tietze, "Liao." Specialist works include Yang Ruowei, *Qidan wangchao zhengzhi junshi zhidu;* Steinhardt, *Liao architecture;* Biran, "China, nomads and Islam," and of course the work of Chen Shu, including *Qidan shehui jingji shigao* and *Qidan zhengzhi shigao;* and Shimada Masao, including *Ryōdai shakaishi kenkyū* and "Characteristic of Northern Region Liao bureaucracy."

20. To be sure, the dynasty was called "Kitan" until 936 and again in 983–1066 (*Liao,* 38)—that is, for just over half of the Five Dynasties period and half of the Northern Song—but the name changes from Kitan to Liao (and back) did not correspond to the dynastic shift from Five Dynasties to Song.

21. David Wright, "Sung-Kitan war," 32; *CB* 58:1299.

22. The Yuan (1260–1368) are often called "the Mongols," of course, but it is harder to marginalize a group that conquered the whole of China Proper. Nevertheless, it is interesting that much more research has been done on the Chinese under Mongol rule than on the Mongols in China.

23. Franke, "Forest peoples of Manchuria"; Christian, *History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia,* 354; Mote, *Imperial China;* Soucek, *History of Inner Asia,* 82. Of the more detailed accounts, Thomas Barfield pairs Liao with Jin as a Manchurian dynasty out for conquest but does draw distinctions between them until he notes

that: "Like previous foreign conquerors, the Jurchens proved unable to drive the Sung out of southern China" (*Perilous frontier,* 179). The "previous foreign conquerors" can only mean the Liao, whereas if they fit anywhere in Barfield's schema, it would be as practitioners of the outer frontier strategy of raids designed to extort subsidies. Denis Sinor does not connect the Liao with the Jin, but does call the Song a "barrier to further southward Kitan expansion." ("Kitan and Kara Khitay," 230). Even Valerie Hansen, who gives the Liao and Jin a positive interpretation, and far more space than other textbook writers, is trapped by the standard historiography into speaking of the "Khitans," and makes them just as hungry for conquest as the Jurchen, who "succeeded where the Khitan failed"—in conquering and ruling north China; *The open empire,* 306–307, 314.

24. On the need for this opposition, see Fiskesjö, "On the 'raw' and 'cooked' barbarians."

25. There has been little apart from Herbert Franke's comparative work, including "Women under the dynasties of conquest," and "Fremdherrschaften in China." But new moves may be afoot; see Song Dejin, "Liao Jin wenhua bijiao"; Guan Yaxin, "Liao Jin wenhua bijiao." The tendency to conflate China's Inner Asian neighbors into a single generalized category is exemplified in Jagchid and Symons, *Peace, war, and trade.*

26. The recent spate of fresh research in English dealing with the Liao has focused primarily on the treaty itself or its later renegotiations, revisiting the large Chinese (and some Japanese) literature on the subject to offer new interpretations. Christian Schwarz-Schilling flagged the importance of the treaty in *Der Friede von Shan Yüan* in 1959; and the diplomatic maintenance of peace was first studied by Melvin Thlick-Len Ang, "Sung-Liao diplomacy" in 1983. Recently we have had Lorge, "War and the creation of the Northern Song," and "Great ditch"; David Wright, "Parity, pedigree, and peace," and *From war to diplomatic parity;* Lamouroux, "Geography and politics"; Lau, "Waging war for peace." Cf. David Wright, "Sung-Kitan war," as well as works including Nie Chongqi, "Song Liao jiaoping kao"; Cheng Guangyu, "Shanyuan zhi meng yu tianshu"; Lin Ronggui, "Bei Song yu Liao de bianjiang jinglue." See also Yao Congwu, "Liao Song jian de 'Shanyuan mengyue'"; Miao Po and Cao Xianzheng, "Gaoliang he zhi zhan dao Shanyuan zhi meng." Research on the pre-Shanyuan period includes Jin Yufu, "Song qian zhi Qidan"; Wang Chengguo, "Lun Tangdai Qidan."

27. For example, Ren Aijun, "Qidan silou yuanliu"; Li Guizhi, "Qidan guizu dahui gouchen"; Zhang Guoqing, "Liaodai Yan-Yun diqu fojiao wenhua"; Wang Shanjun, "Liaochao hengzhang." Archaeological research is another matter, having enjoyed a huge burgeoning since the 1990s.

28. A recent colloquium on the first century of Liao (University of Newcastle, October 2005) may point to developing interest.

29. For example, Yang Shusen, *Liao shi jianbian;* Tao Jinsheng, *Song Liao guanxi,* revised and trans. as *Two sons of heaven;* Tao Maobing, *Wudai shi lüe;* He Tianming, "Shilun Liaochao jieguan Yan-Yun diqu"; but cf. Wang Yikang, "Hou Tang

jian guocheng zhong diyu Qidan." Earlier views could be more balanced, for example, Xing Yitian, "Qidan yu Wudai zhengquan gengdie zhi guanxi," but cf. Jin Yufu, "Song yu Liao zhi guanxi"; Yang Zhijiu, "Shi shiji Qidan shehui fazhan."

30. Compare *JW* 75:984, 989; 76:995 and *LS* 3:38, 40–41 with *TJ* 280:9146–9147. In truth, this topic needs detailed study, but the contrast with later conquests remains. Abaoji opportunistically demanded Hebei in 926, but conquered Bohai. The latter could render the Liao a genuinely conquering dynasty, but only if Bohai were accepted as part of the Chinese imperium. More work is needed to supplement Adami, *Bibliography on Parhae* and Reckel, *Bohai.*

31. Standen, "Raiding and frontier society," and "What nomads want."

32. This view has become generally accepted among specialists writing in European languages; e.g., Lamouroux, "Geography and politics"; Lau, "Waging war for peace"; Lorge, "Great ditch."

33. Also in 907 Wang Jian declared himself emperor in Shu (Sichuan), while Li Maozhen in Fengxiang (south-central Shaanxi) acted as an emperor but stopped short of taking the title; see Standen, "Five Dynasties."

34. Miao Po, "Lun Liao xi Tang zhi" argues the case for institutional borrowing and continuation from Tang into Liao, but with a definite Liao twist. Cf. items cited in note 9 above.

35. Virtually all Chinese work on Liao relations with its southern neighbors, and on Chinese working for the Liao, treats these phenomena as examples of ethnic encounter, known in Chinese as *han-hu* relations.

36. Crossley, "Rulerships of China," 1472.

Chapter 1: You Can't Get There from Here

1. My own early effort to address this question is "From region of frontiers."

2. Dirlik, "Postmodernism and Chinese history," 43. Although there is always, of course, a range of motivations in any historiography. See, for example, Schneider, "Reconciling history with the nation?"

3. Tillman, "Proto-nationalism?" 404. Tillman's article seeks to add a philosophical criterion to this list.

4. Two influential critiques of the nation as an organizing principle, offering diachronic and synchronic comparisons with the present case, are Duara, *Rescuing history from the nation;* and Geary, *The myth of nations.*

5. See, for instance, Trauzettel, "Sung patriotism," and Tillman, "Proto-nationalism?"

6. A position analyzed and critiqued recently by Dru Gladney for the modern period in *Dislocating China.* In frontier studies, the *locus classicus* for this opposition—in this case between steppe and sown—is Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China,* which offers a complex analysis of interactions in the "transitional zone," further developed and modified in the essays in *Studies in frontier history.*

7. E.g., Gu Jiguang, "Fanlun Tangmo Wudai de sijun he qinjun, yier"; Menggu Tuoli, "Liaochao Hanzu rushi qunti"; Ren Chongyue, "Liaochao yu Wudai de guanxi";

and, for a particularly harsh view, Lin Ruihan, "Wudai junchen zhi yidan er zhengfeng duo tandu," and "Wudai haochi, baonüe, yiyang zhi fengqi."

8. E.g., Wang Mingsun, "Liaodai de hanren jituan"; Yin Keming, "Qidan hanhua luekao"; Han Guanghui, "Liaodai Zhongguo beifang renkou de qianyi"; Meng Guangyao, "Shilun Liaodai hanzu rushi de 'huayi zhi bian' guannian"; and the references in note 9 of the Introduction.

9. See Standen, "What nomads want."

10. See Standen, "(Re)constructing the frontiers." This distinction lies at the heart of Thongchai Winichakul's discussion in *Siam mapped.* For a different perspective on how this relationship changed in the tenth century, see Mostern, "Dividing the realm."

11. Classically described in Fredrik Barth's volume *Ethnic groups and boundaries,* boundaries can be studied independently of borders or frontier zones. See, for example, Hay, *Boundaries in China.*

12. Thongchai, *Siam mapped,* x, 56. Cf. Anderson, *Imagined communities.*

13. Speed, "Nationality law," http://www.legal500.com/devs/uk/im/ukim_004.htm, 9 June 2005. This principle was modified slightly in the case of the non-Chinese ethnic minorities in Hong Kong, mostly of South Asian descent. China denied citizenship to this small group on ethnic grounds, but permitted residence, whereas Britain permitted them BNO status, without right of abode in the British Isles. Nobody wished these people to live anywhere but Hong Kong, but the clash between territorial and ethnic principles was not resolved until 1997, when Britain finally relinquished the territorial principle and permitted these BNOs to register as full British citizens. The ethnic principle won out in this case, but it applied to a tiny number of people (4,520 had registered up to 2003) and was evidently a deeply problematical exception to the general rule.

14. The pernicious effects of such divisions need hardly be reiterated here, but we might note that walls and fences are not a modern invention, and have only ever treated the symptoms of the perceived problem; they have never addressed the source of the malady.

15. Waldron, *Great Wall of China.*

16. The *reasons* why these walls were built are proving much more complicated than once thought as they are subjected to increasing scrutiny. See, for instance, Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and its enemies;* and Waldron, *Great Wall of China;* cf. Lattimore, "Origins of the Great Wall."

17. Shui Anli's *Lidai dili zhi zhang tu.* Waldron discusses what is known about Qin Shihuang's Wall and its predecessors, *Great Wall of China,* 13–21.

18. Few maps survive from before the twelfth century. Yee, "Reinterpreting traditional Chinese geographical maps." Cf. Needham, *Science and civilisation in China,* Vol. 3, 547–550.

19. The map of Song Taizong's achievements is literally called "Map of the Emperor Taizong's unification," *Lidai dili,* 90–91.

20. Tan Qixiang et al., *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji 5,* 32–37.

21. Premodern frontier institutions, arrangements, and definitions varied enormously, as illustrated in the following four volumes of comparative studies: Bartlett and McKay, eds., *Medieval frontier societies;* Power and Standen, eds., *Frontiers in question;* Pohl et al., eds., *Transformation of frontiers;* Abulafia and Berend, eds., *Medieval frontiers.*

22. Yee, "Chinese maps in political culture," 75; Mostern, "Cartography on the Song frontier."

23. The effect may have been exacerbated by the localization of tax collection and record-keeping after An Lushan's rebellion and the Two-Tax reforms of 780 and later; see Denis Twitchett's work on the Tang economy, esp. *Financial administration under the T'ang,* and "Provincial autonomy and central finance."

24. Contrast the modern situation where such a change involves sovereignty, which normally brings with it a different political and legal system and frequently also a new language. Examples that spring to mind include British India, colonial Southeast Asia, Vichy France, and the Arab Israelis.

25. Lorge, "Great ditch"; David Wright, "Sung-Kitan war."

26. *QG* 20:189–190; also *CB* 58:1299. The first English translation of the oath letters containing these terms is in David Wright, *From war to diplomatic parity,* Ch. 2.

27. Crossley, "Thinking about ethnicity." Ernest Gellner made the general case in his classic *Nations and nationalism.*

28. See, for example, Rex and Mason, eds., *Theories of race and ethnic relations;* Bacal, *Ethnicity in the social sciences.*

29. Smith, *Ethnic origins of nations,* 22–30. Also Armstrong, *Nations before nationalism.* Smith and Armstrong are both political scientists. The fourteen contributors to the 2004 special issue of *Nations and nationalism* on Smith's ideas (eds. Guibernau and Hutchinson) include only three historians. Cf. discussion of the relationship between history and social anthropology in the study of ethnicity, in Tonkin et al., eds., *History and ethnicity.*

30. Viz. *Nations and nationalism* special issue. The Jews are a favorite example for Smith in particular, but how representative they are is another matter.

31. For example, Harrell, *Cultural encounters on China's ethnic frontiers;* Brown, *Negotiating ethnicities in China and Taiwan;* Gladney, *Dislocating China.*

32. Crossley, *Orphan warriors* and *Translucent mirror;* Rawski, *The last emperors;* Elliott, *Manchu way;* Rhoads, *Manchus and Han.* Also Guy, "Who were the Manchus?"; Sen, "New frontiers of Manchu China."

33. Language is no longer regarded as automatically coterminous with a separate identity, but it does act as a boundary marker for some cultural complexes, including the Chinese.

34. Crossley, *Orphan warriors,* esp. Chs. 1 and 5; Elliott, *Manchu way,* 275–304.

35. This distinction is central to Pamela Crossley's argument in *Orphan warriors* and has been taken up by several others since, including Leong, *Migration and ethnicity;* and Elliott, *Manchu way.*

36. Respectively: Gladney, *Ethnic identity in China,* 47–48; and *Dislocating China,* passim; Elliott, *Manchu way,* 17. Crossley, *Orphan warriors,* earlier described

the same process without applying a specific term. Such interpretations highlight the importance of boundary processes, as famously set out in Barth, ed. *Ethnic groups and boundaries,* and much developed since in the social sciences literature. See, for example, Wallman, "Ethnicity and the boundary process in context."

37. For explicit discussion, see Liu Pujiang, "Shuo 'hanren.'"

38. See *Liao,* Section XIV, 428–504; cf. Yang Ruowei, *Qidan wangchao zhengzhi junshi zhidu,* 85–159.

39. See Wang Gungwu, "Rhetoric of a lesser empire"; and Tao Jing-shen, "Barbarians or northerners." Cf. Cartier, "Barbarians through Chinese eyes."

40. Trauzettel, "Sung patriotism" and Tillman, "Proto-nationalism" mention ethnicity in its connection with nationalism, but the essays by Wang Gungwu and Tao Jing-shen mentioned in note 39, which are frequently cited as providing the most empirical evidence for Song attitudes towards foreigners, do not themselves deploy the concept of ethnicity. In "Seeking common ground," Peter Bol explicitly avoids analysis on these lines. On the assumptions and effects of different approaches to ethnicity, see Richard Thompson, *Theories of ethnicity.*

41. For example, Gellner, *Nations and nationalism,* 1.

42. Crossley, *Orphan warriors,* esp. Ch. 1; and subsequently Elliott, *Manchu way,* esp. Ch. 7.

43. A recent suggestion in this regard is Pearce, "Hou Jing."

44. There is now increasing interest in this topic, e.g., Skaff, "Straddling steppe and sown" and "Barbarians at the gates?"; Mayo, "Birds and the hand of power." Cf. some interesting points raised in Billy So, "Negotiating Chinese identity."

45. In previous work I have called these people "Liao Chinese" (with a caveat about the meaning of "Chinese" in this context), but having now defined a vocabulary, it seems preferable to maintain that precision even at the cost of some linguistic unwieldiness.

46. A different kind of disloyalty was involved in the act of rebellion (Paul H. Ch'en, "Disloyalty to the state") which could be hard to distinguish from simple banditry (Haegar, "Between north and south.")

47. Although even such a universal crime has not always been evaluated equally. The death penalty has been commonplace from Old Testament times into the present day, but institutions like wergild in Anglo-Saxon England, and restitutional enslavement among seventeenth-century Algonquian groups, indicate the possibility of other approaches.

48. See Grodzins, *The loyal and the disloyal,* 16–17. Although Grodzins is chiefly concerned with "national loyalty" in the context of the Cold War, his analysis of the nature and functions of loyalty and the process of becoming "disloyal" has general application.

49. The category of stoicism, passivity, or withdrawal originated with Frederick Mote's discussion of eremitism in the Yuan, and this category has also been connected with loyalism in the late imperial period. Mote, "Confucian eremitism in the Yuan"; Bauer, "Hidden hero."

50. See also, for example, Ho Koon-piu, "'Should we die as martyrs?'"; Marsh, "Chou Fo-hai"; Mitter, *Manchurian myth;* Struve, "Ambivalence and action"; Wakeman, "Localism and loyalism"; Wilhelm, "From myth to myth."

51. Burrin, "Writing the history of military occupations." Work on Vichy France perpetuated a myth of almost universal resistance until Robert Paxton drew attention to the extent of active collaboration in his *Vichy France.* A more nuanced picture is now emerging, in which the idea of accommodation is beginning to play a greater part. For example, Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France;* Kedward, *Occupied France*; Burrin, *Living with defeat.* Accommodation is an older idea among China historians, e.g. Fisher, "Accommodation and loyalism."

52. Their status as "enemy" may have had some similar effects (see Standen, "Raiding and frontier society"), but that is for another study.

53. The Song loyalists made themselves famous in their own time, for example. Critical analyses include Jay, *Change in dynasties;* and Davis, *Wind against the mountain.*

54. Another approach to the working of these relationships is offered by Lewis Mayo, "Birds and the hand of power." Andrew Chittick is also completing a monograph on this topic for the post-Han period.

55. See also Billy So, "Negotiating Chinese identity." Some twelfth-century complexities are noted in Irene Leung, "Conflicts of loyalty."

56. Richard Davis notes in his introduction that Ouyang made a first draft between 1036 and 1039, but the work was not published until 1077. Ouyang Xiu, *Historical records,* xlvii–xlviii.

57. Wang Gungwu, "The *Chiu Wu-tai shih.*"

58. Including the *Wudai tongjian, Tang yu lu,* and *Jiu guo zhi* (three works that are no longer extant) and the *Wudai hui yao, Beimeng suoyan, Wudai shi bu,* and *Wudai shi quewen.* Chai Degeng, *Shi ji juyao,* 118.

59. See Ouyang Xiu, *Historical records,* xlv–lv; James T. C. Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu,* 105–110; and Tonami Mamoru's notice in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography,* 63.

60. See Ming K. Chan, "Historiography of the *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien*"; notice by G. Lewin, in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography,* 69–70.

61. Notice by Shiba Yoshinobu in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography,* 72–75.

62. On the *Qidan guo zhi,* and particularly its dating, see Yu Jiaxi, *Siku tiyao bianzheng,* Vol. 1, 270–274.

63. There are numerous works on the compilation of the *LS* including Chan Hok-lam, "Official historiography"; Franke, "Historiography under Mongol rule"; Davis, "Historiography as politics," 33–72; Feng Jiasheng, *Liao shi yuanliu kao yu Liao shi chuxiao;* Qiu Shusen, "Tuotuo he Liao Jin Song san shi"; Otagi Matsuo, "Ryō Kin So sanshi."

64. This should perhaps be less surprising if we take account of Twitchett's overall point in his *Writing of official history under the T'ang,* that historiographical practice did not begin to become regularized until the Tang dynasty, when it was still subject to serious disruption by political events.

65. Chan Hok-lam, *Legitimation in imperial China.* See also n. 63 for further references.

66. The project also compiled the *Jin shi.*

67. For details, see Chan Hok-lam, "Official historiography," esp. 64–68, 75–79.

68. The subtlety of most of these changes contrasts with the much more overt changes made by the Ming rewriters of Song-period history. See, for example, Ferenczy, "Chinese historiographers."

69. Tables comparing the parallel passages in each text for each of the five case studies are provided in my doctoral dissertation, "Frontier crossings from North China to Liao."

Chapter 2: Fed or Dead

1. Several early imperial case studies pay more or less attention to loyalty, including Mirsky, "Life of Tuan Hsiu-shih"; Peterson, "P'u-ku Huai-en"; Dudbridge, "Yü-ch'ih Chiung"; Graff, "Meritorious cannibal"; Skaff, "Survival in the frontier zone"; and of course, Wang Gungwu, "Feng Tao." The few surveys of conceptual or behavioral developments focus on the pre-imperial period; e.g., Charles Wing-hoi Chan, "Confucius and political loyalism"; Pines, "Friends or foes"; Ning Ke and Jiang Fuye, "Zhongjun." Broader surveys tend to pay too little attention to changes over time, e.g., Ching, "Neo-Confucian utopian theory"; Bauer, "Hidden hero."

2. I do not say "legitimate" because this is a problematical term for the post-Han period in particular. In the Three Kingdoms (220–280) the word can generally refer only to the one-and-only proper state to serve: Andrew Chittick, personal communication, 31 May 2005.

3. For example, Bauer, "Hidden hero"; Mote, "Confucian eremitism in the Yuan" (whose "eremitism" makes the same demands as loyalty); McMorran, "Loyalty in the Ming-Qing transition"; Wing-ming Chan, "Early-Qing discourse on loyalty"; Ge Quan, *Zheng de zhi.*

4. Pines, "Friends or foes"; also Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 79–86. Pines examines the practical applications of the concepts, while Ning and Jiang relate changing ideas to political and economic developments.

5. The character *zhong* can be found neither in Western Zhou texts, nor on Shang or Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, nor on Shang oracle bones. (Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 79). Its earliest surviving appearance is on the latest of the Warring States bronze inscriptions, a *ding* from the tomb of King Cuo of Zhongshan, dated c. 316–315 BCE (Yuri Pines, personal communication), where it means "consciously devoted to the ruler" (*Zhengzhong xing yin yi zonghe da zidian,* 474, cited in Chen Chi-yun, "Orthodoxy as a mode of statecraft," 30). Brief definitions of this type tell us nothing of the practical ramifications of the word, which would seem to represent a concept already in widespread use.

6. Pines, "Friends or foes," 44.

7. Ibid., 42–49.

8. *Zuozhuan,* Ai gong, 16:1704 in Yang Bojun, *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu.* Thanks to Yuri Pines for this reference.

9. Pines, "Friends or foes," 53–56.

10. *Lunyu* 3:19, in Legge, *Chinese classics,* 1:161 (modified). Also *Lunyu* 2:20, "Let him (the ruler) be filial and kind to all; then they will be faithful *(zhong)* to him." Legge, *Chinese classics,* 1:152.

11. See, for example, Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 79–80.

12. For Ning and Jiang ("Zhongjun," 81–82), radical reciprocity is found first in Mencius, but it never became mainstream thinking.

13. Pines, "Friends or foes," 57.

14. Ibid., 41. Pines wonders whether at the extremes of this view, when ministers claimed moral superiority over the ruler, "[c]an we ever speak of the master's loyalty towards his disciples?" "Friends or foes," 59. The Guodian texts, discovered in 1993, include a version of the *Laozi* alongside previously unknown works in the Confucian tradition, and have accordingly prompted reappraisal of the Warring States canon.

15. Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 82–83.

16. Pines, "Friends or foes," 62–63.

17. Pines, "Friends or foes," draft, 17.

18. Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 88, attribute this resolution of the tension between respecting *dao* and being a loyal minister to Dong Zhongshu.

19. Pines, "Friends or foes," 68–71.

20. Xunzi's Legalist pupil Han Feizi said as much. He did not merely identify the interests of state and ruler, for him the ruler *was* the state, making it impossible for a minister to serve the altars by turning against his ruler. By these lights the stricture against disobedience was no longer merely lip service but a real ban: Pines, "Friends or foes," 66–68.

21. *Xunzi,* "Da lue" chapter, quoted in *Hanyu da cidian* 7:414; *Ciyuan,* 1104.

22. Also see Liu Zehua, *Zhongguo de wangquanzhuyi.*

23. The origins of this familiar idea seem to go back to Shang usages of the graph *zheng* ("correct and proper" or "orthodox"). According to Chen Chi-yun, "[t]he reference of *cheng* evolves from 1. a military action, which gives rise to 2. a political dominion, which is given 3. a moral justification": Chen, "Orthodoxy as a mode of statecraft," 31.

24. Summarized in Laurence Schneider, *Madman of Ch'u,* 17–47. The debate is revisited in Charles Wing-hoi Chan, "Confucius and political loyalism."

25. Yuri Pines suggests that the Qin and Han definition of loyalty basically followed Xunzi's synthesis, with an added requirement for unremitting personal adherence symbolized by a shift from the notion that the ruler and minister could be friends to the idea that they were like husband and wife. He notes that the saying "A loyal minister does not serve two rulers, a faithful wife does not marry a second husband" first came to prominence in the early Han ("Friends or foes," 71–72).

26. *Lunyu* 13:19, trans. Lau; cf. Legge, *Chinese classics,* 1:271: "in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere."

27. *Lunyu* 14:17–18, trans. Lau, 126–127, with reference to Pines, "Beasts or humans," handout from original conference paper, 2 (cf. Legge, *Chinese classics,* 1:282–283). This was a classic case. See, for instance, discussion of a very different seventeenth-century interpretation of the story by Crossley, *Translucent mirror,* 251–252.

28. The following paragraph derives heavily from Tillman, "Tension between virtue and achievement," esp. 20–25.

29. Ibid., 21.

30. Andrew Chittick is working on loyalty in this period, and this chapter, and this section in particular, have benefited from discussion with him (email, May-August, 2005).

31. Yan Zhitui, *Yan shi jiaxun,* in *Baizi quanshu* j. 57; translated by Teng Ssuyü, *Family instructions.*

32. Yan Jianyuan's actions are recorded in the biography of his son, Yan Zhitui's father Yan Xie, in the *Nan shi* 72:1748–1749 and *Liang shu* 50:727; citation derived from Teng, *Family instructions,* xv–xvi, and 1, n. 1.

33. *Yan shi jiaxun* 1:11b; and Teng, *Family instructions,* 73–74.

34. *Yan shi jiaxun* 2:3b; translation adapted from Teng, *Family instructions,* 135.

35. He served under the Liang (549–554), Northern Qi (556–577), Northern Zhou (577–581) and Sui (581–591); Teng, *Family instructions,* xxiii.

36. See, for instance, *Yan shi jiaxun* 2:1b–2a; 2:3a; Teng, *Family instructions,* 119–120, 127.

37. *Yan shi jiaxun* 1:14a; translation adapted from Teng, *Family instructions,* 92–93.

38. I am indebted to David McMullen for his observations on *zhong* in this period (personal communication), many of which are followed in this section.

39. *THY* (compiled 961) 79:1461.

40. See McMullen, "Ch'i T'ai-kung," 80.

41. See, for instance, Henricks, "The hero pattern and the life of Confucius."

42. The revival of ideas of *zhong* upon dynastic consolidation is also noted by Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 94.

43. See Pulleyblank, "Neo-Confucianism and neo-Legalism," for discussion of the background to this exodus and the main schools of thought.

44. Standen, "Trials of the An Lushan collaborators."

45. See *QTS* 153:1587–1588; and McMullen, "Historical and literary theory," 317.

46. Respectively, McMullen, "Historical and literacy theory," 326, citing *QTW* 336:14a; 315:9a; Bol, *"This culture of ours,"* 115; Pauline Yu , *Poetry of Wang Wei,* 99.

47. Bol, *"This culture of ours,"* 116.

48. Li Hua's *JTS* biography was expanded in the *XTS* (McMullen, "Historical and literary theory," 320), so Ouyang Xiu also appears to have seen no insoluble problem in his "collaboration." This contrasts with Ouyang's view of the Five Dynasties crossers, who in his eyes generally lacked redeeming *wen* virtues. On this shift, see Davis, *Wind against the mountain,* 15.

49. "Essay on Ji Zha of Wu," *QTW* 389:10a–11a, cited by McMullen, "Histori-

cal and literary theory," 328–329. Dugu Ji seems to have had a particular interest in defending the actions of those whose *zhong* was doubted. See, for example, his unsuccessful argument in favor of Lu Yi being granted the canonization title *zhong, JTS* 187B:4894 (which is among the "loyal and upright" *[zhongyi]* biographies).

50. Ning and Jiang, "Zhongjun," 93, note the difficulty of this choice too.

51. "Essay on Guan Zhong," written 757, *QTW* 382:9b–12a.

52. *TJ* 220:7046–7047. See discussion by Graff, "Meritorious cannibal."

53. See his biography, *JTS* 187B:4900–4902.

54. David McMullen, personal communication; Graff, "Meritorious cannibal."

55. In 788 a group aiming to downgrade the status of the cult criticized Qi Taigong for abandoning Shang for Zhou: see McMullen, "Ch'i T'ai-kung," 98. This provides a further example of the vigor and uses of the debate over *zhong* in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellions.

56. See Schneider, *Madman of Ch'u,* 50ff, on the Tang and later flourishing of the literary genre concerning the difficulties of "retired scholars."

57. *JTS* j. 187A-B. The origins of the *JTS* are not without distortions, but few of these are traceable now. For an exhaustive discussion of the sources for the *JTS* and their interrelationships, see Twitchett, *Writing of official history under the T'ang.*

58. On the range of work produced in the period prior to the rebellion, see McMullen, "Historical and literary theory." The "frontier school," which includes Cen Shen, was a category created after the Song: Marie Chan, *Cen Shen,* 75.

59. Listed in *WDHY* 12:209–210. All but Wang Chucun (*JTS* 182:4699) have *JW* biographies. Lu Zhi is the single case showing nonmilitary *zhong, JW* 93:1227–1229; *XW* 56:643.

60. Zhao Kuangyin rewarded those who joined him but also made new demands for loyalty. Lu Yusong, "Song Taizu shiqi de zhongjie guan."

61. *SS* 441:13044–13049. The recognition passage is on 13045.

62. The account here is largely taken from that given in Zhou Jun, "Xu Xuan yu Songchu 'erchen,'" esp. 123–124.

63. See Chan Hok-lam, "Official historiography," 74ff; and Richard Davis, "Historiography as politics," 37ff.

64. Wang Gungwu, in his 1962 apologia, "Feng Tao," deduces the existence of a different conception of loyalty in the tenth century (p. 142), since it clearly did not occur to Feng that his actions could be construed as disloyal.

65. Richard Davis emphasizes the role of the *XW* in this process in his introduction to Ouyang Xiu, *Historical records,* but it was not the only text involved.

66. *XW* 54:611–612. This passage has been translated many times, but Richard Davis in Ouyang Xiu, *Historical records,* 438, is particularly elegant.

67. *TJ* 291:9511–9513; translation partially adapted from Wang Gungwu, "Feng Tao," 123, 140.

68. A point elaborated by Bol writing of those who served the Jin, "Seeking common ground."

69. On protonationalism, see Trauzettel, "Sung patriotism," 202ff; cf. Tillman,

"Proto-nationalism." Also Ching, "Neo-Confucian utopian theory," 37ff. On gender, see Davis, *Wind against the mountain.*

70. Jay, "Memoirs and official accounts," 611; and *Change in dynasties.* For an example of the completeness with which the Song idea of a loyalist definition of loyalty has dominated the thinking of the best scholars, see James T. C. Liu, "Yüeh Fei and China's heritage of loyalty." This article also indicates the kinds of pressures and tensions under which Chinese scholars can (still) find themselves when considering the subject of loyalty.

Chapter 3: Crossing Boundaries and Shifting Borders

1. A familiar observation among medievalists working on Europe, but not yet among China specialists.

2. Wittfogel and Feng estimated the numbers in Liao at some 2.5 million; *Liao,* 52–56, especially table, 55.

3. For recent English narratives of general events in the tenth century, with references, see *CHC* 5a and 6. Also Somers, "End of the T'ang"; Wang, *Structure of power*; and Lü Simian, *Sui Tang Wudai Shi.*

4. The latter are, however, included in the Appendix, marked out by square brackets. Geng Yanyi's family is known chiefly through three tomb inscriptions; see Zhu Zifang, "Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi"; Luo Jizu, "Du 'Liaodai Geng shi muzhi'"; Zhu Zifang, "'Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi' buchong"; Zhu Zifang and Xu Ji, "Liao Geng shi muzhi kaolüe."

5. The promise to cross if certain conditions were met was sometimes used to deceive the other side into placing themselves in a vulnerable position. Such "dirty tricks" reflect the prevalence of crossing and its value to the other side, but do not contribute to a picture of actual crossings. On the Tanguts and the Xia state, see Dunnell, *Great State of White and High.*

6. On the importance of this relationship in the tenth century, see Wang Gungwu, "The alliance of Ho-tung and Ho-pei," in *Structure of power,* 208–209.

7. Standen, "Raiding and frontier society."

8. Brotherly relationships are clearly relevant to a full study of loyalty, but there is not space to discuss them here. Some pointers may be found in Worthy, "Founding of Sung China," 165; and Yang, "Posthumous letter," 421.

9. The *LS* claims that Abaoji personally joined the 912 assault on Youzhou.

10. Similarly, Zhu Wen had no scruples over accepting the mutinous murderer of Liu Shouguang's son as the new Yichang governor at Cangzhou. Cangzhou was too strategic an acquisition for niceties, even on behalf of an ally.

11. Other examples: Zhao Feng fled to Jin, 912 (*TJ* 268:8750); Liu Xun took Xizhou to Jin, 912 (*TJ* 268:8764); refugee populations, *XW* 72:886.

12. According to *LS* 1:11, Abaoji seems to have taken some districts permanently, renaming them and making appointments, but this is not reflected in either the Liang or Tang annals of the two *Wudai shi,* where even Ouyang Xiu reports these events as straightforward hit-and-run attacks. But cf. *TJ* 269:8805. Other cases, like Song Yao's, could be interpreted either way.

13. *TJ* 269:8812–8813.

14. Lu Wenjin later changed allegiance again, leaving the newly established Later Jin for Shu in 936 (*TJ* 280:9166).

15. Or probably 920. It is unclear how much pressure Liu Yin was under to cross (#22).

16. North-South relations in this period are detailed in Standen, "What nomads want."

17. The figures are more dramatic if we count alliances in the total. These fell to a third of their previous rate, which increases the proportion of crossings under duress; see Table 2.

18. Some of these raids may have been Tang reinterpretations of normal nomadizing; see discussion in Standen, "What nomads want" of Deguang's 934 "expedition," 135–138.

19. The original offer of "the circuit of Lulong and all the prefectures north of Yanmen pass" translated into the prefectures of Youzhou, Jizhou$_1$, Yingzhou$_1$, Mozhou, Zhuozhou, Tanzhou, Shunzhou, Xinzhou$_1$, Guizhou, Ruzhou, Wuzhou, Yunzhou$_1$, Yingzhou$_2$, Huanzhou, Shuozhou, and Yuzhou.

20. The *LS* reports that Wu Luan surrendered and was killed.

21. *LS* 3:40-41; cf. *TJ* 281:9168-9190 passim; and *JW* 76:1004-1077:1021 passim.

22. *TJ* 282:9219; *JW* 79:1045; cf. *LS* 4:48.

23. See Standen, "What nomads want."

24. The military and political aspects of the Liao relationship with Zhou and Song up to 1005 have been comprehensively recounted by Lorge, "War and the creation of the Northern Song."

25. *SS* 1:10; *CB* 10:234.

26. *CB* 10:225; 17:376.

27. This discounts the distorting effect of Yelü Jing's detentions of Northern Han envoys during the 960s (#159–164). Similarly, Liu Jiyuan of Northern Han sent his son as a guarantee to the court of his Liao allies in 978, which is not counted as a crossing.

28. *SS* 4:68 gives only four, and *CB* 23:519–521 does not note the incident at all under 982:5.

29. See Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* 40–63 and Section 3, for translations and full references; and Ang, "Sung-Liao diplomacy."

30. See Ang, "Sung-Liao diplomacy," 88ff; Shiba Yoshinobu, "Sung foreign trade," 98–100.

31. The *SS* in particular mentions far more "fortress towns" *(zhen),* and we know that Guo Rong of the Later Han and his Song successors conducted major fortification programs. On the political significance of *zhen* during the Tang, see Hino Kaizaburō, "Tōdai Hanchin." For imperial control of the Song armies, see Worthy, "Founding of Sung China," Ch. 4; Labadie, "Rulers and soldiers."

32. In 986 all the surviving Song troops taking refuge in Pingzhou were ordered to be wiped out (*LS* 11:122); Song people captured by patrols were executed (*LS* 11:125);

many Song prisoners killed (*LS* 11:126); in 987 all the able-bodied in Wenan were killed because the city refused to surrender (*LS* 12:129). Attempts to control pillaging suggest that things got out of hand rather too often. For instance in 986 no pillage was allowed at Yangtuancheng (*LS* 11:126), and excessive pillaging was punished in 988 (*LS* 12:132). After early 989 the Liao armies seem to have been under closer control.

33. See my "Raiding and frontier society." Cross-cultural comparisons suggest the ubiquity of this kind of activity in frontier regions; see later medieval examples from Wales (Davies, "Frontier arrangements," 93), Ireland (Simms, "Bards and barons," 190) and the Castilian-Granada frontier (Jiménez, "Frontier and settlement in Castile," 70; MacKay, "Religion, culture and ideology," 219–220; and esp. Castañer, "Institutions on the Castilian-Granadan frontier," 137–139).

34. Also *TJ* 281:9181; *LS* 11:120–121; 12:133.

35. The extent of relocation can best be seen in *Liao,* 62–83.

36. On ritual executions, see *Liao,* 268n.

37. The exceptions are #14, 137. There was one other return in the 965–969 period apart from the Northern Han envoys, the Song soldiers mentioned above, who were rescued by a special mission (#169).

38. Cf. Pines, "Friends or foes."

39. Genealogies were frequently fabricated (Johnson, "Last years of a great clan"), but here it is adequate to take the claims of origin at face value.

40. Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* 56–57.

41. Lamouroux, "Geography and politics."

Chapter 4: Loyalties in the Borderlands

1. Qi Xin, "Han Yanhui zu shixi." Han Yanhui appears in the following: *JW* 60:805; *XW* 72:890, 898; *TJ* 269:8810, 8811; 275:8989, 8993; 281:9188; *QG* 1:2, 6; 2:11; 13:138; 16:160–161 (biography, commentary); *LS* 2:22; 47:774, 777, 782; 59:926; 71:1199, 1200; 74:1230, 1231–1232 (biography); 75:1243 (commentary); *CFYG* 1000:11 (*WDHY* 29:455); *Fengtian tongzhi* (1934, 1982) 102:2330b; 138:3179b; *LDN* 2, 3, 4; *LSH* A:14a; *LSJSBM* 5:109–118; *LSSY* 20:385. The *XW* is probably an independent source because the nonimperial biographies in the *JW* are believed to be largely intact, suggesting that Ouyang Xiu got his information from elsewhere. No independent records survive for the autonomous Youzhou regime where Han Yanhui began; his time at the court of the predynastic Later Tang was brief and would have gone unnoted since he was not involved in major events.

2. *LS* 74:1232 pinpoints his place of birth as Anci, to the southeast of Youzhou. He died at seventy-eight *sui.*

3. See Peterson, "Autonomy of the northeastern provinces"; Mirsky, "Rebellion in Ho-pei."

4. See biographies in *JTS* 180:4680–4683.

5. *LS* 74:1231.

6. On the organization of provincial regimes, see Hino Kaizaburō, "Godai chinshō ko"; and Sudō Yoshiyuki, "Godai setsudoshi no shihai taisei."

7. *XW* 72:890; *QG* 16:160. Liu Rengong had earlier made him administrative supervisor *(lushi canjun)* (*LS* 74:1231). It is not clear whether Liu Shouguang kept Han Yanhui on in his old post (making the usage here an abbreviation) or appointed him to the separate post that was simply called *canjun.* The *LS* does not mention any transition of power, so leaving us to assume the former.

8. The *LS* records them twice and the *QG* three times. See below.

9. Sima Guang created some confusion by rejecting this date—given in Han Gaozu's Veritable Records—and choosing late 911 or early 912 instead. His argument is that Liu Shouguang's long-standing enmity to the Kitan would have prohibited recourse to them except in extremis. For further discussion of the dating problem, see my "Frontier crossings from north China to Liao," 111–112.

10. "Tribal" is a problematic word, but is used here as a translation of *bu* and similar terms. My use does not imply the existence of homogeneous ethnic communities in the borderlands at this (or probably any other) time.

11. The end date is given by the death of Wang Jian in 913:12 (*JW* 60:806), of which more below.

12. *TJ* 269:8810; also *QG* 13:138, 16:160; *LS* 74:1231, 71:1200.

13. *XW* 72:890.

14. See, for example, Song Dejin, "Qidan hanhua lisu shulüe," 129; Yin Keming, "Qidan hanhua lüekao," 495.

15. *TJ* 269:8810; *QG* 1:2, 16:160. Cf. *LS* 74:1231.

16. *XW* 72:890; *TJ* 269:8810; *QG* 1:2; 16:160; *LS* 74:1231; *WDHY* 29:455; also *CFYG* 1000:11a-b.

17. There appear to be no Liao attacks on the Tangut before 916:7 and none on the Shiwei between 909 and 965. See *LS* 1:4–8 for absence of attacks 911–913, *Liao* chronology, 574, 575, 581 for convenient summary of dates of known attacks. For further discussion of dating, see my "Frontier crossings from north China to Liao," 114–115.

18. *LS* 74:1232; cf. 59:926.

19. *LS* 74:1231.

20. *TJ* 269:8810; *QG* 1:2, 13:138; 16:160. This is not repeated in the *LS* versions, which clearly derive from the *TJ* and/or *QG.* The story appears in the *LS* biographies of Han Yanhui and of the Shulü empress, each of which make their own changes to the earlier versions, suggesting some independence in editing and compilation; *LS* 71:1199–1200; 74:1231.

21. *LS* 74:1231 anachronistically says that Han fled to Later Tang, which was not founded until 923. The terms used for "fled back" vary slightly. The *TJ* usage of *taoben* (picked up by the *QG*) contains overtones of fleeing *from* one's home to another place.

22. E.g., Wang Chengguo, "Liaochao de er han," 89.

23. See Standen, "Five Dynasties"; and Zang Rong, "Lun Wudai de Bian-Jin zhengheng."

24. *XW* 72:890; *TJ* 269:8810; *QG* 1:2, 16:160–161; *LS* 74:1231–1232. The friend subsequently crossed to Liao himself, in 921, see Appendix #25.

25. *JW* 60:806.

26. It is also possible that Han Yanhui had a son in Liao by the time of Wang Jian's death. If so, he may have been concerned that his family would be used as hostages for his return; see Standen, "Frontier crossings from north China to Liao," 118.

27. *TJ* 269:8810; *QG* 1:2; 16:160.

28. A *topos* also attributed to Li Huan; *LS* 103:1450. See Chapter 6.

29. *LS* 74:1231.

30. Ibid.

31. *LS* 74:1232.

32. *TJ* 269:8811; also *QG* 16:161.

33. An editorial note by the Yuan scholar Hu Sanxing (1230–1287) cites specific instances of Kitan aggression and gives the strength of the Jin (Later Tang) army, rather than Han Yanhui's energies, as the reason the Kitan were held back; *TJ* 269:8811. The *LS* records numerous raids in this period and later, but centrally directed raids effectively ceased after 926; see Standen, "Raiding and frontier society," 167–168.

34. *LS* 74:1230, 1231; 2:22.

35. *TJ* 275:8989; *QG* 1:6.

36. *TJ* 275:8993.

37. See the standard interpretation offered by Mote, *Imperial China,* 44–48, following Yao Congwu, "Abaoji yu Hou Tang shichen Yao Kun."

38. *QG* 16:161, *LS* 74:1231.

39. *JW* 42:583; 67:892; 92:1224; 98:1312, 1313–1316 (biography), 1317 (commentary); 100:1332; 108:1421; 137:1835; *XW* 55:638; 72:897, 898, 899; 73:901, 902; *TJ* 274:8955, 8964; 280:9153, 9161; 281:9170; 285:9319, 9320; 286:9330, 9339, 9346, 9352; 287:9358, 9365; *QG* 2:20; 3:37; 4:42, 43; 16:161 (biography), 165–166 (commentary); *LS* 4:59, 60; 76:1251–1252 (biography); *Fengtian tongzhi* 221:4702b; *LSJSBM* 5:115–118; *LSSY* 20:389–390; *LSSYB* 5:115–116; *LWK* A:26a; *QLW* 70; *Shengjing tongzhi* 90:7b. The first *JW* biography is pieced together from the *YLDD* (j. 10,798; 13,913) and *CFYG* (j. 796). Although the Qing recompilers of the *JW* believed this was the full version of the biography, they appended a second version in the palace edition of the text (*JW* 98:1319, n. 7).

40. Fuyang was part of Xiangzhou under the Tang, but later became seat of Cizhou_1 prefecture. Some passages give Cizhou_2 in Hedong as Zhang Li's native place, see *JW* 67:892 and n. 17.

41. On the primary significance of this relationship, see Moore, *Rituals of recruitment,* esp. 210–212.

42. *JW* 98:1314. In Li Yu's biography Zhang Li is already a provincial graduate when Li Yu sponsors him; *JW* 67:892. The detail on Zhang Li's education contrasts with the lack of any information on Han Yanhui's studies.

43. *JW* 67:892. Here *beiren* must mean the Taiyuan court. Three of Li Yu's writings are named.

44. *JW* 98:1314; *TJ* 274:8955, 8964; *QG* 16:161; *LS* 76:1251.

45. *JW* 98:1314.

46. *JW* 98:1314–1315; *XW* 34:474; *TJ* 274:8694.

47. *JW* 98:1315.

48. *JW* 92:1224. *XW* 55:638 says the poems were "unskillful."

49. For extensive contemporary comment, see Moore, *Rituals of recruitment,* which appeared too late for me to incorporate its findings more fully.

50. *JW* 98:1314, 1315; 42: 583 (return to service).

51. *JW* 98:1314, 1315; *TJ* 280:9153.

52. *QG* 16:160.

53. *JW* 135:1803–1805, *XW* 39:424–426, *TJ* 268:8744–8745. Although the *TJ* dates this incident to 911:8, the *JW* biography of Liu Shouguang appears to place it in 907:6 and the declaration as emperor to 907:8, but it must be that the characters giving the year have been lost. A similar ambiguity arises in the *XW* biography, so that the incident could appear to have happened in about 908. The *JW* and *XW* both place the incident before the declaration as emperor, as part of sections showing Liu Shouguang's cruelty and growing hunger for power and position. The *QG* has followed the *TJ* in placing the incident immediately after Liu Shouguang adopted the title of emperor and before his formal accession (*TJ* 268:8745).

54. Ye Longli seems to find this an attractive trait; cf. his account of Zhang Li, *QG* 16:161–162. *LSJSBM* 5:109 maintains the impression, saying that Han Yanhui "remonstrated strenuously but was not heeded." This phrase is quoted as if it were from the *LS* but cannot be found there.

Chapter 5: An Emerging Boundary

1. The only exception is a *XW* story about Zhao Yanshou borrowing books from an exiled Liao prince (*XW* 73:901). Zhao Yanshou is well recorded in all the sources because of his high rank and extensive involvement in major events. Ouyang Xiu, however, denied him his own biography. See *JW* 38:527; 39:538, 542; 40:549; 41:569; 42:575, 577; 43:596; 44:606, 607; 45:616; 46:635; 47:644, 653; 48:657, 665, 666, 667; 49:678, 679; 66:877; 75:985; 76:992; 77:1018; 80:1058; 82:1084, 1085, 1088; 83:1099, 1102; 84:1117, 1118; 85:1123, 1127; 88:1144; 89:1170, 1172; 94:1242; 95:1267; 96:1277; 97:1286; 98:1308, 1309, 1310, 1311–1313 (biography), 1315; 99:1329; 100:1331, 1332, 1334; 107:1405; 108:1420, 1421, 1430; 109:1441; 124:1636; 126:1660; 127:1668; 129:1704; 137:1833, 1834, 1835; *XW* 6:63, 65; 7:73; 8:78, 79; 9:93; 15:160, 164; 27:290, 292; 30:331; 33:361, 362; 47:532; 49:557; 51:577, 578; 52:595; 57:654; 72:893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899; 73:901, 902; *TJ* 275:8986, 8992; 277:9058, 9059; 278:9078, 9079, 9080, 9087, 9088, 9089; 279:9119, 9120, 9128, 9133; 280:9151, 9153, 9155, 9159, 9160, 9161; 281:9185, 9188, 9190; 283:9243, 9253, 9256, 9260, 9263; 284:9267, (9268), (9272), 9280, 9282, 9283, 9284, 9288, 9290; 285:9306, 9311, 9318, 9319; 286:9330, 9331, 9332, 9333, 9334, 9339, 9346, 9352, 9356, 9357; 287:9358, 9368, 9369, 9382, 9383; 288:9388; *QG* 2:18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26; 3:28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37; 4:42; 16:163–165 (biography); *LS* 3:38–40; 4:47, 53–59; 5:64; 47:774, 775, 781; 48:804; 76:1246, 1247–1248 (biography), 1249, 1253; 86:1322; *CFYG* 980:28 (*JW*

77:1018); 997:4 (*XW* 73:901); 998:12 (*JW* 84:1118); *LDN* 3, 4; *LFN* 14a; *LSJ* 4:9a; *LSJSBM* 12:283–290; *LWK* A:6a; *QLW* 69; *QWDS* 9:202–203 (*QWDSB* 9:154–155); *Taiping guangji* 200:1508.

2. The county is given as either Changshan (*JW* 98:1311; *XW* 72:893) or Hengshan (*LS* 76:1247). *QG* 16:163 gives Zhao Yanshou's native place as Xiangzhou, which was where his adoptive father (as well as Zhang Li) came from.

3. *TJ* 265:8658–8659. The *JW* and *LS* biographies both give a date of "early Kaiping" (907–911), but this does not coincide with any other recorded attack on Tiaoxian. In 912 Zhao Dejun was back at Tiaoxian as an officer of the Taiyuan Jin facing attack by Zhu Wen. (*JW* 55:741).

4. *JW* 98:1311; *XW* 72:893; *LS* 76:1247.

5. *JW* 32:445, 43:592, 98:1308–1309; *TJ* 273:8930, 278:9076. For more on Zhao Dejun and his handling of the Youzhou command, see Standen, "(Re)constructing the frontiers" and "Who wants to be an emperor?"

6. *WDHY* 2:22.

7. This is the standard translation, but it does not reflect the unspecified, and potentially wide, powers of military affairs commissioners under the Five Dynasties; see Wang Gungwu, *Structure of power,* passim; Worthy, "Founding of Sung China," 212ff.

8. *JW* 44:609–610; *TJ* 278:9091ff.

9. Standen, "(Re)constructing the frontiers"; Mayo, "Birds and the hand of power."

10. *TJ* 279:9119–9120. Cf. Wang Gungwu, *Structure of power,* Appendix: "The alliance of Ho-tung and Ho-pei," 208–215.

11. Different aspects of this key moment in Five Dynasties history are addressed in my articles "What nomads want" and "Who wants to be an emperor?"

12. *JW* 48:666, 98:1309, 106:1396; *TJ* 280:9152–9155. On alternative readings of these and the subsequent events, see my "Who wants to be an emperor?"

13. See Standen, "Five Dynasties."

14. *TJ* 280:9156.

15. Ming K. Chan says the *TJ* compilers detested disloyalty ("Historiography of the *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien,*" 17–18), but one must ask how disloyalty is being defined in this context.

16. *JW* 75:981, 89:1162; Wang Gungwu, *Structure of power,* 157–158, 176.

17. He praised the loyalty of Zhang Jingda, the Jin'an commander, but exterminated the Kitan guardsmen employed by Zhao Dejun; *TJ* 280:9157–9158, 9160; *JW* 137:1833, 98:1310; *QG* 2:17, 16:163; *LS* 3:39. The *QG* and *LS* retain the praise of Zhang Jingda without the criticism of his murderers; the *LS* does not mention the killing of the Kitan guards.

18. The *Luozhong ji yi lu,* quoted in *LSJSBM* 12:286–287, contains a different ending in which Zhao Yanshou presents a counterargument to Shi Jingtang's objections, resulting in Deguang burning Shi Jingtang's letter and appointing Zhao Yanshou to govern Youzhou under the Liao. Zhao Yanshou did subsequently receive this appointment, but in rather different circumstances.

19. *TJ* 280:9157–9160. Gao Xingzhou might have been genuinely trying to help, since Zhao Dejun had once recommended him to Li Siyuan (*JW* 123:1612).

20. Different versions of the story make the Zhaos' crossings variously voluntary, coerced, and involuntary; see Appendix #55, 56 (including references).

21. *LS* 3:40 instead notes that Deguang inspected the camp of the surrendered army before departing north.

22. He apparently died from shame following a searching interview with the Shulü empress dowager, at which Zhao Yanshou may also have been present; *JW* 98:1310; *XW* 72:894; *TJ* 280:9160–9161; *QG* 2:18, 16:163. Zhao Dejun's tomb has been excavated, see Su Tianjun, "Hou Tang Beiping wang."

23. *LS* 76:1247 says he was "in charge of all affairs south of the mountains" *(zong shannan shi).*

24. *XW* 72:897; *QG* 16:162; *LS* 76:1252.

25. *Fengtian tongzhi* 221:7b (4702b), borrowing from *Shengjing tongzhi* 90:7b.

26. *JW* 98:1316.

27. The *TJ* and *LS* give Yanying, and the *QG* editors correct Tangying to Yanying.

28. See Hu Sanxing's note, *TJ* 281:9170; Sinor, "Interpreters in medieval Inner Asia."

29. There is slight rewording, and some detail is omitted. *TJ* 281:9170; *QG* 2:20; 16:162.

30. *XW* 72:898.

31. *LS* 76:1252.

32. Curiously, the *LS* replaces the reference to clothing with one to housing (or everyday life), perhaps reflecting Mongol sensitivities to this ancient distinguishing mark between Chinese and "barbarians" found, for instance, in the story of Guan Zhong (*Lunyu* 14:16–17).

33. See, for example, Mote, "Confucian eremitism in the Yüan"; cf. De Rachewiltz, "Personnel and personalities."

34. Mote, "Confucian eremitism in the Yüan"; cf. Langlois, "Chinese culturalism and the Yüan analogy," and Swope, "All men are not brothers."

35. *JW* 98:1312; 137:1835.

36. See Standen, "Five Dynasties."

37. *TJ* 281:9188; *QG* 2:21.

38. *JW* 77:1018; *LS* 76:1247.

39. The second post, director of the Department of Administration, was called *zhengshiling* before 926, then *zhongshuling* until Zhao Yanshou's appointment (*LS* 47:774–775, also *Liao,* 485). On the duties of the post, see Yang Ruowei, *Qidan zhengzhi junshi zhidu,* 143ff.

40. The *LS* and *QG* place Zhang in the same positions in 946 as in 938, giving the impression of a career on hold for lack of ability. Since neither text conveys such an overall impression of Zhang Li, it is probable that Ye Longli made a mistake, which was then transmitted into the *LS.*

41. *TJ* 283:9242–9243; *LS* 4:52; *JW* 88:1144. For accounts, see my "Five Dynasties" and "What nomads want."

42. *JW* 88:1144; cf. *XW* 29:322. The *JW* annals give the impression that the war was a result of a provincial challenge to Shi Chonggui and a Liao invasion. *JW* 81:1068–1082:1085.

43. *TJ* 283:9253.

44. *TJ* 283:9243.

45. Consultation with Zhao Yanshou: *LS* 4:52–53, a passage deriving from Jing Yanguang's *JW* biography via the *TJ*. The *LS* claim that the Liao were provoked holds even if we accept the *TJ* dating of the crucial exchange.

46. For some implications, see Standen, "What nomads want."

47. *Liao,* 516ff, esp. 522–523; Yang Ruowei, *Qidan zhengzhi junshi zhidu.*

48. *LS* 76:1248. The other sources name the captured Jin general as Cai Xingyu (Appendix #74)

49. A similar change happens in the *Liao shi* annals for 946, which imply that Zhao Yanshou defeated Zhang Yanze at Dingzhou, when the other sources report a Kitan defeat with no mention of Zhao; *LS* 4:57, cf. *JW* 84:1117; *TJ* 285:9310; *QG* 3:30.

50. *TJ* 284:9282.

51. *JW* 95:1267.

52. Ibid.

53. *XW* 33:362–363. Ouyang calls him Shen Bin. On the "Martyrs in Service" chapter, see Davis's comments in Ouyang Xiu, *Historical records,* li.

54. *TJ* 284:9284; followed in *QG* 3:28.

55. Shen Yun had been an effective military officer on Li Jiji's Shu campaign, where he must have known Zhang Li (*JW* 33:457; 95:1266; *XW* 33:362). One could speculate on the possibility of an implied contrast between the two men.

56. *LS* 4:55; also *JW* 83:1101.

57. See esp. *JW* 84:1118; also *XW* 72:896; 52:595; *TJ* 285:9306; *LS* 76:1248.

58. *LS* 76:1248. The ambiguous word is *ning.*

59. *JW* 98:1311; *TJ* 283:9256.

60. *TJ* 285:9318.

61. *JW* 85:1126, 137:1835; *TJ* 286:9327–9330; *LS* 4:58–59. I have argued in "What nomads want" that Deguang had little choice in his own elevation and was keen to delegate authority in the South, as he had to Shi Jingtang.

62. *JW* 98:1312; *XW* 72:897; *TJ* 286:9339; *QG* 3:36; *LS* 76:1248.

63. *XW* 72:898. Abridged in *LSJSBM* 5:116, which adds notes on dress regulations for non-Chinese at the Liao court; version from *Hong jian lu* (also in *DDSL*) quoted in *LSJSBM* 12:289.

64. *TJ* 285:9319–9320. This expands on the original *JW* biography, 98:1314: "Since these barbarians *(hu)* use this kind of military strategy and tactics, how can they control the capital for long?" Note that the important thing in this statement is what these people *do,* not their cultural category.

65. *TJ* 285:9322.

66. *TJ* 285:9318–9319; also Du Chongwei's *JW* biography, 109:1435.

67. *TJ* 286:9331–9332; cf. *JW* 98:1312.

68. In contrast, Hu Sanxing's note to the *Tongjian* passage strains credibility when it says that Zhao Yanshou acts simply in order to sound out Deguang's intentions regarding his promise to make Zhao emperor in the South.

69. *XW* 72:899.

70. *JW* 98:1313; 99:1329; 100:1331; *XW* 73:901–902; *TJ* 286:9356–9358; *QG* 4:42–43; 16:165; *LS* 76:1253.

71. *XW* 73:901.

72. *TJ* 286:9356; also *QG* 4:42.

73. A similar interpretation can be placed upon Zhao Dejun's actions in 936; see Standen, "Who wants to be an emperor?"

74. *TJ* 286:9357.

75. To Liu Zhiyuan, as it happened; Sun Fangjian's biographies: *JW* 125:1649–1651; *XW* 49:560.

76. The developing exception were the Lis of Dingnan, who went on to found the Tangut state of Xi Xia; see Dunnell, "Hsi Hsia," 154–180. The Northern Han are another example, although their independence relied heavily on Liao support.

77. *TJ* 287:9358. *QG* 4:42 unusually adds to as well as omits from the *TJ* account.

78. *XW* 73:902.

79. *LS* 76:1248.

80. This contrasts with the genuine power of later generations, notably Han Derang; *LS* 82:1289.

81. *JW* 98:1315–1316.

82. *TJ* 287:9365; also *QG* 16:162. According to his *LS* biography (76:1245), Jieli had tried to *prevent* Zhang Yanze's plunder of Bianzhou.

83. *TJ* 287:9365; *QG* 16:162.

84. Ironically, Xiao Han later resisted Wuyu and was executed in 949:1; *LS* 5:65.

85. *Taiping guangji* 200:1508; *QWDSB* 9:155; *QLW* 4:69 (with *chong* "layered" for *dong* "drift"). The *QWDSB* calls the poem "On the frontier"; Chen Shu's *QLW* calls it "Disgrace," but says that it "sings of the Kitan landscape." It is untitled in *Taiping guangji.*

86. See Marie Chan, *Cen Shen;* Hu-sterk, "Entre fascination et repulsion"; cf. Linck, "Visions of the border."

87. See Wang Gungwu, *Structure of power,* 134–143.

88. *TJ* 287:9382.

89. *LS* 76:1253.

Chapter 6: Drawing the Line

1. Sources for Li Huan: *JW* 51:694; 76:1009; 77:1013; 79:1043; 82:1091; 84:1108; 112:1482, 1483; 119:1586; *XW* 29:320; 73:902; *TJ* 278:9095; 282:9218; 284:9273; 287:9364; 290:9479; 294:9601; *QG* 4:43; *LS* 4:60; 6:70; 47:779, 782; 103:1450 (biog-

raphy); *SS* 208:5349; 262:9062–9063 (biography), 9066; *LSH* A:15b; *LSJ* 4:9b; *LSSY* 21:399–400; *LSSYB* 5:123; *LWC* 1:3a (29); *LWK* A:30a; *QLW* 72; *QTS* 11:770:8748; *QTW* 861:12a; *QWDS* 12:265; *QWDSB* 11:203; *SSXB* 72:5a. The *CB* contains references to a Li Han in 977 and 979, and Han can be an alternative for Huan (see Glossary), but our Li Huan died in 962.

2. Sources for Wang Jizhong: *LPJ* 18:686–687 (biography); *CB* 45:971; 49:1066, 1067; 51:1125; 52:1137; 54:1190, 1192, 1196; 57:1265, 1268, 1269, 58:1278, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1285, 1286, 1291, 1294, 1296; *DDSL* 42:647–648 (biography); *QG* 7:63, 67; 13:143; 14:152; *LS* 14:158, 160; 15:172, 179; 16:185; 47:789; 81:1284–1285 (biography), 1286, 1287 (commentary); 85:1314, 1316; 88:1340; 115:1521; *SS* 7:121, 125, 126; 257:8951; 278:9465; 279:9471–9472 (biography), 9493 (commentary); 280:9507; 281:9520; 285:9614; 287:9658; 290:9705, 9710; 324:10474.

3. The *Dongdu shilüe* (1186) and *Long ping ji* (1142) offer practically identical accounts of Wang Jizhong, and are not major sources for the *SS* (see Haeger in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography,* 90).

4. This Li Huan was not the author of the *Meng qiu* children's primer, as claimed in the *Siku tiyao* and the *QTS.* Tang colophons on a copy in Japan and at Dunhuang prove that Song writers were right to credit the work to an earlier Li Huan; Bi Suojuan, "Liaoban shuji—'Meng qiu.'"

5. See Hu Sanxing's note (*TJ* 278:9095). Li Hui has a biography in *JTS* 173:4501–4502, but none in the *XTS.*

6. For instance, *WDSB* 3:6a-b. The early Song writer Su Yijian (958–996) also speaks of his "ornate language which was especially beautiful"; *Xu Hanlin zhi,* quoted in *LSSYB* 5:123; *LSJSBM* 18:346. On the Four Worthies, see entries in Nienhauser, *Companion to traditional Chinese literature,* esp. 105–108.

7. *SS* 262:9062; *TJ* 278:9095 (exile dated 933:11, 14 December).

8. *JW* 76:993–1000.

9. The Tang writer Han Yu notes a Hanlin academician honored thus for his sincerity; in his *Dong gong xingzhuang,* quoted in *Hanyu da cidian* 9:888.

10. *XW* 29:320; see also *JW* 79:1042.

11. *TJ* 282:9218.

12. The Yuan commentator Hu Sanxing highlights the implied connection; *TJ* 282:9218. By contrasting the correctness of stopping Li Huan's drunken actions with the incorrectness of abolishing all the academicians because of the intemperance of one, Hu implies that Li Huan's drinking was just an excuse for Shi Jingtang to remove the last representatives of the "Confucian" interest from his close circle.

13. Chen Jiru (1558–1639), *Gujin shi hua,* quoted in *LSSY* 21:399; also abridged in *LSJSBM* 18:346.

14. See Standen, "Five Dynasties."

15. In 944:6, 28 June and 16 July respectively. *TJ* 284:9273; also *JW* 82:1091; *XW* 29:320.

16. Sang Weihan was killed by Zhang Yanze during the sack of Bianzhou. Biographies and surviving works provide evidence of the talent of the others: Feng Dao—

JW 126:1655–1666; *XW* 54:612–615; *QWDSB* 9:150–151. Li Song—*JW* 108:1419–1421; *XW* 57:653–655. He Ning—*JW* 127:1671–1674; *XW* 56:639–640; *QWDSB* 11:191–199.

17. Only *TJ* 287:9358 mentions He Ning; cf. *QG* 4:42; *JW* 100:1331.

18. In 947:9, *TJ* 287:9377. The others returned their allegiance to the South. This is the *QG*'s only mention of Li Huan. It is not clear why Wuyu chose these people to take North when he could pick from almost the entire Jin official body. Deguang had complained that the lesser Jin officials were idle (*LS* 4:60) and had previously followed advice to take the most senior officials first (*TJ* 286:9348–9349).

19. *WDSB* 3:6b.

20. *LS* 103:1450.

21. *LS* 47:779.

22. The *LS* (6:70; 103:1450) concentrates on the events following the discovery of the conspiracy, suggesting that the Liao may never have known its full extent. The *SS* biography (262:9063, also *TJ* 290:9479) gives a relatively full account, and presumably the writer of Li Huan's vita could draw on information known within the Li family. The *Cefu yuangui* (completed 1013), however, provides the most detail, collected into a coherent account in the *Liao shi jishi benmo* and including the text of three letters: *LSJSBM* 18:345–346, which also quotes an account from *Tongjian gangmu.* The letters are also collected in *Liao wen cun,* 3:4b, 7b-8a, 5:10a, and in *QLW* 4:72.

23. *JW* 112:1482.

24. The word *mu* can mean "yearn for" as well as "admire."

25. *JW* 41:570; *TJ* 277:9052; *LS* 3:32.

26. *LSJSBM* 18:345–346.

27. "Yu xiong Tao shu," quoted in *Liao wen cun* 5:10a, and *QLW* 4:72. Also *QTW* 861:13a.

28. *SS* 262:9063.

29. *TJ* 290:9479.

30. *LS* 6:70.

31. Starting in 951:12. *TJ* 290:9469ff; *JW* 112:1479ff.

32. He may also have deliberately avoided direct entanglement with the Liao. Three months later he ordered people in the Northern borderlands to cease their raiding northward into Liao; *JW* 112:1484.

33. *LS* 6:70. If Tian traveled at a courier's speed of 300 *li* a day, it would have taken him about seven days to travel between Shangjing and Bianzhou, a distance of about 1100 km (2200 *li*) as the crow flies. But the actual distance must have been greater, and Tian could easily have been traveling slower.

34. *LS* 103:1450.

35. Ibid.

36. See, most notably, Meng Guangyao, "Liaodai Hanzu rushi de 'huayi zhi bian' guannian," esp. 67.

37. Appendix #91. Biography at *LS* 85:1317.

38. *LS* 103:1450.

39. *LS* 6:77–77:87.

40. A Fengguo temple dated to 1020 by surviving inscriptions remains at Yixian in Liaoning. Li Huan's exile is the sole evidence suggesting an earlier foundation: see Steinhardt, *Liao architecture,* 88, citing Takeshima Takuichi, *Ryō-Kin jidai no kenchiku to sono Butsuzō,* 54. With thanks to Tracy Miller.

41. Jay, *Change in dynasties.*

42. Han Yanhui's retirement during Yelü Jing's Yingli reign period (951–968) possibly coincided with the death of Deguang's widow the Shulü empress (now Yingtian empress dowager) in 953. She was in exile for supporting her third son as Deguang's successor in place of her grandnephew Wuyu, but although Han Yanhui may have been close to her, he appears to have had no involvement in the succession dispute. *LS* 5:63–64; 74:1232.

43. *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:686; *SS* 279:9471. *LS* 81:1284 says that Wang's place of origin is unknown.

44. *DDSL* 42:647 and *LPJ* 18:686 call him a duty attendant *(dianzhi/dianzhishi).* This sometimes refers to a eunuch, but Wang Jizhong married and his wives produced sons. In *SS* 279:9471 the causal relationship between his father's death and this appointment is not made explicit.

45. *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:686; *SS* 279:9471; 287:9658.

46. *CB* 45:970; 49:1066, 51:1125; 52:1137. Also *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:686; *LS* 81:1284; *SS* 279:9471.

47. See Worthy, "Founding of Sung China," 66–67, 195ff, 238ff.

48. *LS* 81:1284. Also *LS* 14:158; 85:1314, 1316.

49. *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:686.

50. *CB* 54:1190; *QG* 7:66–67. English grammar cannot always be preserved when showing the alteration of the text.

51. *SS* 279:9471–9472.

52. Ibid.; cf. *SS* 7:121. Wang Chao's and Sang Zan's biographers were unlikely to accuse them of cowardice, and Wang Chao's biography is careful to record the investigation into accusations of withdrawal. This laid all the blame on two deputy commanders, leaving Wang Chao and Sang Zan with official reputations unscathed. *SS* 278:9464.

53. *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:686; *CB* 54:1193; *SS* 279:9472.

54. *LSSY* 20:392, quoting *Wang Wenzheng gong bilu.*

55. Ibid.

56. *SS* 287:9658. This is not the same Zhao Anren who crossed to Liao and became a eunuch (*LS* 109:1481).

57. *SS* 285:9614.

58. *Yuhu qinghua* 4:3b, quoted in *LSSYB* 5:119.

59. *SS* 279:9493.

60. *LS* 81:1287.

61. In the *Song shi* Ouyang Xuan was sympathetic to Song loyalists, but within a generally pro-Yuan approach. See Jay, *Change in dynasties,* 70-71.

62. See Zhou Jun, "Xu Xuan qiren yu Songchu 'erchen'," 126ff.

63. *XW* 54:611–612; *TJ* 291:9511–9513.

64. *CB* 57:1268; *QG* 7:67; *LS* 81:1284. On Chengtian, see Twitchett and Tietze, "Liao," 87–91.

65. *LS* 81:1284.

66. Wang's role in these negotiations is tangential here but is treated in numerous Chinese works, including Jiang Fucong, "Song Liao Shanyuan mengyue"; Wang Minxin, "Liao Song Shanyuan mengyue dijie"; and receives detailed analysis in Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* esp. 40–50.

67. *CB* 57:1268; *QG* 7:67.

68. *CB* 57:1268–1269; 58:1278, 1283, 1285–1286, 1291; *QG* 7:67; *SS* 7:125–126; 279:9472, 9520; *LS* 14:160; 81:1284. The Southern sources say that the regular envoys instituted by the treaty would bring gifts for Wang; *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18–687; *CB* 62:1391; *SS* 279:9472. The *LS* biography places these presents *before* negotiations began, locating the opening of peace talks in the context of regular present-giving. If this is not simply a mistake, then the Southern sources' claim that Wang's opening letter was the first indication that he was still alive may imply that the Song knew more than their records are admitting.

69. Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* 41.

70. *CB* 57:1268. Translated with reference to Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* 110.

71. This argument reappears among Ming literati justifying service to the Manchus before 1644 and Republican collaborators with the Japanese such as Wang Jingwei, both cases where there remained the option of continuing to serve the defending regime; see, for example, Wakeman, *Great enterprise* and Poshek Fu, *Passivity, resistance, and collaboration.* By this time, of course, the morality of loyalty had been codified as the core neo-Confucian value and was routinely inculcated through the examination curriculum and campaigns directed at the mass of the populace. Wang Jizhong lacked such clear guidance for his actions. A similar viewpoint is implied by He Tianming, "Shanyuan yihe yu Wang Jizhong."

72. See, for example, Poshek Fu's discussion of guilt among collaborators in Japanese-occupied Shanghai: *Passivity, resistance, and collaboration,* 126–133 and references. The seventeenth-century poet Wu Weiye (1609–1672) also regretted not dying for the last Ming emperor; Wakeman, "Romantics, stoics, and martyrs," 639. Examples could be multiplied.

73. *LS* 81:1284. The opening phrase could also mean "You can argue (the case for peace) privately, and if they consent . . . ," but this retains the implication that Wang will tell the Song when the time is right to send envoys.

74. Jiang Fucong, "Song Zhenzong yu Shanyuan zhi meng," argues that Wang Jizhong's capture was planned to plant a Song spy at the Liao court. His view is countered by Wang Minxin, "Shanyuan de meng zhi jiantao."

75. Schwarz-Schilling argues that this was probably mostly a face-saving tactic on Zhao Heng's part, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan,* 42.

76. *DDSL* 42:647; *LPJ* 18:687; *CB* 62:1391; *SS* 279:9472.

77. *CB* 62:1391.

78. On this brief Korean campaign, see Twitchett and Tietze, "Liao," 111–112.

79. *LS* 88:1340.

80. For the last of these characteristics, see the *topos* of advice given, rejected, and vindicated in relation to Wang's opinion on the suitability of Xiao Hezhuo for leadership of the Korean campaign. *LS* 81:1285, 1286, 1287; 88:1340.

Conclusion: Locating Borders

1. The idea of a continuum is proposed by Jay, *Change in dynasties.*

2. For example, Langlois, "Chinese culturalism and the Yüan analogy"; Bol, "Seeking common ground"; Chen-main Wang, *Hung Ch'eng ch'ou.*

3. On the loyalist biographies, see Davis's comments in Ouyang, *Historical records.* Davis deliberately chooses not to translate the "Appendices on Barbarians."

4. James T. C. Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu,* 111–112.

5. Wang Jizhong also justifies himself, in *CB* 57:1268.

6. Jay, *Change in dynasties,* 71.

7. For a concise discussion of the current state of the debate over the extent of censorship in the Yuan, see Jay, "Memoirs and official accounts," 598–604, reprising *Change in dynasties,* 71–79.

8. On multivocality in Chinese histories, see Hardy, "Can an ancient Chinese history contribute to modern Western theory?"; Moloughney, "Derivation, intertexuality and authority."

9. Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao,* demonstrated the immense value of the straightforwardly historical information contained in the *Liao shi* in 1946, but their work predated the advent of critical theory.

10. Standen, "From region of frontiers."

11. Twitchett and Tietze, "Liao," 77ff.

Glossary

Abaoji (Liao Taizu, 907–926) 阿保機
acting grand mentor *(shou taifu)* 守太傅
adjutant *(canjun)* 參軍
administrative assistant *(panguan)* 判官
administrative supervisor *(lushi canjun)* 錄事參軍
administrator of the Expeditionary Imperial Quarters *(xingying dubushu)* 行營都部署
Alusaogu 阿魯掃姑
An Chongrong 安重榮
An, concubine dowager 安皇太妃
An Congjin 安從進
An Lushan 安祿山
An Shenqi 安審琦
An Shuqian 安叔千
Anci 安次
Anguo 安國
Anping 安平
Anyuan 安遠
Appendices on Barbarians 四夷附錄
assistant general *(pijiang)* 裨將
Bai Sheng 白昇
Baicheng 白城
bei lai Hanlin xueshi chengzhi 北來翰林學士承旨
beiren 北人
Beizhou 貝州
Bi Gan 比干
Bianzhou (Daliang, Kaifeng) 汴州
Bo Yi 伯夷
Board of Astronomy *(sitian)* 司天
Bohai 渤海
Bozhou 博州
bu 部
Cai Xingyu 蔡行遇
Cangzhou 滄州
Cao Cao 曹操
Cartographic Publishing House (Ditu chubanshe) 地圖出版社
Cen Shen 岑參
Central Capital (Zhongjing) 中京
Chang Xian 常顯
Chang'an 長安
Changcheng kou 長城口
Changshan 常山
Channu 禪奴
Chen Chuyao 陳處堯
Chen Da 陳達
Chen dao 臣道
Chen Daren 陳大任
Chen Jiru 陳繼儒
Chen Kongzhang 陳孔璋
Chen Liang 陳亮
Chengde 成德
Chengtian empress dowager 承天
chief commander of the Imperial Guard *(shiwei qinjun du zhihuishi)* 侍衛親軍都指揮使

chief minister (informal) *(zaixiang)* 宰相
chong 重
Chong, Lady 种氏
Chouning 籌寧
Chu (927–951) 楚
Cizhou$_1$ (Hebei) 磁州
Cizhou$_2$ (Hedong) 慈州
commander in chief *(yuyue)* 于越
commissioner of the Court of Palace Attendants *(xuanhuishi)* 宣徽使
Court of Ushers *(zhihou yuan)* 祗候院
Daibei 代北
Daixianguan 待賢館
Daizhou 代州
Daliang (Bianzhou) 大梁
dao 道
Datong (Yunzhou$_1$) 大同
defense commissioner *(fangyushi)* 防禦使
Deguang (Liao Taizong, 926–947) 德光
Dengzhou 鄧州
Dezhou 德州
Dilie 敵烈
Ding Hui 丁會
Ding Shenqi 丁審琦
Dingnan 定難
Dingnian ji 丁年集
Dingzhou 定州
Dizhou 棣州
dong 動
Dong gong xingzhuang 董公行狀
Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒
Dongjing 東京
dongxi ban (function unknown) 東西班
Du Chongwei (Du Wei) 杜重威
Du Fu 杜甫
Du Hongsui 杜弘璲
Du Wei (Du Chongwei) 杜威
Du Zhimin 杜知敏
Duan Xiushi 段秀實
Duanming palace 端明殿
Dugu Ji 獨孤及
Duoluo 多羅
duty attendant *(dianzhi/dianzhishi)* 殿直 / 殿直侍
er 貳
fan 番 or 蕃
Fan Yanguang 范延光
Fang Tai 方太
fanren 蕃人
Feng Dao 馮道
Feng, Empress 馮皇后
Feng Yu 馮玉
Fengguo temple 奉國寺
Fengmuzhen 馮母鎮
Fengxiang 鳳翔
Five Dynasties (Wudai, 907–960) 五代
Former Shu (907–925) 前蜀
Fu Tinghan 傅廷翰
Fu Yanqing 符彥卿
Fuyang 滎陽
Fuzhou 府州
Gao Mouhan 高謀翰
Gao Tangying (Gao Yanying) 高唐英
Gao Xingzhou 高行周
Gao Xun 高勳
Gao Yanying (Gao Tangying) 高彥英
Gaohe 高河
Gaolaozhen 高老鎮
Gaoliang River 高梁河
Gaoping 高平
Gaoyangguan 高陽關

Geng Chongmei 耿崇美
Geng Shaozhong 耿紹忠
Geng Yanyi 耿延毅
gongchen 功臣
governor *(jiedushi)* 節度使
grand councilor of the Southern Administration *(nanfu zaixiang)* 南府宰相
grand guardian of the heir apparent *(taizi taibao)* 太子太保
grand mentor *(taifu)* 太傅
Great Yan (Da Yan) 大燕
Gu'an 固安
Guan Zhong 管仲
Guide 歸德
Guisheng army 歸聖軍
Guizhou 嶲州
Gujin shi hua 古今詩話
guo 國
Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜
Guo Chongwei 郭崇威
Guo Lin 郭璘
Guo Rong (Song general) 郭榮
Guo Rong (Zhou Shizong, 954–959) 郭榮
Guo Shourong 郭守榮
Guo Wei (Zhou Taizu, 951–954) 郭威
Guo Ziyi 郭子儀
Guo Zongxun (Zhou Gongdi, 959) 郭宗訓
Guodian 郭店
Han 漢
Han Derang 韓德讓
Han Dewei 韓德威
Han Gaozu (Liu Zhiyuan) 漢高祖
Han Mengyin 韓夢殷
Han Yanhui 韓延徽
Han Yindi (Liu Chengyou) 漢隱帝
Han Yu 韓愈
Han Zhigu 韓知古
han-hu 漢胡
Hanlin academician (Hanlin *xueshi*) 翰林學士
hanren 漢人
He Jiyun 何繼筠
He Lingtu 賀令圖
He Ning 和凝
Hebei 河北
Hedong 河東
Heilukou 黑盧口
Hejian 河間
Henan 河南
Henghai 橫海
Hengshan 恆山
Hengzhou (Zhenzhou) 恆州
Hezhong 河中
Hezhu 曷主
Hou Yi 侯益
Hu Qiong 胡瓊
Hu Sanxing 胡三省
Hua Zhaoyin 華昭胤
Huage 化哥
Huang Chao 黃巢
Huang River 潢河
Huangfu Yu 皇甫遇
Huanzhou 寰州
huaren 華人
huitushi (unknown title) 回圖使
Huan, Duke 桓公
inspector-in-chief of the Palace Armies *(dianqian duyuhou)* 殿前都虞候
interlocutor *(tongshi)* 通事
Ji Zha 季札
Jia Changchao 賈昌朝
Jia Zhi 賈至
Jibizhai 雞壁砦
Jieli (Xiao Han's colleague) 解里
Jieli 解利

Jin (1115–1234) 金
Jin'anzhai 晉安寨
Jin Chudi (Shi Chonggui) 晉出帝
Jin Gaozu (Shi Jingtang) 晉高祖
Jing Yanguang 景延廣
Jingnan (Nanping, 924–963) 荊南
Jinpingluo 金瓶濼
jinshi 進士
Jinyang (Taiyuan) 晉陽
Jiu guo zhi 九國志
Jiu, Prince 公子糾
$Jizhou_1$ (Sixteen Prefectures) 薊州
$Jizhou_2$ 冀州
Jizi 箕子
junior guardian of the heir apparent *(taizi shaobao)* 太子少保
junshi 軍士
junzi 君子
Jurchen 女真
Kaifeng (Bianzhou) 開封
Kaiping (907–911) 開平
Kang Moji 康默記
Kang Yanxiao 康延孝
Kang Zhaoyi 康昭裔
Kangcun 康村
Kitan 契丹
Koryo 高麗
Kululi 窟魯里
Langshan 狼山
Later Han (947–950) 後漢
Later Jin (936–947) 後晉
Later Liang (907–923) 後梁
Later Shu (934–965) 後蜀
Later Tang (923–936) 後唐
Later Zhou (951–960) 後周
Leshou 樂壽
li (mile) 里
li (ritual, courtesy) 禮
Li Bo 李白
Li Conghou (Tang Mindi, 933–934) 李從厚
Li Congke (Tang Modi, 934–936) 李從珂
Li Congrong 李從榮
Li Congyi 李從益
Li Cunxu (Tang Zhuangzong, 923–926) 李存勗
Li, empress dowager 李皇太后
Li Guangmei 李光美
Li Han 李瀚
Li Hua 李華
Li Huan 李澣
Li Hui 李回
Li Jida 李繼達
Li Jiji 李繼岌
Li Jipeng 李繼捧
Li Jiqian 李繼遷
Li Jitao 李繼韜
Li Keyong (Jinwang) 李克用
Li Kuangchou 李匡籌
Li Ling 李陵
Li Maoxun 李茂勳
Li Quanzhong 李全忠
"Li sao" 離騷
Li Shaobin 李紹斌
Li Shaochen 李紹琛
Li Shouzhen 李守貞
Li Shu 李恕
Li Siben 李嗣本
Li Sibi 李嗣弼
Li Siyuan (Tang Mingzong, 926–933) 李嗣源
Li Song 李崧
Li Tao 李濤
Li Xu 李緒
Li Yantao 李彥韜
Li Yin 李殷
Li Yiyin 李彝殷
Li Yu 李愚

Liang (549–554) 梁
Liang Hui 梁暉
Liang Modi (Zhu Youzhen) 梁末帝
Liang Taizu (Zhu Wen, Zhu Quanzhong) 梁太祖
Liangxiang 良鄉
Liao (907–1125) 遼
Liao Jingzong (Yelü Xian) 遼景宗
Liao Muzong (Yelü Jing) 遼穆宗
Liao Shengzong (Yelü Longxu) 遼聖宗
Liao Shizong (Wuyu) 遼世宗
Liao Taizong (Deguang) 遼太宗
Liao Taizu (Abaoji) 遼太祖
Linzhou 麟州
Liu Bang (Han Gaodi, 202–195 BCE) 劉邦
Liu Chengyou (Han Yindi, 948–951) 劉承祐
Liu Chong (Bei Han Shizu, 951–954) 劉崇
Liu Chuo 劉綽
Liu Hanzhang 劉漢章
Liu Jiwen 劉繼文
Liu Jiye 劉繼業
Liu Jiyuan (Bei Han Yingwudi, 968–979) 劉繼元
Liu Jun (Bei Han Ruizong, 954–968) 劉鈞
Liu Kang 劉邟
Liu Ping 劉平
Liu Rengong 劉仁恭
Liu Shouguang 劉守光
Liu Shouqi 劉守奇
Liu Shouwen 劉守文
Liu Xiu (Han Guangwudi, 25–57 CE) 劉秀（漢光武帝）
Liu Xu 劉昫
Liu Xun 劉訓
Liu Yanhan 劉延翰
Liu Yanlang 劉延朗
Liu Yin 劉殷
Liu Yuan 劉邟
Liu Zhiyuan (Han Gaozu, 947–948) 劉知遠
Liu Zuo 劉祚
Lu Guoyong 盧國用
Lu Jun 盧俊
Lü Qi 呂琦
Lu Wenjin 盧文進
Lu Yi 盧奕
Lu Zhi 盧質
Luancheng 欒城
Lulong (Youzhou) 盧龍
Luojing 洛京
Luoyang 洛陽
Luzhou 潞州
Ma Yinqing 馬胤卿
Mada 麻荅
Majiadu 馬家渡
Mancheng 滿城
Meng Hanqiong 孟漢瓊
Meng qiu 蒙求
Mengchen 夢臣
Middle Kingdom 中國
military affairs commissioner *(shumishi)* 樞密使
military affairs commissioner (*xiting shumishi*–variant) 西廳樞密使
Min (909–945) 閩
Ming (1368–1644) 明
minister of education *(situ)* 司徒
Mozhou 莫州
Murong Yanchao 慕容彥超
Nangong 南宮
Nanjing (Southern Capital/Circuit) 南京
Nanping (Jingnan, 924–963) 南平

Neiqiu 內丘
Niaoguzhi 褭古只
Nie, Lady 聶氏
ning 寧
Northern Administration (beimian) 北面
Northern Court 北朝
Northern Han (951–979) 北漢
(Northern) Han Ruizong (Liu Jun) 漢睿宗
(Northern) Han Shizu (Liu Chong) 漢世祖
(Northern) Han Yingwudi (Liu Jiyuan) 漢英武帝
Northern Qi 北齊 (550–577)
Northern Song (960–1126) 北宋
Northern Zhou (577–581) 北周
Pan Mei 潘美
Pan Yunian 潘聿撚
Pei Xin 裴信
pianwen 駢文
Pinglu 平盧
Pingzhou 平州
planner *(mouzhu)* 謀主
provisional governor *(jiedu) liuhou* 節度留後
provisional grand guardian *(shou taibao)* 守太保
Pununing 蒲奴寧
Puzhou 蒲州
Qi (Springs and Autumns state) 齊
Qi Taigong 齊太公
Qi Xingben 齊行本
Qianlong (1736–1796) 乾隆
Qiao Rong 喬榮
Qicheng 戚城
Qin (221–206 BCE) 秦
Qin Shihuang (221–210 BCE) 秦始皇
Qing (1644–1911) 清
qing dafu 卿大夫
Qingzhou 青州
Qizhou$_1$ 岐州
Qizhou$_2$ 齊州
Qizhou$_3$ 祁州
Qu Yuan 屈原
recipient of edicts *(chengzhi)* 承旨
reminder *(shiyi)* 拾遺
ren 仁
Ren Huan 任圜
ru 入
Ruzhou (Sixteen Prefectures) 儒州
Sai Xiangyu 塞項羽
Sang Weihan 桑維翰
Sang Zan 桑贊
Sanhe 三河
Secretariat (*zhongshu*) 中書
Sha Yanxun 沙彥珣
Shang (c. 1600–c. 1050) 商
Shangjing (Supreme Capital) 上京
Shanyuan 澶淵
Shanzhou 澶州
Shao Ke 邵珂
Shatuo 沙陀
Shen Bin 沈斌
Shen Shijun (Shen Yun) 沈使君
Shen Yun (Shen Shijun) 沈贇
Shenzhou 深州
shi 士
Shi Chonggui (Jin Chudi, 942–947) 石重貴
Shi Chongrui 石重睿
Shi Hongzhao 史弘肇
Shi Jingtang (Jin Gaozu, 936–942) 石敬瑭
Shi Siming 史思明
Shi Yanbao 石延寶
Shi Yanxu 石延煦
Shiwei 室韋
Shu 蜀

Shu Qi 叔齊
Shuangguli 雙骨里
Shucheng 束城
Shulu 束鹿
Shulü empress 述律后
Shunzhou 順州
Shuozhou 朔州
Sixteen Prefectures (Yan-Yun) 燕雲
Song 宋 (960–1276)
Song Shun 宋順
Song Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi) 宋太宗
Song Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin) 宋太祖
Song Yanyun 宋彥筠
Song Yao 宋瑤
Song Zhenzong (Zhao Heng) 宋真宗
Southern Administration *(nanmian)* 南面
Southern Circuit (Nanjing) 南京
Southern Han (917–971) 南漢
Southern Qi (479–502) 南齊
Southern Song (1127–1276) 南宋
Southern Tang (937–975) 南唐
Springs and Autumns (Chunqiu, 722–453 BCE) 春秋
Su Wu 蘇武
Su Yijian 蘇易簡
subject *(chen)* 臣
sui 隨
Sui (581–618) 隋
Suicheng 遂城
Sun Fangjian 孫方簡
Sun He 孫鶴
Supreme Capital (Shangjing) 上京
surveillance commissioner *(guanchashi)* 觀察使
surveillance and revenue commissioner *(guancha duzhishi)* 觀察度支使
Taiyuan (Jinyang) 太原
Taizhou 泰州
Tang (618–907) 唐
Tang Mindi (Li Conghou) 唐閔帝
Tang Mingzong (Li Siyuan) 唐明宗
Tang Modi (Li Congke) 唐末帝
Tang Wuzong 唐武宗 (r. 840–846)
Tang yu lu 唐余錄
Tang Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu) 唐莊宗
Tangut 党項
Tangyang 堂陽
Tanzhou 檀州
taoben 逃奔
Taoshan 桃山
tax commissioner *(hubushi)* 戶部使
Ten Kingdoms 十國
Three Kingdoms (220–280) 三國
Tian Chongba 田重霸
Tian Fengji 田逢吉
Tiande 天德
tianming 天命
Tianping 天平
tianxia 天下
Tianxiong 天雄
Tiaoxian 蓨縣
Tongguang (923–926) 同光
Tongli 通利
Tuanboyu 團柏谷
Tuque 突厥
Tuyuhun 吐谷渾
Uighur 回鶻
Veritable Records *(shilu)* 實錄
vice-administrator of the Imperial Quarters *(fubushu)* 副部署
vicegerent *(liushou)* 留守
Wang Bai 王白

Wang Chao 王超
Wang Chucun 王處存
Wang Chuzhi 王處直
Wang Du 王都
Wang Fuzhi 王夫之
Wang Hui 王暉
Wang Jian (Shu) 王建
Wang Jian (Taiyuan) 王緘
Wang Jien 王繼恩
Wang Jingchong 王景崇
Wang Jingwei 汪精衛
Wang Jizhong 王繼忠
Wang Mang (9–25 CE) 王莽
Wang, Pure Consort 王淑妃
Wang Song 王松
Wang Wei (Tang poet) 王維
Wang Wei (Yiwu) 王威
Wang Wenzheng gong bilu 王文正公筆錄
Wang Yu 王郁
Wang Zhou 王周
Wangdu (xian) 望都縣
Waqiaoguan 瓦橋關
Warring States (453–221 BCE) 戰國
Wazhicheng 洼只城
Wei Desheng 衛德升
Wei Lin 魏璘
Wei, prince of 魏王
Wei River 渭水
WeiBo 魏博
Weifu 魏府
weisi chen 未死臣
Weizhou (Yedu) 魏州
wen 文
Wenan 文安
Wu (902–937) 吳
Wu (Springs and Autumns state) 吳
Wu Bai 武白
Wu Luan 吳巒
Wu Zetian (690–705) 武則天
Wudai tongjian 五代通鑑
Wuqing 武清
Wutai shan 五臺山
Wuyu (Liao Shizong, 947–951) 兀欲
Wuyue (907–978) 吳越
Wuzhou 武州
Xi 奚
Xi Xia 西夏
Xialie 匣列
xian yu 陷于
Xiang Yu 項羽
Xiangzhou 相州
Xianping 咸平 (998–1004)
Xiao Haizhen 蕭海貞
Xiao Han 蕭翰
Xiao Ji 孝己
Xiao Meigude 蕭眉古得
Xiao Paiya 蕭排押
Xiao Talin 蕭撻凜
Xiazhou 夏州
xin 信
Xin Zhongfu 辛仲甫
Xingguo 杏堝
Xingping princess 興平公主
Xingzhou 邢州
Xinkou 忻口
Xinzhou_1 新州
Xinzhou_2 忻州
Xiongzhou 雄州
Xishan 西山
Xizhou 隰州
Xu Hanlin zhi 續翰林志
Xu Taifu 徐台符
Xu Xuan 徐鉉
Xuanli army 宣力軍
Xuanzheng palace 宣政殿
Xuzhou 許州
Yan 燕

Yan Jianyuan 顏見遠
Yan Xie 顏協
Yan-Yun (Sixteen Prefectures) 燕雲
Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿
Yang Chengxin 楊承信
Yang Chengxun 楊承勳
Yang Chengzuo 楊承祚
Yang Chongjin 楊重進
Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠
Yang Jiye (Yang Ye) 楊繼業
Yang Xiong 楊雄
Yang Yanxun 楊彥詢
Yang Ye (Yang Jiye) 楊業
Yangtuancheng 楊團城
Yanjing 燕京
Yanmenguan 鴈門關
Yanzhou$_1$ 延州
Yanzhou$_2$ (Henan) 兗州
Yao Dongzhi 姚東之
Yao Hanying 姚漢英
Yao Kun 姚坤
Yedu (Weizhou) 鄴都
Yellow River (Huang he) 黃河
Yelu 耶魯
Yelü Bei (Li Zanhua) 耶律倍（李贊華）
Yelü Jing (Liao Muzong, 951–969) 耶律璟
Yelü Konga 耶律孔阿
Yelü Longxu (Liao Shengzong, 982–1031) 耶律隆緒
Yelü Nugua 耶律奴瓜
Yelü Pode 耶律頗德
Yelü Sha 耶律沙
Yelü Shanbu 耶律善補
Yelü Su 耶律蘇
Yelü Xian (Liao Jingzong, 969–982) 耶律賢
Yelü Xiezhen 耶律斜軫
Yelü Xiuge 耶律休哥
Yi Yin 伊尹
Yichang 義昌
Yideli 意德里
Yin Jufan 尹居璠
Yingli 應曆 (951–969)
Yingtian empress dowager 應天太后
Yingzhou$_1$ (Sixteen Prefectures) 瀛州
Yingzhou$_2$ (Sixteen Prefectures) 應州
Yingzhou$_3$ 營州
Yinshan 陰山
Yinzhou 銀州
Yiwu 義武
Yiwulüshan 醫巫閭山
Yixian 義縣
Yizhou 易州
Yizhou$_2$ 宜州
Youzhou (Lulong) 幽州
Yu 禹
Yu Shun 虞舜
Yu xiong Tao shu 與兄濤書
Yuan (1260–1368) 元
Yuan Jie 元結
Yuan Shao 袁紹
Yuancheng 元城
Yulin(dian) 榆林店
Yunzhou$_1$ (Datong, Sixteen Prefectures) 雲州
Yunzhou$_2$ (Shandong) 鄆州
Yuzhou 蔚州
Zezhou 澤州
Zhai Guangye 翟光鄴
Zhang Chong 張崇
Zhang Chujin 張處瑾
Zhang Hui 張暉
Zhang Jingda 張敬達
Zhang Li 張礪

Zhang Qixian 張齊賢
Zhang Wenli (Wang Deming) 張文禮 (王德明)
Zhang Xichong 張希崇
Zhang Xun 張巡
Zhang Yanchao 張彥超
Zhang Yanze 張彥澤
Zhang Zuo 張祚
Zhangguo 彰國
Zhanguo 戰國
Zhao 趙
Zhao Anren 趙安仁
Zhao Ba 趙霸
Zhao Beiping 趙北平
Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞
Zhao Feng 趙鳳
Zhao Heng (Song Zhenzong, 997–1022) 趙恆
Zhao Kuangyi (Song Taizong, 976–997) 趙匡乂
Zhao Kuangyin (Song Taizu, 960–976) 趙匡胤
Zhao Kuangzan 趙匡贊
Zhao, Lady 趙氏
Zhao Siwan 趙思綰
Zhao Siwen 趙思溫
Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽
Zhao Ying 趙瑩
Zhao Yuan 趙遠
Zhao Zan 趙贊
Zhaoyi 昭義
Zhe Congyuan 折從遠
zhen 鎮
Zhenming (915–921) 貞明
Zhenwu 振武
Zhenzhou (Zhao, Hengzhou) 鎮州
zhong 忠
zhongchen 忠臣
Zhongduqiao 中渡橋
Zhongjing (Central Capital) 中京
Zhongshan 中山
zhongyi 忠義
Zhou (c. 1050–249 BCE) 周
Zhou Dewei 周德威
Zhou Gongdi (Guo Zongxun) 周恭帝
Zhou Jing 周靖
Zhou Ru 周儒
Zhou Shizong (Guo Rong) 周世宗
Zhou Taizu (Guo Wei) 周太祖
Zhou Ying 周瑩
Zhou shu 周書
Zhu Quanzhong (Zhu Wen, Liang Taizu, 907–913) 朱全忠
Zhu Wen (Zhu Quanzhong, Liang Taizu, 907–913) 朱溫
zhuhou 諸侯
Zhuozhou 涿州
zi 字
Zi Xu 子胥

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